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
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
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



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Pakistan a country study

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
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Pakistan a country study

Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Edited by
Richard F. Nyrop
Research completed
October 1983

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in Karachi

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Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books prepared by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program. The last page of this book provides a listing of other published studies. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future new editions.

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Special thanks are owed to Farah Ahannavard, who designed the book cover and the illustrations on the title page of each chapter. The inclusion of photographs in this study was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and public and private organizations. The authors acknowledge their indebtedness especially to those who provided work not yet published.

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Preface

In late 1983 Mohammad Zia ul Haq retained the positions of president of the republic, chief martial law administrator, and chief of the army staff. He remained the leader and spokesman of the military junta that had seized power in a coup d'état in July 1977. Although in August 1983 Zia promised that elections would be held in 1985 for the federal and provincial legislatures, his announced intent to exclude political parties from the electoral process and to amend the 1973 Constitution to assign predominant power to the president at the expense of the central parliament and the provincial governments provoked protests and civil disobedience demonstrations nationwide.

Pakistan. A Country Study replaced the *Area Handbook for Pakistan*, published in 1975. Like its predecessor, the present book is an attempt to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects of contemporary Pakistan. Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official reports and documents of governments and international organizations; foreign and domestic newspapers and periodicals, and interviews with individuals with special competence in South Asian affairs. Relatively up-to-date economic data were available from several sources, but the sources were not always in agreement. Most demographic data should be viewed as well-informed estimates.

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those who are unfamiliar with the metric system (see table 1, Appendix). The information available on ancient and modern Pakistan is detailed and voluminous. Limitations of space and time, however, precluded the presentation of anything more than a short survey. For the convenience of the reader, a brief chronology of the major eras and events of South Asian and Pakistani history is included (see table A).

The transliteration of various words and phrases posed a problem. For many words of Arabic origin—such as Muslim, Quran, hadith, and *zakat*—the authors followed a modified version of the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN system; the modification entails the omission of diacritical markings and hyphens. In numerous instances, however, the authors adhered to the spelling used by the government and people of Pakistan. For example, the reader will find Ramazan rather than Ramadan, syed rather than sayyid, sheikh rather than shaykh, *hadood* rather than *haddud*, and qazi rather than qadi. The reader should also note that the Khan that appears with numerous names—such as Asghar

Khan, Ayub Khan, Ghaffar Khan, Yahya Khan—is an honorific and is almost never a surname.



Table A. Chronology of Important Events

Period	Description
Ancient Empires	
ca. 3000-1500 B.C.	Harappan culture in the Indus Valley and elsewhere
ca. 1500-500 B.C.	Migrations of Aryan-speaking tribes, the Vedic Age
ca. 550-496 B.C.	Life of Gautama Buddha, founding of Buddhism
ca. 320-180 B.C.	Mauryan Empire, Asoka most famous emperor, spread of Buddhism
ca. 180 B.C.-A.D. 150	Saka dynasties in Indus Valley and northwest
ca. A.D. 78-A.D. 200	Kushan Empire, Gandharan art flourishes
fourth-seventh centuries A.D.	Gupta Empire, Classical Age in northern India
Coming of Islam	
711	Arab Muslims in Sind
994-1030	Mahmud of Ghazni raids into the subcontinent from Afghanistan
1192	Muhammad of Ghor defeats Rajputs
1206	Establishment of Delhi Sultanate
1396	Destruction of Delhi by Timur
Mughal Period	
1526	Babur victorious in first Battle of Panipat
1530-56	Wars of succession
1556	Akbar victorious in second Battle of Panipat
1556-1605	Reign of Akbar the Great
1605-27	Reign of Jahangir, in 1612 East India Company opens first trading center
1626-58	Reign of Shah Jahan
1658-1707	Reign of Aurangzeb
1761	Third Battle of Panipat, an Afghan victory over a Maratha army
1707-1858	Decline of the Mughal Empire
British India	
1757	Battle of Plassey—British victory over Mughal forces in Bengal, conventional date for beginning of British rule in India
1784	William Pitt's India Act
1799-1839	Sikh kingdom in the Punjab under Maharaja Ranjit Singh
1830s	Institution of British education and other reform measures
1838-42	First Afghan War
1843	British annex Sind, Hyderabad, and Khairpur
1845-49	Sikh Wars, British annex the Punjab and sell Kashmir, Gilgit, and Ladakh "Package," known as Kashmir
1857-58	Uprising, variously known as the Great Mutiny, the Sepoy Rebellion, and the first war of independence
1858	British Raj begins
1878-80	Second Afghan War
1885	Indian National Congress formed
1893	Durand Line established as boundary between Afghanistan and British India

Table A —Continued

Period	Description
1905	Partition of Bengal
1906	All India Muslim League founded
1911	Partition of Bengal annulled
1919	Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, Third Afghan War
1935	Government of India Act of 1935
March 23, 1940	Muslim League adopts Pakistan Resolution
Pakistan	
August 14, 1947	Partition and independence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah becomes governor general, Liaquat Ali Khan becomes prime minister
September 11, 1948	Jinnah dies, Khwaja Nazimuddin becomes governor general
October 1951	Liaquat Ali Khan assassinated, Ghulam Mohammad becomes governor general
August 1955	Ghulam Mohammad dies, succeeded by Iskander Mirza
October 1955	One Unit established, incorporating the four provinces of West Pakistan
March 23, 1956	Constitution adopted, Mirza becomes president
October 7, 1958	President Mirza abrogates constitution, declares martial law
October 27, 1958	Mirza sent into exile, General Mohammad Ayub Khan begins rule
September 1965	War with India
March 25, 1969	Ayub resigns as result of public pressure, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan assumes power
July 1, 1970	One Unit abolished, four provinces reestablished in West Pakistan
December 1970	First general elections, Awami League secures majority
March 25, 1971	East Pakistan attempts to secede, civil war begins
December 1971	Indo-Pakistani War, East Pakistan becomes the independent state of Bangladesh, Yahya resigns, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto takes charge
July 2, 1972	Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi conclude Simla Agreement
August 14, 1973	New Constitution goes into effect with Bhutto as prime minister
February 22-25, 1974	Islamic Summit Conference held in Lahore
March 1977	General elections, massive victory by Bhutto's party evokes widespread rioting and protest
July 5, 1977	Martial law proclaimed
September 1978	Mohammad Zia ul Haq becomes president
April 4, 1979	Bhutto hanged
March 4, 1981	Provisional Constitutional Order, which in effect suspended 1973 Constitution
August 12, 1983	President Zia announces that martial law will be lifted in 1985, but warns that army will retain key role in future governments

Country Profile



Formal Name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Short Form: Pakistan.

Term for Citizens: Pakistani(s).

Capital: Islamabad (Islamabad Capital Territory).

Flag: White vertical band on staff side, green field with white crescent and star in center.

Geography

Size: Approximately 891,176 square kilometers, which includes Baluchistan and Gilgit agencies and Azad (Free) Kashmir. About 84,130 square kilometers of the national territory includes Pakistan-held Jammu and Kashmir (see fig. 1).

Topography: Three major geographic areas: northern highlands, Indus River Plain, and Baluchistan Plateau.

Climate: Generally arid, hot summers, cool or cold winters, wide variations of temperature in given locale and between coastal area on Arabian Sea and glacier area of northern areas.

Society

Population: In mid-1983 estimated at 88.5 million, but some estimates ranged up to 94.8 million. Annual rate of growth about 2.8 to 3 percent.

Ethnic Groups: In general, same as the linguistic groups: Punjabi, Sindhi, Pakhtun, and Baluchi/Brahui, plus the *muhajirs*, immigrants from India, many of whom native speakers of Urdu.

Languages: Urdu official language, but English remains in general use in government, military, business, and higher education. Urdu spoken as native tongue by perhaps 10 percent of population, Punjabi by over 60 percent, Sindhi by about 12 percent, Pakhtu by about 11 percent, and Baluchi and Brahui by about 4 percent.

Religion: At least 98 percent Muslim, of which about 70 percent Sunni, remainder Shites, many of whom Ismailis.

Education and Literacy: Education organized into five levels: primary, grades one through five, middle, grades six through eight, high school, nine and 10, intermediate, 11 and 12, and higher degree programs, 13, 14, and above. Attendance rates remained low, drop-out rates high in early 1980s. 1981 census reported less than 25 percent of those over 10 years of age literate.

Health and Welfare: Substandard housing, inadequate sanitation and water supply, and widespread malnutrition contribute to spread of disease and to high infant, childhood, and maternal mortality.

Economy

Gross National Product (GNP): US\$28.7 billion in FY 1983, or US\$328 per capita.

Agriculture: 31 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); employed 55 percent of labor force. Main crops: wheat, rice, cotton, and sugarcane. Yields low, mainly dependent on irrigation.

Energy: Firewood and dung major energy sources. Small crude oil production, over 90 percent of petroleum requirements imported. Natural gas and hydroelectric power major domestic commercial energy sources. Substantial deposits of poor-quality coal. Energy remained constraint on industrialization in early 1980s.

Industry: About 20 percent of GDP. Textiles largest manufacturing industry, other major industries: food processing, tobacco, metal products, chemicals, and engineering.

Exports: US\$2.5 billion in FY 1982. Main products: cotton and manufactured textiles, rice, surplus refined petroleum products, surgical instruments, and leather.

Imports: US\$5.5 billion in FY 1982. Major imports: crude oil and refined products (30 percent), vegetable oil, machinery and transport equipment, and iron and steel products.

Major Trade Partners: United States, Britain, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Saudi Arabia, Japan, and China.

Exchange Rate: Averaged 12.7 rupees per United States dollar in FY 1983.

Fiscal Year: July through June (FY 1983 indicated July 1982 to July 1983).

Transport and Communications

Railroads: 8,823 kilometers of track, 963 locomotives, 36,213 freight cars in March 1983. Track mostly broad gauge (1.7 meters). 1,022 kilometers double tracked. Railroads government owned.

Roads: 97,500 kilometers, of which 23,500 kilometers paved, 23,000 kilometers gravel, remainder dirt, mostly unimproved tracks.

Ports: Karachi main port. Handled 15 million tons in FY 1982. Three other ports of minor significance. Expansion under way in Karachi to reduce port congestion.

Pipelines: 230-kilometer crude oil line and 1,600-kilometer line for natural gas. In 1983 multipurpose pipeline under construction between Multan and Karachi.

Airfields: 111 total, of which 92 usable and 69 with paved runways.

Telecommunications: Good international links via microwave and satellite. Over 140 international telex circuits. Domestic radio communications poor. Telephone service inadequate—414,000 telephones in March 1983.

Government and Politics

Government: In late 1983 General Mohammad Zia ul Haq remained president, chief martial law administrator, chief of the army staff, and

leader of military junta that had ruled since seizing power in July 1977. Provisional Constitutional Order promulgated in March 1981 empowers president to amend 1973 Constitution, which is de facto null and void, and places acts of military junta and decisions of military courts beyond review of Supreme Court and provincial high courts. Four provinces—Baluchistan, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Sind—governed by provincial martial law administrators, army lieutenant generals, and members of junta. Many retired and active-duty military officers, mostly from army, fill key administrative positions, but senior civil service personnel remain as important in government affairs at all levels as they were in British India.

Politics: Political parties technically illegal, several grouped together in Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), but most leaders either in exile, prison, or detention in their homes or villages. In 1983 Zia indicated that political parties would be banned from participation in proposed 1985 legislative elections.

National Security

Armed Forces: Total strength in 1983 about 478,600: Army, 450,000, navy, 11,000, and air force, 17,600. All service in armed forces voluntary. Most army recruits selected from Punjab and NWFP; navy and air force personnel more representative of country as whole. In addition to regular forces, about 65,000 in units of Frontier Corps, about 15,000 in Pakistan Rangers, both auxiliary forces.

Military Units: Army General Headquarters commands seven numbered corps plus Northern Area Command. Sixteen infantry and two armored divisions comprise principal units of seven corps, but there are also several infantry and armored brigade groups and artillery brigades. Main naval base at Karachi is fleet operational headquarters, most naval air support provided by air force. Air force deploys about 18 operational squadrons in three territorial commands.

Equipment: Most of tank inventory Chinese T-59s; also some American and Soviet tanks. Artillery mélange of American, British, Chinese, and Soviet weapons. Army has over 500 armored personnel carriers, primarily American M-113s. Navy has one light cruiser, nine destroyers, and six submarines, in addition to various patrol craft, mine warfare vessels, support ships, and midget submarines. Acquisition of new French, American, and Chinese aircraft—Mirage 5s, F-16s, and A-5s, respectively—planned to provide air combat capability for 1980s and early 1990s.

Police: No national police force as such, but Police Service of Pakistan, small, elite agency, provides senior police personnel for all provincial forces, in which bulk of country's police employed. Special Police Establishment small investigative agency at national level; Frontier Constabulary also controlled by central government.




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions and Selected Cities, 1963

Introduction

SINCE ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE in 1947, the people of contemporary Pakistan have undergone several traumatic sociopolitical experiences. The partitioning of British India into India and Pakistan in August 1947 was preceded and accompanied by communal riots of unprecedented violence and scope. Within a few months an estimated quarter-million people were killed, and as many as 12 to 14 million Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh refugees fled past each other across the new international border drawn through the formerly unified Punjab. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan initiated an inconclusive war with India over the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, a war that was resumed, and as inconclusively halted, in 1965 (see *Problems at Independence*, ch. 1). And in September 1948, a scant 13 months after independence, Mohammad Ali Jinnah—known reverentially as the Qaid-e-Azam (Great Leader)—died. Jinnah's role in the creation of Pakistan had been so dominant that observers noted that he had neither peers nor associates, only lieutenants and aides.

In the early and mid-1950s the increasingly inept performance by the nation's politicians—many of whom had been late converts to the Pakistan movement—was overshadowed by an abortive military coup in early 1951, the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan later in the year, bitter religious riots in 1953, and the assassination of the chief minister of the then province of West Pakistan in 1956. In 1951 a former civil servant, Ghulam Mohammad, became the head of state, and from that time forward a coalition of civil servants and army officers, most of them Punjabis, governed the country (see *The Bureaucracy*, ch. 4). When in 1958 it appeared that the politicians might regain supremacy, President Iskander Mirza, a former army officer turned civil servant, declared martial law. A short time later the army commander in chief, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, sent Mirza into exile and assumed power (see *The Ayub Khan Era*, ch. 1).

Ten years later, however, nationwide rioting erupted against what the public perceived as corruption, political oppression, and economic chaos, and in March 1969 Ayub, field marshal of the army and president of the republic, relinquished power and the presidency to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army commander in chief. It fell to Yahya to preside over the two most traumatic and psychologically devastating events in the country's history: the humiliating defeat of Pakistan's armed forces by India and the secession of East Pakistan (see *Yahya Khan and Bangladesh*, ch. 1).

The *raison d'être* for the creation of Pakistan had been to provide a "homeland for South Asian Muslims." With the exception of Israel, Pakistan is the only nation of the twentieth century whose coming into being was based on the demand by a religious community for a political

entity in which it would be dominant. The bifurcated Pakistan that existed from August 1947 to December 1971 was composed of two parts, or wings, known as East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory. From 1947 onward, foreign observers pointed out that the people of the two wings were alien to each other in terms of language and cultural traditions and were united only in adherence to Islam and that the "monsoon Islam" of Bengal was not quite the same as the "desert Islam" of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The political leaders of Pakistan, particularly of West Pakistan, asserted that the Islamic faith and a shared fear of "Hindu India" provided the cement to join the two societies into one nation.

By 1970, however, the East Pakistanis, who accounted for over 54 percent of the population, had almost unanimously decided that their province's political and economic position vis-à-vis West Pakistan had to be altered. In the country's first direct universal suffrage election, which was held in December 1970, the East Pakistan-based Awami League campaigned on a six-point platform that called for virtually total provincial autonomy. The election was held to select the members of a 300-member national legislature; the allocation of seats was based upon equal representation of the population, and 162 of the seats were assigned to East Pakistan. The Awami League won all but two of the 162 seats and thus was assured an absolute legislative majority.

The Awami League insisted that as the majority party in the promised constitutional convention it would adhere to its campaign platform, that is, it would draft and adopt a constitution that would provide for a confederation of autonomous provinces. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had won 81 of the 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan—mostly in the Punjab and Sind—and the PPP leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, exerted strong pressure on Yahya to block the ascendancy of the Awami League. Bhutto's efforts were joined by several senior army officers, most of whom were Punjabis, and Yahya eventually refused to convene the constitutional convention. On March 25, 1971, Yahya banned the Awami League and ordered the arrest of its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, on a charge of treason.

For the next several months East Pakistan was the scene of a brutal and savage civil war, in which scores of thousands were killed, and an estimated 10 million took refuge in India. In late November, India entered the war and by December 16 had decisively defeated the Pakistan military. Over 90,000 Pakistani troops and civilians were taken prisoner, and the newly independent state of Bangladesh announced that it would conduct a war-crimes trial for 105 Pakistanis on charges that included rape, torture, and genocide.

On December 20 a now disgraced Yahya surrendered the presidency to Bhutto. During the civil war the government-controlled news media had reported only a few minor events and had dismissed the secessionist movement as the work of a small band of "miscreants" in the pay of India, and during the brief war with India in early December,

military spokesmen had claimed or implied that Pakistan's armed forces were moving from victory to victory. To most Pakistanis, the news bulletins of December 17 and 18 came as a numbing shock. Literally overnight the country had lost its status as the largest Muslim nation in the world. Perhaps most shattering of all, Pakistan was no longer the homeland of South Asian Muslims, the basic premise and rationale for the creation of Pakistan had apparently been discredited.

Bhutto at once launched a forceful campaign to restore the people's self-confidence and to repair Pakistan's image abroad. He ruled with only nominal limitation or hindrance under the Defence of Pakistan Rules—as indeed, he continued to do until overthrown in 1977—but he revoked formal martial law. He either imprisoned or placed under house arrest Yahya and several other generals, but Bhutto lavished praise on the armed forces as a whole and promised that they and the nation would be revenged. He jailed a number of industrialists and others who were popularly regarded as corrupt profiteers and who were, coincidentally, on Bhutto's list of political enemies, but in his almost daily speeches he focused on the themes of national unity and the need to restore political democracy.

In April 1972 Bhutto summoned the winners of the 1970 election to sit as the Constituent Assembly. The assembly adopted an interim constitution that provided for a parliamentary system in a federated state. Bhutto, who served as president, prime minister, and president of the Constituent Assembly, appointed a committee to draft a permanent constitution. The draft prepared by the committee provided for a federal parliamentary system in which predominant power was reserved to the federal government. Furthermore, the draft stipulated that although the prime minister would be responsible to the parliament, the procedures by which parliament could remove the prime minister were so circumscribed by restrictive clauses that for all practical purposes Bhutto would have been immune from a parliamentary vote of no confidence until 1983.

The opposition parties, particularly the National Awami Party (NAP), sought to amend the draft to provide for increased provincial autonomy and for a more equitable allocation of powers between the federal and provincial governments. Bhutto and the PPP easily forced through the adoption of the Constitution in April 1973, however, and it came into effect on August 14, 1973, Independence Day. The PPP-controlled assembly elected Chaudhry Fazal Elahi to the largely ceremonial presidency. Bhutto continued as prime minister, and in forming his cabinet he retained some of the more important ministerial portfolios, among them defense and foreign affairs.

The slogan of the PPP was "Islam our Faith, Democracy our Policy, and Socialism our Economy." The Constitution, which embodied Bhutto's official political and economic philosophy, contained the injunction that "the State should ensure . . . the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle, from each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Bhutto had also promised during the 1970 election cam-

paign that when elected he would create a mixed economy that would incorporate the best aspects of the private and public sectors.

In early 1972 Bhutto began to redeem his campaign pledges with respect to industry and commerce. The government nationalized the management of 32 of the most important manufacturing firms and nationalized outright the domestically owned maritime shipping companies and the life insurance, vegetable oil, and domestically owned banking industries. In addition, the government took over the distribution of petroleum products, monopolized the export of cotton and rice, and placed a number of commercial operations under the control of a government body, the Pakistan Trading Corporation. These actions substantially slowed economic growth.

By the mid-1970s Bhutto's determination to crush any and all potential opposition had become obsessive. He had purged his party of real or imagined opponents, brought the prestigious civil service under control, and sacked various military officers who possessed what Bhutto described as "Bonapartist tendencies." Bhutto then named General Mohammad Zia ul Haq as the new chief of the army staff (the title that replaced that of commander in chief); Zia, a relatively junior and obscure general, thus became the first *muhajir* (immigrant from India) to hold the top army post. Bhutto deposed the non-PPP governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP and ruled the provinces from Islamabad. He established a paramilitary police force, the Federal Security Force, which was responsible solely to him. Literally thousands of his opponents were incarcerated for prolonged periods without trial and when released pursuant to writs of habeas corpus were frequently arrested and detained again.

The 1973 Constitution provides for elections on a four-year schedule, and in early 1977 Bhutto announced that National Assembly members would be elected in early March and the members of the provincial assemblies a few weeks later. Most observers had predicted that the PPP would retain control of the National Assembly; but the extent of the PPP margin was so overwhelming that charges of fraud were immediately made, and riots erupted throughout the country. Within weeks hundreds of people had been killed or wounded, and in numerous towns and cities the army was called upon to impose peace, police work that the army traditionally abhorred.

During the next three months the military chiefs periodically and publicly voiced their loyalty to Bhutto as the head of government. On July 5, 1977, however, General Zia informed the nation that he had taken power as the chief martial law administrator (CMLA). He assured the people that the military desired only to supervise fair elections, which he said would be held in 90 days, after which the military would withdraw from the scene. As election time approached, however, Zia announced criminal charges against Bhutto and postponed the elections until the charges had been tried in court. A divided bench of the Lahore High Court found Bhutto and four associates guilty of various charges, including conspiracy to commit murder, and a divided Supreme Court

upheld the conviction and the sentence of death. Despite requests for clemency by the governments of Britain, China, the United States, several Muslim states, and numerous other countries, Zia, who in 1978 had assumed the presidency when President Elahi's term expired, ignored the requests. Bhutto was executed on April 4, 1979.

The military junta that seized power in 1977 and continued to rule in late 1983 differed in important aspects from the military regimes of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Ayub and Yahya were, like Zia and his colleagues, contemptuous of politicians, and their style of governing was in the tradition of the British Raj and its Mughal predecessor. Nevertheless, Ayub introduced various reform measures, such as the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which in part varied from customary and Islamic law to provide protection for women within their families. Moreover, early in his reign Ayub isolated the army and other service chiefs from the governmental decision-making process. Ayub relied heavily on senior civil servants and a few conservative politicians, and the latter executed their assignments in the semifeudal manner in which they managed their vast landholdings.

Zia's rule, by contrast, has been notable for the high visibility of a small number of army officers and for Zia's fervent advocacy of his version of Islamic orthodoxy. In late 1983 Zia retained the titles and duties of chief of the army staff, CMLA, and president. The presidency was of significance in foreign relations; it was as chief of the army staff that Zia remained the man in charge of the junta (see *The Junta*, ch. 4). The military leadership experienced little change in the 1977-83 period, and the inner core of army generals closest to Zia changed scarcely at all. On more than one occasion in the early 1980s Zia bluntly declared that if something happened to him, another general would take over, and many observers believed that Zia made important decisions only after extensive consultations with the members of the military council and other senior generals. Prominent members of the junta were General Mohammad Iqbal Khan, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; Lieutenant General K.M. Arif, chief of staff to the president; General Sawar Khan, vice chief of the army staff; and the four lieutenant generals serving as the governors and provincial martial law administrators (see fig. 9).

Zia and the junta differed sharply from their predecessors in their attitude toward the proper role of Islam in the society. The Quaid-i-Azam frequently and specifically endorsed the concept of a secular state. In his first formal address to the constituent assembly, Jinnah asserted that "you will find that in the course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state." Nevertheless, Zia has made clear his desire to supplant the extant legal system with Islamic law—*sharia* (see Glossary). He has frequently noted that there are no provisions in the Quran or the Sunna for either parliamentary democracy or political parties, and he has suggested that political parties will have

no role in future elections. He and some of his fellow generals have asserted that the military possesses the duty and mission of protecting the nation's ideological as well as its territorial integrity, meaning the protection and exposition of Islamic fundamentalism as perceived by the senior officers.

Zia's pronouncements and laws on the Islamization process were couched in the language and reflected the ritual practices of Sunni Islam (see Glossary). Some 20 to 25 percent of the citizens are Shiites (see Glossary), and they objected strenuously and at times violently to some of Zia's measures. The Shiite community was keenly aware that many of the nation's past leaders—most notably the Quaid-i-Azam but also including Yahya Khan, Bhutto, and many others—had been Shiites, and on political as well as religious grounds the members of the community resented the imposition of Sunni practices as law. Moreover, the Shiites remembered that in response to demands from a number of reactionary Sunni religious leaders, the National Assembly in 1974 amended the Constitution to declare that the members of a small deviant sect known as the Ahmadiyah were not Muslims. Some Shiites feared that what happened to one religious minority could happen to them.

On August 12, 1983, Zia committed his government to National Assembly elections on March 23, 1985, the forty-fifth anniversary of the passage of the Pakistan Resolution. By late 1983 the framework of the future government had become fairly clear, although some key issues remained vague, perhaps deliberately so. The Provisional Constitutional Order of 1981 not only had made the judiciary subservient to the chief executive but also had awarded the president unlimited power to amend the Constitution. Zia made it clear that before the 1985 election he would amend the Constitution to make the office of the presidency the most powerful post of government (see *Emerging Political System*, ch. 4). He also announced that a national security council would be established, and although the composition of the council was not spelled out, the clear implication was that the council was envisaged as the government body through which the officer corps would continue to exercise decision-making on any issue of concern to them.

Zia's formal announcement preceded by two days the beginning of a civil disobedience campaign. The campaign planners—the leaders of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, a loose coalition of eight banned political parties—had hoped that the campaign would be nationwide, but the major focus was in Sind (see fig. 1). By late November an estimated 17,000 to 23,000 people had been arrested, hundreds had been killed, and hundreds more had been flogged (see *Law Enforcement*, ch. 5). The military junta professed to be unconcerned, but its members nonetheless accused India of meddling in Pakistan's internal affairs.

In late 1983 Zia and his colleagues faced many serious problems. They were aware that most Pakistanis desired an early end to martial

law. They were also aware that although the economy prospered in the 1979-83 period, future prospects were generally grim (see *Growth and Structure of the Economy*, ch. 3). In common with numerous other Third World countries, Pakistan possesses limited natural resources but a seemingly unlimited population. In 1951 the area of contemporary Pakistan contained about 33.7 million people; by mid-1983 the population was generally estimated at 88.5 million, although the United States Bureau of the Census suggested that the figure was 94.8 million (see *The Census*, ch. 2). If the annual rate of growth were to remain at the 2.8 to 3 percent level, the population would reach 145 million by 2000, 200 million by 2010, and over 300 million by 2030. In the unlikely event that the rate of growth were to decline rapidly to 1 percent a year by 2010, the population would nevertheless reach about 130 million that year.

In 1983 between 1.5 and 2 million Pakistanis were working abroad. Although a few score thousand were serving in one of Pakistan's several foreign military missions and a few thousand more were physicians, dentists, and other professionals, the bulk of those abroad were males working as unskilled laborers (see *Rural Society*, ch. 2; *Foreign Alliances and Influences*, ch. 5). The remittances by these workers in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1982 were about US\$2.2 billion and were expected to reach US\$2.6 billion in FY 1983, an amount larger than the anticipated total commodity export earnings. Most observers expected the number of Pakistanis working abroad to decrease because of the gradual slowdown in construction projects in the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula. This will obviously decrease the remittances from abroad and thereby worsen the country's already grave economic problems (see *Balance of Payments*, ch. 3).

Although the military junta has been severely criticized for years by such organizations as Amnesty International for various aspects of its repressive rule, the armed services as such were widely admired for their training, discipline, and professionalism (see *Armed Forces in Government and Society*, ch. 5). The nation's geography and location, however, present these professionals with serious, almost insoluble strategic and tactical problems. It borders on India, a regional superpower; China; an Afghanistan occupied by Soviet forces; and an Iran bent on exporting its religious fanaticism. Most of the border with India goes through open terrain suitable for tank warfare, and in 1983 the bulk of Pakistan's ground and air forces remained positioned to resist an invasion by India's markedly larger forces. Pakistan's largest urban areas and its key land transportation systems lie close to the border with India, posing additional defense problems (see fig. 8).

China, for over 30 years at odds with both India and the Soviet Union, remained a valued source of military and economic aid and assistance and of diplomatic support. The Sino-Pakistani border traverses some of the most rugged mountainous terrain in the world, however, and China's ability to provide prompt military aid in meaningful quantities remained doubtful (see fig. 5). Relations with Iran

were formally correct, but they were often complicated by occasional Iranian Shiite involvement in Sunni-Shiite divisions within Pakistan. In addition, Baluch dissidents in Iran sometimes sought refuge in Pakistan, and vice versa.

Pakistan's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union remained complex. Many Pakistanis—particularly army officers—like to consider the Pakistan Army as having inherited the British Indian Army function of guarding the Indian subcontinent from invaders from Central Asia. The Afghanistan occupied by Soviet forces is, after all, the successor to the Afghanistan where, as Stephen Philip Cohen recently phrased it, "the expanding British and Russian empires met and clashed in the 'Great Game' of Kim, Kipling, and Lord Curzon." Zia and his fellow generals were keenly aware that should the Soviets decide to march through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, the armed forces of Pakistan alone could at best delay the Soviet forces and, following defeat, engage in guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the Soviets possess the ability to provide significant aid and support to dissident elements in Pakistan, particularly in Baluchistan, which could create serious problems for the army and the government (see Baluch, ch. 2, The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration, ch. 4). In addition, on the eve of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, India and the Soviet Union signed the 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. Among other provisions, the treaty stipulates that should India be at war, the Soviet Union would replace India's combat matériel losses as rapidly as possible.

Nevertheless, Pakistan remained committed to a policy of providing shelter to refugees from Afghanistan—estimated at about 2.2 million in mid-1983—and of allowing military and other assistance from abroad to reach Afghan resistance groups that maintain camps and bases in Pakistan. Pakistan had hoped that negotiations with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union that were sponsored and conducted by a representative of the secretary general of the United Nations would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from and the return of the refugees to Afghanistan. In November 1983, however, Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan announced that the talks were stalemated.

The Afghan refugees—most of whom lived in over 300 camps in the NWFP and Baluchistan—presented numerous problems. The refugees brought with them an estimated 2.5 million camels, goats, and sheep, which competed for already scarce water and forage areas. The United Nations and other international organizations contributed to the cost of food, health, education, and other services provided to the refugees, but the cost to the government of Pakistan was estimated in early 1983 at nearly US\$1 million per day. For many if not most of the refugees, their standard of living was higher in the refugee camps than it had been in their Afghan villages, and many Pakistanis feared that numerous refugees would refuse to return to their homeland even if the Soviets were to leave.

The refugees were also entering the smuggling trade, particularly the traffic in heroin. The United States Drug Enforcement Adminis-

tration estimated in 1983 that at least one-half—and perhaps as much as three-fourths—of the heroin entering the United States either originated in Pakistan or transited Pakistan from Afghanistan. In late 1982 the government of Pakistan estimated that at least 30 heroin-processing "laboratories" were in operation in the NWFP. Government officials noted that heroin addiction was for the first time becoming a serious domestic problem, but there was neither agreement about the number of addicts nor a specific policy for confronting the problem.

In late 1983 most observers believed that the military junta would continue to adhere to its support for the Afghan refugees and its connections with China, the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula, other Islamic polities, and the United States, which in the early 1980s resumed its earlier role as a source of economic and military aid and supplies. At the same time, the junta will continue to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union, against which Pakistan's armed forces could mount only a brief, albeit bloody, resistance. The primary attention of the military planners, therefore, will remain fixed on India. Although few observers believed that India would ever wish to conquer and absorb Pakistan, some foreign observers and many in the Pakistan officer corps suggested that conditions could emerge in which India's leaders might conclude that India's security required four weak, demilitarized states in place of the four provinces of a well-armed, unified Pakistan. The goal of Pakistan's military planners was to make sure that such an Indian move would obviously be so costly that it would not be attempted.

December 1, 1983

During the first five months of 1984 General Zia made some changes in the military junta and the cabinet, but he altered neither his authoritarian control nor his commitment to Islamize the society. In almost weekly speeches and statements he insisted that legislative elections would be held on or before March 23, 1985, but he refused to provide specific details. He made clear, however, that he favored a presidential system and that the National Assembly would be a consultative body. He frequently stated that he could envisage "no scope for any Western type democracy," but on April 14, 1984, he publicly announced that he might hold a national referendum to determine whether the people wanted a "Western form of democracy or an Islamic system of government." In early May he announced that the election campaign would be limited to a few—possibly seven—weeks and that individuals whose commitment to the ideals of Islam was suspect would be disqualified and allowed neither to stand for election nor to participate in the campaign. Zia made clear that the existing ban on political activities would not be lifted "for some time," and he reiterated his known preference for the exclusion of political parties from any role in the election. As if to display his determination on this point, Zia later in May issued a

directive forbidding the press from publishing anything relating to the political parties.

Zia has consistently demonstrated his pronounced antipathy for political groups of any form—even those that have supported his Islamization program. On January 30, 1984, in his role as chief martial law administrator, he promulgated Martial Law Regulation No. 60, which prohibited the "formation and continuance" of student unions in the Islamabad Capital Territory and stipulated a punishment of violators of the regulation by rigorous imprisonment up to five years, by a fine, or by both. In April the ban was imposed on all student organizations throughout the country. Provincial martial law administrators had issued similar regulations in Baluchistan and the NWFP in April 1983, and the provincial martial law administrators in the Punjab and Sind had issued almost identical orders in early February 1984. Zia had in effect given national status to these provincial ordinances.

On almost all campuses the best organized and most active student unions were branches of the Islami Jamaat-i-Tulaba, the student wing of the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami, which has endorsed many of Zia's Islamization proposals. Within days of the ban order there were student-police clashes on campuses and in the streets of Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and elsewhere. Several universities were closed for brief periods, and in April the Lahore branch of the Islami Jamaat-i-Tulaba claimed that over 250 of its members were in jails in the Punjab and that clashes with the police were continuing throughout the country.

General Zia also added to the harassment of the Qadiani community. In April he issued an ordinance that added new sections to the Penal Code (see Crime and Punishment, ch. 5). The new sections specified three years' imprisonment for any Qadiani who "poses" as a Muslim, describes his faith as Islamic, or in any way "injures the religious feelings of Muslims." The sections also stipulated imprisonment for any Qadiani who issues the call to prayers or who uses religious titles or honorifics of Muslim origin. Many observers believed that the edict was designed to placate Sunni Muslim leaders, and in a speech to a Shiite convention a few weeks later Zia insisted that religious minorities would be zealously protected. Given continuing Sunni-Shiite clashes, however, not all members of the Shiite community felt that their future was necessarily secure (see The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration, ch. 4).

In early March, Zia announced the retirement of General Iqbal Khan as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and of General Sawar Khan as vice chief of the army staff, both of whom had been key members of the small ruling group in the Zia government (see The Junta, ch. 4). Iqbal was replaced by newly promoted General Rahimuddin Khan, who had been serving as the governor of Baluchistan and whose son was married to Zia's daughter. Sawar Khan was replaced as vice chief by newly promoted General Arif, who had been serving the junta as chief of staff to the president.

These changes paved the way for other transfers and promotions.

Lieutenant General Sardar Faruq Shaikat Khan Lodi, a former corps commander, took over as governor of Baluchistan. Lieutenant General Jahandad Khan, also a former corps commander, became governor of Sind, replacing Lieutenant General S. M. Abbasi, who was slated for a post in Islamabad.

Before his promotion, General Arif had been one of the more junior lieutenant generals, and his elevation was expected to lead to the retirement of a few senior lieutenant generals who had been passed over. This would in turn open the way for the promotions of additional major generals and, eventually, brigadiers and others down the line, many of whom were restive over the logjam at the top in recent years. At about the same time, the chief of the naval staff, Tariq Kamal Khan, was promoted from vice admiral to admiral, and Air Marshal Jamal Ahmad Khan became the new vice chief of the air staff, replacing Air Marshal Abdur Rashid Sheikh, who retired. In addition, in early March Zia announced the resignations of three cabinet ministers as part of an impending reorganization of the cabinet. Among those leaving was Major General (retired) Rao Farman Ali, who had generally been perceived as a member of the inner core of the junta.

Changes in the inner circle of the junta signaled a consolidation of authority throughout the military command structure. Senior commanders in the field supportive of the army's role in national politics were linked directly to the country's decisionmaking network. Zia's comparatively long tenure as president had not caused his separation from military service. His continuance as chief of the army staff and his domicile in the Rawalpindi cantonment gave constant emphasis to his view that the armed forces constituted a more coherent organization and a better representation of the national ethos than the political parties. Indeed, even if he contemplated stepping aside for an "elected" president, Zia showed every indication of keeping the military establishment's hands on the levers of power.

May 31, 1984

Richard F. Nyrop

Chapter 1. Historical Setting



*A bearded steatite bust depicting a king-priest of Mohenjo-Daro, part
of Harappan cultural sphere, 3000-1500 B.C.*

PAKISTAN IN JULY 1977 passed once again under a martial law administration. It was headed by General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, chief of the army staff, chief martial law administrator and, since September 1978, president. The execution of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on April 4, 1979, put an end to hopes, or fears, of his return to power. Nevertheless, the mark left by Bhutto on Pakistan's political life remains as distinct and controversial as that of the longtime president, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, whom he helped to overthrow in 1969. In the 1980s Pakistan continued the search for political identity that it had pursued since its emergence on August 14, 1947, as an independent state. In these past decades the governing and control of Pakistan has shifted, often violently, between the hands of populist leaders, military rulers, and an authoritarian elite. As of late 1983, the people had yet to settle on a policy that satisfied their differing needs as well as their common heritage of Islam.

Many of the difficulties experienced by Pakistan in self-identification were the result of its being composed of two separate areas on the northwest and one on the east of the Indian subcontinent. A civil war between the two wings of Pakistan in 1971 ended in the independence of East Pakistan as the new state of Bangladesh, assisted and recognized by India. The areas encompassed by Pakistan in 1983 are contiguous to each other, the population is less heterogeneous in ethnic origin and language than before 1971. At the same time, Pakistan remains typical of a borderland, encapsulating within itself many components. It was first a borderland between settled civilizations in the river valleys of the subcontinent and the nomadic cultures of the Central Asian plateaus, then a borderland between a predominantly Islamic western Asia and a largely Hindu India. Pakistan has, with justice, been called the "fulcrum of Asia."

The imprints of interminglings among peoples, customs, languages, and religions since ancient times is discernible in contemporary Pakistan. Tribes and oral traditions, as well as archaeological remains and artifacts, bear witness to the past. But a series of historic events must be considered decisive in the shaping of Pakistan.

One such series was the gradual Islamic expansion over most of South Asia, leading up to the fabulous Mughal Empire (1526-1858, with effective rule between 1580 and 1707). Another series was the British conquest of India in the twilight of the Mughals. The establishment of British India produced many reactions, including nationalism. A third decisive series of events took place as the pace of nationalism quickened after World War I. The All-India Muslim League, led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, diverged increasingly from the movement of the Indian National Congress led in fact, if not in name, by Mahatma

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Gandhi. Divergence took many forms, including violent communal strife. It ended in the partition of British India in August 1947.


Jinnah is reverentially known as the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) in honor of his unique contribution to the creation of Pakistan. He became the first governor general of the new dominion, but he assumed executive as well as ceremonial functions. Jinnah thus provided a precedent for a continuation of the British viceregal tradition in which the administration is dominant and almost impervious to legislative opinion. Further steps along the same road were taken both by Ayub Khan and by Bhutto. Despite challenges posed by constitution makers, politicians, and lawyers, the viceregal tradition remains strong. Whether or not it could satisfy all sections of the population or be permanently legitimized by the Nizam-i-Mustafa (Rule of the Prophet), promulgated by Zia, remained to be seen.

Early Civilizations

From earliest times the Indus region has been a two-way transmitter of cultures and a receptacle of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. This fact is demonstrated in the remains of the earliest known civilization on the subcontinent dating from the third millennium B.C. The large urban sites of Mohenjo-Daro in Sind and Harappa in the Punjab were first discovered by archaeologists in the 1920s, both are in Pakistan. Subsequent diggings uncovered many more sites in India to the south and east of Mohenjo-Daro and to the east of Harappa. Grave sites in Baluchistan and northwest Pakistan are similar also to sites in northern Iran and Central Asia (see fig. 2). Recent scholarship, therefore, indicates a much larger area and longer time frame for the Harappan culture than previously envisaged.

The well-planned, well-constructed brick cities of the Harappan culture seem to have enjoyed a high level of comfort and creativity. They had excellent drainage and sanitation facilities, charming artifacts, and regular trade with Sumeria. Historians speculate on the kind of polity that could have combined the kind of authority and individuality apparent from remains. Many of the motifs found on Harappan artifacts and pottery reappear later in Indian sculpture, notably those motifs connected with asceticism and with fertility rites. Philologists from different parts of the world have struggled to decipher the script on steatite seals. Some suggest it represents a proto-Dravidian language, and others suggest a proto-Sanskritic language. Although historians agree that the civilization ended abruptly, at the least in the cities of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa, they dispute the possible causes for its end.

Migrations of peoples into the subcontinent from Central Asia through the passes in the northwest are also a feature of prehistory. Migrations increased in the second millennium B.C. The records of these peoples—who spoke an Indo-Aryan language—are literary, not archaeological, and are preserved in the Vedas, the collections of orally transmitted hymns. From the earliest collection, the Rig Veda, the



Source: Based on information from Mortimer Wheeler, *Early India and Pakistan to Ashoka*, New York, 1966, 95.

Figure 2 Harappan Culture Sites in or near the Area That Is Now Pakistan

Aryan speakers appear to have been a tribally organized, pastoral, and pantheistic people. The later Vedas and other sources indicate the eastward and southern movement as well as the evolution of a social and economic system in which the Aryan speakers dominated but at the same time accommodated and absorbed various indigenous members and ideas. The beginnings of a culture that came to be called Hindu grew on the basis of settled agriculture rather than urban occupation and on a fourfold division of society and a complex philosophy.

The details of India history began to emerge with greater clarity after 600 B.C. But the territorial fluctuations and dynastic changes in the kingdoms and republics of northern India are of little importance compared with the phenomenon of Buddhism. This religion came to flower in the Ganges Valley and then spread outward in all directions through monks, missionaries, and mercantile groups. Buddhism originated in the teachings of the Enlightened One, or the Buddha, who was born Prince Siddhartha. His message of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path, or Middle Way, to eliminate suffering stressed self-

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
restraint, nonviolence, and moderation. The Buddha's teachings proved enormously popular, and his followers were drawn from high and low castes without segregation. Kingdoms and republics, Brahmanism, Buddhism, and other heterodox sects appear to have coexisted on the subcontinent.

Meanwhile, the kingdom of Gandhara, roughly coterminous with much of northern Pakistan and centered in the vicinity of present-day Peshawar, was semi-independent. It stood between the westerly expanding empires based in the Ganges Valley and the easterly expanding Achaemenid Empire of the Iranian plateau. Alexander of Macedon became master of the latter, marched across Bactria to the upper Oxus and Kabul valleys, and turned longingly toward India. He crossed the Hindu Kush mountains to victory over King Porus near Peshawar (see fig. 1). Threatened mutiny among his soldiers forced him to turn down the Indus River and back to Babylon, where he died in 323 B.C. A Hellenistic imprint remained in the satrapies he left behind and the Saka dynasties that followed (see table A).

Gandhara was soon conquered by Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Mauryan Empire, the first universal state of northern India. His grandson, Emperor Asoka, was a Buddhist, and his symbols of state survive to the present day. Buddhist principles were promoted by ambassadors, merchants, missionaries, and artisans and survived the disintegration of the Mauryan Empire. Gandhara became known for a school of art in which Buddhist and Hellenistic influences fused in beauty. It continued to flourish in the Kushan Empire of the first and second centuries A.D., whose best-known emperor was Kanishka (see fig. 3). At its widest extent the Kushan Empire included trans-Pamir areas now in Tibet or the Soviet Union, as well as parts of the upper Indus and Ganges valleys. Purushapura (present-day Peshawar) was the capital. Trade was the major occupation of the Kushans (also known as the Yueh Chi tribe), who dominated the land routes between the Roman, Chinese, and Indian empires. Coins, artifacts, inscriptions, and contemporary accounts by Chinese travelers testify to the prosperity and tolerance of the Kushans. Their territories were eventually overrun by the Huns in the north and taken over by the Gupta Empire in the south and the Sassanians in the west.

The age of the imperial Guptas in northern India (fourth to seventh centuries A.D.) is regarded as the Classical Age of Hindu civilization. Sanskrit literature was of a high caliber; extensive knowledge in the science of astronomy, mathematics, and medicine was widespread, and artistic expression flowered. Society became more settled and more hierarchical, and rigid social codes emerged that separated castes and occupations. A rich and diverse culture evolved distinctive characteristics. It was able to accommodate new groups, such as incoming non-worshippers who came to be known as Rajputs. In the absence of a highly centralized empire, numerous kingdoms flourished. Rulers patronized Saivite and Vaishnavite cults, Buddhism, and Brahmanism.

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Source: Based on information from Willem C. Brice, *An Historical Atlas of Islam*, Leiden, 1981, 47-53, and C. Collin Davies, *An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula*, London, 1939, 15.

Figure 3. Kushan Empire, circa A.D. 150

and permitted esoteric blends of Tantricism to spread with apparently equal generosity.

Notwithstanding these achievements and the influence of Indian traders and teachers in other parts of Asia, northern India suffered a decline after the seventh century A.D. Its ruling groups became culturally introverted, politically balkanized, and strategically unaware. Their insularity, arrogance, and intellectual clutter were recorded for posterity by the Arab scholar Al Biruni in the eleventh century. Against

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this background, Islam came to India and operated as both a destructive and a creative force. It annihilated centers of Buddhist and Hindu learning, but it reopened the subcontinent to outside stimulation.

Islam in India

Islam is a revealed religion propagated by the Prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century A.D. Islam gave the Arab tribes unity and the zeal of moral purpose in a burst of military expansion (see *Islam Tenets and Early Development*, ch. 2). By the end of the eighth century, the Arabs had extended their domain westward into North Africa and Spain and eastward into Persia and Central Asia. An Arab expedition entered Baluchistan and Sind in 711, with slight effect. Coastal trade, however, permitted significant cultural exchanges with India and the introduction into the subcontinent of saintly teachers of Islam, Sufis (see *Glossary*). Their influence grew and was systematized into schools of thought.

Almost three centuries later, the Turks and Afghans became the spearhead of Islamic conquest in India through the traditional invading routes of the northwest. Mahmud of Ghazni (979-1030) led a series of raids against Rajput kingdoms and rich Hindu temples and established a base in the Punjab for future incursions. Although a patron of learning, Mahmud's tactics originated the legend of idol-smashing Muslims bent on plunder and forced conversions, a reputation that has persisted to the present day.

At the turn of the thirteenth century, Muhammad of Ghor and his generals seriously undertook conquest by moving into the Indo-Gangetic plains. A new Muslim sultanate was created around Delhi by Iltutmish (1206-36). Within 100 years much of the subcontinent had changed hands to Muslim rulers, only the Vijayanagar Empire in the south remained intact until 1565. Chronicles, travelers' accounts, and surviving monuments tell a story of changing dynasties, shifting jurisdictions, and the establishment of Muslim kingdoms in Bengal, Malwa, Gujarat, and the Deccan, which were more or less independent of Delhi.

The sultans of Delhi enjoyed cordial, if superficial, relations with Muslim potentates in the Middle East but owed them no allegiance. The sultans based their laws on the Quran and the sharia (see *Glossary*), permitting their non-Muslim subjects to practice their religion only on payment of the *jizya*, or protection tax. The centers of the sultans' rule were urban, military camps and trading posts provided the nuclei for towns that sprang up in the countryside. No innovations were introduced into agricultural techniques or revenue collection, and both were adversely affected by political instability and the consequent brutalization of behavior. But an impetus was given to trade and industry by the reestablishment of links between India and civilizations elsewhere, as well as by the free-spending habits of the new courts and armies. Skilled native artisans took to the new patronage with alacrity, often converting to Islam in the process.

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The main achievement of the sultanate was to protect the subcontinent from the devastation of the Mongols. The sack of Delhi by Timur (Tamerlane) in 1398 provided the one bitter taste of what large parts of the world suffered. Another achievement was an Indian cultural renaissance as a result of the stimulation of Islam. The resulting fusion is obvious in architecture, such as the Quwwat-ul-Islam Mosque in Delhi; Hindustani classical music, both vocal and instrumental, performed in Pakistan and India; and vast literature in Urdu, Hindi, and Bengali. Popular religious practices were influenced in varying degrees by the uncompromising monotheism, simple rituals, devout faith, and social equality of Islam, which in turn was heavily influenced by local religious practices. If formal conversions to the religion of the conquerors were not many, the acceptance of Islamic ideals was significant. A number of casteless religious sects arose, based on *bhakti*, or devotion to God, and simple rituals. Among these, the Sikhs in the Punjab became the most notable.

The sultanate suffered too from profound drawbacks. The subcontinent was vertically and horizontally compartmentalized: Muslim kingdoms competed with one another as well as with neighboring Hindu kingdoms. The Rajput-Brahmin ruling class had for the most part been replaced and had retreated into obscurantism. The conservatism of the peasantry and its suspicion of armies and rulers increased. The mainly Muslim urban proletariat proved troublesome to all rulers. No political science evolved enabling a sultan to be equally just to all his subjects, obey Quranic injunctions, and provide efficient administration of settled lands. Attempts to do so by Allaudin Khalji and Muhammad bin Tughlaq were personal and autocratic; they ended in failure. Equally important, no system providing for peaceful succession was developed; every strong man was a potential ruler—or rebel.

The Mughal Period

India in the sixteenth century presented a fragmented picture of quarrelsome rulers, both Muslim and Hindu, who lacked concern for their subjects and failed to create a common body of laws or institutions. Outside developments played a role in shaping events. Europeans began to challenge Arab control of the trading routes between Asia and Europe, especially at sea. In Central Asia and on the Afghan Plateau, shifts of power pushed Babur of Ferghana (in present-day Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) southward, first to Kabul and then to India. The dynasty he founded left its name to the next 200 years.

A descendant of both Genghis (Chinghiz) Khan and Timur, Babur combined strength and courage with a love of beauty, and military ability with cultivation. Babur concentrated on gaining control of north-western India; he did so in 1526 after defeating Ibrahim Lodi at the first Battle of Panipat. Babur turned to the task of persuading his followers to stay on in the subcontinent and of overcoming other contenders to the throne of Delhi, mainly the Rajputs in the west and Afghan chiefs in the east. He succeeded in both tasks but died shortly

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
thereafter. He left as legacies his memoirs, gardens in Kabul, Lahore, and Agra, and lineal descendants, who inherited his qualities, albeit in different combinations. The Mughal Empire he founded became another universal state in India, precursor to the British Empire. Its extent and wealth was such that the very word Mughal has become a synonym for opulence and power (see fig. 4).

Detailed administrative records of the Mughal courts are extant, as are the diaries and poems of emperors and courtiers, the diatribes of dissidents, and the voluminous correspondence or notebooks penned by European visitors. Art flourished; thus pictorial records and illuminated manuscripts add valuable source material. Research into the period is further stimulated by the number of fascinating personalities who strode a large stage. Some key questions, however, remain only partly answered and are perhaps unanswerable. One, who was the greatest Mughal ruler? Another, why did the Mughal Empire, despite its vast material wealth and relative security, fail to generate the economic creativity and general prosperity that characterize the modern age?

The perennial question of who was the greatest of the six "great Mughals" receives varying answers in present-day Pakistan and India. Some are attracted to Babur the pioneer, and some to his great-grandson Shah Jahan, builder of the Taj Mahal and other magnificent mosques and palaces. But the two towering figures of the era were Akbar (1556-1605) and Aurangzeb (1658-1707). Each expanded the empire by hundreds of thousands of square kilometers. Both were able administrators. But they represented opposite qualities of statesmanship and are evaluated accordingly by the preferences of the observer. Akbar stood forth as father of all his subjects, the majority of whom were Hindu. Aurangzeb was the pious Muslim, restoring the edge of orthodox Islam in an alien and heterodox environment, renouncing the symbols of worldly power.

Akbar's qualities surfaced early. He based his authority on the ability and the loyalty of many men, irrespective of their religion. Instead of carrying on an unending war of attrition with the Rajputs around their desert strongholds, he treated them with respect and contracted matrimonial alliances with some. Rajput princes joined the aristocracy of Persians, Turks, and Afghans—all Muslims—and with special privileges led Mughal armies on to further conquests. Raja Man Singh of Amber (Jaipur) was one such prince. Rajput princesses were mothers to future emperors. Hindu advisers, such as Todar Mal and Bir Bal, helped to tap ancient practices and to draw up uniform laws and efficient schemes of revenue collection and administration. In 1564 the *jizya* on non-Muslims was abolished, and bans on temple building or Hindu pilgrimages were lifted. At the same time, Akbar was relentless against those who did not submit to his authority, such as the Rana of Mewar, whose fortress at Chitor he sacked. Mughal armies defeated those of Vijayanagar at Talikota in 1565.

Historical Setting



Source Based on information from R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri, and K. Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, London, 1966, 490. Michael Edwards, *A History of India From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, Bombay, 1961, 183, and C. Collin Davies, *An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula*, London, 1959, 51.

Figure 4. Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century

Akbar's methods of administration reinforced his power against two probable sources of challenge, the Afghan-Turk Muslim aristocracy and the traditional interpreters and scholars of Muslim law, the ulama (see Glossary). He created a ranked imperial service based on ability rather than birth, whose members were obliged to serve wherever required. They were remunerated with cash rather than land and kept away from their inherited estates, so that the supremacy of the imperial treasury

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was clear. Their military and political functions were separated from those of revenue collection, which was also supervised by the imperial treasury. This system of administration, known as the *mansabdari* system, was the backbone of the Mughal Empire. Although it has some similarities to a modern bureaucracy, its effectiveness depended ultimately on personal loyalty to the emperor and his ability and willingness to choose, remunerate, and supervise men.

Akbar declared himself to be the final arbiter in any disputes of law derived from the Quran and the Sunna (see Islam: Tenets and Early Development, ch. 2). He backed his authority in religion primarily with his authority in the state. In 1580 he also initiated a syncretic court religion called the *Din-i-Ilahi* (Divine Faith). In theory, the new faith was compatible with any other, provided the devotee was loyal to the emperor. In practice, orthodox Muslims were profoundly offended by both ritual and content. The ulama found their influence undermined. The concept of Islam as a superior revealed religion with a historic mission in the world appeared to be compromised. The syncretism of the court and its tolerance both of Hindus and of unorthodox Shia (see Glossary) sects among the Muslims triggered a reaction among the Sunni (see Glossary). Many in the aristocracy felt threatened by the addition of Persians, Indian Muslims, and Rajputs to their ranks in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the fratricidal war of succession that closed the reign of Shah Jahan in 1657 and 1658, the aristocracy gave its support to the austere military commander Aurangzeb against the learned and eclectic Dara Shikoh.

Great as Aurangzeb was, his reign ushered in the decline of the Mughal Empire. His cruelty to his father and brothers on coming to power alienated some. Although inspiring awe, he lacked the warmth of personality to attract new lieutenants and the trust to delegate adequate power. Although Aurangzeb was an outstanding general and rigorous administrator in an expanded empire, Mughal fiscal and military standards had declined as security and luxury increased. Land rather than cash had become the normal means of remunerating high-ranking officials, and fissiparous tendencies in a large empire further undermined the central authority.

In 1679 Aurangzeb reimposed the *jizya* on Hindus. Coming as it did after a series of other taxes and discriminatory measures in favor of the Sunni Muslims, this event spurred rebellion among Hindus and others in many parts of the empire: Jat, Sikh, and Rajput forces in the north and Maratha in the Deccan. The emperor was able to crush the rebellions in the north, but at a high cost to agricultural productivity as well as to the legitimacy of an all-India Mughal rule. He was compelled to move his headquarters to the Deccan to face the challenge of Maratha guerrilla fighters, and his victories there were ephemeral. Aurangzeb died in 1707 at age 82, oppressed by a sense of failure and impending doom.

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In the twilight century that followed, effective control by Aurangzeb's successors shrank, and the institutional weaknesses of the empire took their toll. Succession to imperial or even provincial power remained subject to intrigue and force. Princes and nobles became dissolute as they neglected their military and administrative functions, sometimes for patronage of the arts. In order to support an obligatory lavish style of living, they increased extortions from peasant and merchant alike. The risks to commerce increased in times of political insecurity, and the accumulation of wealth became hazardous. The *mansabdari* system, based on loyal service and cash payments, gave way to the *zamindari* system in which high-ranking officials were something between a hereditary landed aristocracy and a class of predatory rent collectors. The famous Mughal bureaucratic hegemony disintegrated into a network of warring kingdoms. The attitude of a ruler toward the ruled appeared to be closer to that of a spider toward a fly than the ancient ideal of a cowherd toward his cow.

As Delhi's control waned, other contenders for power emerged and clashed. New leaders in the Iran-Afghan Plateau were again attracted, and Nadir Shah of Meshed (present-day Iran) sacked Delhi in 1736. Anarchic conditions prevailed in the Punjab and the northwest, enticing Ahmad Shah Abdali of Qandahar. Maratha chieftains used the sentiments of Hindu revivalism, as well as military expertise, to expand their power beyond the Deccan in every direction. They reached for Delhi, where the Mughal emperor was distracted by Abdali's depredations, and called in the Marathas. Maratha forces under the Mughal banner were defeated by those of Abdali at the third Battle of Panipat in 1761. But the Afghan's victory was in name only. Real power on the Indian subcontinent was in the process of passing into the hands of European merchants.

The Europeans became part of the Indian scene after the Portuguese voyager Vasco da Gama sailed into the thriving Malabar port of Calicut in 1498 and conquered Goa in 1510. Under Admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque the Portuguese successfully challenged Arab power in the Indian Ocean. As European demand for Asian goods accelerated, Portuguese galleons dominated the sea routes for a century. Jesuits came to convert, to converse, and to record observations of the Mughal Empire. The Protestant countries, however, were irked by Portugal's monopoly, and the Dutch and British founded trading companies at the turn of the seventeenth century. Coastal potentates in India, trying to play one foreigner against another, granted them concessions. Mughal officials permitted the new carriers of India's considerable export trade to establish trading stations (factories). The main ones were around Surat, chief western port of the empire, and along the Ganges and Cauveri deltas on the east coast. The Dutch East Indies Company grew rapidly but concentrated mainly on the spice trade from the East Indies (Indonesia). The East India Company, chartered by the English went inland, carrying on trade with India instead. The French East India

Company was a newcomer to the subcontinent in 1670 but, like the others, was allowed to establish factories.

During the insecure eighteenth century, European trading factories served not only as collecting and transshipping points of trade but also as fortified centers of refuge for foreigners and Indians alike. The English factories in Surat, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta gradually came to apply English laws to disputes occurring within their boundaries. They also grew in size and population. Armed company servants were normal protectors of trade in those days and acquitted themselves well. As rival contenders to power called for armed assistance and as individual European adventurers found permanent homes in India, the English and French companies became part of the shifting political chessboard in the provinces of south India and Bengal.

The most prominent rivals for ascendancy in southern India were the nizam of Hyderabad, the sultan of Mysore, and the Marathas; the French and English invariably supported opposite sides in any conflict. The French leader Marquis Duplex was unable to consolidate his strong position, and by the end of the century the English in Madras had prevailed. In Bengal, too, the French and English supported different factions in the succession struggles of the Mughal viceroys. Bengal politics were further complicated by the rise of a new banking and trading class of Hindus and the absence of firm group loyalties. Plots and counterplots climaxed when East India Company forces, led by Robert Clive, decisively defeated the larger but divided armies of Nawab Siraj ud Daula at Plassey in 1757.

The Company Rule

It is convenient to date the beginning of British rule from the Battle of Plassey. Clive's victory was consolidated in 1764 at the Battle of Buxar, where the Mughal emperor Shah Alam was defeated. As a result, he appointed the East India Company to be the *diwan* (collector of revenue) in the areas of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa; the company thus became the supreme, but not the titular, power in much of the Ganges Valley. Company agents continued to trade, however, on terms highly favorable to themselves. There followed a period that British historians have called "shaking the pagoda tree," because the net transfer of wealth to company servants and to the company was so astronomical.

The initial period of freebooting and corruption had its effects in London, where Parliament passed William Pitt's India Act in 1784. Parliament was attempting to regulate the activities of British agents and also to systematize revenue collection and landownership along patterns evolved in Britain. Parliament was anxious to recover taxes from the company and in the process of investigation found itself sometimes moved by the plight of the Indian peasantry. The Permanent Settlement, imposed by the governor general, Lord Cornwallis, stands as a monument to the good intentions of that effort and to its disastrous effects. As a British official later wrote: "Our dealings with the land



The Hall, Mora Murado, Taxila



*Main stupa, Mora Murado, Taxila
Photos courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington*

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have been more destructive of all ancient property rights than were the old methods. . . . Our rigid and revolutionary methods of exacting land revenue have reduced the peasantry to the lowest extreme of poverty and wretchedness, and the procedures of our settlement courts have been the means of laying upon them burdens heavier than any they endured in former times."

The domain of the company was expanded in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. A mixture of tactics was used, sometimes against the same opponents, such as the Marathas. Their political power had not been consolidated into stable institutions, and by 1818 they were militarily eclipsed in western India. The company signed "subsidiary alliances" with Maratha and Rajput princes through which the company gained control, and often territory and tribute as well, in return for promises of defense and annual pensions. Outright military conquest or direct annexation brought other territorial gains, as with Oudh. Wars were fought with Mysore in the south, Burma in the east, and Nepal in the northeast, bringing highlands and future plantation areas under company control. In the northwest, however, the Afghans had given way to the Sikhs, whose several clans had been consolidated into an empire. Maharaja Ranjit Singh presided over a resplendent court at Lahore and an efficient administration tolerant of religious diversity. His well-disciplined forces took Kashmir in 1819 and Peshawar in 1823. Ranjit Singh and the company shrewdly maintained peace with each other.

Meanwhile, British agriculture, industry, and foreign trade were being transformed to make Britain the engine of prosperity in Europe. The British Parliament was becoming more representative and more effective. British belief in their superior capacity to govern others was becoming entrenched. The effects of these changes were also felt in India. The company lost its monopoly of trade and most of its commercial functions. Its political control was legalized and became infused with the zeal of the Evangelical and Utilitarian movements in Britain. Partly in response to demands from articulate and reformist Indians, new laws were passed affecting Hindus, especially high-caste females subjected to childhood marriage and the self-immolation of widows. In 1835 the company's government decided to use its educational funds exclusively for education in the English language. Persian was replaced by English as the official language, and the study of Arabic, Persian, and Sanskrit was no longer officially patronized. The rising middle class absorbed English customs and sent their sons to schools and colleges established on the British pattern. The far-reaching effects of these decisions remain visible on the subcontinent in the 1980s.

As British territorial acquisitions expanded in India, so too did Russian designs in Central Asia and mutual fear. The East India Company signed treaties with some Afghan amirs (kings or princes) and with Ranjit Singh. Russia backed Persian ambitions in western Afghanistan. In 1838 the company launched the First Afghan War (1838-42) when, with Sikh allies, they took Qandahar and Kabul and made their own

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candidate amir. Their position was untenable; an attempted withdrawal resulted in a massacre of the company's military force from which only one European escaped. A relief column reached Kabul and burned it in retribution but made no attempt to reoccupy the country. The First Afghan War is noted by historians as an example of outlandish phobia. Its impact was felt immediately in adjacent areas and set the stage for future problems.

The British occupied the amirates of Sind, Hyderabad, and Khairpur in the 1830s and used them as bases for the advance to Afghanistan. Friction arose on several points, and after the British retreat from Afghanistan the amirs staged an attack on the British residency. The amirs were defeated at Miani in 1843, and their territories were placed under the administration of Bombay. Similarly, in Baluchistan company forces had marched through the lands of the khan (see Glossary) of Kalat to reach Qandahar. In 1854 a treaty was negotiated by which the British gained the right to station a political agent in Kalat.

Tension in the Punjab followed the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839. As long as he lived, the Sutlej River was explicitly recognized as the dividing line of influence; Sikh states east of the Sutlej fell under British protection (see fig. 5). On the maharaja's death, Sikh clans quarreled among themselves and, fearing British ambitions, attacked across the Sutlej in 1845. The Sikh armies were defeated in 1846, and parts of the Punjab were placed under British rule. Kashmir, Gilgit, and Ladakh were consolidated by the British into a package that they sold to a Dogra general, Gulab Singh, for the sum of 1 million pounds sterling. The Second Sikh War was fought in 1848-49. It resulted in a final British victory and annexation of the Punjab.

A band of extraordinarily able British officers serving first the company and then the British crown administered the Punjab. They avoided the mistakes made by the British in Bengal. They maintained a high standard of probity, decisiveness, and fairness. They introduced reforms in some fields although respecting local customs by and large. New irrigation schemes later in the century helped the Punjab become the granary of northern India (see Irrigation, ch. 3). The respect gained by the new administration can be gauged by the fact that within 10 years of the Sikh wars, Sikh armies were fighting elsewhere for the British to quell the uprisings of 1857. The Punjab became the major recruiting area for the British Indian armies that fought so well in two world wars.

The British Raj

The uprisings of 1857 are called the Sepoy Mutiny (or Rebellion) by the British (an understatement) and the first war of independence by Indian and Pakistani nationalists (an exaggeration). The war was indeed a reaction to British expansion and the outcome of Lord Dalhousie's policies of modernization and annexation, especially of Oudh in 1856. The immediate spark for mutiny by the sepoys (Indian soldiers employed by the East India Company) was the introduction of a new

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Enfield rifle, which used cartridges allegedly greased with cow and/or pig fat, the tips of which were bitten off before loading. Both Muslim and Hindu soldiers were outraged at this offense to their religious scruples. Although confined more or less to northern and central India and with participation limited to sepoys and to the armies of the princes, the uprisings lasted a year and rocked the British psyche.

The war of 1857 became the great divide in nineteenth-century South Asian history. It brought the end of company rule inside India and the formal termination of the Mughal Empire. The British Parliament passed the Government of India Act of 1858, which established the British Empire of India under the direct responsibility of the queen—proclaimed empress in 1877. The "brightest jewel in the British Crown" was also the arena in which the achievements and the failures of Victorian imperialism were most conspicuously displayed.

The Victorian model of administration in British India remains the standard reference point for law, order, and probity in contemporary Pakistan. At the apex of the administration stood the governor general, always a British peer. He enjoyed supreme legislative and executive powers and was responsible only to the secretary of state for India in the British cabinet. British India was divided into provinces for administrative purposes, each headed by a governor or lieutenant governor. Provinces were partitioned into divisions and these into districts, the basic administrative unit encompassing substantial territory and population.

The district officer was the linchpin of the system. He combined in his person the functions of revenue collection as well as dispenser of justice and was called district collector, district magistrate, and in some areas district or deputy commissioner—the DC—with equal validity. Touring for several days each month was obligatory and added a personal touch to paternalism. District officers were usually drawn from the prestigious meritocracy, the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Recruitment to the ICS was competitive, based on examinations of young men with a British classical education. Exclusively British in its beginnings, the ICS was forced to open its doors slightly to successful Indian candidates. After 1871 district boards and municipal committees were established to assist the district officers in their administrative functions. And so elective politics were introduced on the subcontinent.

The governor general was also known as viceroy in his dealings with Indian princes on behalf of the British crown. The crown promised sanctity of treaties, implying a renunciation of company expansionism in which the absence of a direct or designated heir had been made an excuse for annexation on the death of a ruler. Political boundaries were frozen, and some 568 princely states of varying size and status were interspersed among the British Indian provinces that soon covered three-fifths of the subcontinent. The relationship between British crown and Indian prince was set out in an elusive doctrine of "paramountcy." The princes promised loyalty and surrendered all rights to conduct foreign or defense policy; the crown promised noninterference in in-

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ternal affairs (except in cases of gross maladministration or injustice) and protection from external or internal enemies. In the twentieth century the British came to regard the princely states as breakwaters in a turbulent sea of rising nationalism.

The British Raj was a socially and politically conservative entity, but it brought profound economic change to the subcontinent. For strategic, administrative, and commercial reasons the British improved transport and communications and kept them in good repair. Telegraph lines hummed. Railroad construction advanced from about 600 kilometers in the 1850s to over 40,000 kilometers by the end of the century. As a direct consequence, coal mines were opened up in Bengal, irrigation canals were laid out in the Yamuna-Ganga and Indus valleys, and new plantations of tea and coffee in the hills were added to those of indigo, cotton, and jute in the plains. Law and order guaranteed a high rate of return on British financial investment in these enterprises. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 knitted India into world markets.

The British Raj acted with London in support of British industry and not for the enrichment or modernization of India. For example, all track, locomotive, and mining equipment was designed and shipped from Britain and thus made limited technological impact on India. Most blatant of all, tariffs were structured so that the Lancashire cotton mills, having already ruined India's indigenous hand-weaving cotton industry, were also favored over the new cotton mills established in western India. The experience of economic colonialism combined with the exposure to the fruits of British industry and to British political thought and education led to a potent mix. The minds of a small but growing group of Indian financiers and industrialists turned to thoughts of political autonomy, and then to nationalism, within decades of the establishment of the Raj.

Perhaps the most pervasive effect of the 1857 uprisings was in the realm of race relations. The generally easy camaraderie maintained by company servants in the early days was gone forever. In its place was erected a veritable wall between the white-skinned rulers and the "native" population, causing far-reaching results. Psychologically, even those well-born, educated, or wealthy Indians to whom British doors were open were kept outside. Physically, the British with their families and servants lived in new "civil lines" or cantonments at a distance from towns and villages, children were sent "home" to Britain at high cost.

Racial criteria were also used in a dramatic overhaul of the British Indian Army. The number of British soldiers was increased relative to the Indians, and Indians were excluded from the artillery and other technical services. Moreover, a spurious theory of "martial races" was used to accelerate recruitment from among "loyal" Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Pakhtuns (Pathans—see Glossary) and to discourage recruitment of "disloyal" Bengalis or high-caste Hindus. The racism of the rulers undoubtedly fueled the nationalism of the ruled.

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The Forward Policy

British policy toward the tribal peoples on the northwest border vacillated between caution and adventurism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Some viceroys opposed extending direct administration or defense beyond the Indus River. Others favored a more assertive posture, or a "forward policy." The latter prevailed, partly because Russian advances in Central Asia gave their arguments credence. In 1874 Sir Robert Sandeman was sent to improve British relations with the Baluch tribes and the khan of Kalat. In 1876 Sandeman concluded a treaty with the khan that brought his territories—including Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela—under British suzerainty. The Second Afghan War was fought in 1878-80, and in the Treaty of Gandamak of May 1879 the Afghan amir ceded the districts of Pishin, Sibi, Harnai, and Thal Chotiali to the British. During succeeding years other tribal areas were forcibly occupied by the British. In 1883 they leased the Bolan Pass, southeast of Quetta, from the khan of Kalat on a permanent basis, and in 1887 they declared many districts of Baluchistan to be British territory.

A similar forward policy was pursued farther north. A British political agent was stationed in Gilgit in 1876 to report on Russian activities as well as on developments in the nearby states of Hunza and Nagar. In 1880 the Gilgit Agency was made permanent. Two years later, Captain Francis Edward Younghusband, who subsequently gained fame and knighthood for his march on Tibet, met a Russian party north of Gilgit in the Wakhan Corridor (see fig. 1). A British expedition was sent against Hunza and Nagar, which submitted. A new mir (chief) was appointed from the ruling family of Hunza by the British. British garrisons were established in Hunza and Chitral in 1892. A formal protectorate was declared over Chitral and Gilgit in 1893.

In the same year Sir Mortimer Durand negotiated an agreement with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan to fix an only partially surveyed line running from Chitral to Baluchistan as an international border between his territories and those of the British. Each party pledged not to interfere in the lands across the Durand line. This agreement brought under British control territory and people that had not yet been conquered. It was also the source of considerable trouble in the future.

The establishment of British hegemony in the northwest frontier regions did not lead to direct administration of the kind familiar to other parts of British India. Local customary laws were continued in force, as were the traditional lines of authority and social customs upheld by tribal chiefs. Agents did not give way to district officers or posturage to plantations. To a large extent the frontier was no more than a training ground for the British Indian armies. Along with Afghanistan and Iran it formed a vast buffer zone between the British and the Russian empires in Asia.

The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism

The uprising of 1857 was the last gasp of the Mughal Empire and of princely rule in India. Mutineering sepoys had marched from Meerut toward Delhi proclaiming their intention of restoring the poet-emperor Bahadur Shah II to imperial glory. British forces captured Delhi, bombarded Mughal forts and palaces, and banished the emperor to Burma, where he died in penury. British mistrust for the Muslim aristocracy was overtly expressed. Muslim leaders were alleged to have had a major role in the planning and leading of the revolt, albeit the revolt itself was a series of badly planned and uncoordinated uprisings. In the eyes of the British rulers, as well as Indians who chafed under them, the traditional Muslim leaders had been discredited.

As a consequence, the landed Muslim upper classes retreated into cultural and political isolation. They produced no large group comparable to the upwardly mobile British-educated Hindu middle class. They did not revise the doctrines of Islam to meet the challenges posed by alien rule, Christian missionaries, and revivalist Hindu sects attempting reconversion, such as the Arya Samaj. Economically, Muslim merchants had been ruined by the East India Company and did not enter the fray again until the twentieth century. The former Muslim rulers of India were in danger of becoming a permanent noncompetitive class in the British Raj at the very time that the seeds of Indian nationalism were sprouting.

The British system of imperial authority was based on an incomplete view of Indian society as an atomistic collection of socially discrete groups. But as British census takers and administrators categorized groups—ignoring the complex interrelationships among them—the groups themselves began to seek self-identification in terms of these categories. Thus, the question “who are the Indian Muslims?” became culturally and politically relevant and stimulated diverse responses to the British hegemony that posed the question.

One response came to be known as the Deoband Movement. It was led by the *ulamas*, who were expanding traditional Islamic education. Their most famous school (*madrasah*) was located at Deoband. *Ulamas* trained there also sought to reform the teaching of Islamic law and to promote its application in contemporary Muslim society. They promoted publications in Urdu, established fund-raising drives, and undertook other modern organizational work on an all-India basis.

Another response was led by Syed (see Glossary) Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and came to be called the Aligarh Movement after the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College that he founded at Aligarh in 1875, which became known as Aligarh College. Syed Ahmad placed his faith in British teachers and British education at a residential institution as a means of social mobility for the sons of the Muslim gentry under colonial rule. A clear precedent had been set by Raja Ram Mohan Roy and other Hindu reformers in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and their followers had reaped the advantages of their edu-

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cation and demonstrated loyalty to the British. A similar movement of Muslims in Bengal had been led by Nawab Abdul Latif, who founded the Muhammadan Literary Society in Calcutta in 1863.

Meanwhile, the beginnings of the Indian national movement could be discerned in the increasing tendency to form all-India associations representing various interests. English-speaking Indians, predominantly middle class but from different parts of the country, were discovering the efficacy of association and public meetings in propagating their views to a wider audience and in winning the attention of the British government of India. The Indian Social Conference was created in 1884 as a meeting place for those actively concerned with the regeneration of Hindu character. In 1885 the Indian National Congress (Congress) was developed to formulate proposals and demands for presentation to the British. Congress provided a national, all-India forum representing Indian opinion. Until after World War I, Congress was largely constitutionalist in form and procedure, though individuals differed on the best tactics to adopt. Overall, Congress contained many who visualized a long British tutelage and advocated strictly constitutionalist reforms and others who argued for a speedy end to alien rule; it was an umbrella organization for the secular as well as for those who wished to revive one religion or another. Above all, Congress was a political organization based on the idea of territorial, not sectarian, identification with India.

Under Principal Theodore Beck's tutelage, Aligarh College aspired to be an Indian Cambridge, carrying forward liberal values in literature, social life, education, and religion. Its founder also emphasized its role of giving a religious content to ethnic loyalty. Aligarh became a Muslim college as well as a college for Muslims. But the role for Muslims in India appeared cloudy as the principles of representation and elective government infiltrated the late Victorian age. Numerically, Muslims formed only one-fifth of the Indian population according to the 1881 census.

Thus it was that although Ahmad Khan often voiced demands similar to those made by Surendranath Banerjee and other founders of the Indian National Congress—for local self-government, Indian representation on the Viceroy's Council, equal duties and privileges for Indian members of the ICS, and judicial service—he remained conspicuously aloof when Congress was founded in 1885. And when another prominent Muslim, Badruddin Tyabji of Bombay, became president of the third Indian National Congress meeting at Madras in 1887, Ahmad Khan spoke out in opposition from a simultaneous meeting of the Muhammadan Educational Congress at Lucknow. He was knighted the following year. Sir Syed forbade his followers to join Congress. He argued that education, not politics, was the key to progress and that demonstrated loyalty to the British was essential for Muslim security. Graduates of Aligarh sought their careers initially in administration, not in politics. By and large, Muslims ignored the introduction of



Farm family in the Punjab
 Courtesy Kay Muldoon, WORLD BANK

representative institutions at the provincial level in the India Councils Act of 1892

Bengal was to prove that agitation could be as useful as politics. Lord Curzon, the governor general, partitioned Bengal in 1905. The province was unwieldy administratively, and Curzon decided to cut across the linguistic entity. According to his new administrative division, the new province of East Bengal and Assam contained a majority of Muslims. A massive antipartition campaign was launched against the British in Bengal using constitutional as well as terroristic methods and spearheaded by revolutionaries as well as by Congress. The partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911, but ambitious Muslims in the province remained disgruntled and looked to the All-India Muslim League (League) for better prospects.

In 1906 the League was founded to promote loyalty to the British government and "to protect and advance the political rights of the Muslims of India and respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government." In the same year a deputation to the viceroy led by the Agha Khan—the leader of the Ismailis—requested that in all elections Muslims should be represented by Muslims alone, elected by purely Muslim electorates, and that their political importance and greater contribution to British India be recognized by giving them representation greater than that warranted merely by numerical strength. The principles of communal representation and special electorates were

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incorporated into the India Councils Act of 1909 (known as the Morley-Minto Reforms) and remained part of all subsequent British constitutional experiments in India.

Beginnings of Self-Government

The Morley-Minto Reforms gave Indians limited roles in the central and provincial legislatures. Official government-appointed majorities remained, and the viceroy was in no way responsible to his council. The establishment of a parliamentary system, however, was not intended. The granting of separate electorates and communal representation was welcomed by the Muslims but resented by Congress. The League was pleased by apparent evidence of British intentions to support and safeguard Muslim interests in the subcontinent, and separate electorates remained part of the League platform even after the independence of Pakistan. Congress opposition to the principle was equally understandable. As the numerical majority, Hindus stood to lose from weighted minority representation. Congress as a national secular party in principle could not compromise its claim to represent all communities.

In retrospect, the Morley-Minto Reforms were a milestone. Step by step the nonofficials gained power in subsequent reforms and increasingly became an "opposition" to the official "government." Communal electorates were later extended to other communities and made a political factor out of the Indian habit of group identification through religion. The practice created certain vital questions for all concerned. The intentions of the British government became questionable, how humanitarian was their concern for minorities, how much was expediency, or was "divide and rule" their sole intention?

As the vacillations of British policy on India continued over the next 40 years, British good faith was doubted, and both the League and Congress sensed betrayal of implied promises. The Congress officially opposed communal representation, although privately some members conceded its utility. For nationalist Muslims the problem was frequently intense. Did emphasis of their separate identity deny them a place in all-India affairs? Did becoming part of the mainstream imply a denial of Islam? Could they be Muslim nationalists and Indian nationalists at the same time, if so, how?

Individuals resolved the predicament differently according to circumstances, as the career of Mohammad Ali Jinnah illustrates. Jinnah was born in 1875, studied law in England, and on returning to India began his political career as an enthusiastic liberal in Congress. In 1913 he joined the League, which had been shocked by the 1911 annulment of Bengal's partition into cooperating with Congress to make demands on the British.

India's contribution to the British Empire's efforts in World War I further stimulated moves toward self-government. In December 1916 the League and Congress held a joint session in Lucknow, where Hindu-Muslim unity was preached and a proposal for constitutional

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reform was drafted for presentation to the viceroy. The Lucknow Pact was a sincere compromise. Congress accepted separate electorates, and the League supported demands for self-government. It was the first Hindu-Muslim pact and was expected to lead to permanent united action against the British Raj.

In August 1917 the British government formally announced a policy of "increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." Constitutional reforms in 1919, known as the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, represented the maximum concessions Britain was prepared to make. The franchise was extended, as were direct elections, and some decentralization of authority took place, the governor general continued to be responsible solely to London, however.

The 1919 reforms did not satisfy political demands in India. The postwar economic recession, the troop demobilization, and a violent influenza epidemic intensified discontent. The British adopted a severely repressive posture against all opposition. This posture was epitomized for history in the April 1919 massacre at Jalianwala Bagh, Amritsar, which provided a spur to both the masses and political leaders, such as Gandhi.

Britain's postwar peace settlement with Turkey provided an additional and specific stimulus to grievances of the Muslims. After the abolition of the Mughal Empire, the Ottoman caliph had become a symbol of Islamic authority, the abolition of the caliphate by the Turks was seen as another blow to Muslim identity. As part of a pan-Islamic movement, mass protests, known as the Khilafat Movement, arose in India. The Khilafat Movement was also a repudiation of Muslim loyalty to British rule and thus legitimized Muslim participation in the Indian nationalist movement. In addition, the leaders of the Khilafat Movement, such as the Ali brothers—Muhammad and Shaukat—used Islamic symbols to unite their diverse community on an all-India basis. With a unified and assertive Muslim mass behind them, they felt confident of bargaining both with the Congress leadership and with the British for recognition of minority rights and the granting of political concessions.

Muslim leaders from Deoband and students from Aligarh joined Gandhi in mobilizing the masses for the 1920 and 1921 movements of civil disobedience and noncooperation. Although a variety of techniques were used, these methods predominated and were widely employed in subsequent twentieth-century political movements. Between 1919 and 1924 the Muslim League held joint sessions with the Indian National Congress, asserting India's right to self-government.

Despite impressive achievements, however, the Khilafat Movement failed. First, Turkey, having rejected the caliph, became a secular, modernizing state. Second, the religious, mass-based aspects of the movement alienated such Western-oriented constitutional politicians

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as Jinnah, who resigned from Congress. Other Muslims were also uncomfortable with Gandhi's leadership. Third, and most important, the movement failed to lay a lasting foundation of Indian unity; on the contrary, it served to aggravate Hindu-Muslim differences among the very masses who were being politicized. The Moplah Revolt of 1921 was the most bloody of a series of communal riots that had religious overtones and economic undertones and that prevented Hindu-Muslim unity over the next two decades.

Meanwhile, Gandhi contributed revolutionary ideas and the tactics of mass mobilization and civil disobedience. His success in converting an elitist all-India movement into a mass-based national movement had, ironically enough, a deleterious effect on Hindu-Muslim relations. For example, the song "Bande Mataram" was elevated to the status of a national anthem, but the song was an affront to Muslims because its symbolism of a Mother Goddess was offensive and because it was derived from an anti-Muslim tirade. The Hindus as the overwhelming majority were often intolerant of minority sensitivities.

The political picture in India was not at all clear when the decennial review of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms became due in 1929. Prospects of further constitutional reforms spurred greater agitation and almost a frenzy of demands from different groups in India. British policy itself was not consistent, and minority or coalition governments in Britain were obliged to respond to different British interests as well as to a variety of opinions in India. Investigatory commissions and round-table conferences in London added information to the point of confusion, and six years elapsed before the Government of India Act of 1935 was promulgated.

Designed as a compromise to all interested parties, the act satisfied none; it was surrounded by explanations and assurances in Britain that were inevitably misinterpreted in India. The act provided the basic machinery for self-government by widening the franchise, allowing provincial autonomy, and introducing dyarchy at the center, but it did not provide for responsible government at the center and did so only to a very limited extent in the provinces. Separate electorates and special powers of the governors were meant to safeguard the interests of minorities, but the parliamentary principles of majority party government were implicit in the new constitution. A federation of British India and princely India was planned for but never came into existence. The 1935 act provided the framework and World War II the background for partition in 1947.

The Two-Nation Theory

The political-intellectual ferment in India during the late 1920s and 1930s produced the first articulations of a separate state as an expression of Muslim nationhood. The leading modern Muslim philosopher in South Asia, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, discussed contemporary problems in his presidential address to the League conference at Allahabad in 1930. He saw India as Asia in miniature, in which a unitary form of

government was inconceivable and community rather than territory was the basis for identification. To him, communalism in its highest sense was the key to the formation of a harmonious whole in India. Therefore, he demanded the creation of a confederated India that would include a Muslim state consisting of the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sind, and Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings Sir Muhammad reiterated the claims of Muslims to be considered a nation "based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests."

Sir Muhammad gave no name to his projected state; that was done by Rahmat Ali and a group of students at Cambridge in England who issued a pamphlet in 1933 entitled *Now or Never*. They opposed the idea of federation, denied that India was a single country, and demanded partition into regions, the northwest receiving national status as a "Pakistan." They explained the term as follows: "Pakistan . . . is composed of letters taken from the names of our homelands, that is Punjab, Afghana (NWFP), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. It means the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean." There was a proliferation of articles on the theme of Pakistan expressing the subjective conviction of nationhood but no coordination of political effort to achieve it.

In 1934 Jinnah took over leadership of the League, which at that time was without a sense of mission—very different from the Khilafat Movement, which had combined religion, nationalism, and political adventure. Jinnah set about restoring a sense of purpose to Muslims. He emphasized the two-nation theory based on conflicting ideas and conceptions.

The 1937–40 period was critical in the growth of the theory. Under the 1935 act, elections to provincial assemblies were held in 1937, giving Congress majorities in eight of the 11 provinces. But Congress refused to form ministries unless the governors promised not to use their special reserve powers to interfere in administration. The viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, satisfied Congress on that count, but the Muslims and other special interest groups were fearful of the consequences. Congress also took a strictly legalistic stand on the formation of ministries and refused to form coalition governments with the League even in the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh in India), which had a substantial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the League's claim to be the only true representative of Indian Muslims. In the Punjab and Bengal, coalition ministries were formed under the Muslim leadership of Sikander Hyat Khan and Fazlul Huq, respectively; these worked well, since neither Congress nor the League was strong. Nevertheless, the conduct of Congress governments permanently alienated the League.

By the late 1930s Jinnah was convinced of the need for a unifying issue among Muslims, and Pakistan was the obvious answer. At its annual session in Lahore on March 23, 1940, the League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in the northwest and in the northeast of

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India should be grouped to constitute independent states, autonomous and sovereign, and that no independence plan without this provision would be acceptable to the Muslims. Federation was rejected and, though confederation on common interests with the rest of India was envisaged, partition was predicted as the final goal.

The Pakistan issue brought a positive goal to the Muslims and simplified the task of political agitation. It was no longer necessary to remain "yoked" to Hindus. For the next few years the League did little to refine its demand. The main opposition to the proposal came from orthodox Muslims, who rejected the idea because they viewed Islam as a global religion that would be hampered by having a separate state, because they doubted the ability of the League's secular leaders to build an Islamic state, and because they believed that partition would not solve the minority problem on the subcontinent.

An interesting feature of the Pakistan movement is that it received its greatest support from areas where the Muslims were in a minority, not a majority. In these areas the main issue was finding an alternative to replacing British rule with Congress (that is, Hindu) rule. When the Congress ministries resigned on December 10, 1939, the Muslims celebrated "Deliverance Day." The Punjab and Sind did not respond to the League until 1946, and the NWFP remained loyal to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi, until independence. The League's power in Bengal was less resolute than in the United Provinces.

Toward Partition

Congress predictably opposed all proposals of partition. It stood for a united India having a strong center and fully responsible government. To many, as to Jawaharlal Nehru, the idea of a sovereign state based on a common religion seemed a historical anachronism and a denial of democracy. From 1940 reconciliation between Congress and the League became increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Muslim enthusiasm for Pakistan grew in direct proportion to Hindu condemnation of it; the concept took on a life of its own and became an objective fact in 1947.

During World War II the League and Congress adopted different attitudes toward the British government. British tactics toward them were dictated by the expediencies of defense. Congress ministers resigned when war was declared for India without consulting Indians and, as a result of the act, lost political leverage with the British. The League followed a course of cooperation, gaining time and favor to consolidate. Its success can be gauged from its sweep of 90 percent of all Muslim seats in British India during the 1946 elections as compared with a mere 4.5 percent in the 1937 elections. In London it was clear that there were now three parties to any discussions on the future of India: the British, Congress, and the League.

Spurred by the Japanese advance in Asia and friendly advice from Washington, British prime minister Winston Churchill's war govern-

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ment in 1942 sent a mission headed by Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a tentative plan of settlement. Briefly, the plan provided for dominion status after the war for an Indian union composed of those British Indian provinces and princely states wishing to accede to it, a separate dominion of those that did not, and firm defense links between Britain and the Indian union. Although Cripps was sympathetic to Indian nationalism, his mission failed.

In August 1942 Gandhi launched a revolutionary "Quit India" movement against the British Raj. Jinnah condemned the movement. The government retaliated by arresting about 60,000 individuals and outlawing Congress. The League, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Indian Communist Party stepped up their political activity. Communal passions rose, as did the incidence of communal violence. Talks between Jinnah and Gandhi in 1944 proved as futile as negotiations between Gandhi and the viceroy.

In July 1945 the Labour Party came to power in Britain with a vast majority. Its choices in India were limited by the decline of British power and the necessity of retaining Indian links in imperial defense, even though the spread of Indian unrest had affected the armed services. Some form of independence was the only alternative to forceful retention of control over an unwilling dependency. The viceroy, Lord Wavell, held discussions with Indian leaders in Simla in 1945 in an attempt to decide what form an interim government might take, but no agreement was reached.

New elections to the provincial and central legislations were ordered, and a three-man cabinet mission arrived from Britain to discuss plans for self-government. Although the mission did not directly accept the demand for Pakistan, concessions were made by severely limiting the power of the central government, by creating a three-tier federation in which the 11 provinces were categorized into three sections, each of which could immediately form a group with one executive and one legislature, and by giving veto power to each community over legislation concerning itself. An interim government composed of the parties that won the election was to start functioning immediately, as was the newly elected Constituent Assembly.

Congress and the League had emerged from the elections as the two dominant parties. At first both parties seemed to accept the cabinet mission plan, despite grave reservations, but subsequent behavior of their leaders soon led to mistrust and bitterness. Jinnah demanded parity for the League in the interim government and temporarily boycotted it when the demand was not met. Nehru indiscreetly made statements that cast doubts on Congress' sincerity in accepting the cabinet mission plan. Each party disputed the right of the other to appoint Muslim ministers.

When the viceroy proceeded to form an interim government without the League, Jinnah called for demonstrations, or "Direct Action," on August 16, 1946. Communal rioting broke out on an unprecedented scale, especially in Bengal and Bihar; the massacre of Muslims in

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Calcutta brought Gandhi to the scene. His efforts calmed fears in Bengal, but the rioting spread to other provinces and continued into the following year. Jinnah took the League into the government in an attempt to prevent additional communal violence, but disagreements among the ministers rendered the interim government ineffective. Over all loomed the shadow of civil war.

In February 1947 Lord Louis Mounbatten was appointed viceroy with instructions to arrange for the transfer of power by June 1948. Mounbatten made a quick assessment of the Indian scene, which persuaded him that Congress was willing to accept partition as the price for a transfer of power, that Jinnah was aware that a smaller Pakistan than the one demanded was better than none in his lifetime, and that the Sikhs would learn to accept a division of the Punjab. Mounbatten obtained sanction from London for the drastic action he proposed and then persuaded most of the Indian leaders to acquiesce in a general way to his plan.

On June 3 British prime minister Clement Attlee introduced a bill in the House of Commons calling for independence and partition of India, and on July 14 the House of Commons passed the India Independence Act, by which two independent dominions were created on the subcontinent and the princely states were left to accede to either. Throughout the summer of 1947, as communal violence mounted and first drought and then floods wracked the land, preparations for partition proceeded in Delhi. Not surprisingly, these preparations were inadequate. Assets had to be divided and boundary commissions set up to demarcate frontiers. British troops were evacuated. The military was restructured into two forces while law and order broke down in different parts of the country. Civil servants were given the choice of joining either country. British officers could retire with compensation if not invited to stay on. Jinnah and Nehru tried unsuccessfully to quell the passions that neither fully understood. On August 7 Jinnah flew from Delhi to Karachi to take office seven days later as the first governor general of the new Dominion of Pakistan.

Legacy of the British Raj

Evaluations of the British Raj tend to vary with the outlook and nationality of the evaluator and the criteria used for assessment. Moreover, British dominance in India was first extended by the merchant adventurers of the eighteenth century and then by the overt imperialists of the nineteenth century. Ideas of permanent trusteeship were evolved to justify continued British rule by those convinced of its benefits, but these ideas came into conflict with demands for self-government as the logical culmination of the Raj. The Indian subcontinent itself was not homogeneous, and its inhabitants' responses to the British impact varied with time, place, and socioeconomic position. Keeping these qualifications in mind, a broad balance sheet can be suggested.

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The British Raj secured the subcontinent from external attack and provided a relatively high standard of internal security for about 150 years. The main instruments for security were the army and the police, both of which were developed into fine professional machines. Financed by India and manned largely by Indians, the army was organized under British officers (almost exclusively until the 1920s) and kept under British control to serve imperial interests. Indian troops recruited from so-called martial races were balanced by community and segregated from the rest of the population, as were the police. Nevertheless, the services proved invaluable legacies to the succeeding states.

Extending over 55 percent of the subcontinent and encompassing 73 percent of the population, the British Raj provided a political unity seldom enjoyed in South Asian history. This unity was reinforced by law and government as much as by modern means of communication. The Indian national movement was a product of British imperialism, and the claim has often been made that India as a unified political entity was a British achievement. Partition of the subcontinent into two hostile states shattered that claim.

A more significant contribution was made in the legal sphere. English law was the basis of the civil and criminal codes drawn up in the 1860s, many of which remained in force more than a century later (see *Crime and Punishment*, ch. 5). Respect for the integrity and independence of judges, concern for "due process" in relations between government and citizen, and the principle of equality of persons before the law were evolved in Britain, but the people of the subcontinent became enthusiastic converts to the "rule of law," criticizing such aberrations as special procedures for Europeans, repressive security measures, martial law, and special religious and military courts. Civil liberty was enjoyed in British India, especially after freedom of the press was granted in the late nineteenth century, provided that emergency laws against political dissidents were not in effect.

Despite the introduction of representative institutions in the twentieth century, the British Raj was a highly centralized bureaucracy. Its highest cadre was the ICS, a small elite corps that until shortly before independence had few Indian members. The ICS staffed the expanding functions of government and generally maintained high standards of ability and probity. Its members enjoyed paternal power in the countryside and were called *ma-baap* (mother-father) by the people whose welfare they held in trust. Praiseworthy as it was, this "steel frame" of the Raj produced some adverse effects. Traditional forms of local self-government atrophied and were replaced by excessive dependence on government. Aspects of the racial exclusiveness of the ICS and its assumption of innate superiority were retained by Pakistan's elite civil service and remained evident in 1983.

Britain's political impact, however, went further than administration. It gave the subcontinent an introduction to the principles and procedures of parliamentary democracy; it provided a body of literature on

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liberal political ideas and institutions that could not be matched in the indigenous traditions.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the British Raj was economic. Despite nineteenth-century efforts to rectify earlier errors in land revenue policy and to encourage agricultural production through vast irrigation works, agriculture stagnated after the 1890s. Famine codes that were issued to assist farmers only testified to their increasing impoverishment. An infrastructure of industry was laid and industrialization begun, but the process was inhibited rather than encouraged by the government. Electric power, defense industries, and technical education were neglected. No central bank or fiscal autonomy existed until the 1920s. At the time of independence, Pakistan and India still had economies with pre-twentieth-century frameworks.

A close relationship between South Asia and the modern West was created through the mediation of Britain. Both gained from this and might have gained further if the relationship had not been tainted by racism. Its benefits are more evident in the postindependence era. Perhaps unconsciously Britain acted, as Marx called it, as "an engine of progress."

Independent Pakistan

Problems at Independence

Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947, burdened with numerous problems. Its territory was in two widely separated parts. It lacked the machinery, personnel, equipment, and habitude of central government. Its economy scarcely seemed viable after severing ties with India. Above all, there was the immeasurable problem of refugees flowing in both directions, fearful of life, honor, and property. Nobody was prepared for the violence of communal rioting or for the mass movements of population that followed the British announcement on June 3, 1947, of intention to partition. The actual boundaries were only made known on August 17 after two border commissions chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe had labored through the summer with maps of Bengal and the Punjab to divide them with new borders. Conservative estimates of a quarter of a million dead and 12 to 14 million rendered homeless provide only a hint of the human tragedies experienced in both countries.

West Pakistan lost its Hindus and Sikhs. The Punjab was the worst affected because the Hindus and Sikhs had managed the commercial life of the province. In their place came an approximately equal number of Muslims from different provinces in India, especially from the United Provinces. Most settled in the Punjab or in the capital city of Karachi. One economist estimates that in 1951 about 46 percent of the population of Pakistan's major cities were immigrants (known as *muhajirs*). They were potential sources of disorder not only because the poor among them created problems of welfare but also because the prominent among them were mainly urban people coming from cities in



*Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
Quaid-i-Azam*



*Liaquat Ali Khan, the
Quaid-i-Millet*

Photos courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington

India that had had more modern institutions than those in Pakistan. The aspirations for Pakistan and the goals for the new state these urban refugees had helped to create were not always the same as those of the traditional rural people already inhabiting it, whose support for the idea of Pakistan had been but lately given. According to one Pakistani scholar, the country was born polarized. Conflict between these two groups was and remains an important determinant of the course of Pakistan's political and economic development (see *The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration*, ch. 4).

East Pakistan, or East Bengal, did not initially face a comparable problem. But its administrative resources were poor and heavily dependent on the Hindus. Economically, it was a producer of raw materials that traditionally had been processed in West Bengal, now part of India. An exodus of Hindus took place in 1950 and 1951. Their place was taken mostly by Bihari or Punjabi refugees who found it difficult, if not impossible, to merge and identify with the Bengali Muslim population.

The land and people west of the Indus River had always posed problems for administrators such as the British. For Pakistan the prob-

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lems were compounded by the fact that the most popular grass-roots political organization in the NWFP was Congress. It was led by Khan Abdul Ghaflar Khan and his Khuda-i-Khitmagar (Servants of God, usually referred to as the Red Shirts). He asked his followers not to participate in a referendum held on July 6, 1947, which was declared in favor of Pakistan. An additional problem for Pakistan was to establish the legitimacy of its authority against possible challenge from Afghanistan. Irredentist claims from Kabul were based on the ethnic unity of the tribes straddling the border; the emotional appeal of "Pakhtunistan," homeland of the Pakhtuns, was undeniable. However, Pakistan upheld the treaties British India had concluded with Afghanistan and refused to discuss the validity of the Durand Line as the international border. It preferred to deal with the Pakhtunistan issue internally. Nevertheless, relations with Afghanistan were recurrently hostile, resulting in the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations. The influx of refugees from Afghanistan after the December 1979 Soviet invasion has clearly added immense new problems for Pakistan.

The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically free to accede to either dominion. In practice, their choices were limited by location and the wishes of the population. The frontier princely states of Dir, Chitral, Swat, Amb, and Hunza in the north and northwest acceded to the contiguous dominion of Pakistan, while retaining substantial autonomy in internal administration and customary law. The khan of Kalat in Baluchistan declared independence on August 15, 1947, but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan. Other Baluch sardars (tribal chiefs) also expressed their preference for separate identity. Pakistan took military action against them and brought about accession in 1948.

Bahawalpur State in former Rajputana, with its Muslim population of 1.5 million, acceded to Pakistan. Other princes on the Rajputana border may have been tempted to do so in order to retain more autonomy but were preempted by skillful Indian diplomacy and popular demonstrations. The nawab of Junagadh, a Kathiawar state composed of many scattered enclaves, did accede to Pakistan on August 18, 1947, but his actions were negated by an Indian police action and subsequent referendum.

The nizam of Hyderabad in the Deccan attempted to resist internal and external pressures to join India; he probably wished to regain independence. However, he and his government were unpopular and ineffective. A breakdown of law and order as well as armed clashes between extremist groups of Muslims and Hindus provided the occasion for an Indian military action in September 1948.

The maharaja of Kashmir was similarly reluctant to make a decision on accession to either dominion and was also unpopular. Armed incursions into the state by tribesmen from Pakistan's NWFP forced him to seek military assistance from India. He signed accession papers in October 1947 and allowed Indian troops to recover much of the state. The government of Pakistan, however, refused to recognize the acces-

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sion, denounced it as a fraud, and conducted an active military and diplomatic campaign to undo its results. Indeed, much of Pakistan's foreign policy revolved around Kashmir and was played out in the United Nations (UN). Pakistan's position was simple, consistent, and appealing. It rested on the theory of two nations on the subcontinent according to which Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population, was a logical summation of Muslim nationalism. Kashmir had consistently figured in the preindependence notions of Pakistan, whereas Bengal was rarely mentioned. A cease-fire arranged by the UN in January 1949 formalized a military status quo, leaving about 30 percent of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan's control. Subsequent engagements, as well as agreements between Pakistan and India, did not substantially alter the cease-fire line or the ideological stalemate.

The new state of Pakistan had little economic viability; facts of economic complementarity had been ignored in partition. West Pakistan produced more wheat than it consumed and formerly had provided for deficit areas in India. Cotton grown in West Pakistan had been milled in factories in and around Calcutta. Coal, sugar, and other basic necessities had come from West Bengal in India. Of the four major ports in undivided India, only Karachi was allocated to Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan had practically no economic exchanges before partition and were separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory.

The two new dominions had decided to allow free movement of goods, persons, and capital for one year, but this agreement broke down. In November 1947 Pakistan levied export duties on jute and cotton, and India retaliated with export duties of its own. The heaviest burden fell on East Bengal jute. The trade war reached a crisis in September 1949 when Britain devalued the pound sterling to which the rupee of both India and Pakistan was pegged. India followed suit, but Pakistan did not. India severed trade relations. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the subsequent price increases for jute, cotton, and wool saved the economy of Pakistan. New trading relationships were formed, and the construction of jute and cotton mills inside Pakistan was quickly undertaken. Although India and Pakistan reopened trade in 1951, both the volume and the value of trade steadily declined. Smuggling across the borders posed problems for both countries, but for 25 years the two countries ignored bilateral trade in the new patterns of international trade they built.

The assets of British India were divided on the ratio of 17 to India and five to Pakistan by decision of the Viceroy's Council in June 1947. Division was difficult to implement, however, and Pakistan complained of nondeliveries. A financial agreement was reached in December 1948, but the actual settlement of financial and other disputes connected with the division of assets continued through thousands of transactions until 1960.

Division of the all-India services of the ICS and the Indian Police Service proved difficult as well. Among a total of 1,157 officers only

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101 were Muslim. Among these, 95 opted for Pakistan; they were joined by one Christian, 11 Muslim army officers transferring to civilian service, and 50 Britons, totaling 157. But only 20 had more than 15 years of service, and more than one-half had fewer than 10 years of service. These men formed the core of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), which became one of the most elite and privileged bureaucracies in the world. They built around themselves the administrative, judicial, and diplomatic services. Their contribution in tiding Pakistan over the first years of independence was unquestionably high, their esprit de corps strong. Bureaucratic services were virtually indispensable to every government of the 1950s and 1960s. Their ideas on government and economics were decisive in the Ayub Khan era. Conflicts between some senior civil servants and Bhutto in the 1970s, however, resulted in reorganization and reorientation of the bureaucracy. The decline in both morale and standards was noticeable (see *The Bureaucracy*, ch. 4).

Constitutional Beginnings

At independence, Jinnah was the supreme authority. An active politician almost all his adult life, he was more than a party leader in the Western sense. He had won independence for Pakistan within seven years and was hailed by his followers as Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) and other phrases appropriate to a Mughal emperor. Too much a constitutional lawyer to wish royal honors, Jinnah nevertheless could not conceive of himself as a prime minister advising a governor general who represented the British crown, the role Nehru sought and secured in India. He chose to unite in himself the ceremonial functions of head of state with the effective power of chief executive as well as party boss. The office of governor general was adapted to give Jinnah wide powers of special responsibility and discretion.

Jinnah often presided over meetings of the cabinet. He looked for lieutenants rather than colleagues in the Muslim League. He was legal advisor as well as president of the Constituent Assembly. He appointed strong men as governors of the provinces and instructed them to report to him in writing every fortnight. He was comfortable with a governmental machinery of preindependence days, a viceregal system. His main concerns were maintaining law and order and rooting out bribery and corruption. In addition, he brought an urban bias toward commerce and industry that was supported by refugee groups. His Industrial Policy Statement of 1948 encouraged entrepreneurs among them to bring industry quickly to predominantly agricultural Pakistan. Although Jinnah had led the movement for Pakistan as a separate Muslim nation, he was appalled by the communal riots and urged equal rights for all citizens irrespective of religion. But too many conflicts of interest and ideology existed within the society to permit the creation of a secular modern polity. Jinnah died in September 1948—a scant 13 months after independence—leaving it to his successors to tackle the problems of Pakistan's identity as best they could.

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Jinnah's acknowledged lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, assumed leadership, but only as prime minister. Khwaja Nazimuddin of East Pakistan was appointed governor general, and Choudhury Khaliquzzaman became president of the Muslim League. Liaquat had long political experience as a lawyer in British India and tried to mold the future constitution along lines consistent with a parliamentary democracy. He failed largely because the two main political instruments in Pakistan, the Muslim League and the Constituent Assembly, were not equipped to resolve in a parliamentary fashion the problems and conflicts of interest they encountered. His term of office was abruptly terminated by assassination in October 1951.

The Muslim League had been too preoccupied with its struggle for Pakistan to formulate postindependence social and economic programs. Its leadership was composed mostly of urban professionals whose political base in the areas that became Pakistan was weak. Instead, the authority and power of landed families was strong, especially in West Pakistan. Government and party had to come to terms with them. Landlords with ascriptive privileges were not comfortable with procedures of decisionmaking through debate, discussion, and majority vote. Their entry into politics in the early 1950s put a stamp on the Muslim League as a party with a weak organizational structure at the grass roots, powerful factional leaders, and decisions made at the top. Moreover, leaders showed more concern for office and the fruits of power than for the evolution of ideology or implementation of mass programs. The Muslim League lost heavily in West Pakistan during the provincial elections of 1954 and was completely defeated in East Pakistan. Other political parties were born during this period, though their importance showed itself much later. The National Awami Party (NAP) had separate branches in the eastern and western wings of the country and identified itself with sentiments of provincial autonomy. Islamic parties catered to other, nonsecular aspirations.

The League was obligated to take responsibility for all deterioration since independence and to answer for the high hopes that had been raised and left unfulfilled. A rising level of opposition and frustration in Pakistan can be judged to some extent by the government's increased use of preventive detention powers and of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which gave administrative officers powers amounting to martial law. In 1952 the Security of Pakistan Act was passed, which expanded the powers of the government in the interests of public order.

The armed services themselves posed a serious threat to Liaquat's government, which was less hostile to India than some officers wished. In March 1951 Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan, chief of general staff of the army, was arrested along with 14 other officers on charges of plotting a military coup d'état. The authors of what came to be called the "Rawalpindi Conspiracy" were tried in camera and sentenced to imprisonment. All were subsequently released, however, and in 1963 one of those convicted was a member of President Zia's cabinet. There is much speculation but little public documentation of this small but

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important episode, which reflected factionalization within the officer corps of the armed forces. A new and powerful element was entering Pakistan's politics.

The Constituent Assembly was composed of 80 members drawn from the 1946 Indian Constituent Assembly, plus representation for refugees and divided provinces. It did not function with sincerity, efficiency, or a high level of debate, however. Its only achievement was the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, which specified that the constitution would be Islamic, democratic, and federal. But there was no agreement on how these objectives would take form, no detail, and no calming of fears among minorities. After the assassination of Liaquat, the paucity of leadership became obvious. Differences of opinion and conflicts of group interest remained unresolved on crucial issues. These issues included the division of executive power between head of state and head of government, the division of powers and functions between permanent officials, i.e., CSP, and elected leaders, the distribution of powers between the central government and provincial governments, the balance of power between the two wings of the country, and the ways in which practical form could be given to Islamic principles.

During the years following Liaquat's assassination the problems inherent in these issues were not resolved. Events built up to a major confrontation between the governor general and the prime minister, which was also a confrontation between civil and military officials on the one hand and elected representatives on the other. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad was more assertive than his predecessor, Khwaja Nazimuddin. In 1953 he imposed martial law in the Punjab and governor's rule in East Bengal. When the prime minister tried to limit the governor general's powers through amendments to the constitution, Ghulam Muhammad dismissed the prime minister and appointed his own "Cabinet of Talents" in 1954. It was headed by a man without personal following, Mohammad Ali Bogra, and included Major General (Reserve) Iskander Mirza, minister of interior, General Ayub Khan, defense minister, and Choudhry Mohammad Ali, former head of the civil service, finance minister. Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly, an act pronounced illegal by the Federal Court. In 1955 Ghulam Muhammad invested himself with powers by ordinance to create a new and single province of West Pakistan—known as One Unit—and to provide the country with a new constitution.

Generally speaking, Ghulam Muhammad was successful in his subordination of the prime minister because he had the tacit or explicit support of civil and military officials as well as the backing of the landed families in his home province of the Punjab. Those groups benefited from his actions. They were also able to capitalize on the inability of elected politicians to provide stable government, practical programs, or a constitution.

The inability of politicians arose from their mutual suspicions. Their loyalties tended to be provincial and personal. Debates on the national good or great issues of polity seldom moved them. Provincialism was

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openly expressed in terms of real fears: fears that the Punjab would dominate the nation, or at least West Pakistan; fears that democratic political processes would give the upper hand to the more populous province of East Bengal; fears that all other provinces would combine against the Punjab; fears that the urban professionals, especially lawyers, would prevail against landed interests.

Those fears were also present in the Second Constituent Assembly, which met in 1955, having been chosen by the provincial assemblies elected in 1954. It differed in composition from the first through a notable reduction of members from the Muslim League and the presence of a United Front coalition from East Pakistan in opposition. It was led by H.S. Suhrawardy of the Awami League and Fazlul Huq of the Krishak Sramik (Workers and Peasants) Party. Provincial autonomy was the main plank of the coalition platform, a foretaste of the 1970 elections. Debate on the government's Establishment of West Pakistan Bill was long and acrimonious. Attacks from the opposition focused on both the motives and the methods in bringing into being One Unit. They suspected that agreement from the Punjab for underrepresentation in the new legislature and in key governmental positions for a period of 10 years was merely a cloak for eventual domination. They pointed to the outflow of Punjabis to less-populated parts of West Pakistan and the heavy Punjabi representation in all government services, not least the army, as cause for concern on the part of others.

In 1956 the Second Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution that proclaimed Pakistan an Islamic republic and contained directives for the establishment of an Islamic state. A kind of romantic Islam had infused the Muslim separatist movement in India, and the slogans of Islamic state, Islamic government, and Islamic constitution had been popular in the 1940s. But there was no consensus on what these terms meant in practice. Intense expectations were not matched by a comparable intellectual effort to resolve the problems of creating an Islamic state on the subcontinent in the twentieth century.

The lawyer-politicians who had led the Pakistan movement had used the principles and legal precedents of a nonreligious British parliamentary tradition even while they advanced the idea of Muslim nationhood as an axiom. Many of them represented a liberal movement in Islam in which their personal religion was compatible with Western technology and political institutions. They saw the basis for democratic processes and tolerance in the ancient Islamic institutions of *ijma* and *ijtihad* (consensus of the community and the concept of continuing interpretations and judgment of Islamic law). Most of Pakistan's intelligentsia and Westernized elites belonged to this group of *ijma* modernists (see Religion, ch. 2).

In contrast stood the traditionalist ulama (Islamic scholars), whose position was a legalistic one based on the unity of religion and politics in Islam. The ulama asserted that the Quran, the Sunna, and the sharia (see Glossary) provided the general principles for all aspects of life if correctly interpreted. The government's duty, therefore, was to rec-

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ognize the function of the ulama in interpretation of the law. Because the ulama and the less-learned mullahs enjoyed influence among the masses and because no politician could afford to be denounced as anti-Islamic, none dared publicly to ignore them. Nevertheless, they were not given powers of legal interpretation until the Zia regime (see *Emerging Political System*, ch. 4). The lawyer-politicians making decisions in the 1950s almost without exception preferred the courts and legal institutions they had inherited from British India.

Another viewpoint on Islam was presented by a fundamentalist movement in Pakistan. Its most significant organization was the Jamaat-i-Islami, which gradually built up support among refugees, the urban lower middle class, and students. Unlike the traditional ulama, the fundamentalist movement was the outcome of modern Islamic romanticism. It was also crucial in the constitutional and political development of Pakistan. It forced politicians to face the questions of Islamic identity. On occasion, definitions of Islamic identity resulted in violent controversy, as in the Punjab during the early 1950s when agitation was built against the Ahmadiyas, a small but influential sect considered by the orthodox to be deviant. In 1953 attacks on the Ahmadiyas by Sunni mobs led to riots that brought on martial law. In the mid-1970s the Ahmadiyas were declared to be non-Muslims by both the Bhutto government and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, in which more than a touch of fundamentalism was visible.

During the 1950s, however, the fundamentalist movement led by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder and leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami, succeeded only in introducing Islamic principles into the 1956 constitution. A section called Directive Principles of State Policy attempted to define ways in which the Islamic way of life and Islamic moral standards could be pursued. The principles were nonjusticiable and contained injunctions against the consumption of alcohol and the practice of usury. The establishment of Islamic schools and endowments was urged. An Islamic institution for research and instruction was to be established by the government. Laws repugnant to Islam were to be expunged. A minimum consensus was reached among various groups, and the substance of the 1956 clauses on Islam reappeared in the 1962 constitution.

Early Foreign Policy

Side by side with a shift in emphasis away from electoral politics toward bureaucratic administration in the mid-1950s came a major change in Pakistan's foreign policy. Notwithstanding its dispute with India, Pakistan's initial stance in world affairs had been similar to that of its sister dominion. Pakistan valued its membership in the Commonwealth of Nations and the UN. In the latter body its delegates consulted with other Asian and Arab delegates and voted on Cold War issues as a nonaligned state—without prior commitment either to the United States or to the Soviet Union. Pakistan's positions on Middle

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East questions and the issue of colonialism were also similar to those of other South Asian and Arab states.

A radical shift was made in early 1953 when Pakistan accepted United States offers for military and economic assistance in return for membership in an alliance system against international communism. The immediate causes for this change were both economic and political. The post-Korean War recession had taken a heavy toll of Pakistan's balance of payments, and neither food production nor industrialization was proceeding in pace with rising demands. The functioning of government was deteriorating in conditions of political uncertainty. Senior army officers were becoming increasingly vocal in their demands for new weaponry and other equipment and assertive in their suggestions on how to meet Pakistan's internal and external security needs. In the diplomatic worlds of the Commonwealth and the UN, Pakistan was overshadowed by India, with which accommodation appeared to be distasteful but imperative.

When the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration in the United States (elected November 1952) focused on Pakistan as a fulcrum of American security designs in the Near East and South Asia—the "Northern Tier" of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—the power brokers in Pakistan saw their hopes being fulfilled. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States, concluded a defense agreement with Turkey, and became one of the signatories to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The following year Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact, later converted to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). It leased bases to the United States for intelligence and communications facilities. Pakistan borrowed power from its ally to balance India.

Collapse of the Parliamentary System

The system outlined in the 1956 constitution could not be implemented without disciplined political parties, which did not exist. The prestige of the Muslim League continued to decline in West Pakistan. Sind and the NWFP were resentful of the Punjab and hostile to the One Unit scheme, though Pathans were the second most influential group in it. Political leadership in the Punjab was hopelessly divided. No political party offered a platform of social reform with mass appeal. Opposition was usually a matter of expediency; support was available through patronage. Corruption was believed to be widespread.

In the East Wing (East Pakistan, present-day Bangladesh), the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party, which had eclipsed the Muslim League, were engaged in a power struggle. Smuggling was a well-recognized means of livelihood, and a 1957 antismuggling campaign conducted by the army alienated the politically influential as well as the commercially prosperous groups, including the Hindus. Political leaders in East Pakistan did attempt to formulate issue-oriented parties, and some land reforms were carried out. On the whole, a higher level of political consciousness prevailed than in the West Wing, but an

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important reason for this was the coalescing of Bengali nationalist feeling on the language issue. Pakistan's choice of Urdu as a national and "Muslim" language in 1952 had angered Bengalis, who were intensely proud of their own language and wanted it adopted as one of two national languages for the country. Periodic riots put down by the central government gave cause for further grievance.

In 1956 Suhrawardy formed a coalition cabinet of Awami League and Republican Party members. He was respected in the East Wing but inspired little confidence in the West Wing. Suhrawardy had ambitions of longtime leadership and sought to unite major groups in both wings for the first time. But he took a strong position against abrogating One Unit and so alienated support in Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan, which opposed it. In addition, his use of emergency powers lost him much of the Punjabi backing he had gained. Moreover, his open advocacy of speedy elections, reliance on the Assembly, and democratic government aroused the suspicions of President Mirza, who had succeeded Ghulam Mohammad as head of state. Mirza had great drive and ambition and used his manipulative expertise to oust Suhrawardy.

The drift toward political chaos continued. In East Pakistan a violent scuffle in the provincial assembly between members of the opposition and the police forces took place in 1958. In the same year West Pakistan chief minister Dr. Khan Sahib was assassinated, and attempts were made to implicate political leaders in a murder plot. In the NWFP Dr. Khan Sahib's brother, Ghaffar Khan, turned his back on Pakistan's politics and said he would devote his energies to realizing Pakhtunistan. And in Baluchistan the khan of Kalat again declared independence but was overcome by the Pakistan Army and the invocation of martial law. Pakistan seemed on the verge of disintegration.

On October 7, 1958, President Mirza suspended the 1956 constitution, imposed martial law, and canceled the elections scheduled for January 1959. The president was supported by the army, which moved units into position around cities to preempt opposition. The coup was also supported by the bureaucracy, which resented the interference of politicians in administration. It appeared as though the politicians also acquiesced. Even genuine believers in democracy were questioning the applicability of parliamentary institutions to Pakistan. Moreover, General Charles de Gaulle's similar actions in France in 1958 offered a noteworthy precedent to those who argued that presidential rule was the only alternative to anarchy and collapse. But the unity of the presidential group was only illusory. On October 27 three senior generals escorted Mirza from the President's House to the airport and sent him into exile in Britain. General Mohammad Ayub Khan assumed control of a military dictatorship.

The Ayub Khan Era

In January 1961 Ayub Khan succeeded General Sir Douglas Gracey as the commander in chief of the Pakistan Army, thus becoming the

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first Pakistani to fill that position. Although Ayub's military career had not been particularly brilliant and he had not held a combat command, he was promoted over several senior officers who had distinguished careers. Observers believe that Ayub was selected because of his known competence as an administrator and mediator, his presumed lack of political ambition, and the absence of powerful group backing. Coming from a relatively humble family of an obscure Pakhtun tribe in Hazara District, Ayub lacked affiliation with major internal power blocks. He was, therefore, acceptable to all elements.

Within a few months of his promotion, however, Ayub had become a potent political figure. Perhaps more than any other single Pakistani, Ayub was responsible for seeking and securing military and economic assistance from the United States and for aligning Pakistan with it in international affairs. As army commander in chief and, for a time in 1954 as minister of defense, Ayub possessed and used a veto over government policy that, in his judgment, would be inimical to the interests of the armed forces.

By 1958 Ayub and his fellow senior officers had become receptive to ideas that they should turn out the "inefficient and rascally" politicians. They did so. Ayub's personality and his experience as an army officer in the British tradition predisposed him toward a benevolent authoritarianism and the imposition of discipline. But he was politically shrewd enough to realize that he would benefit from a wider base of support than the army alone and that he could suffer from the antagonism of entrenched interest groups. He tried therefore to devise political means to bring him such support and institutions that he considered more appropriate to the "genius" of Pakistan than those of parliamentary democracy. He viewed himself as a reformer and cited Turkey's Kemal Atatürk as a model. His philosophy meshed with Mughal and viceregal traditions; his rule, like theirs, was highly personalized. Ayub justified his assumption of power by citing the nation's need for stability. When internal stability broke down in the late 1980s, he remained contemptuous of lawyer-politicians and handed over power to his brothers in arms.

Ayub used two main approaches in his first few years. One was directed toward consolidating power and intimidating the opposition. The other was aimed at establishing the groundwork for future stability through amending the economic, legal, and constitutional institutions of the country.

The imposition of martial law in 1958 facilitated a policy of rooting out "antisocial" practices. Military courts imposed heavy penalties for black marketeering, smuggling, hoarding, abducting of women and children, and other prevalent social evils. Suspension of normal civil rights effectively prevented the legal processes from being used to the advantage of the accused. Thousands of officers in the civil and police services were investigated for corruption, misconduct, subversive activities, and inefficiency. Punishments ranged from dismissal or compulsory retirement to reduction of rank or curtailment of salary raises.

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A presidential order of 1959 compulsorily retired 37 senior civil servants, some of high reputation. Ayub's message was clear: he, not the civil servants, was in control. The public may have found these proceedings salutary, but senior administrators were alarmed at the prospects of becoming beholden solely to the military regime and losing their institutional independence. At the same time, Ayub stopped short of attempting far-reaching administrative reforms. He also sought to retain the support of the civil servants as well as the military. Together they formed the steel frame of his regime.

Ayub initiated more resolute measures against politicians. The Public Office (Disqualification) Order (PODA) prescribed 15 years' exclusion from public office for those found guilty of corruption. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance (EBDO) authorized special tribunals to try former politicians for "misconduct"; prosecution could be avoided by the accused agreeing not to be a candidate for any elective body. Approximately 7,000 individuals were "EBDOed" from political life. In 1962 writs of habeas corpus were remanded for political detainees, and former prime minister Suhrawardy was arrested.

The Press and Publications Ordinance was amended in 1960 to specify conditions under which newspapers and other publications could be commandeered or closed down. The conditions described were broad and included the publication of anything that tended to show contempt for the government or the military. Various newspapers were closed and others brought under new government-controlled management. *Dawn*, an English-language daily, and other leading dailies were allowed to continue because they broadly supported the government line and refrained from criticizing martial law. Trade organizations were closely controlled, unions were discouraged, and mosques were warned against including political discussions at their religious meetings.

On the whole, however, the initial years of martial law in Pakistan were mild. The army maintained low visibility, it did not act as a revolutionary force and was content to uphold the traditional social order. By early 1959 most army units had resumed their normal duties. Ayub, with few exceptions, left administration in the hands of the civil bureaucracy.

Efforts were made to popularize the new regime at the same time as the opposition was being muzzled. Ayub undertook extensive tours in both wings to "meet the people." In appearance, manner, and speech he filled the traditional image of an impartial paternal ruler. Ayub chose two effective leaders to be governors of the two wings. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan of Kalabagh in the west was a wealthy and powerful landlord who evoked fear and obedience. General Azam Khan in the east was an army officer from the NWFP who managed to win remarkable popularity before Ayub forced his resignation in 1962.

Ayub also addressed himself to some of the grievances of East Pakistan. Bengali members of the civil services were posted only in the East Wing. The Planning Commission and other bodies were instructed to hold regular sessions in Dacca (Dhaka), which was built up as a

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second national capital (The capital in the West Wing was moved from Karachi to Rawalpindi, pending construction of the new capital city, Islamabad.) Public investment in East Pakistan was increased, and an impression was given that genuine provincial autonomy was being contemplated. The Ayub regime was highly centralized, however, and in the absence of democratic institutions, populous and politicized Bengal continued to feel oppressed.

Ayub used the facilities of martial law between 1958 and 1962 to initiate some progressive reforms that reduced the power of groups opposing him. One such group was the landed aristocracy. The Land Reform Commission was set up in 1958, and in 1959 the government imposed a ceiling of 200 hectares of irrigated and 400 hectares of unirrigated land in the West Wing for a single holding. In the East Wing the ceiling was raised from 33 hectares to 48 hectares (see *Farm Ownership and Land Reform*, ch. 3). Other measures sought to prevent the continued subdivision of inherited land and placed final limits on claims of land by refugees. But government claims that the power of the great landowners was broken were not substantiated in practice; landowners retained their dominant positions in the social hierarchy and so retained political influence. They did, however, comprehend Ayub's warnings against political assertiveness. Moreover, some 4 million hectares of land in West Pakistan were released for public acquisition between 1959 and 1969 and sold mainly to civil and military officers, thus creating a new class of farmers having medium-sized holdings. These farms became immensely important for future agricultural development, but the peasants benefited scarcely at all.

In 1955 a legal commission had been set up to suggest reforms of the family and marriage laws. Ayub examined its report and in 1961 promulgated the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. Among other things it restricted polygamy and equalized conditions of divorce between men and women. A humane measure supported by women's organizations in Pakistan, it could not have been passed if the vehement opposition to it from the ulama and fundamentalist Muslim groups had been allowed free expression. Like the new steps taken in family planning, the ordinance was only a mild measure that did not transform the highly patriarchal pattern of society. Pakistan's population growth rate remained the highest in South Asia (see *Population*, ch. 2). Similarly, no sweeping changes were introduced in education. Primary education and literacy were neglected while investments were made in higher education.

Ayub adopted an energetic approach toward economic development that soon bore fruit in a rising rate of economic growth. Land reforms, consolidation of holdings, and stern measures against hoarding were combined with rural credit schemes and work programs, higher procurement prices, and augmented allocations for agriculture to put the country on the road to self-sufficiency in food grains. Loans from the United States, especially the 1961 Agricultural Commodities Agreement, financed imports of new equipment and rural development proj-

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ects, such as the Work Project Academies in Comilla of the East Wing and Peshawar of the West Wing.

The Export Bonus Vouchers Scheme (1959) and tax incentives stimulated new industrial entrepreneurs and exporters. Bonus vouchers made access to foreign exchange for imports of industrial machinery and raw materials easier. Tax concessions were offered for investment in relatively less developed areas. These measures had important consequences in bringing industry to the Punjab and breeding a new class of small industrialists of different social origin from the magnates of Karachi.

Favorable interest in Pakistan's economy was stirred in the United States and in the World Bank (see Glossary). In 1960 the World Bank formed the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium to coordinate the financial and technical assistance of the major donors. Ayub's campaign to attract foreign capital also attracted private foreign investment and scores of foreign advisers, technicians, and managers. At the same time, the government encouraged indigenous entrepreneurial talent and exports from small-scale industries. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) undertook high-risk projects, such as paper mills in East Pakistan. The Planning Commission was made directly responsible to the president, who personally made announcements about the second plan. In short, a successful combination of private enterprise and governmental intervention resulted in a high rate of economic growth for much of the 1960s.

The defects of the Ayub pattern of economic development became obvious later. Economic and social disparities appeared to be exacerbated. Much of the population remained extremely poor, and neither economic 'nefficiency nor corruption was eradicated. Workers displaced from the countryside found inadequate employment in the new capital-intensive industries of the towns. Unions were discouraged; thus industrial labor was at a disadvantage and therefore vulnerable to radical political theories. East Pakistan shared little in the accretion of private investment, foreign or domestic, which accounted for 85 percent of the industrial sector. In the West Wing, wealth was concentrated in an estimated 24 families. The Memons, Chinitotis, Bohras, and Khoja Ismailis were especially prominent in commerce and industry, and the syeds and Yusufzai Pathans ranked high as wealthy landowners and traders. Ayub's own family, particularly his eldest son, accumulated great wealth, largely as the result of government favors, thus tarnishing his image of integrity. Inequitable income distribution was visibly expressed in consumption patterns and increasingly aggravated the grievances of the educated unemployed and the urban poor. From their politicization grew the disorders of the late 1960s and support for a new political party founded by Bhutto.

Basic Democracies

Ayub Khan proposed a bold new political system for Pakistan. In 1960 he inaugurated the Basic Democracy system, and in 1962 he

promulgated a new constitution. Both were predicated on Ayub's belief that a sophisticated parliamentary democracy was unsuitable for Pakistan. The Basic Democracies, as the individual units were called, were intended to initiate and educate a largely illiterate population in the workings of government by giving them limited representation and associating them with decisionmaking at a "level commensurate with their ability." Basic Democracies were concerned with no more than local government and rural development. They were meant to provide a two-way channel of communication between the Ayub regime and the common people. They were expected to permit slow social change.

The Basic Democracies Order set up five tiers of institutions. The lowest but most important rung was composed of union councils, one each for groups of villages having an approximate population of 10,000. Each council was composed of 10 directly elected members and five appointed members, all called Basic Democrats (BDs). They were responsible for local agricultural and community development, maintained law and order through rural police, tried minor cases in conciliation courts, and were empowered to impose local taxes for local projects. In 1960 the union councils confirmed by vote the presidency of Field Marshal Ayub, and under the 1962 constitution they formed an electoral college to elect the president, the National Assembly (which replaced the Constituent Assembly under the 1962 constitution), and the provincial assemblies. These powers, however, were more than balanced by the fact that the controlling authority for the union councils was the deputy commissioner (DC), whose high status and traditionally paternalistic attitudes generally elicited obedient cooperation rather than demands.

The next tier consisted of *tehsil* (subdistrict) councils, which performed coordination functions. Above them, district councils, chaired by the deputy commissioners, were composed of nominated official and nonofficial members, including the chairmen of union councils. The district councils were assigned both compulsory and optional functions pertaining to education, sanitation, local culture, and social welfare. Above them, the divisional advisory councils coordinated activities with representatives of government departments. The highest tier consisted of one development advisory council for each wing, chaired by the governors and appointed by the president. Although the analogy was not drawn publicly, the Basic Democracies Order read like an early document of British crown colonies.

The system of Basic Democracies was not allowed time to take root or fulfill Ayub's intentions. Whether a new class of political leaders equipped with some administrative experience could have emerged to replace those trained in British constitutional law was never discovered. Nor did the system provide for mobilization of the rural population around institutions of national integration. Its emphasis was on economic development and social welfare alone. The authority of the civil service was augmented in the Basic Democracies, and the power of landlords and big industrialists in the West Wing went unchallenged.

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Although the urban councils in the East Wing used what powers they were given, they resented a system that was intended to bypass the urban intelligentsia and to exclude party politics. Above all, the pious enunciation of "good government" sentiments offended the many Pakistanis who preferred to have self-government.

The 1962 Constitution

In 1958 Ayub had promised a speedy return to constitutional government. In February 1960 an 11-member constitutional commission was established. The commission's recommendations for direct elections, strong legislative and judicial organs, free political parties, and defined limitations on presidential authority went against Ayub's known philosophy of government. Accordingly, he ordered other committees to make revisions. Thus, the new constitution had a stormy genesis reflecting differences of opinion among the elite, possible opposition to Ayub, and the inherent difficulty of creating a democratic system by fiat.

Ayub sought to retain certain aspects of his martial law authority in the new document. The 1962 constitution, which was promulgated on March 1, retained the Islamic nature of the republic. The president was to be a Muslim, and the Advisory Committee of Islamic Ideology and the Islamic Research Institute were established to assist the government in reconciling all legislation with the tenets of the Quran and the Sunna. Their functions were advisory and their members appointed by the president, so no real base of power was allotted to the ulama.

The 1962 constitution created a presidential form of government in which the traditional powers of the chief executive were augmented by his control of the legislature, power of issuing ordinances, right of appealing to referendum, protection from impeachment, control over the budget, and special emergency powers, which included the right to suspend civil liberties. As the 1965 elections showed, the presidential form of government was opposed by those who equated constitutional government with parliamentary democracy. The 1962 constitution did relax martial law limitations on personal freedom and made fundamental rights justiciable. The courts continued their traditional function of protecting the rights of individual citizens against encroachment by the government, but the government made it clear that the exercise of claims based on fundamental rights would not be permitted to nullify its previous progressive legislation on land reforms and family law.

The National Assembly, consisting of 156 members (including six women) and elected by an electoral college of 80,000 BDs, was established as the federal legislature. Legislative powers were divided between the central and provincial assemblies. The National Assembly was to hold sessions alternately in Islamabad, the recently established national capital, and Dacca, the latter being designated as a second capital of the republic, where the Supreme Court would also hold sessions. The ban on political parties was in operation at the time of

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the first elections to the National Assembly, as was the prohibition against EBDQed politicians; thus the groups that emerged from the election were new. They proved to be factions formed on the basis of personal or provincial loyalties. Despite the ban, political parties functioned outside the legislature as vehicles of criticism and opinion formulation. In late 1962 they were again legalized. The factions then crystallized into governmental and opposition groups.

The Muslim League had also split into fragments but was named the official government party. Ayub Khan became a member of it in December 1962 and its president a year later; he concluded that he could not remain without a political party of his own once party activity had been legalized. He most likely felt the need for an instrument of legitimacy and political support, which the respected name of the Muslim League could provide. When the professional politicians formed what they called the Conventionist Muslim League, Ayub and his supporters established the government party, the Councilor Muslim League.

The presidential elections of 1965 resulted in a victory for Ayub but also demonstrated the appeal of the opposition. Four political parties joined to form the Combined Opposition Party, nominating Fatima Jinnah (sister of the Quaid-i-Azam and known as Madar-i-Millet—the mother of the nation) their presidential candidate. These parties were the Conventionist Muslim League, strongest in the Punjab and Karachi, the Awami League, strongest in East Pakistan, the NAP, strongest in the NWFP where it stood for dissolving the One Unit arrangement; and the Jamaat-i-Islami. They produced a nine-point program combining their different platforms. Mainly, they advocated a complete restoration of parliamentary democracy.

Miss Jinnah waged a moving campaign against "dictatorship," but she made the tactical error of giving the impression that the Basic Democrats who formed the electorate would lose their power in a new regime. Ayub also expended considerable effort on the election campaign. His public meetings were well organized and were used as opportunities for discussion of tangible issues; they also provided access to the source of power. He won 63.3 percent of the electoral college votes, though his majority was larger in the West Wing (73.6 percent) than in the East Wing (53.1 percent).

The true significance of the 1965 elections emerged later, as the Ayub regime disintegrated. The political system he installed and the limited elections he held could not bridge the conflict between two opposing philosophies: an authoritarian government essentially intolerant of all opposition, and unsatisfied politicians and interest groups who had not yet found an internal balance of power and condemned all restrictions on them as tyrannical. This basic conflict carried over to Ayub's successors, military and civilian, who proved no more capable of solving it than he.

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Ayub's Foreign Policy and the 1965 War with India

Ayub articulated his foreign policy on several occasions, particularly in his autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*. His objectives were the security and development of Pakistan and the preservation of its ideology as he discerned it. Toward these ends he sought to improve, or normalize, relations with Pakistan's three giant neighbors, India, China, and the Soviet Union. While retaining and renewing the alliance with the United States, Ayub emphasized his preference for friendship, not subordination, and bargained hard for higher returns to Pakistan.

Other than ideology and Kashmir, the biggest bone of contention between Pakistan and India was distribution of the waters of the Indus River system (see fig. 5). As the upper riparian power, India controlled the head works of the prepartition irrigation canals. After independence it had, in addition, constructed several multipurpose projects on the eastern tributaries of the Indus. Pakistan feared that India might repeat a 1948 incident of curtailing the water supply as a means of coercing Pakistan. Attempts at finding compromise solutions that met the needs of both countries were made during the 1950s, one finally found favor with Ayub and Nehru in 1960.

The Indus Waters Agreement of 1960 was backed heavily by the World Bank—whose president, Eugene Black, had been the principal mediator—and the United States. The agreement allocated exclusive use of the three western rivers, Jhelum, Chenab, and Ravi, to Pakistan; made plans for transitional arrangements, detailed new irrigation works and feeder canals; and took account of waterlogging and soil salinity problems in Pakistan's Punjab. The Indus Basin Development Fund was established and financed by the World Bank, the major contributors to the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, and India. An impressive example of international cooperation by any standard, the Indus Waters Agreement continued to be honored by all parties in the mid-1980s.

Pakistan's tentative approaches to Beijing intensified in 1959 when China's occupation of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India put an end to five years of Chinese-Indian friendship. An entente between China and Pakistan evolved in inverse ratio to Sino-Indian hostility, which climaxed in the border war of 1962. For more than two decades, this informal alliance has formed a keystone of Pakistan's foreign policy—at the least in verbiage. A border agreement of March 1963 was followed by agreements on trade and Chinese economic assistance as well as grants of military equipment. China began constructing a major strategic highway through the Khunjerab Pass, linking Xinjiang (formerly Sinkiang) with Gilgit; it was opened to traffic in 1971-72 (see fig. 8). China's diplomatic and possible military support to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War was high; its new diplomatic weight in the UN was exercised on Pakistan's behalf in 1971. Ayub's foreign minister, Bhutto, often took credit for this new China policy, which gave Pakistan a flexibility in international dealings akin to nonalignment. The entente deepened during the Bhutto years.

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Pakistan's alliance with the United States had invoked much fulmination in the Soviet Union, but Moscow was interested in keeping doors open to both subcontinental states. Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union in 1965. He did not immediately obtain the military equipment for which he asked, but he gained a more significant diplomatic gesture—the Soviet Union maintained neutrality during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 over Kashmir. In 1971, too, Moscow was not quick in siding with India or condemning Pakistan for atrocities in the East Wing.

Although Ayub Khan had been a key figure in Pakistan's identification with the United States, he was outspoken in his criticisms of United States policy on the subcontinent. His first major foreign act was to sign bilateral economic and military agreements with the United States in 1959. He reacted badly to subsequent criticism in the United States Congress and its substantial cuts in appropriations for military and economic aid to Pakistan. Ayub was vehemently opposed to simultaneous United States support, direct or indirect, for India's defense forces, especially when this assistance was augmented in the wake of China's attack on India in 1962. In the opinion of Ayub and many of his countrymen, in return for use of bases, the United States owed Pakistan security protection in all circumstances, not merely in response to communist aggression, as well as a settlement of the Kashmir question on terms favorable to Pakistan.

Pakistan was disappointed on both counts. The United States and Britain did pressure India into holding six rounds of talks with Pakistan in 1963 to arrange a partition of the Kashmir Valley, but no agreement was possible. The two Western powers were strictly neutral during the 1965 war, and Lyndon B. Johnson's administration more or less ignored the subcontinent thereafter. In 1968 the United States communications-intelligence unit near Peshawar was closed at Pakistan's request. It epitomized the period of strain in relations between allies.

In the spring of 1965 a series of border incidents occurred between troops on either side along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and near the Rann of Kutch in the southwest. A major engagement took place in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 as the two countries disputed the legal boundary in that undemarcated territory. By mutual consent and under British sponsorship, a cease-fire was called at the end of June, and the border dispute was referred to international arbitration.

In Kashmir UN observers and India reported increased activity by infiltrators from Pakistan. There was no uprising of Kashmiris against India, however, and in August India retook Pakistani-held positions in the north. Pakistan attacked in the Chamb sector of the southwest part of the state. But on September 6 Indian forces unexpectedly retaliated in the Punjab near Lahore and Sialkot. Both countries had limited objectives, and neither was economically capable of sustaining a long war. Both were adversely affected when the United States and Britain cut off military supplies and economic assistance—Pakistan more seriously because it was more dependent on them. On September 23 a

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cease-fire was reached through the UN Security Council. The anger and resentment of the Pakistani public was expressed violently in Lahore and Karachi, where the United States Information Service libraries were burned. A deep frustration in Pakistan about expending lives and funds without attaining declared objectives made itself felt on the government.

In January 1966 President Ayub met Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri at Tashkent under the good offices of Soviet premier Aleksey Kosygin. They signed an agreement formally ending hostilities and stipulating a mutual withdrawal of forces. This objectively statesmanlike act elicited an adverse reaction in West Pakistan. Students as well as politicians demonstrated in urban centers, and many were arrested.

The political leaders were not satisfied. In February they called for a national conference in Lahore where all parties could discuss their differences and come to some agreement on basic issues. For West Pakistani politicians the central issue was the agreement reached at Tashkent, a subject in which the East Pakistanis manifested scant interest. Among the 700 delegates who attended the conference, only 21 were from the East Wing. They were led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who presented a six-point program, itself a summary of the 1954 East Pakistani demands for complete autonomy of the provinces and a preview of the demands of 1970 that led to secession. The six-point program consisted of a parliamentary form of government having a central parliament directly elected by adult suffrage and an executive responsible to parliament, powers of the federal government restricted to defense and foreign policy, leaving all others to the constituent units, separate fiscal policies or currencies permitted if necessary to stop the flow of capital from the East Wing, limited powers of taxation for the federal government, each province to have authority to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries and full control over its earned foreign exchange, and the provinces to have, if necessary, their own military or paramilitary forces. Under these circumstances, no national goals or unified public platform emerged from the national conference.

Ayub lost the services of Foreign Minister Bhutto, who resigned and became a vocal opposition leader. Meanwhile, opposition from leftist elements swelled, and the government hesitated to take prohibitive action. By 1968 it was becoming clear that only the military-civil services establishment stood against the challenge of the articulate urban opposition. Thus, the open disaffection of members of that establishment, such as Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the former commander in chief of the air force, and former chief justice S.M. Murahed, was most significant. Although they could rally public opinion against the corruption, nepotism, and incompetence of the government, as political amateurs they had no real grip on the situation and lacked viable alternatives to propose. Ayub's serious illness in February 1968 undermined his control.

In West Pakistan Bhutto organized the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to lead a "revolution". In East Pakistan the Awami League's six points became a rallying cry of opposition. The government declared that it had uncovered a conspiracy and accused 44 persons of plotting the secession of the East Wing, with India's connivance. Mujib and 34 others were charged with treason. Their trial dragged on in an atmosphere of mounting tension.

In October 1968 the government sponsored a "decade of development" celebration. Instead of reminding people of the achievements of the regime, the festivities highlighted the frustration of the urban poor affected by inflation and the costs of the 1965 war. For the masses Ayub became the symbol of inequality, of all that had gone wrong. Bhutto capitalized on this emotion and challenged the president at the ballot box. In the East Wing dissatisfaction with the system went deeper than its opposition to Ayub, and in January 1969 opposition parties formed the Democratic Action Committee with the declared aim of restoring democracy through a mass movement.

Ayub reacted using alternate methods of conciliation and repression. Disorder spread. The army was moved into Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Dacca, and Khulna to stem mob rule. In the countryside of the East Wing, curfew was relatively ineffective, local officials sensed the ebbing of government control and began retreating from the peasant revolt and carnage that was beginning. In February Ayub released political prisoners, invited the Democratic Action Committee to meet him in Rawalpindi, promised a new constitution, and declared that he would not stand for reelection in 1970. Still in poor health and now lacking the confidence of his generals, Ayub sought a political settlement as violence continued.

On March 25, 1969, martial law was once again proclaimed; General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army commander in chief, was designated chief martial law administrator. The 1962 constitution was abrogated, the president announced his resignation, and on March 31 Yahya assumed the presidency. He soon promised early elections on the basis of direct adult franchise to the National Assembly, which would draw up a new constitution, and he ordered investigations into existing institutions, such as Basic Democracies, for the purpose of reform. He also entered into discussions with leaders of political parties.

Yahya Khan and Bangladesh

The new administration formed a committee of martial law administrators. It functioned above the entire civil machinery of government. The generals were now overtly in power, no longer merely the supporting arm of civilians—elected or bureaucratic—as they had been throughout the country's history. Every significant change of government had relied, in large part, on the allegiance of the army. Now they were determined to take the credit as well as do the work. But Yahya and his military advisers proved no more capable of overcoming

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the nation's problems than their predecessors. Indeed, the new administration displayed some peculiar failings, and Yahya lacked the national vision and capacity for dedicated hard work that Ayub had possessed.

The two generals closest to him, Lieutenant Generals S.G.M. Peerzada and Abdul Hamid Khan, competed with each other and also cut Yahya off from the rest of his staff. The attempt to establish a military hierarchy running parallel to and supplanting in authority the civilian administration inevitably ruptured the bureaucratic-military alliance on which efficiency and stability depended. An already existing tendency to center on personalities rather than issues was exacerbated. Little effort was made to promote a national program, the relationship of means to objectives was never clarified. In addition, the dissolute habits of the president and his associates not only diminished their ability to make decisions or formulate policy but also cost them the respect of the nation.

These weaknesses were not immediately apparent but became more and more obvious as events moved quickly toward crisis in East Pakistan. On November 28, 1969, Yahya made a nationwide broadcast announcing his proposals for a return to constitutional government. General elections for the National Assembly were set for October 5, 1970, but were postponed until December. The National Assembly would be obliged to draw up a new constitution within 120 days. Maximum provincial autonomy compatible with effective federal government would be permitted, on July 1, 1970. One Unit was dissolved into the four original provinces.

In 1970 an intense election campaign took place. Bhutto campaigned in the West Wing on a strongly nationalist and leftist platform that hardly appealed to conservatives. The slogan of his party was "Islam our Faith, Democracy our Policy, and Socialism our Economy." The Awami League in the East Wing gained widespread support for its six-point program.

The first general elections on the basis of one man, one vote ever to be conducted in Pakistan were held on December 7, 1970, though in some districts of East Pakistan the elections were postponed until January 17, 1971. In all, 23 parties put forward 1,237 candidates for the 291 seats of the National Assembly. There were also 391 independent candidates. The voting was heavy, and the atmosphere was generally free and fair. The Awami League secured an overwhelming victory in the East Wing, where it won 167 out of a possible 169 seats. The PPP won a large majority in the West Wing, especially in the Punjab and Sind. In the NWFP and Baluchistan the NAP emerged as the largest party but without a majority. Somewhat surprisingly, the more conservative Islamic parties of the West Wing fared poorly.

Any constitutional settlement in Pakistan clearly depended on agreement between Mujib representing the East Wing, Bhutto representing the West Wing, and Yahya representing the military government in power. The president had placed a 120-day time limit on drafting a

new constitution, and although all were anxious to prevent repetition of the delays that had crippled the constitutional process in the 1950s, each wanted power for himself. In January 1971 Yahya and Mujib met to discuss how the demands of the West Wing political victory—the PPP—could be reconciled with the Awami League's six points on provincial autonomy. Mujib adhered to his six points and to his rights as majority leader to form a government in the National Assembly. His earlier willingness to trust the president was eroded, and Yahya accused Mujib of a lack of sincerity.

Yahya then held talks with Bhutto, who denied the right of the Awami League to form a government and draft a constitution for Pakistan when its base was confined to East Pakistan. On February 17 Bhutto publicly declared that the PPP would not attend the inaugural session of the National Assembly. His intransigence made civilian government virtually impossible. On March 1 the president dissolved his civilian cabinet and declared an indefinite postponement of the National Assembly, which had been scheduled to convene on March 3 in Dacca.

There was violent reaction to this announcement in the East Wing. Strikes, public demonstrations, and civil disobedience amounted to open revolt. In response to a series of directives issued by Mujib, the Bengalis paid no taxes or revenues, ignored martial law regulations on press and radio censorship, and reduced public services to a minimum. For all practical purposes the writ of the central government ceased to run in East Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the well-liked governor, Admiral Ashan Khan, had been recalled. The provincial chief martial law administrator, Lieutenant General Sahabzada Muhammad Yaqub Khan (in 1963 Pakistan's foreign minister), also expressed a desire to resign if a political solution to the Bengal problem were not pursued with greater vigor. Yahya, however, tended to the opposite view, as did some other generals and Bhutto. General Tikka Khan was sent to Dacca as chief authority; he was well known for his reliance on armed force as the answer to problems. The lines of confrontation became clearer.

A last effort to resolve the crisis peaceably was made between March 15 and March 25, 1971. Yahya held a series of talks with Mujib in Dacca, where Bhutto joined them on March 21. Negotiations were also conducted between their three teams of "experts." Simultaneously, Tikka Khan prepared emergency plans for a military takeover and called for troop reinforcements via Sri Lanka (then Ceylon). Reports to the press of a compromise formula proved unfounded. Although there was very little difference between the Awami League and government drafts, each side stood firm. The unwillingness of either Mujib or Bhutto to share power or to trust each other in the exercise of power was too great to be papered over by their drafting experts.

On March 25 the president and Bhutto flew back to Islamabad. Tikka Khan's emergency plans went into operation as roadblocks and barriers appeared all over Dacca. Mujib proclaimed the birth of the "sovereign

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for Refugees assisted India in the task of providing minimal shelter, food, and medical facilities to a homeless mass of humanity.

Relations between Pakistan and India, already tense, deteriorated sharply as a result of the crisis. On March 31 the Indian Parliament passed resolutions in support of the "people of Bengal." Pakistani and Indian deputy high commissions in Calcutta and Dacca, respectively, were closed down. The Indian government repeatedly declared that the refugees must be allowed to return to their homes under safe conditions and rejected Pakistan's assurances that the refugees could return. The Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army) forces in East Pakistan were formed around a nucleus of regular troops, which received equipment, training, and other assistance from India during the summer.

The international dimensions of the Bangladesh crisis were enlarged when President Richard M. Nixon's administration used Yahya Khan as an instrument for establishing the critical new link with China in July 1971. Soon thereafter—and in the opinion of most observers as a response to the United States-China rapprochement—India and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. Great-power rivalries impinged on Pakistan's civil war and possibly impeded its political resolution.

In the fall military and guerrilla operations increased, and Pakistan and India reported escalations of border shelling. On the western border military preparations were also in evidence. On November 21 the Mukti Bahini launched an offensive on Jessore, and the Provisional Government of Bangladesh was announced there on November 29. Yahya had declared a state of emergency in Pakistan on November 23 and asked his people to prepare for war. In response to Indian military independent People's Republic of Bangladesh" and called on his people to prepare for supreme sacrifice for their cause. Mujib was arrested in his house on the night of March 25, but other Awami League leaders escaped, they later established in Calcutta the Provisional Government of Bangladesh.

On March 26 the president outlawed the Awami League, banned political activity throughout Pakistan, and reimposed complete press censorship in both wings. One result of these strictures was that the people of the West Wing remained uninformed about developments in the East Wing and tended to discount reports appearing in the international press as an "Indian conspiracy."

Fierce fighting broke out in the major cities of the East Wing. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, mutinied and joined the rebel forces. Nevertheless, the Pakistan Army maintained a heavy offensive and in early April retained control of many of the towns in East Pakistan. More than 250,000 refugees crossed into India during the first few days of war. The influx continued over the next six months and reached an overwhelming total of about 10 million people. No accurate estimates could be made of the numbers killed, but it was soon obvious that a particularly brutal civil war was raging. The international community responded slowly to the horrors; the UN High Commissioner



National mosque under construction in Islamabad, 1963
Courtesy Frederick M. Denny

movements along and across the Indian-East Pakistani border, on December 3 the Pakistan Air Force attacked military targets in northern India, and on December 4 India launched an integrated ground, air, and naval invasion of East Pakistan. The Indian army launched a five-pronged attack and began converging on Dacca. India also recognized the Provisional Government of Bangladesh on December 6, whereupon Pakistan severed diplomatic relations.

Indian forces closed in around Dacca and received the surrender of the Pakistani forces on December 16. Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi declared a unilateral cease-fire in the west on December 17. Violent demonstrations against the military government were the most immediate effect of these events. Yahya resigned on December 20. Bhutto, who had been pleading Pakistan's case before UN deliberations of the Bangladesh crisis, flew back to Islamabad to assume power as president and chief martial law administrator of a disgraced military, a shattered government, and a bewildered and demoralized populace.

Bhutto and the Restoration of National Confidence

On assuming power on December 20, 1971, Bhutto promised to make a new Pakistan out of the demoralized western fragment. His efforts to restore national confidence took several forms. First, he laid

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the entire blame for the 1971 war and Pakistan's defeat on Yahya Khan and his junta and asserted the principle of civilian leadership. Second, he sought to legitimize and stabilize his power by speaking about democracy and introducing a new constitution with a modified federal and parliamentary system. Third, he took steps to revitalize a stagnant economy and ameliorate conditions for the poor under the banner of Islamic socialism. Fourth, he attempted to reform and control the civil service by unifying different cadres and permitting lateral recruitment. Last, but by no means least, Bhutto employed his considerable diplomatic skills abroad. He negotiated a satisfactory peace settlement with India in 1972. He built new and publicized links between Pakistan and the oil-exporting Islamic countries to its west. And he maintained a high international profile and a flexible diplomatic stance, which has been emulated by his successor.

Bhutto's program appeared to be laudable. But his performance over the five and one-half years in which he exercised near-total power became, and in 1983 remained, the subject of great controversy. His ambition overreached his ability to manipulate individuals and events to his lasting advantage, especially when they represented long-standing group interests in Pakistan. Equally important, an intense concentration of decisionmaking power in Bhutto's hands prevented democratic institutions from taking root and ultimately antagonized all but his closest family and followers.

Bhutto used General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan in ousting Yahya Khan in December 1971, but he retired them both in March 1972 along with six other senior military officers. Bhutto appointed General Tikka Khan chief of the army staff, the position with reduced status and authority that replaced the former post of commander in chief (see Ministry of Defence, ch. 5).

Bhutto purged the military ranks of about 1,400 officers. He also created a paramilitary force called the Federal Security Force (FSF) to function as a personal bodyguard, a watchdog on the armed forces, and an internal security force to obviate the necessity of military intervention in cases of civil disorder. A White Paper on defense issued in 1976 firmly subordinated the armed forces to civilian control and gave Bhutto, as prime minister, the decisive voice in all matters relating to national security. In that role Bhutto took credit for bringing home over 90,000 prisoners of war without allowing any of them to be put on trial in Bangladesh for war crimes. In 1976 Bhutto elevated General Zia ul Haq to the post of chief of the army staff over the heads of several senior army officers, who then resigned (see *The Junta*, ch. 4).

In April 1978 Bhutto lifted martial law and summoned the National Assembly, consisting of members elected from the West Wing in December 1970. Notwithstanding the absence of politicians from the East Wing, the old controversies over presidential versus parliamentary government and the division of powers between the central government and the provinces remained alive. Not even the two-nation theory was buried; adjustment to reality was painful. Considerable jostling

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for position and political advantage took place at the center and in the provinces among the three major political parties: the PPP, most powerful in the Punjab and Sind; the NAP, most powerful in NWFP and Baluchistan, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), also based in the frontier provinces. A fairly high level of tension and political agitation in the countryside accompanied the provincial elections and the process of constitution drafting, especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Bhutto reached some accommodation with opposition leaders from the NAP and the JUI on the matter of gubernatorial appointment and constitutional principle.

Pakistan's third constitution was formally submitted on December 31, 1972, approved on April 10, 1973, and promulgated on independence day, August 14, 1973. In deference to opposition wishes, Bhutto accepted a formal parliamentary system in which the executive is responsible to the legislature. At the same time, however, and supposedly in the interests of governmental stability, provisions were included that made it virtually impossible for the prime minister to be removed by the Assembly. Similarly, the 1973 Constitution provided for a federal structure in which the residuary powers were vested in the provinces. However, the federal list was strikingly comprehensive and, combined with Bhutto's substitution of NAP-JUI ministries in Baluchistan and the NWFP with PPP ministries, showed clearly his preference for a powerful center.

Bhutto's power derived less from the 1973 Constitution than from his charismatic appeal to the populace as he made his viceregal peregrinations through the countryside and also from the vigor of the PPP. Its socialist program and Bhutto's oratory had done much to radicalize urban sectors in the late 1960s and was responsible for the popular optimism accompanying the restoration of democracy. But the ideological appeal of the PPP to the masses sat uneasily with the accommodations Bhutto reached with the holders of economic and political influence—that is, the landed and commercial elites—after he came to power. Factionalism and patrimonialism became rife in the PPP, especially in the Punjab, where Sheikh Rashid and Ghulam Mustafa Khar were rivals for party support as well as for Bhutto's favor. The internal cohesion of the PPP and its standing in public esteem were adversely affected by a ubiquitous political and bureaucratic corruption that accompanied state intervention in the economy and, equally, by the rising incidence of political violence, which included the beating and even murder of opponents. The PPP had started as a movement mobilizing people to overthrow a military regime. In Bhutto's lifetime it failed to convert itself into a political party organized for peaceful functioning in an open polity.

Bhutto's predilection for a strong center and for provincial governments in the hands of the PPP inevitably aroused opposition in those provinces where regional and ethnic identity was strong. Feelings of Sindhi solidarity were muted by Bhutto's familial connections with the feudal leaders of Sind and a manipulation of offices (see *Politicians and*

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Political Parties, ch. 4). He did not enjoy the same leverage in the NWFP or Baluchistan. In February 1973 Bhutto dismissed the NAP-JUI governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan. In the NWFP Bhutto succeeded in ousting NAP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan—Ghaffar Khan's son—by a combination of threats and inducements. Wali Khan was put on trial and imprisoned without provoking a violent reaction in the province.

In Baluchistan a long-dormant crisis erupted in 1973 into an insurgency that lasted four years and became increasingly bitter. The insurgency was put down by the Pakistan Army, which employed brutal methods and equipment, including the devastating Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships, which were provided by Iran and flown by Iranian pilots. The deep-seated Baluch nationalism based on tribal identity had international as well as domestic aspects. The Baluch had been divided in the nineteenth century among Afghanistan, Iran, and British India and, like the Kurds in a similar situation farther west, found their aspirations and their traditional ways of nomadic life frustrated by the solidification of national boundaries and the extension of central administration over their lands (see fig. 7). Moreover, many of the most militant Baluch nationalists were also Marxist or vaguely Marxist-Leninist, willing to risk Soviet protection for an autonomous Baluchistan. As the insurgency wore on, the influence of a relatively small but disciplined group in a liberation front seemed to increase (see Threats to Internal Security, ch. 5). However, the three dominant leaders of the Baluch nationalist movement—Khair Bakhsh Marri, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, and Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal—were more strongly rooted in their tribes than in any particular ideology; they were anti-Punjabi dominance rather than pro-Soviet.

Bhutto was able to mobilize domestic and international support for his drive against the Baluch. Support of the Punjab was most tangibly represented in the use of the army to put down the insurgency. One of the main Baluch grievances was the influx of Punjabi settlers, miners, and traders into their resource-rich but sparsely populated lands. Bhutto could also invoke the idea of national integration with effect in the aftermath of the Bangladesh secession. External assistance to Bhutto was given generously by the shah of Iran, who feared a spread of the insurrection among the Iranian Baluch. Some governments feared that an independent or autonomous Baluchistan might allow the Soviets to develop and use the port at Gwadar, and no outside power was willing to assist the Baluch openly or to sponsor the cause of Baluch autonomy. During the mid-1970s Afghanistan was preoccupied with its own internal problems and seemingly anxious to normalize relations with Pakistan. India was fearful of further balkanization of the subcontinent after Bangladesh, and the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardize the leverage it was gaining with Pakistan (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). Thus, hostilities in Baluchistan were protracted and, despite an apparent victory of Pakistani forces, remained liable to recur in the absence of

political settlement between Baluch leaders and Islamabad (see *The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration*, ch. 4).

The PPP manifesto was couched in socialist terms, at least in part in reaction to the socioeconomic disparities evident in the Ayub years and after. Bhutto issued an Economic Reform Order on January 3, 1972, to give effect to the PPP program. Banking and insurance were nationalized, and 70 other industrial units were taken over by the government. The Ministry of Production, which incorporated the Board of Industrial Management, was created to oversee industry. Managing agencies were abolished, and the scope of private business in industry was restricted. Investment in the public sector increased, and Bhutto negotiated Soviet assistance for Pakistan's first steel mill. The state also entered trade in food grains. Clearly, Bhutto intended to break the power of the 20-odd families so prominent in the Ayub era. Trade unions were organized and welfare measures for labor announced. Although Bhutto's initial zeal diminished as he came face-to-face with economic realities and the shortage of capital, he tried to refurbish his populist image with another spate of nationalizations in 1976.

Bhutto proceeded more cautiously in the field of land reform and did not fulfill earlier promises of distributing land to the landless. The ceiling on landholdings in theory was a high of 40 hectares of irrigated and 80 hectares of unirrigated land. Bhutto recognized and cultivated the sociopolitical influence of landowners. At the same time, he did not impede the process begun earlier of consolidation of tenancy rights and acquisition of mid-sized holdings by servicemen. Punjab was the vital agricultural region of Pakistan; it remained a bastion of support for the government.

The privileged and powerful CSP was a certain target for Bhutto. He introduced measures of administrative reform with the declared purpose of limiting the paternalistic power of the bureaucracy and making it more responsive to the technological and democratic needs of the new Pakistan. Consolidating cadres and unifying pay scales were rational measures, shedding some outdated social distinctions. Lateral recruiting of professionals at the middle and upper ranks was justified in view of a vastly expanded state role in economic management, for which generalists were ill equipped. Pakistan's civil service, however, had played the role of guardian alongside the army since independence. Many of its members reacted badly to politicizing appointments for which patronage appeared to be a more important criterion than merit or seniority.

Bhutto claimed success for his economic policies. The gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) and rate of economic growth climbed; inflation fell from 25 percent in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1972 to 6 percent in FY 1976. Bhutto pointed out that his foreign policy had brought Pakistan prestige in the Islamic world, peace if not friendship with India, and self-respect in dealings with the great powers. He felt assured of victory in any election. Therefore, with commitment to a constitutional order at stake, in January 1977 he announced that Na-

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tional Assembly and provisional assembly elections would be held in March of that year.

The response of Bhutto's opposition to this news was vigorous. Nine political parties ranging across the ideological spectrum formed a united front named the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Fundamentalist Muslims were given satisfaction in the adoption of Nizam-i-Mustafa (Rule of the Prophet) as the party slogan. The NWFP was gratified that Wali Khan's wife was a leading member. Modern secular elements respected the leadership of Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan. The PNA filed 1,200 candidates for the Assembly and 4,000 for the provincial elections. As curbs on the press and political activity were loosened for the election campaign, an extraordinary surge of public support for the PNA swept Pakistan's cities. This evoked a whirlwind nationwide tour by Bhutto with all his vote-catching charm in the foreground. In the background lurked indirect curbs on free expression as well as political gangsterism (see *The Politics of Terrorism*, ch. 4).

The results of the Assembly elections were announced on March 7 as PPP 154 seats, PNA 38 seats. At the same time, cities were placed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, limiting assembly to five persons or fewer. The PNA challenged the election results and demanded a fresh election—not merely a recount of votes. Bhutto refused, and a mass protest movement was launched against him. Religious symbols were used by both sides to mobilize agitation. Despite talks between Bhutto and opposition leaders, the disorders persisted as a multitude of frustrations were vented. The army intervened on July 5, took all political leaders including Bhutto into custody, and proclaimed martial law. Pakistan had come full circle; nobody won.

. . .

A rich literature exists on the history and civilizations of the Indian subcontinent. An excellent and succinct survey of the ancient and early medieval periods is Romila Thapar's *A History of India*. The most comprehensive compendium of scholarship on the Harappan culture can be found in Gregory Possehl's *Ancient Cities of the Indus*. The Mughal period has inspired fine scholarship on its various aspects. One of the most enjoyable works is Bamber Gascoigne's *The Great Moghuls*; much of his text is drawn from primary sources and includes lavish photographs of the artistic and architectural masterpieces of the period. Another survey particularly good for its narrative of the British period is Stanley Wolpert's *A New History of India*.

The rise of Muslim nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is a subject that has produced polemic as well as serious study. David Lelyveld's *Aligarh's First Generation* and Gail Minault's *The Khilafat Movement* are good recent examples of American scholarship on very early phases based on primary sources. K.K. Aziz' *The Making of Pakistan* and Hafeez Malik's *Muslim Nationalism in India*

Historical Setting

and Pakistan are older accounts by Pakistani scholars. There is, unfortunately, no serious objective biography of Jinnah.

The political history of postindependence Pakistan can be adequately captured from Khalid Bin Sayeed's *Pakistan: the Formative Phase*, Ayub Khan's *Friends Not Masters*, Shahid Javed Burki's *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977*, and Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*.

The traumatic civil war has been approached from many angles. Rounaq Jahan's *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* is an analysis of Ayub Khan's policies culminating in disintegration. Fazal Muqeem Khan's *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership* blames mainly Yahya Khan and India for the debacle. G.W. Choudhury's *The Last Days of United Pakistan* is a multifaceted account by one who was personally involved in the negotiations that finally broke down in March 1971. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment



*Buddha on the Lion Throne, representative of Gandhāran art, second
and third centuries A.D.*

PAKISTANI SOCIETY of the early 1980s remained ethnically diverse yet overwhelmingly Muslim. It was largely rural yet beset by the problems of hyperurbanization. The vast majority lived in poverty while a narrow stratum of elite families enjoyed great wealth. Almost any problem a low-income country might have, Pakistan had in abundance.

Founded as an Islamic republic and with 98 percent of its population professed Muslims, religion has nonetheless failed to provide a focus for national identity. Pakistan remains a country of immense regional diversity. Pakhtuns, Baluch, Punjabis, and Sindhis are all Muslim, yet they represent diverse cultural traditions and speak different languages. Ethnic, regional, caste, and, above all, family loyalties figure far more prominently for the average individual than national ones.

Punjabis, the most numerous ethnic group, predominate in the central government and the military. Baluch, Pakhtuns, and Sindhis find the Punjabi preponderance at odds with their own aspirations for provincial autonomy. That the provinces are not monoethnic further complicates ethnic relations. Sind, in particular, absorbed the lion's share of the Urdu-speaking refugees from India following partition and has received scores of thousands of Baluch and Pakhtun immigrants in more recent years.

Islam itself has added to the diverseness. There is a sizable minority of Shiite Muslims, as well as a variety of smaller sects, amid the majority Sunnis. There have been sporadic outbursts of sectarian violence. Many of the non-Sunni Muslims are economically successful, and their level of success and affluence does not sit well with the Sunni majority.

The precise role of Islam in society and government has been a frequent subject of debate. Even within the Sunni community there is a major split between fundamentalists and modernizers. The two groups hold widely disparate views on almost any imaginable subject. The schism between fundamentalists and more secular-minded Muslims and that between Shiites and Sunnis were accentuated in the early 1980s by government policies fostering Islamization. Finally, there is the gulf between orthodoxy of whatever ilk and popular religion. For the mass of believers, intensely and unquestioningly devout though they are, Islam is largely a matter of customary practice and mores. For them, elements of the Quran are intermingled with a host of unorthodox beliefs about spirits, saints, amulets, and the like.

In the early 1980s more than 70 percent of the populace lived in the countryside. Rural overpopulation has been a feature of village life for nearly a century. Peasant families have long relied on emigration and remittances from a portion of their members as a safety valve for excess heirs and a supplement to farm incomes. Continued population

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growth means ever-increasing pressure on the land base and greater fragmentation of small holdings that grow more marginal still with division among each passing generation's heirs.

The landlord is a pivotal figure in rural social relations. Even as smallholders have become more marginal, large landowners, having weathered the perils of Islamic socialism under the late prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, have become more firmly entrenched. The independent peasant proprietor has been increasingly lost amid the swarms of landless laborers and tenant farmers. The landed gentry wield both political and economic clout. They are able to dispense any number of favors to their tenants and dependents, thereby ensuring a political power base.

Both the elite and the middle class are narrow social strata when compared with the mass of peasants and urban poor. They are urban in residence and orientation. Many are more fluent in English than in Urdu, the country's official language. They are at ease with and accustomed to Western culture. The elite and middle class are ethnically mixed, refugees from India and adherents of several small Islamic sects play a significant role in commerce and industry.

Rural overpopulation and the continued high rate of population increase have fueled massive urban expansion. Cities have grown faster than total population since the 1950s. Their expansion has been accompanied by problems in providing amenities and employment for hundreds of thousands of new inhabitants.

Population growth rates through the 1960s and 1970s were of such magnitudes that major readjustments were necessary for the rest of the twentieth century—regardless of what might happen to fertility rates in the 1980s and 1990s. Annual population growth rates of nearly 3 percent in the 1960s and 1970s gave Pakistan an immense school-age population, strained already limited resources, and swallowed up gains in economic growth.

Geography

Part of the greater Indian subcontinent, Pakistan was formed as a state in the partition of British India that took effect on August 14, 1947. This division, based principally on location of Hindu and Muslim majorities, created Pakistan in two parts separated by about 1,600 kilometers. East Pakistan, or the East Wing, became the independent state of Bangladesh after the Indo-Pakistani War of December 1971. Since that time, the country of Pakistan has consisted only of what was formerly called West Pakistan, or the West Wing. Its area, including Pakistan-held Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan, is about 801,176 square kilometers (see fig. 1).

The boundary with Iran, some 800 kilometers in length, was first delimited by a British commission in 1893, separating Iran from what was then British India Baluchistan. In 1957 Pakistan signed a frontier agreement with Iran, and the border between the two countries has not since been a subject of serious dispute. Pakistan's boundary with

Afghanistan is about 2,250 kilometers long and in the north runs along the ridges of the formidable mountain regions of the Hindu Kush (Hindu Killers) and the Pamirs, where a narrow strip of Afghan territory called the Wakhan Corridor separates Pakistan from the Soviet Union by only a few kilometers.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand and was accepted by the amir (king) of Afghanistan in a treaty that same year. The definition of this boundary, called the Durand Line, was not in doubt when Pakistan became independent in 1947. Afghanistan, however, claiming that the Durand Line had been imposed by a stronger power upon a weaker, favored the establishment of still another state west of the Indus River to be called Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan (see *Foreign Policy*, ch. 4). Pakistan maintained, and was supported fully in this position by Britain, that it was Britain's direct successor to the existing boundary. The Durand Line remained in effect in 1963.

Along this boundary the Khojak Pass, on Pakistan's side of the border and about 80 kilometers northwest of Quetta, is an important access route through the mountains of western Pakistan. To the north, on the border about 40 kilometers west of Peshawar, is the famous route through the Khyber Pass. In the far north, access into the Wakhan Corridor is provided by the Baroghil Pass (see fig. 5).

In the northeastern tip of the country, Pakistan controls about 84,130 square kilometers of the former British-Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, in dispute between India and Pakistan since 1947 (the remaining 144,729 square kilometers remain under Indian control). From the eastern end of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a boundary of about 520 kilometers runs generally southeast between China and Pakistan-controlled Jammu and Kashmir, ending at the Karakoram Pass. This line was both delimited and demarcated as a result of a series of notes and agreements between China and Pakistan during the 1961-65 period. By mutual agreement, a new boundary treaty is to be negotiated when the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is finally resolved.

The Pakistan-India cease-fire line runs from the Karakoram Pass to a point about 130 kilometers northeast of Lahore. This line, arranged with United Nations (UN) assistance in January 1949 after the preceding year and one-half of fighting, is about 770 kilometers in length and was last adjusted and agreed to by the two countries in the Simla Agreement of July 1972, since that time the two countries have called it the Line of Actual Control. From the southern end of the line, the Pakistan-India boundary runs irregularly southward for about 1,280 kilometers, following the line of the 1947 Radcliffe Award—named for Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the head of the British boundary commission for the partition of the Punjab and Bengal in 1947.

In southern Pakistan, the Thar Desert in the province of Sind is separated from the salt flats of the Rann (wilderness, or desolation) of Kutch by a boundary that was first laid down in 1923-24. After partition,

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


Figure 5. Topography and Drainage

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
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
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
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The Society and Its Environment



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Pakistan contested the southern boundary of Sind, and a succession of border incidents finally resulted in the Pakistani-Indian hostilities of April-June 1965. These hostilities were ended by British mediation, and both sides accepted the award of the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal designated by the secretary general of the U.N. The tribunal made its award on February 19, 1968, delimiting a line of 403 kilometers that was later demarcated by joint survey teams. Of its original claim of some 9,100 square kilometers, Pakistan was awarded about 780 square kilometers; the new boundary was not significantly different from the older. Beyond the western terminus of the tribunal's award, the final stretch of Pakistan's border with India is about 80 kilometers in length, running west and southwest to an inlet of the Arabian Sea.

Internally, excluding the Jammu and Kashmir region in the north, Pakistan is divided into the four provinces of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Punjab, and Sind. The federal capital district is at Islamabad. In the far north and northeast of the country, a number of small feudatory states in the Jammu and Kashmir region acceded to Pakistan at the time of independence and were held in whole or in part during the subsequent hostilities. These are grouped under two federally administered agencies and a protected quasi-state: the Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan Agency, and Azad (Free) Kashmir. The latter is neither a province nor an agency but has a government of its own that is regarded by Pakistan as independent. It is, however, under the protection and direct control of Pakistan.

Regions, Mountains, and Rivers

Pakistan can be divided into three major geographic areas: the northern highlands, the Indus River Plain, its two major subdivisions corresponding roughly to the provinces of Punjab and Sind; and the Baluchistan Plateau. Some geographers designate additional major regions, for example, the mountain ranges along the western border with Afghanistan are sometimes described separately from the Baluchistan Plateau, and on the eastern border with India, south of the Sutlej River, the Thar Desert may be treated separately from the Indus Plain. Nevertheless, the country may conveniently be visualized in general terms as divided in three by an imaginary line drawn eastward from the Khyber Pass and another drawn southwest from Islamabad down the middle of the country. Roughly, then, the northern highlands are north of the imaginary east-west line; the Baluchistan Plateau is to the west of the imaginary southwest line; and the Indus Plain lies to the east of that line.

The northern highlands are a region of some of the most rugged, formidable mountains in the world. Virtually all elevations in the area are higher than 2,400 meters above sea level; more than one-half are above 4,800 meters, and more than 50 peaks are above 6,500 meters. Travel through the area is difficult and dangerous. Because of the rugged topography and rigors of the climate, the northern mountains

and the Himalayan chain to the east have throughout history been formidable barriers to movement into Pakistan.

In addition to the northern mountains, the southern deserts, and the generally barren plateaus, the most important physical feature, and the one that makes intensive cultivation possible in such an arid environment, is the Indus River and its tributaries. The name *Indus* comes from the Sanskrit word *Sindhu*, meaning ocean, from which also come the words *Sind*, *Hindu*, and *India*. One of the great rivers of the world, the Indus rises in southwest Tibet, only about 160 kilometers west of the sources of the Sutlej River, which joins the Indus in the Punjab, and the Brahmaputra, the dominant river of Bangladesh and eastern India. The catchment area of the Indus is estimated at almost 1 million square kilometers, and all of the country's major rivers—Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej—flow into it. The Tarbela Dam on the Indus and the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum are of vital importance to the national economy (see *Irrigation, Energy*, ch. 3).

Various parts of the country are subject to frequent seismic disturbances. The Quetta region is the most earthquake prone. A severe quake in 1931 was followed by one of major proportions in May 1935. The small city was almost completely destroyed, and the adjacent military cantonment was heavily damaged. At least 20,000 people were killed. Tremors of varying intensity continue to occur in the vicinity of Quetta, but as of late 1983 there had been no major quake since 1935.

Climate and Rainfall

Pakistan lies in what is called the warm temperature zone. The climate is generally arid, characterized by hot summers and cool or cold winters and wide variations between extremes of temperature at given locations. Rainfall, on the whole, is low. These generalizations should not obscure the distinct differences existing between particular locations, for example, between the coastal area along the Arabian Sea and the frozen snow-covered ridges of the Karakoram and other mountains of the far north.

The year in Pakistan can be divided into four seasons: a relatively dry-cool winter period from December through February; the dry-hot weather season, or summer, from March through May; the summer rainy season, or southwest monsoon period, from June through September, and the retreating monsoon period of October and November, sometimes also called the northeast monsoon. The onset and duration of these general seasons vary somewhat according to place.

Monsoon winds are caused by the differential heating of land and water. During the hot months of April and May, the hot air over the Indian subcontinent rises, creating a partial vacuum into which rush cooler, moisture-bearing currents from off the Arabian Sea. These winds blow across Pakistan from Sind and up the Indus Plain to the mountains in the north, where they are deflected to the northwest by the mountain wall and drop rain on the southern slopes. The northeast, or retreating, monsoon blows from the land to the sea. Its winds are

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generally light and carry little rain. The intensity of both monsoons and the amount of rain deposited is much less in Pakistan than in India. At least 80 percent of the cultivated acreage in Pakistan depends on some form of irrigation. Actual annual rainfall varies from place to place, for example, from 381 millimeters at Karachi to 313 millimeters at Dera Ismail Khan to 959 millimeters at Rawalpindi (see table 2, Appendix).

Population

The Census

Pakistan has a long history of census taking, established during the time it was part of British India. The first census, confined to what were then called the Northwestern Provinces, was taken in December 1852, with a reference date of January 1, 1853. Between that time and 1871, separate and uncoordinated censuses were taken in most of the other provinces of British India. The census of 1871-72, although it did not cover all provinces and contained many irregularities, was taken under central government direction and scheduling and is regarded as the first general census.

After 1871 the count was made regularly with increasing effectiveness at 10-year intervals. For each such decennial census the government created an ad hoc organization to do the work and prepare the report. After independence in 1947 the new government of Pakistan established the Pakistan Census Organization. Pakistan then included the East Wing, and the 1951 and 1961 census reports therefore include data for that area, and it is necessary in using those records to select the data under the subheadings of "West Pakistan" in order to construct the census background of post-1971 Pakistan.

Because of political conditions culminating in the December 1971 war with India, no census was taken in Pakistan that year, but one was taken during the period September 16-30, 1972, the intercensal period thus being 11 years and eight months. This enumeration, along with that of 1971 in India, completed 100 years of census taking in the subcontinent.

The government carried out its fourth population count in March 1981; it had been preceded by a housing census in December 1980. The preliminary census report—the only one publicly available in mid-1983—provided a total population of 83,782,000. This total excluded Gilgit, Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir. The report indicated a 28.3 percent increase in the population in the intercensal period (see table 3, Appendix). A projection of the census data provides a March 1983 total of over 88.5 million. In August 1983, however, the United States Bureau of the Census estimated Pakistan's mid-1983 population at about 94.8 million. The bureau provided no explanation for its figure, which most observers believe was too high.

Although several urban areas grew significantly during the intercensal period, the population remained over 70 percent rural. Ap-

proximately 54.6 percent of the people were under 20 years of age and over 45 percent under 15 years of age (see fig. 6). Short of a startling, and unexpected, adoption of population control practices by this young population, the annual rate of growth may be expected to remain close to 3 percent per annum for decades to come. Even if a majority of the population practice birth control measures, the annual population increases will impose greater burdens on already inadequate health, education, and social services well into the twenty-first century and will add a significant number to the working force each year (see Health, Education, this ch.; Labor Force, ch. 3).

The preliminary census report did not include the refugees from Afghanistan. In mid-1983 the Pakistani government estimated the total at about 3.1 million refugees. Some observers suggested that the total was closer to 2.4 or 2.5 million, but all agreed that additional refugees were arriving each month. The bulk of the refugees were housed in camps in the NWFP, although several hundred thousand were also located in Baluchistan. In 1983 the government was beginning to relocate a few thousand of them in the western reaches of the Punjab.


The preliminary report presumably also omitted the large number of Pakistanis temporarily working abroad. Rough unofficial estimates ranged around 2 million, of which between 1.4 million and 1.5 million were working in the states of the Arabian Peninsula; most of them were concentrated in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. An overwhelming majority of those working abroad were men unaccompanied by families. Although among these were medical personnel, technicians, military specialists, and other professionals, the majority consisted of unskilled laborers. A significant portion of the workers were from the NWFP and Baluchistan. The census report indicated that in some districts of the NWFP the ratio of men to women changed markedly during the 1970s.

In a research document prepared under contract for the United States Agency for International Development (AID) and presented to President Mohammad Zia ul Haq in the spring of 1983, The Futures Group illustrated the impact of population growth on the nation's development plans. Among other things, the report projects that if the current annual growth rate remains unchecked, the population will reach 145 million by 2000, 200 million by 2010, and over 300 million by 2030. Even if the rate of growth were to decline sharply and rapidly to about 1 percent a year by 2010, the population would still reach 115 million by 2000, 130 million by 2010, and over 150 million by 2030. Inasmuch as only about 6 percent of those of childbearing age regularly practiced contraception, a sharp decline in the fertility rate was deemed unlikely.

Family Planning

A falling death rate unaccompanied by any significant decrease in the birth rate has been the impetus behind the country's astronomical population growth. The death rate declined from 27 per 1,000 in 1950

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NOTE: Based on 10 percent sample of the 1981 census. Federally Administered Tribal Areas excluded

Figure 6. Age-Sex Pyramid, 1981

to an estimated 12 in 1981, at the same time, the birth rate dropped only slightly from 44 to 41 per 1,000 population. In the early 1980s the average woman bore a total of six children during her reproductive life. Annual population growth rates began rising in the 1930s and increased dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s (see table 4, Appendix). From 1972 through 1981 the population grew at some 2.8 percent annually, a rate at which the population will double in roughly 25 years.

The Pakistani workers currently employed outside the country have not provided a safety valve for excess population. The majority of the emigrants are single males. They are not permanent emigrants, and their families remain in Pakistan.

Continued population growth carries a high socioeconomic price tag. The dependency ratio (of adults aged 15 through 60 to children under 15) is roughly one-half to one-third that of developed countries, little more than one to one. Although the widespread use of child labor lessens the burden on the working population, this solution entails its own costs. Education, especially education of females, is strongly correlated with dropping fertility rates.

The number of workers entering the labor force annually will continue to grow dramatically, at least until the end of the century. The new workers of 1985 have already been born, so regardless of what happens to fertility in the coming decades, the country's labor force will grow at some 3.8 percent annually from 1983 through 1985. The rate is nearly double that of the preceding decade, from 1967 to 1977 the working population expanded by 2.5 percent yearly. If present fertility levels continue, the country will need 1.5 million new jobs in 2000, 2.2 million in 2010.

Even granting continued expansion of irrigation, reclamation of land from salination, and increasing use of improved inputs, population growth would strain agricultural capacity. The problem is the more acute because partible inheritance among male heirs, the customary practice, fragments holdings. Despite bumper crops in 1980 and 1981, Pakistan imported some 600,000 tons of wheat to meet domestic needs. Given the most optimistic projections of increased agricultural production this deficit would, at present levels of fertility, reach 2 million tons by 2000, 5 million by 2010.

Requirements for housing, health care, education, and electricity would be immense if fertility continued at its current level and substantial even with sizable reductions. At current rates of growth the urban population would be 75 million by 2000, that of Karachi alone some 15 million by 2010.

The Sixth Five-Year Plan's goal of universal primary-school enrollment for males and a rise from 33 to 45 percent attendance for females, if attained, becomes more difficult to maintain with continued population growth. At present rates the primary-school population, 11.6 million in 1980, would nearly double by 2000. Spending would have to increase more than fivefold to keep pace with growing enrollments.

Controlling population growth has been a perennial theme of five-year plans. The first (1955-60) noted the need to reduce the annual rate of population increase—it was then less than 2 percent. The fourth lamented that increases in gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) were more and more swallowed up by increases in population. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1978-83, listed controlling the population explosion as a principal goal, all to little avail. Family planning began with scattered volunteer programs and clinics in the 1950s. Formal government efforts date from the 1965 formation of the Pakistan Family Planning Council, which remained in existence until 1977. Efforts have been hampered by a lack of resources, indiscriminate dispersal of these scarce resources, frequent organizational changes, general inflexibility, and the minimal qualifications of many field-workers. Any attempts at a clinical program were virtually abandoned in the political upheaval of 1977. The Fifth Five-Year Plan notwithstanding, little if anything was done between 1977 and 1980.

In 1980 the Population Division, formerly under the direction of a minister of state, was renamed the Population Welfare Division and transferred to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development.

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The agency was charged with the delivery of family planning services and maternal and child health care. These services were to be delivered through Family Welfare Centers; there were roughly 1,000 of these centers in early 1983, and the government planned to add another 250 within a year. The main practical goals were to lower the annual population growth rate to 2.7 percent and increase contraceptive users from 6 to 14 percent of women of childbearing age by 1984.

The new population program called for the active participation of all relevant public agencies; it was a multipronged approach that emphasized increasing female school enrollments and improving maternal and child health as well as the delivery of contraceptives to the populace at large. Reproductive health centers attached to hospitals were to provide quality gynecological and obstetrical care. A broad range of educational programs made use of both face-to-face communication and media campaigns. The educational themes were those associated with small family size, i.e., the importance of breast-feeding, proper maternal and child health-care practices, good child nutrition, the positive virtues of late marriage, and the improvement of women's status. The new program aimed at not only increasing the general availability of contraceptives but also improving the training of family planning personnel and involving the local community in decision-making.

Ethnic Relations

Religion was the key force behind the drive for a separate state; Pakistan's *raison d'être* was to provide a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims. The country was founded as a self-confessed "Islamic Republic." Some 98 percent of the populace are avowed Muslims. During the 36 years of the country's existence, however, these coreligionists have found faith a two-edged sword. Islam was a unifying force in the face of a sea of Hindus. With a heritage of rule from the Mughal Empire, South Asian Muslims were reluctant to accept minority status in Hindu-dominated India. That Hindus had taken greater advantage of British colonial reforms than Muslims exacerbated these fears (see *The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism*, ch. 1). As independence approached, Hindus had far outstripped Muslims in education and civil service. By 1870 Hindus outnumbered Muslims in government service by seven to one.

Although most Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims, there remains substantial cultural diversity within and among the four provinces. An individual's loyalties are defined in terms of family, local leaders, lineage or clan or, on a slightly more abstract level, tribe and caste. The notion of national loyalty has little currency. Coreligionists think of themselves as Muslims and Sindhis, Punjabis, Baluch, or Pakhtuns (see Glossary). Even the term Pakistani is frequently used as a negative referent, a way of distinguishing outsiders: anyone who is not Baluch, etc., is a Pakistani.

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*Youngsters in Hunan
Courtesy Aramco World Magazine*

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Three distinct groups constituted the subcontinent's prepartition Muslim community. In the northwest, in the regions of what is now Pakistan, Muslims were a majority. Overall, they were a prosperous rural populace. They enjoyed substantial privileges under colonial rule—a reward for their loyalty during the Sepoy Mutiny (or Rebellion) of 1857 and, in the case of Baluch and Pakhtun tribesmen, as part of the carrot-and-stick policies the British used to secure access to the strategic frontier (see *The Forward Policy*, ch. 1).

In the northeast provinces of Assam and Bengal (currently Bangladesh), by contrast, Muslims had opposed British advances and taken part in the mutiny. Colonial policy was concomitantly harsh in dealing with them. By the early twentieth century, Muslims there were largely a landless rural proletariat at the mercy of Hindu landlords. Finally, there was a substantial Muslim minority in central India, many of whom were urban, educated merchants and professionals.

Support for a separate Muslim state varied among the three groups. It was distinctly lukewarm in the northwest. Colonial rule had not proved all that onerous, and the tribals in particular were uncertain of what advantage they might enjoy in an independent Pakistan. The northeast, where ethnic and religious differences hewed so closely to economic ones, was a hotbed of agitation for a separate state. The same, for slightly different reasons, was true of the urban Muslims. Early proponents of a separate Muslim state found large followings among central India's Muslims. The prospect of elevated social status in an exclusively Muslim state was, one imagines, an enticement.

Pakistan comprises, in short, distinct cultures, diverse in their political histories, varied in custom and language, and each intensely committed to its unique heritage and way of life. Islam provides a tenuous sort of unity in the face of such diversity. That none of the provinces is the exclusive enclave of its predominant ethnic group adds further complexity to the situation. There are substantial numbers of the major ethnic groups outside their "own" provinces (see fig. 7).

Baluchistan includes numbers of Pakhtu speakers in the north. The province's few urban centers are the bailiwicks of Pakhtun, Punjabi, and Sindhi merchants. Punjabi bureaucrats from the civil service and the military have acquired valuable tracts of irrigated land within the province.

The NWFP, the center of Pakistan's Pakhtun population, includes other tribal groups, such as Gujars and Kohistanis. In addition, there are a variety of castes based on occupational groups. Most of these people speak Pakhtu, and many adhere to Pakhtun ideals. Nonetheless, Pakhtuns regard them as outsiders and, usually, distinctly inferior.

Sind includes more Baluch than Baluchistan itself. Karachi is multi-ethnic in the extreme. Its population includes large numbers of Pakhtuns and Baluch émigrés. Sind also absorbed the majority of the *muhajirs*—immigrants from India following partition. Even the seemingly monoethnic Punjab absorbed regions previously settled by other ethnic groups.




Figure 7. General Location of Principal Ethnic Groups

There are 20 or more spoken languages in Pakistan. The most commonly spoken—Punjabi, Sindhi, and Urdu—belong to the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European language family. Scores of thousands of Aryan-speaking invaders swept into the Indo-Gangetic plains in the second and third millennium B.C. (see *Early Civilizations*, ch. 1). The invaders' languages supplanted the indigenous Dravidian tongues in most of the northern half of the subcontinent.

Language serves as a major cultural marker and figures in the identity of the various ethnic groups. Language issues have been politically explosive and frequently divisive forces throughout the country's history. According to the 1973 Constitution, Urdu is the official language. It is, however, not indigenous to the area and is the native tongue only of the *muhajirs*, perhaps 10 percent of the population. The Punjabi intelligentsia have adopted it, but it is rarely a first language for them.

As a language of prestige, Urdu shares billing with English. English is, of course, part of the legacy of colonial rule, but it continues to be

avored by the most elite of the elite, who are frequently more at home in English than in Urdu. It is also a choice of those aspiring to upward mobility. Zia's efforts to enhance the role of Urdu in education and government have run afoul of not only the linguistic affinities of various cultural groups but also the aspirations of upper middle-class and upper class parents wishing their sons to be educated in English.

The Indo-Aryan vernaculars stretch across the northern half of the Indian subcontinent in a vast continuum of local dialects. Linguistic boundaries blur at the village level; any given locale is surrounded by mutually intelligible neighboring dialects. Dialects from distant villages are typically not mutually understandable. Superimposed on the continuum of local dialects are several types of more standardized, often written, forms usually identified as literary or commercial languages. Although often based on the vernaculars of their representative regions, these standardized languages are not identical with them.

Sindhi and Punjabi represent the westernmost extension of the Indo-Aryan continuum, whereas Urdu springs from the dialects of north-central India. Its closest linguistic relative is the Hindi spoken in that region; in an important sense, Hindi and Urdu are dialects of a single language.

The history of Urdu-Hindi begins with the Mughal Muslim conquerors learning the Indo-Aryan dialects of the Delhi area, where their capital was located. Over a period of centuries the language was spread by soldiers, officials, and traders until it became the lingua franca of the military camp and the bazaar. Gradually, it absorbed more and more elements of Persian, the official language of administration. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a stylized, "Persianized" literary form had developed. It was written in Arabic-based Persian script and was quite unlike the colloquial form in common use. The hybrid language came to be known as Urdu, the language of the camp. Punjabi, the mother tongue of the most populous province, has no written script. Sindhi and Pakhtu use an Arabic-Persian script similar to that of Urdu.

Urdu served as a language of national identity in the drive for a Muslim state. Although the native language of only a small minority, it is the major language of literacy. Vehicles for the dissemination of Urdu, such as educational facilities, television, and radio, increased in number in the 1970s.

There are extremes of poverty and wealth within each ethnic community, and each region can boast an indigenous elite. Inequality, however, follows ethnic lines closely enough to be a cause for tension. Per capita gross regional product in Baluchistan and the NWFP consistently lags behind that of the Punjab and Sind.

Punjabis, some 60 to 70 percent of the population, predominate in the upper echelons of the military and the civil service—both powerful and privileged institutions (see *Political Stability*, ch. 4). Pakhtuns, too, play a role disproportionate to their total numbers in the military. They think their province's poverty is partially a function of less-than-benign

neglect by the Punjabi-dominated central government. It is a feeling shared by the Baluch. Political hegemony and a certain amount of Punjabi chauvinism take on new meaning in multiethnic Pakistan. Baluch, Sindhi, and Pakhtun alike see the central government as Punjabi and its efforts to limit provincial autonomy as a blow to their cultural traditions. There is a feeling, particularly among various segments of the Baluch and Pakhtun elite, that Punjabi domination is only a new, and by no means more acceptable, form of colonialism.

Punjabis

The Punjab, a region of fertile agricultural lands, is Pakistan's largest, most populous province. The landed elite were and are the favored social stratum. British rule was geared to their needs and wants, in return for which they maintained order in the countryside. Independence scarcely altered this status quo. Given the province's overwhelming importance, its landowners (in tandem with influential *muhajirs*) continue to have a predominant say in the workings of the central government.

Urdu is favored in urban centers by the movers and shakers. Villagers, however, speak a plethora of similar dialects. Linguistic boundaries are notably diffuse. Punjabis have a saying that language changes every 25 kilometers. Although there is a continuum of village vernaculars, linguists distinguish three main dialects. Punjabi is spoken in central Punjab, Saraiki in the south, and Potwari in the north. Some observers suggest that there is a generalized Punjabi patois understood throughout the region.

Social structure reflects the province's rural agrarian setting. Distinctions based on caste are the most significant social markers. Although Punjabi chauvinism has been prominent in Pakistani affairs, Punjabis themselves, notes one observer, "become Punjabis only when they are outside the province."

In censuses taken in British India, the Punjabi castes were typically described as functional castes or as "agricultural tribes." In fact, tribal affiliation, based on descent, and caste, based on occupational specialization, tend to merge in the Punjab. Many occupational groups claim descent from a common ancestor, and many tribes traditionally followed a single occupation. The traditional occupation gives the caste its name as well as its general position in the social hierarchy. The largest Muslim castes are agricultural groups tracing descent from a common mythical ancestor: Jats, Rajputs, and Arains are the most common.

The name "Rajput" means prince (literally, *raja's son*); Rajputs are by tradition warriors, rulers, landowners, and agriculturists. Divided into numerous lineages, the Rajputs are characterized by a quasi-feudal tribal system, romantic character, chivalrous valor, and punctilious regard for personal honor. The Muslim Rajputs probably descended from local aristocrats who were converted to Islam during Mughal rule. They held positions of honor in the military and administration. They

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contributed large numbers of excellent soldiers to the Indian army under the British, and they continue to form the largest component in the Pakistani military.

The Jats are the largest group in the Punjab. Their social position, though lower than that of the Rajputs, is highly respectable. The boundary between the two groups is sometimes indistinct. Jats are commonly landowning cultivators, though they too contribute large numbers to the military. Like the Jats, the Arains are an agricultural group of good social standing. Many of them moved into the canal colony districts when new land was opened through irrigation projects (see Irrigation, ch. 3).

There are, in addition, a number of other groups of social and political significance. Bilochs, derived largely from the tribes of Baluchistan, are numerous in the southwest Punjab. Typically, they engage in agriculture combined with animal husbandry. They are particularly known as camel drivers, and in some cases camel drivers of whatever origin are called Bilochs. Awans and Gujars are agricultural tribes common in the northwest Punjab and closely related to tribes of the same names in the NWFP. These tribes enjoy a higher social status in the Punjab, ranking only slightly below the Jats. Finally, there are the Lohar and Tarkhan castes, whose members are traditionally blacksmiths, carpenters, and artisans.

Sindhis

Sind spent much of the era of the British Raj as the nearly forgotten hinterland of Bombay. The social order was dominated by the relatively few families possessing large landholdings. Most of the populace were tenants facing terms of contract that were scant improvement on outright servitude. It was a rural landscape of unremitting poverty. Landlords ruled with little concern for any outside interference. A series of irrigation projects in the 1930s merely served to increase the wealth of large owners; their wastelands were made productive. Reformist legislation in the 1940s aimed at ameliorating the lot of the poor but had little success. The province approached independence with entrenched extremes in wealth and poverty. The middle class was nearly nonexistent; the mass of landless toiled for a few landed families.

Sind suffered considerable upheaval in the years following partition. Millions of Hindus and Sikhs left for India to be replaced by roughly 7 million *muhajirs*. Generally better educated than most native Sindhis, the refugees filled a vacuum in the province's commercial life left by the departing Hindus and Sikhs.

The refugees' preponderance in commerce and the professions was hardly calculated to endear them to native Sindhis. Although numbering in 1981 perhaps 10 percent of total population, the *muhajirs* accounted for one-half of those who had gone to secondary school or beyond. Their substantial commercial skills and Pakistan's need to industrialize combined to give them an edge in the expanding industrial

sector of the economy. By the 1960s modern industry and commerce were firmly in *muhajir* hands (see Social Organization, this ch.).

In addition to the refugee community, Sind has sizable numbers of Pakhtuns, Baluch, and Punjabis. The proportion of Hindus dropped following partition, most of the lowest caste Hindus, however, stayed on, occupying the lowest social rung. Some experts suggested that perhaps 90 percent of the urban working classes were non-Sindhis.

Tensions between "old Sindhis" and "new Sindhis" have been a perennial feature of social life. Language differences have exacerbated the tensions. Urdu has gone a long way toward supplanting Sindhi, which is now spoken by little more than one-half the populace. Urdu is particularly common in urban areas.

"Old Sindhis" are divided into an extraordinary number of small occupational, geographic, tribal, lineage, and caste groups. Most are endogamous. Sometimes coinciding with such groups and sometimes cutting across their boundaries are groups of disciples of Muslim saints (*pirs*) (see Islamic Institutions and Leadership, this ch.). Saints such as Pir Pagaro were pivotal in mobilizing popular resistance to British rule, and saints continue to play a significant role in rural life.

The 1960s saw increasing agitation for reform, particularly among native Sindhi students. The combination of students denied a significant role in the central government and business and the rural landless bearing the brunt of extreme overpopulation was a politically potent one. At the same time, other ethnic groups—the "new Sindhis"—feared being shut out of employment and an effective say in provincial government.

In the early 1970s the accumulated tensions erupted into riots, sparked by the choice of Sindhi as the official provincial language. The province also faces considerable religious conflict because it is here—especially in its capital, Karachi—that the country's Shiite Muslim community is concentrated. There was sectarian violence in the early 1980s over a variety of religious issues associated with Zia's Islamization policies (see Islam in Pakistani Society, this ch.).

Pakhtuns

The 1981 census enumerated 10.9 million residents—all but 20 or 30 percent Pakhtuns—in the NWFP. There were, in addition, some 2.8 million officially registered Afghan refugees who were overwhelmingly Pakhtun. As with all previous censuses and enumerations, these were estimates. Questions related to a man's sisters, wives, mothers, or daughters are the subject of great sensitivity. Even questions about the number of women in a household are, in the Pakhtun view, an invasion of privacy. Anthropologist Akbar S. Ahmed, in his study of both tribal and sedentary Mohmands, was able to obtain accurate household censuses and found the official figures inflated by roughly two to three times. The tendency is for respondents to overstate the number of men in a household (one's sons and brothers are a source of strength) and undercount the number of women.

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By whatever count, Pakhtuns constitute one of the largest tribal groups in the world. They are centered in Afghanistan and the NWFP. Pakistan's Pakhtun population is bordered on the south by Baluch, on the east by Punjabis, and on the north by ethnically mixed populations. They inhabit a wide variety of ecological zones, manifest varying life-styles, are governed under a number of administrative arrangements, and pursue disparate means of livelihood. All Pakhtuns, however, share a common value system, ethos, and world view. However diverse their life situations, their kinship and social dynamics remain comparable.

Pakhtuns trace putative descent from Qais bin Rashid, who, according to Pakhtun history, went to Arabia in the seventh century and was converted to Islam by the Prophet himself. Descent is reckoned patrilineally—an individual counts as blood (or consanguineal) relatives those to whom one can trace a link through the male line. Tribes and clans are composed as various patrilineally related lineages. Lineages themselves have a notable tendency to fragment and fission at the local level, i.e., between relatively closely related lineage mates. This on-going process has, over the centuries, given rise to larger groupings—clans and tribes. At every level of Pakhtun social organization, groups are split into a complex and shifting pattern of alliance and enmity.

Pakhtun society and culture remain profoundly male oriented. The principal avenues for prestige are exclusively the domain of men, women's lot is almost exclusively domestic. With rare exceptions, purdah—the formal seclusion of women—is strictly followed, women have no place, according to the common saying, but "home or the grave." Daughters are regarded by their own lineages as "temporary visitors," because their children will belong to another lineage (their father's). Pakhtuns will use the same term to characterize women as they do to designate the low status, non-Pakhtun groups with whom they come into contact. Individual women may be held very dearly by their husbands and sons, but overall a woman's lot is difficult.

To be a Pakhtun is to be a Muslim. Islamic symbolism suffuses Pakhtun social thought and action. A Pakhtun's enemies are inevitably not simply political or social opponents but unbelievers and infidels (*kafirs*). Islam is a potent force in mobilizing supra-lineage support for a course of action. During the colonial era, various religious leaders led countless millenarian movements against the *kafir* British. Indeed, a man is able to pledge his loyalty to a mullah (religious leader) who leads in God's name, whereas to do so to another Pakhtun would demean the individual and violate the intensely egalitarian Pakhtun ethos.

In keeping with the Quran's dictates, most Pakhtuns pray five times daily, and the month of obligatory fasting is almost universally followed, in many instances from the time the individual is 12 or 14 years old. Families will forgo even buying land or educating their children to save for a *haj* (the pilgrimage to Mecca a devout Muslim should make at least once) (see *Islam: Tenets and Early Development*, this ch.).



School in tribal area

Customary practice nonetheless contradicts the sharia (see Glossary) in important respects. Pakhtuns make and take interest-bearing loans. Women virtually never inherit, nor are they allowed to divorce their husbands. Death to adulterers hardly follows Islamic rules of evidence. Pakhtuns are aware of and admit the contradictions between common practice and proper Islamic law. They admit that they are wrong. Nonetheless, Pakhtuns implicitly hold that they are favored by Allah. Their ancient and free conversion, they think, gives them a particularly favored status within the community of believers. They are willing to leave theology to the mullahs. The Pakhtun considers himself Muslim in the same way he is Pakhtun—by birth and heritage. The two are simply inextricable.

Much of the Pakhtun ethos is focused on the Pakhtun Code, *pakh-tunwali* (the way of the Pakhtuns), or the code of honor (*nangwali*). The tenets of the code are virtually omnipresent in the minds of Pakhtuns. They are the constant theme of song and poetry over the centuries. Despite the wide-ranging changes since independence and the considerable diversity among the various Pakhtun tribes, there is virtually total agreement about what the Pakhtun way demands.

Pakhtun history and ethos glorify the martial virtues. Pakhtuns on the Indus Plain might fall under the sway of empires, but those in the mountains retained control of the strategic passes between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. They lived—and continue to es-

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pouse—a fiercely independent existence. The British troops north of the Malakand Pass in the late nineteenth century were the first conquerors the region had known in centuries. Pakhtuns in Afghanistan defeated the British Army of the Indus in 1842, as they had the Mughal Army two centuries earlier. Even Pax Britannica extended only 100 meters on either side of roads in the region—and there were few roads.

Colonial rule was typically an uneasy peace, it was established through a "divide and conquer" policy of playing various feuding factions against one another. British hegemony was frequently tenuous, in 1937 Pakhtun tribesmen wiped out an entire British brigade. Throughout the 1930s there were more troops stationed in Waziristan in the southern part of the NWFP than in the rest of the subcontinent.

Pakhtunwali demands that the individual offer hospitality to guests. Commensality is a means of showing respect and friendship. A complex etiquette surrounds the serving of guests. The host or his sons serve guests, and they will refuse to sit with those they entertain as a mark of courtesy. Observers credit the relatively minimal tension between Pakistani Pakhtuns and the large number of Pakhtun refugees from Afghanistan to the deeply felt obligation of Pakhtuns to obey the customary dictates of hospitality. To consistently receive hospitality from someone implies that you are under his protection, a subservient relationship Pakhtuns shun. An extension of the norms of hospitality implies that, if an enemy comes in supplication, he must be well treated. By the same token, however, to sue for peace or to be reduced to accepting hospitality and protection from an enemy is a profound disgrace.

Pakhtun ethos is deeply egalitarian. No man will willingly admit himself less than any other's equal. Nor will he, unless driven by the most dire circumstances, put himself in a position of subservience or admit dependency on another. The equality that Pakhtuns value is evident in the men's council. The council comprises lineage elders and deals with matters ranging from disputes between local lineage sections to relations with other tribes or the Pakistani government. Although the council can make and enforce binding decisions, within the body itself all are equals. To attempt or to appear to coerce another is to give grave insult and to risk precipitating a feud.

True Pakhtuns avenge their wrongs. "He is not a Pakhtun who does not give a blow for a pinch." Vendettas and feuds were, and frequently are, an endemic feature of social relations. *Tarbur* (sons of brothers) are commonly hostile, as is the relationship between uncle and nephew. The hostility can easily engulf brothers. These unfriendly relations are the subject of numerous Pakhtun proverbs and anecdotes. "God knows that the father's brother is an infidel," is a common saying. "My brother's enemy is my friend," another. Even the term *tarbur* carries the connotation of enemy. Where parallel cousins do get along well, the relationship is dispensed with, and they address each other as brother.

At the local level, Pakhtun feuds normally reflect rivalry between *tarbur*. It is hard for an outsider to fathom the passion or longevity



Reading the Quran, Baltit



Carrying wood home, Baltit

*Photos courtesy
Aramco World Magazine*

that surrounds these vendettas. Ahmed records disputes spanning four to five decades and three to four generations. They can spread outward from the original participants to include, by way of alliance, whole sections of lineages. Indeed, given the Pakhtuns' strategic location astride the Durand Line and the ways more and more allies can be called into support of disputants, it is not unheard of to have an argument over grazing rights on a paltry half-acre of land ramify until the national powers backing the respective factions are involved.

The mortality arising from feuds and murders associated with sexual transgressions can be substantial. In recent decades the number of murders in the Peshawar District equaled that of the entire Punjab Province. Virtually all were associated with revenge and the maintenance of Pakhtun honor.

Ideal Pakhtun behavior demands that the man not count the cost of vengeance. Even the defeated, if they are courageous and refuse to submit to their enemies, win honor and respect. Ahmed records a

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multigeneration feud that left one of the major participants with virtually all of his progeny dead, his village in ruins, absolutely without hope of victory against his rivals. He was universally acclaimed a "real Pakhtun man" because of his steadfast refusal to be subservient. Pakhtuns themselves readily admit the madness of the system. There is little apparent material gain to be had from vendettas. Because most of the participants on both sides are close patrilineal kin, deaths on either side mean sorrow for both. "The prize," comments Ahmed, "is negligible, the price is exorbitant." Nonetheless, they remained passionately committed to the intertwined ideals of honor and revenge.

In tribal areas, where the level of wealth is generally limited, perennial feuding acts as a leveler. The killing, pillaging, and destruction keep any one lineage from amassing too much more than any other. In settled areas the intensity of feuds has declined, although everyone continues to be loyal to the ideals. Violence is more subject to effective government control, guns are illegal and scarce, and younger Pakhtuns tend to be less ready to become deeply involved in their elders' disputes.

Honor also demands that sexual propriety be maintained. Complete chastity among a man's female relatives is of the essence; only with the purity and good repute of his mother, daughters, sisters, and wife or wives can a man ensure his honor. Those involved in illicit sexual liaisons are killed if they are found out. Even to make lewd innuendos or, in the case of women, to have one's reputation besmirched means death. The men involved sometimes escape to other regions (where they are frequently tracked down by the woman's kin). Women, almost without exception, are killed by a close male relative. Killings associated with sexual misconduct are the only ones that do not demand revenge. Even the courts are accustomed to deal leniently in such cases.

Pakhtun society varies notably from the riverine valleys to the hills. In the densely populated valleys, irrigated land is the basis of wealth. These are regions under regular criminal and civil laws. Hill Pakhtuns, by contrast, are typically under federal jurisdiction through the six tribal agencies on the NWFP western border. Wealth and the opportunities to amass it are limited. Hill society conforms more thoroughly to Pakhtun egalitarian ideals.

Society in the river valleys is more stratified, comprising Pakhtun landlords and a variety of non-Pakhtun occupational and religious groups (often referred to as castes). Landownership confers more than wealth; it is essential to Pakhtun identity. Only landowning Pakhtuns may speak in the men's council. To lose the family's land is a major loss of status.

Ideally, lands were to be redistributed among the clans every 10 years. The redistribution system was an effort to enforce equality, limiting the opportunities any given group had to accumulate wealth and solidify a local following. It had only limited success. Redistribution between clans holding land in the valuable river basin areas and those

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on the valley flanks broke down almost immediately. In general, landholders tried to limit the operation of the redistribution system through a variety of stratagems. The wali (ruler) of Swat eliminated the system entirely in the 1930s in an effort to win the larger landlords' support.

In addition to Pakhtuns, valley landowners include numerous *stanadars*, descendants of holy men who received gifts of land from Pakhtuns. The donated land was mostly of the poorer variety and, importantly, owning it did not confer the right to membership in the men's council. Ideally, Pakhtun land was not alienable beyond clan boundaries, but *stanadar* land could be freely bought and sold.

Whereas the hill Pakhtun won prestige and status through marksmanship and personal valor, the valley Pakhtun consolidated his position by acquiring a large retinue of dependent followers. The one, Ahmed notes, was a warrior, the other a warlord. Although the virtues lauded in the Pakhtun code of honor were universally esteemed, valley dwellers, brought into contact with the parade of empires in the Indus Valley, were forced to accommodate themselves to the realities of centralized governments and their power. The qualities necessary to do so—a capacity for compromise and politic submission—were clearly at odds with Pakhtun ethos.

The Pakhtun landlord cemented the ties to his followers in a variety of ways. He drew his clientele principally from the tenants on his land, but to ensure their loyalty demanded rounds of feasting in men's houses. Indeed, until population growth and the changing politico-economic situation eroded the tenants' position in the 1960s and 1970s, they could garner considerable advantage in "shopping around" and renting land from several landowners. In some ways, at least, it was a tenants' market. If the landless were dependent, the level of competition for prestige and influence among Pakhtun overlords kept most landlords from abusing their position unduly. They could hardly press their economic advantage too strongly without losing their main political one: their following. Likewise, smaller Pakhtun landholders appeared to have been in a relatively favored position, although practically speaking they were forced to ally with a large owner for protection.

There are a variety of religious practitioners—*mins* (see Glossary) and mullahs being the most common. Successful *mins* are wont to give themselves the title of syed (descendant of the Prophet—see Glossary) and trace their roots to Arabia. They are supposed to lead the community by their example of piety and probity; they are to be men of peace in an otherwise highly contentious social landscape. According to popular repute they are able to cure diseases, and their curses are particularly potent. As in most of Islam, mullahs have a formal role in leading prayers, taking care of the mosque, and the like. Just as *mins* tend to elevate their status to syed, mullahs, if they change villages, often take the opportunity to give themselves the title of *min*. Religious leadership, in fact, was traditionally the single means of upward mobility available to non-Pakhtuns. The much-quoted proverb was "last year I was a weaver [an occupational group], this year I

am a disciple of the Prophet [sheikh], next year, if the prices rise, I will be a syed."

Religious leaders spearheaded opposition to British intrusion. There were countless millenarian movements in the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their efforts put them at odds with the traditional secular leadership in hill and valley alike. Influential khans and chieftains found themselves between a rock and a hard place. It was against them that the British took reprisals, but to fail to support the local mullah in a jihad meant being denounced as an infidel. The mullah gained power by opposing the British, while the local khans and *maliks* (small-scale chiefs) enhanced their position by getting foreign support for their faction in the perennial feuding that was the basis of traditional politics. The pattern of opposition and tension with the political agent (previously the district officer) and local khans versus mullahs persisted into the 1960s.

Although Pakhtuns are devoutly Muslim and effective religious leaders can acquire a substantial following, there is a basic ambivalence in the Pakhtun attitude toward mullahs as a whole. Normally, they are clearly subordinate to lineage elders. Men frequently comment on the mullah's illiteracy, asking who is he to intercede between them and God. Pakhtun belief, notes Ahmed, includes "a laic, uncomplicated, surface reaction to an inherited tradition that is suspicious of dogmas, debates and formalized priesthood."

The situation of the Pakhtun has changed dramatically in the years since Pakistan's formation. Increasing numbers of Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns from the region have entered the civil and police services, the armed forces, and the professions since 1947. Population growth has given rise to substantial emigration. By the late 1970s there were more than 1 million Pakhtuns in Karachi. It was the ambition of most young men to work in the Arab states, and many had already done so.

In the densely settled river basins, landlord-tenant relations were transformed by the changing political and economic situation. Agricultural production itself was increasingly market oriented and mechanized. Both trends undercut the personalistic bonds linking tenant to landlord. At the same time, the government's increasingly effective presence meant landlords no longer needed a large body of retainers to ensure their position in society. The growing presence of manufactured goods meant less need for traditional craftsmen like weavers and potters. At the same time, the presence of high-prestige manufactured goods created greater demands for ready cash. By the late 1970s cash rents and wages rather than payment in kind and service contracts were the rule. Land was increasingly treated as a marketable commodity, and non-Pakhtun buyers were more and more common. Bhutto's calls for land reform struck a responsive chord among tenants at the same time that they terrified Pakhtun landlords, whose self-identity demanded that they have land and followers to work it.

In the tribal agencies, education and national development efforts had a growing impact. Schools were increasing in number and, al-

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though mullahs had vehemently opposed education initially, by the late 1970s they were touting its virtues. There were even a number of girls' schools. Because instruction was mostly in Urdu, education gave rise to a certain "Pakistanization." The growing number of development projects meant roads and diverse employment opportunities. The roads themselves spawned numerous trucking firms and bus lines.

Baluch

A majority of the world's Baluch, an estimated 3.7 million, or some 70 percent, live in Pakistan. Baluchistan Province itself is an exceedingly inhospitable habitat. Visiting geologists characterize the landscape as Martian, and the neighboring Pakhtuns think of it as "the dump where Allah shot the rubbish of creation."

The Baluch themselves trace their roots to tribes migrating eastward from around Aleppo some time before the Christian Era. Their migrations took them to the southern shores of the Caspian Sea and thence, sometime between the sixth and fourteenth centuries, to the region of present-day Baluchistan.

The language, Baluchi, is part of the Iranian group of Indo-European languages. Linguistic evidence indicates its origin to be in the pre-Christian Medean or Parthian civilizations. The modern form has incorporated borrowings from Persian, Sindhi, Arabic, and a number of other languages. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Baluch intellectuals used Persian and Urdu scripts to transcribe Baluchi into written form. More recently, with the rise of Baluch nationalism, they have favored Nastaliq, an adaptation of Arabic script.

If the region is inhospitable, it is likewise a crossroads. Baluchistan has had frequent foreign claimants. At various times Persians, Brahmins, and Arabs have all laid claim. Until the twentieth century, however, foreign rule had limited impact on the local scene. Effective control was almost impossible, given Baluchistan's remoteness and inhospitality, and effective power remained in the hands of indigenous elites. Baluch see the bleak landscape as a refuge from the predatory states surrounding the region. A famous ballad notes that "The lofty heights are our comrades, the pathless gorges our friends."

Beginning around the seventeenth century, the Brahui khans of Kalat incorporated the various Baluch tribes into a loose confederacy. Local-level politics, however, remained more or less business as usual; local factions competed for the collection of revenues on various levels, agreeing to split the spoils with the khan. The confederacy reached its apex under Nasir Khan in the eighteenth century but collapsed into tribal strife in the decades after his death.

Brahui is of Dravidian origin, and Brahuis, according to journalist-scholar Selig Harrison, constitute some 15 percent of Pakistan's Baluch population. The precise status of Brahui is the subject of debate, i.e., is it only a dialect of Baluch, are the two converging, should it be recognized by the government as a minority language of equal status

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with Pashtu and Baluchi? The whole question figures in the resurgent Baluch nationalism, because the majority Baluch see Brahui attempts to gain recognition as divisive. As of the early 1980s Brahui had no written script. Overall, Brahuys are integrated into Baluch society. Anthropologists who have worked in the Kalat region find both Brahui and Baluch tribes similar in "culture, tradition, and political organization."

As with the Pakhtun tribes to the north, the British played local rivals against each other in a policy of divide and conquer. They exploited the endemic anarchy to the hilt; by 1876 they had established in treaty the right to station troops in the region. They adopted a policy of indirect rule, leaving power in the hands of the elites that had long ruled. It was an exchange of local autonomy and subsidies to rulers in trade for access to the strategic Afghanistan border.

Pastoral nomadism, dry-land and irrigated agriculture, and fishing are the principal means of subsistence. Baluch fishermen were driven south to the coast of the Arabian Sea by drought and religious persecution. Some, in fact, headed for the Sind coast early in the British intrusion there, finding in Pax Britannica a greater measure of religious tolerance.

Dry-land farming is marginal, although it is a mainstay for many seminomadic herders. Baluch plant drought-resistant grains in earthen embankments where the scanty rainfall has accumulated. Irrigated farming is concentrated near oases. There are two kinds of systems: open channels that bring water from a few riverbeds and subsurface drains that channel groundwater downward to planted fields. These elaborate underground channels (*karez*) may wander for miles in order to maintain adequate gradient to bring the water to the cultivated areas. Overall, however, there is little land suitable for cultivation. In 1983 less than 4 percent of the province's total area was cultivated, less than one-quarter of 1 percent was irrigated. Non-Baluch settlers compete with the Baluch for the small fraction of good land concentrated in the environs of Bela and west of Karachi. Most Baluch eke out a living herding and farming in the marginal lands of the hinterland.

Elaborate arrangements surround water rights, particularly in the irrigated drain system. Those wishing to increase their crops can join a number of irrigation projects and/or arrange any of a variety of sharecropping agreements.

Sheep and goats are the main herd animals. The herder typically consumes the dairy products these animals produce and sells the meat and wool. Pastoralists organize themselves around water sources; wells are the property of specific camps.

Kinship and social relations reflect the exigencies of dealing with the harsh physical environment. Like the Pakhtuns, Baluch reckon descent patrilineally. Lineages, however, play a minimal role in the lives of most Baluch. They are notably flexible in arrangements with both family and friends. Ideally, a man should maintain close ties with relatives in his father's line; but in fact most relations are left to in-

dividual discretion, and there is wide variation. Close kinsmen often find themselves at odds over matters such as inheritance. Even among noble lineages where the patrilineally related group plays a larger role, the rule is for lineages to split and fragment. Most Baluch treat both mother's and father's kin as a pool of potential assistants to be called on as the occasion demands. Again, the precariousness of gaining a subsistence favors having the widest possible circle of friends and relatives.

Actual marriage patterns embody this kind of flexibility. As in many parts of West Asia, Baluch say that they prefer to marry their cousins. In actuality, marriage choices are dictated by pragmatic considerations. Residence, the complex means of access to agricultural land, and the centrality of water rights coupled with its uncertain supply all favor flexibility in choosing one's in-laws. The plethora of land tenure arrangements tends to limit the value of marrying one's cousin—a marriage pattern that functions to keep land in the family. Anthropologists Stephen and Carroll Pastner found roughly 70 percent of the agricultural Baluch they studied married to non-kin.

Only among coastal Zikri Baluch is marriage between cousins common; there, nearly two-thirds of married couples are first cousins. The coastal Baluch, however, are in greater contact with non-Baluch and manifest a concomitantly greater sense of group solidarity. For them to be "unified amongst ourselves" is a particularly potent cultural ideal. Because they are Zikris, they have, as well, a limited pool of eligible mates. They do not wish to marry non-Baluch or non-Zikri Baluch.

Baluch are split between adherents of Sunni Islam and Zikris, a fifteenth-century sect founded by a *mahdi*, an Islamic messiah. In the Zikri view they are Muslims, the larger Sunni community, however, sees them as infidels. Zikri belief and ritual differ from orthodox Islam in a number of ways. They believe that the teaching of the *mahdi* superseded that of Muhammad—a violation of one of Islam's central tenets (see Islam: Tenets and Early Development, this ch.). Zikris have their own daily prayers and do not keep Ramazan fasting.

The original conversion to Zikrism and an eighteenth-century reconversion to Islam were both choices of rulers rather than mass movements of the populace. The reconversion was, in fact, politically motivated—an effort by the then-controlling faction of the elite to forestall a holy war against Sunni outsiders. Substantial numbers of Baluch reconverted with the elite under varying degrees of coercion.

All told there are an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 adherents. Zikrism survives among some remote nomads as well as among some fishing-village dwellers and Karachi residents. For sedentary Baluch villagers, the adherence to Zikrism is further evidence of the general backwardness of the nomads. Sunni nomads are more tolerant of their Zikri counterparts. Baluch in general are reputedly somewhat casual in their practice of Islam.

Baluch society is stratified; it is divided into the traditional ruling class, the *hakim*; the broad middle echelons of pastoralists and agri-

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culturists and lower-level leaders, the *baluch*, and a lower level of tenant farmers and former slaves, the *hizmatkar*. Supra-family groups formed through patrilineal descent—lineages and clans—are significant mostly for the *hakim*. Traditional political life was dominated by warring factions vying for dominance. A perquisite of rule was the right to exact tribute and taxes. The *hakim* might periodically be forced to divide their revenue with conquerors or share it with other Baluch tribes. Life at the lower levels went on much as before. Rivalry and politics were the domain of the elite *hakim*. Their power was centered in the rich oases, over the barren backlands no one exercised much control.

The system has been characterized as "feudal militarism," the significant social tie being that between the leader and his retinue. The system operated at various levels, lower ranking leaders with their followers being pledged to higher and higher chiefs. The specific alliances were highly fluid arrangements. Followers would desert as one leader's fortunes began to wane in search of a newer rising star.

The basic exchange underlying this elaborate system was the leader's offer of booty or property rights in return for support in battle. In more recent years various favors have been traded for votes, but the structure of the system—the participation of the lower echelons through patron-client ties—remains much the same.

In common with the neighboring Pakhtuns, Baluch are deeply committed to maintaining their personal honor, showing generous hospitality to guests and giving protection to those who seek it of them. In contrast with the egalitarian Pakhtuns, however, the prototypical relationship is that between the leader and his minions. The Baluch suffers no loss of status in submitting to another. Quarrels among allies mean one or another of the principals will seek a new patron, neither need suffer a loss of face. There has been a gradual assimilation of Pakhtuns who have lost their land, been unable to avenge their honor according to Pakhtun standards, or been otherwise displaced. For them the protection of a Baluch chief is less demeaning than submission to a fellow Pakhtun. Baluch tribes in the border region often have sections tracing Pakhtun descent.

The competition among those aspiring to leadership is intense and demands great personal courage and strength of will. Politics was traditionally power politics, where success in battle determined the winner. Baluch themselves explain the charisma of a strong leader by saying, "Strong water can flow uphill," i.e., the strong and able leader can contravene even the laws of physics.

At lower levels of Baluch society there is competition for scarce resources: water and land. This coexists, however, along with a deeply held belief in the virtues of sharing and cooperation. The environment is hardly beneficent, and the Baluch recognize that misfortune can befall anyone. Baluch ethos demands that a camp group share water with those who are drought stricken. Sharing creates networks of obligation among herders. Mutual aid is an insurance policy in the face

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of a precarious livelihood. When water is more generally available, competition reinstates itself, and sharing fades until another drought hits.

In common with many Islamic societies, male honor is protected through the institution of *purdah*. Keeping women in seclusion is to render them sexually invisible and inviolable. Traditionally, only the wealthiest could maintain strict *purdah*. It required that a family be able to afford male servants to go to market. It remains, nonetheless, a central cultural ideal. The Pastners describe a Zikri Baluch fishing village of some 600 that maintained *purdah* without separate compounds simply by having the men avoid the paths that women of other households were likely to take at certain hours of the day. Some observers suggest that the practice of *purdah* has in fact become more rigorous with the increasing presence of outsiders, i.e., British and Pakistanis, in Baluchistan. Strict *purdah* is as well a mark of economic success: as *baluch* acquire money, they seek to follow the mode of *purdah* that the *hakim* traditionally have followed.

The 1970s saw a precipitous deterioration in relations between Baluchistan and the central government. Baluch have been long accustomed to "indirect rule"—a policy that leaves local elites with a substantial measure of autonomy. "I touch the political agent's boots and get a thousand to touch mine," was how a local chief explained it to one anthropologist.

Central government policies in the 1970s, however, were more and more unpopular. Central government support was less and less desirable from the perspective of Baluch leaders. Pakistani support could only be "bought" at the cost of enforcing policies the Baluch populace found distasteful, and enforcement of these unpopular measures would cost the local leader his following.

There have been sporadic separatist movements in Baluchistan since independence. The violent confrontation between Baluch insurgents and the Pakistani military in the mid-1970s, however, was particularly brutal. At its height there were air attacks on Baluch villages. The conflict touched the lives of most Baluch and politicized those long accustomed to accepting the status quo. Original demands for greater regional autonomy escalated into a full-scale movement aimed at restructuring the government along confederal lines. By the end of the decade the traditional cleavages between *hakim*, *baluch*, and *hizmatkar* had declined in importance. Baluch were increasingly accustomed to thinking of themselves as Baluch in opposition to Pakistani or Punjabi hegemony.

Social Organization

Rural Society

Pakistan of the early 1980s remained, as it had always been, a country of rural hamlets and villages. According to the provisional figures of the 1981 census, over 70 percent of the populace were rural dwellers.

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Even in Sind, which included Karachi, the country's largest city, nearly 60 percent lived in the countryside. Nearly three-quarters of the Punjab's population and over 80 percent that of the NWFP and Baluchistan were rural dwellers. Agriculture represented nearly one-third of GDP and over one-half the total labor force.

The rural social spectrum included a landed gentry that wielded considerable political and economic clout, small peasant proprietors, an increasing number of tenant farmers, and landless laborers. The colonial policy of choice was indirect rule of the region. The British favored landlords, local chiefs, and *pirs*; colonial rule reinforced their economic power and political hegemony. In return they were expected to keep the peace, collect land revenues, and guarantee the frontiers. The alliance between the landed elite and the colonial administration was particularly close in northwest India. By the end of the nineteenth century, India was the linchpin in Britain's industrial economy, and the northwest was strategic to India's defense. There were periodic outbreaks of unrest, often led by *pirs* or mullahs who called for a jihad against the infidel westerners. Overall, however, as political scientist Khalid B. Sayeed notes, the "triumvirate" of district commissioner, landlord, and *pir* provided effective control of the northwest.

The situation of the rural populace altered dramatically under British rule. Under the Mughals, land was apparently farmed by individual households, but it was not freely alienable. The main lien against the peasants' income was tax revenues, which could amount to one-third to one-half the harvest. Collection, however, was occasionally lax and, because the tax was tied to actual production and land was not salable, most families were assured a means of livelihood.

The colonial legal system gave individuals private proprietorship (see *Legacy of the British Raj*, ch. 1). Land revenues were defined in terms of holdings, not harvests, and they were collected with vigor. The smallholder short of money was forced to borrow or lose his land through tax default. Beginning in the 1880s there was rising rural indebtedness. The presence of a land market, population growth, and the return to their villages of artisans put out of work by cheap manufactured goods all combined to erode the customary protection afforded peasants. Between 1891 and 1931 the number of rural landless tripled. Whereas tenancy was virtually unknown in the early years of British rule in the Punjab, by the early 1880s one-third of the total area farmed was tenanted, and by the turn of the century over one-half was. As one Briton commented, "The peasantry . . . confess themselves the servants of God and of Muhammad his Prophet, but in actual fact they are the servants of the landlord, moneylender, and *pir* . . ."

There were legislative efforts at redress; the Land Alienation Act (1900) tried to stem the transfer of land from farmers to nonagricultural moneylenders and to limit rural debt. It did little but limit the amount of credit available to poorer farmers and create a new social entity, the prosperous farmer-moneylender. These individuals played and continue to play a pivotal role in the relationship between villagers and

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the larger society. They serve as patrons, power brokers, and middlemen dealing with officialdom and other powerful outsiders on behalf of their clients, debtors, and tenants. Their dependents form their local power base in jockeying for influence among various village factions.

The situation was difficult for small farmers in the Punjab, but there, at least in some portions of the canal districts, the British had attempted to create a class of "yeoman" farmers. Many of the land allocations arising from the massive irrigation works undertaken from the 1880s through the 1930s benefited large landholders, but some land went in smaller parcels (10 to 20 hectares). The principal beneficiaries were military veterans. If life was hard for the Punjabi small farmer, it was nearly as hard for the minions of Pakhtun landlords in the settled areas of the frontier and the menials of Baluch and Brahui *sardari* (chiefs) in the oases of Baluchistan. Sind was nearly feudal, and tenants lived in serf-like dependence on large estates.

The economic hold of large landowners on the countryside, coupled with the continued increase of the landless and tenants, continued with little alteration into the 1960s. By the 1960s more than 75 percent of all farms were less than five hectares in size, they constituted less than one-third of all land. The 0.2 percent of all farms of 60 or more hectares made up 10 percent of the land. By the early 1970s some 60 percent of all farms were below the subsistence level—a figure that leaves uncounted the number of joint households and landless and thereby underestimates the extent of rural poverty. Roughly one-half of all cultivated land was farmed by tenants—about the same proportion as in the early 1900s.

Land reforms beginning in 1959 reduced the amount of land an individual could own. As of 1977 the ceilings were 40 hectares of irrigated land and twice that of unirrigated. The legislation's impact was softened by the wide variety of stratagems available to landholders wishing to avoid its strictures. Among other things, an individual could deed his holdings to relatives (see Farm Ownership and Land Reform, ch. 3). Land redistribution had scant impact, given the magnitude of rural poverty. All told, about 1.2 million hectares had been distributed to some 120,000 beneficiaries by 1977. Land reform did have the effect of forcing sales of land from large to mid-sized owners and so may have improved the position of the middling farm.

Tube well irrigation, mechanization, and the use of Green Revolution technology all increased in the 1960s and 1970s. Their impact was to reduce the already slim margin of safety that tenants and the nearly landless enjoyed. Prior to mechanization, five hectares were considered the maximum an individual with a single team of draft animals could efficiently cultivate; virtually all holdings of more than eight to 10 hectares were rented out. Mechanization has reduced the supply of rental land and forced tenants and the nearly landless to rely more on seasonal wage labor. Although very large landholders continue to keep a retinue of tenants about for labor during peak agricultural seasons,

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mechanization gives mid-sized farm owners the option of cultivating land themselves rather than renting it.

The political hegemony of the landed gentry is only slightly less thoroughgoing than it was under colonial rule. In elections in the Punjab and Sind, families and agents usually capture some 80 to 90 percent of the seats. Village politics are typically defined by factions organized around several large landholders who gather together followers—their tenants, landless laborers, and smallholders in varying degrees of dependency. The large landholder controls his followers through his ability to bestow patronage and a variety of favors.

Economic dependency generates a pattern of political alliances that crosscuts class lines. Grass-roots political mobilization takes place through successive layers of village factions composed of landlords and their minions. Large landholders' influence is the greater because most have their lands scattered in a number of villages, in each of 15 to 20 hamlets a landlord may serve as a political broker.

There was some measure of agrarian unrest during the Bhutto era, especially in the NWFP, where tenants were ready to stop paying rent in response to calls for Islamic socialism. (Their Pakhtun overlords were evidently shocked to learn the extent to which their dependents were discontented.) There was some measure of mobilization in the Punjab. In Sind, however, Bhutto—himself the scion of a landed family—was forced to rely on the gentry for political support.

Urban Society

Pakistani cities are a diverse lot; the urban typology reflects the varied political history of the region. There are cities dating from the medieval era—most notably Lahore—that served as capitals of kingdoms, small principalities, or fortified border towns prior to colonial rule. Other precolonial cities were trading centers, such as Peshawar, located at a strategic point along the caravan route. Some Sind and Punjab cities centered on cottage industries, and their trade rivaled the premier European cities of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Under colonial rule many of the older administrative cities declined. In those instances where the British located a post in the same locale as a previous administration, the city typically came to be divided into its old and new, i.e., European, quarters. There was as well significant growth of new towns and cities, especially in the expanding canal colonies. Faisalabad (formerly Lyallpur) is such a city. British rule, the opening of massive irrigation projects, and the expansion of agricultural exports marked the beginning of Karachi's astronomical growth. The town expanded as a center of rail and sea transport.

Many cities experienced rapid growth following independence as they were flooded by refugees from India. In the 1950s more than one-half the populace of several Sind and Punjab cities were *muhajirs*. Some refugee colonies were eventually recognized as cities in their own right. Rapid industrialization has changed the urban physiognomy.

Heavy industry is concentrated in a few districts—above all, in the environs of Karachi. Light industry is more dispersed, scattered about the relatively low-cost districts of smaller cities. Tube well irrigation and a number of improved agricultural technologies have spawned a variety of supporting industries in smaller regional centers, especially in the Punjab. Efforts to foster more decentralized industrialization in the 1960s did little to challenge Karachi's predominance, in the early 1990s the city still accounted for roughly one-half of manufactured output.

Despite rapid urban expansion the country remains an overwhelmingly agrarian one. There is a preponderance of political-administrative centers among cities—though these centers do not represent the majority of the urban population. There are two distinct urban networks, the first is that of the mid-sized to large cities of the Indus Valley and regions of intensive agricultural production that are linked to the national government and economy, and the second is that of dispersed cities scattered throughout the country, each functioning as a market-ing-administrative center for its rural hinterland.

The dimensions of urbanization are stupendous. In a country where the population grows at a rate of nearly 3 percent annually, cities are growing substantially faster (see table 5, Appendix). Between 1951 and 1981 the urban population quadrupled. Annual urban growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s were more than 5 percent. Rates dropped slightly in the 1970s to something over a 4 percent annual increase. The magnitudes of growth in individual cities are sometimes hard to imagine. Karachi absorbed tens of thousands of *muhajirs* following partition. It grew nearly two and one-half times from 1941 to 1951 and nearly doubled again in the following decade. By the early 1990s it was a city of more than 5 million.

In the early 1990s more than one-half the urban population (53 percent) was concentrated in the eight largest cities having more than 500,000 inhabitants each, nearly one-fifth in Karachi alone. The largest cities appeared to be expanding at a rate of more than 6 percent annually. The level of urbanization varied dramatically by region. Sind was more than 40 percent urban, largely because of Karachi; excluding that city, scarcely more than 20 percent of the populace lived in cities. Slightly more than one-fourth of all Punjabis lived in cities, as did perhaps 15 percent of the populace of the NWFP and Baluchistan.

The volume of growth has strained urban services and infrastructure. The portion of city dwellers having access to potable water actually dropped in the 1970s. By 1980 some 45 percent of the urban populace lived below the absolute poverty level as defined by the government of Pakistan and agencies of the UN. Problems in obtaining adequate shelter and employment were by no means limited to the very poor. Stringent demands for collateral meant that only 5 percent of the urban population was able to gain access to formal housing and credit.

Villages have long been centers of out-migration. Often wretchedly overpopulated, for nearly a century they have depended on emigration

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both as a safety valve to relieve the press on scarce land and as a source of remittances to bolster limited rural incomes. Military service was an avenue of escape for the indebted land-poor peasant under the British and remains so in independent Pakistan (see Personnel, ch. 5). Since the 1950s the landless or nearly so have continued to stream into cities. Karachi in the early 1960s had more than 1 million Pakhtuns and more Baluch than Baluchistan.

Although rural-urban migrants are typically young unmarried males, the overall sex ratio in urban areas was only slightly more unbalanced in favor of males than in the countryside, according to the preliminary results of the 1961 census. Individual cities differed, clearly, in some, males outnumbered females by as much as 7 to 8 percent.

The city-bound peasant retains his ties with the village. His rights are acknowledged long after his departure. The initial migration is frequently seen as a temporary expedient, a grubstake to purchase land or pay off a debt. Typically, migrants send part of their earnings to the family left behind and go home to work at peak agricultural seasons. The spread of cities has engulfed some villages, and these former agriculturists too have swelled the urban population, often commuting to work from their former villages. The focus of the individual's loyalties remains family and fellow villagers. Because many of these have also migrated, the city tends to re-create the social ties of the rural community. Even married migrants typically begin an urban career by leaving their families in the village. The decision to bring wife and children to the city is a milestone in the rural-urban migrant's life.

A proliferation of squatter settlements has accompanied urban expansion. Housing material runs the gamut from makeshift reed matting to concrete blocks with reinforced concrete roofs. Squatters' housing choices reflect their aspirations and their sense of future security. From the migrant's perspective, housing choices, after the decision to bring one's family to the city, offer a good measure of the migrant's sense of security and feelings about the future. The relationship between housing and income is weaker than that between the householder's hope for the future and housing. The belief that the squatter settlement will not be demolished leads to building more permanent structures.

Squatters face considerable handicaps in their efforts at home improvement. Illegal occupancy limits both their security of tenure and the sources of financing available to them. Nonetheless, squatters who feel they are reasonably safe from eviction have several options open to them if they lack ready cash to make home improvements. Some sell small parcels of land they have in the village; others get loans from relatives. Some employers will loan money and then deduct payments from the worker's wages. Lineages will sometimes form committees making rotating grants to members. Those who join these committees make payments equal to the grant they will receive until all have received their share; the grant system functions as a sort of enforced savings plan. There is ample chance for misunderstanding; those who

are the last to receive grants must have considerable faith that they will not be defrauded by earlier recipients.

Finding adequate full-time employment is a major hurdle for the migrant, and a substantial minority of city dwellers are forced to settle for a part-time job or piecework. The service sector rather than manufacturing is the migrants' main source of employment. The lengthy process of cutting the ties to the countryside helps the migrant's gradual adjustment to the city. The money he sends to the rural branch of the family not only helps them but also assures him of a cushion in case of failure.

The country's cities include its elite and middle classes—urban in residence and ethos, often Westernized in education and values. The gulf between them and the mass of peasants and urban poor can hardly be overstated. Many of the elite are fluent English speakers; they are familiar with and oriented to Western culture, many Westernized customs have filtered into their daily lives.

The configuration of the elite and middle class in contemporary Pakistan reflects the role the northwest played under the British Raj. The region was "an agricultural appendage and a recruiting ground for the military." The state bureaucracy, the professions, and military service were the main sources of nonagricultural employment for middle- and upper middle-income groups. The educated classes formed under British rule came mostly from relatively prosperous Punjabi and, to a lesser extent, Pakhtun landholding families; they became lawyers, writers, military officers, and civil servants. Almost all counted on landholdings to provide a portion of their income. In the middle ranks, however, this was rarely enough to provide a livelihood. To survive they had to find employment in urban centers.

Colonial rule gave Pakistan a corps of highly educated, underemployed bureaucrats and professionals. The region was virtually without an indigenous Muslim commercial or industrial elite. At independence Pakistan inherited less than 10 percent of the subcontinent's industry, perhaps 3 percent of its electrical capacity, and roughly 6 percent of its industrial work force. What manufacturing there was tended to be small-scale seasonal enterprises. Large-scale commercial trading houses and financial institutions were overwhelmingly in the hands of non-Muslims. Hindus, on the eve of partition, controlled 80 percent of industry, held 75 percent of fixed urban property, and accounted for nearly 90 percent of the port of Karachi's trade.

Both the elite and the middle class were and remain narrow social strata. Traditionally, Pakistan was a country that the landlords owned, the army ruled, and the civil service governed. Because it inherited no flourishing indigenous bourgeoisie on independence, the push to industrialization in the 1950s to 1980s period benefited the few with capital or entrepreneurial experience—largely refugees from India. By the mid-1980s it was commonly held that 22 families controlled perhaps 80 percent of private industrial assets. Similarly, much of the expansion in irrigation benefited large landowners and reinforced their control

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of the rural populace at large. Despite sometimes intense business competition along family lines, by the early 1970s the country's elite could be seen as a small network of interrelated families with interlocking economic and political ties. Kinship and marriage reinforced alliances in the marketplace and in politics.

As a result of partition and the influx of refugees from India, Pakistan acquired a number of commercially experienced Muslim merchant castes from central India. Often these groups were minority Islamic sects. Memons, Bohras, and Khoja Ismailis were and are among the more prominent. In the late 1960s these three groups, less than 1 percent of total population, held more than 40 percent of privately owned firms and nearly 30 percent of all enterprises. That commercial activity continues to be organized along ethnic and caste lines gives a particular slant to industrialization, in that competition often takes place between rival castes.

The Memons are perhaps the best known of Pakistan's *muhajir* commercial groups. A majority are shopkeepers, grocers, peddlers, and managers in firms owned by wealthy fellow Memons. They are also numbered among the richest, most prominent families in the country. In the 1960s Memons represented perhaps 0.16 percent of the population, yet they had roughly one-quarter of all private sector factories. Seven of the country's "22 families" are Memon. Memons are devout Muslims; their mutual aid organizations contribute to their commercial success; they offer each other preferential credit and exchange information about business conditions.

The middle class in general shares the values and outlook of the elite. It is diverse, counting in its ranks shopkeepers, smaller merchants, students, lawyers, various professionals, the junior officer corps, and the middle to upper middle levels of the bureaucracy.

Both the military and the civil service have been largely middle-class preserves. Pakistan inherited from colonial rule an entrenched, privileged, and powerful bureaucracy. At its upper reaches its members were of the elite; the organization itself was solidly elitist. Bureaucrats were little accustomed to interference from politicians and were well capable of managing the two main tasks of colonial government—collecting taxes and maintaining order (see *The Bureaucracy*, ch. 4). Their role has, if anything, been augmented in the power vacuum following independence. The civil service has acted to preserve the status quo. Despite numerous calls for reform, the organization has remained a privileged preserve. A 1970s reform tried to dismantle the more elitist elements of the civil service, but to little avail. There were efforts to create a cadre of scientific, technically trained administrators to replace the generalists who, it was felt, was responsible for the poor performance of public enterprises and various development programs.

Politics was traditionally a middle-class activity. The various elements of the middle strata offered important opposition to both Bhutto and Zia. Shopkeepers, small traders, lawyers, and students were active in the 1977 demonstrations leading to Bhutto's downfall. Zia's contin-

ued military rule and Islamization policies have brought protests from teachers, lawyers, students, and various feminist groups (see *Politicians and Political Parties*, ch. 4).

Caste

The ostensible bases of social organization are the egalitarian principles of Islam. Nonetheless, social relations, especially in the major agricultural regions, function in terms of a modified version of the Hindu-based caste system prevalent throughout South Asia.

The caste system among Muslims diverges from that of Hindus in its ideological content and symbolic expression. Castes in Muslim society are secular, occupational, status groups. They do not express a spiritual hierarchy, and they lack the restrictions on personal association, the exchange of food, and common dining that figure so prominently in the Hindu caste system. Indeed, the exchange of food on ritual occasions and common dining in the village men's house are important elements in the social solidarity of the community.

There is considerable diversity in the precise occupational groups of the villages; in its most basic form a village caste system includes landowner-farmers (*zamindars*), various religious practitioners (*mul-lahs*, *mins*, *pirs*), and divers craftsmen (*kammis*). The distinction between landowning farmers and nonlandowning craftsmen holds generally, especially in regions affected by the Land Alienation Act (1900), which did not permit nonagricultural castes to acquire land. The distinction has persisted since 1947 because of the limited opportunities most (but clearly not all) *kammis* have to buy land.

Most would agree that the priestly castes rank highest in prestige, followed by landowners and farmers. Most craftsmen fall into a middle range, but there is a group of despised occupations. Muslims, although they do not regard certain jobs as polluting and do not restrict contact between castes, do regard some occupations as defiling. Cobblers, sweepers, garbage collectors, and latrine cleaners are all at the low end of the occupational hierarchy.

There are a wide variety of *kammis*, and those resident in any given village differ. Some of the more common castes include barbers, cobblers, carpenters, potters, blacksmiths, and weavers. There are few single-caste communities, because the notion of a single caste goes against the interlocking web of complementary relationships that is essential to the system. Ideally, multicaste villages should be nearly self-sufficient in goods and services.

The customary tasks done by each caste often extend beyond what a Westerner would associate with a specific craft. The barber serves as the official cook for ceremonial occasions. He is often a matchmaker and always a messenger. Wives are expected to perform tasks complementary to those of their husbands. The barber's wife serves as the village hairdresser; the potter's spouse paints his vessels and delivers them to her husband's customers. For men and women alike these skills are learned from earliest childhood—a strong force for marrying

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within one's caste and practicing the traditional craft associated with it.

Craftsmen unable to earn a living in their traditional craft may resort to a number of alternatives. They may ply their craft outside the confines of their natal villages. Others seek employment congruent with their craft. Potters who have mules to haul clay may hire out to take grain to mills and transport other goods. Almost everyone finds some supplementary agricultural working during harvest.

Traditionally, it was rare to find someone practicing a trade completely removed from the caste craft. That trades are learned from early childhood makes it difficult for someone not of the proper family background to enter a given occupation. Changes do occur, however, the individual involved normally states both his caste affiliation and his actual craft, i.e., "I'm a priest, but I do the work of a carpenter." Over several generations caste membership changes to reflect the family's actual work.

A host of new occupations have entered villages since the early twentieth century; individuals from a variety of castes have entered teaching, the armed forces, civil service, and so forth. Other craftsmen have been strategically situated to take advantage of new economic opportunities. Some muleteers have managed to move into trading in the vacuum left by the departure of Hindu merchants following partition. Where carpenters and blacksmiths supply services critical to the agricultural cycle, they have been able to amass not inconsiderable wealth. Anthropologist Ahmed, writing of the NWFP, notes that the average carpenter now owns more land than the average Pakhtun. Other authors note a general increase in income of *kammis* relative to that of agriculturists.

The *zamindar* traditionally paid the *kammi* with a share of his harvest. Craftsmen shared the fate of their village's farmers. In recent years there has been a tendency to replace the harvest shares with a cash payment. Individual households contract for services from individual craftsmen. *Kammis* contract among themselves for the services they require. Each village family, farmer and craftsman alike, has contracts with a number of different *kammis* because each family needs the services of a barber, carpenter, potter, etc., at some time during the year.

The relationship transcends the mere economic exchange of goods for services, however. Prestige accrues to households that are able to maintain good, stable relationships with their *kammis* and treat them generously. Although contracts can be made or broken at any time, ideally the relationship is one that should endure through the generations. The *kammis* with whom a household has dealings play an integral role in the family's ritual life. The barber, for example, performs birth rites, circumcisions, and funeral rites. A family's *kammis* expect to be present at weddings and to receive food and presents on religious holidays. They may even insult their host if they feel they have not been well treated.

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Caste membership is not immutable, and the system allows for some social mobility. The traditional avenue of upward mobility for men was to become a religious leader, acquire a following and, if successful, land. In some regions marriage serves as a vehicle for social mobility for women. There is great prestige for a family to conclude a marriage for a daughter with a higher ranking caste, economically successful craftsmen will try to marry a daughter to a landowner. By the same token it brings shame, if not outright dishonor, to marry a daughter to an inferior group.

Family and Kin

Pakistani social life revolves around family and kin. For most, family loyalty overrides other obligations, the overwhelming importance of family ties retains its significance even among the most Westernized members of the elite and upper middle class. The family is the basis of social organization, it provides its members both identity and protection. The isolated individual living apart from relatives is uncommon except for male workers who have migrated to cities. Even they often rely on their kin for assistance in dealing with the urban milieu. Children, especially females, live with their parents until marriage, adults who for one reason or another do not have their own households usually join that of a relative.

The household is the primary kinship unit. In its ideal mature form it includes a married couple, their sons, their sons' wives, and unmarried offspring. Sons establish separate households on their father's death. Whether or not an extended household endures depends on the preferences of the individuals involved. How well the mother-in-law and the brothers' wives get along is particularly important. Quarrels and divisiveness can lead to the premature dissolution of a joint household. Extended families may also establish separate households but continue to hold and farm land in common. Similarly, a nuclear family (consisting of a couple and their children) may have a separate hearth within the husband's father's compound. The couple is seen as a distinct social entity and is expected to make separate presentations at the numerous social events of which the extended family is a part.

Descent is reckoned patrilineally, and the *biraderi* (patrilineage) plays a significant role in social relations. Pakistanis recognize differences among their patrilineal kin and make a general distinction between close relatives (parents, siblings, and children) and more distant kin (uncles, aunts, cousins). The *biraderi* is not corporate; its members neither hold property in common nor share earnings. The honor or shame of individual members, however, affects the general standing of the *biraderi* within the community, a common proverb expresses the sentiment as "One does not share the bread but one shares the shame."

In theory, members of a *biraderi* are coreidents of a single village. In practice, land fragmentation and generations of out-migration have led to the dispersal of many members of the *biraderi* among various

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villages, regions, and cities. This process is even more marked among *kammis*. Patrilineally related families continued to maintain their ties with their (or their parents') natal village long after they have left. Patrilineal kin have the right of first refusal in any *biraderi* land sales; there is a general consensus that one should avoid alienating the land of the *biraderi*.

Members of a *biraderi* celebrate the major life events together. Patrilineal kin are expected to contribute food and help with guests in the ceremonies accompanying birth, marriage, and death. The patrilineage serves as a sort of mutual aid society-cum-welfare agency, arranging loans to members, assisting in finding employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer families.


There is considerable pressure for patrilineal kin to maintain good relations with one another. *Biraderi* members who quarrel will try to patch up their differences before major social occasions so that the patrilineage can present a united front to the village. Those with sons and daughters of marriageable age feel intensely the necessity to maintain good relations, because a spouse whose family is at odds with his or her *biraderi* is considered a poor marriage prospect.

Although descent is reckoned patrilineally, an individual's mother's kin are important. A woman maintains relations with her natal family throughout her life. The tie between brother and sister is typically strong and affectionate; a woman looks to her brothers for support in case of divorce or widowhood early in her marriage. Children, while they are members of their father's patrilineage, are indulged by their mother's kin. Just as a family's relations with its *biraderi* are considered in evaluating potential spouses, so too are the mother's kin.

Individuals also recognize a larger amorphous group of kin related to a person through males, females, or marriage. The individual has great latitude in how he or she acts on these ties. A person may activate the more distant links depending on individual need or personal preference. The Punjabis note that "A well is a well as long as it works; relations are relations as long as they meet."

Marriage serves as a means of allying two extended families. Romantic attachments have no role to play in this complex and carefully plotted social process. The husband and wife serve primarily as representatives of their respective families. The marriage agreement itself is a contractual arrangement typically negotiated between two male heads of household. The terms are worked out in detail and noted, by law, at the local marriage registry. The relationship between in-laws extends beyond the couple and well beyond the marriage event. Families related by marriage exchange gifts on important occasions in each other's life.

Marriage itself is regarded as a process of acquiring new relatives or reinforcing the ties one has with others. There remains a preference for marriage to one's cousins related through either one's mother or father. From the wife's perspective this is particularly desirable because it cushions her transition to married life. If a marriage is successful, it



Woman in burqa
Courtesy Thomas Sennett.
WORLD BANK

will be followed by others between the two families. The links thus formed persist and are reinforced through the generations. The pattern of continued intermarriage coupled with the occasional marriage of nonrelatives creates a convoluted web of interlocking ties of descent and marriage.

Parents go to great lengths to see proper marriages arranged for their children. This constitutes their primary duty as parents, and to see this accomplished is to have lived a fulfilled life. Older siblings arrange marriages for younger in the event of their parents' early deaths. To participate fully in social life a person must be married and have both sons and daughters. Social ties are defined in terms of giving daughters in marriage and receiving daughters-in-law.

Married women are the principal links between households. They serve as mediators in disputes ranging from those within a single household to those between villages. They are pivotal in the system of gift exchange (*cartan bhangh*) that surrounds all significant social relations. Married women receive gifts on virtually all ceremonial occasions. When a son is born to a household, it is the father's sister who receives

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the most elaborate presents. On marriage a young man's family brings gifts not only to the bride and her family but also to all the married daughters of the bride's village.

A married woman's lot is more difficult in the early years of marriage. The young bride has very little status in her husband's household, she is subservient to her mother-in-law. Her situation is made easier if she has married a cousin and her mother-in-law is also her aunt. The proper performance of all the elaborate marriage ceremonies and the accompanying exchange of gifts also serve to enhance the new bride's status. Likewise, a rich dowry confers prestige on the young married woman. The dowry serves as a trousseau, the household goods, clothing, jewelry, and furniture included should remain the property of the bride after she has married.

Many marriages also include a dower—a specified amount of money given by the groom's family to the bride. Typically, half the payment is given the bride on her marriage and half reserved in case of divorce or if the husband dies early. The dower offers a measure of security to the bride against capricious divorce, because her husband's family faces a financial penalty—the payment of the rest of the dower—if the marriage fails. If the marriage goes well, payment of the second half of the dower will frequently be ignored.

A wife's situation improves as she bears sons and they grow to maturity. A woman can only gain status and security if she produces sons, therefore, mothers love and favor their boys, often nursing them longer than girls. In later life the relationship between mother and son remains a warm, intimate one, while the father is a more distant figure.

The social dichotomy of the sexes, often expressed in purdah, remains important in most communities. Where practiced to its full extent, purdah prohibits social contact between women past puberty and men outside their family circle. When venturing outside the family compound, the woman in purdah wears the *burqa*, a long enclosing garment that fulfills the requirements of seclusion and proper modesty.

The principle underlying purdah includes a strict distinction between the roles of men and women. Marriage is necessary not only to protect a woman's honor but also because neither sex can properly do the work considered appropriate for the other. No adult male can appropriately do the family cooking nor can an adult female do the marketing.

This sexual dichotomy remains even though poorer women cannot observe the strictures of physical seclusion, and many women of the upper middle and upper classes no longer follow the strict demands of purdah. The definitions of proper work for men and women ensure segregation of the sexes in public. Positions involving contact with the general public or close cooperation with men are deemed inappropriate for women. Secretaries, personal assistants, shop clerks, receptionists, and restaurant personnel are overwhelmingly male. Employed women generally work in specifically female offices or facilities.

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The practice of purdah and the strong feeling about proper female seclusion and the family's honor are reflected in the low rates of labor force participation among women. In the late 1970s women constituted less than 4 percent of the formal work force. The regional variation was as one might expect: less than 1 percent of women in Baluchistan worked, slightly more than 1 percent of women in the NWFP. Nearly 5 percent of women in Sind were employed. Surveys of currently married women found less than 20 percent were employed, differences between urban and rural women were insignificant. Less than 4 percent of working women found employment in the professions. A vast majority were concentrated in crafts, various cottage industries, and agriculture. Most, some two-thirds, worked in the home.

Family law, based on the Quran, changed under the impact of British rule. The alterations were as much in response to specific court decisions as formal, consciously directed changes in the legal code. At the same time, there were numerous Muslim reformer-modernizers who sought to adapt Islamic practice to changing conditions. They were concerned about the conditions of life, especially married life, for women.

In general, the British policy after the 1857 uprising was to leave family law within the domain of Islamic law. There were, however, significant exceptions. The Indian Evidence Act (1872) made it easier for a married woman in the process of a divorce or widowhood to establish the paternity of her children. The act also helped women whose husbands had disappeared to establish their widowhood—cutting the length of time from 90 years from the husband's birth (as called for by strict adherence to the Hanafi Code) to seven years. Other legislation curbed child marriage and granted women some judicial relief in obtaining divorces or other means of legal redress.

The principal source of family law in independent Pakistan has been the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961. The legislation grew out of the report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Law (1955) and deals with marriage, polygyny, divorce, maintenance, and succession. The single imam (see Glossary) on the commission published a dissenting opinion. The legislation has long been a target of fundamentalist groups.

The legislation required registration of all marriages in an effort to strengthen the protection women enjoyed under the contractual agreements surrounding marriages. Polygyny was subject to legal restraints, a husband wishing to take another wife was supposed to demonstrate that such a move is "necessary and just." Various strictures limited a husband's ability to divorce his wife through repudiation, i.e., simply saying "I divorce you" three times in the presence of witnesses. Under the 1961 law, orphaned children could inherit from their grandfather's estate a share equal to that of their deceased parent.

Other legislation seeks to limit the lavish spending on weddings and thereby protect the bride's family from incurring heavy debts. Still other laws protect the wife's exclusive ownership of her dowry.

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Customary practice, nonetheless, remains commonplace. Legislative safeguards for women are honored more in the breach than the observance. Women are still commonly deprived of their inheritance. Husbands need not comply with either Islamic injunctions or the legal code in taking new wives. Most women are unaware of and unable to exercise their rights in terms of maintenance and divorce.

Religion

Islam: Tenets and Early Development

In A. D. 610 Muhammad (later known as the Prophet), a merchant of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the Angel Gabriel. Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business owing to the numerous pagan shrines located there, his censure eventually earned him the bitter enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of his followers were accepted into the town of Yathrib, later known as Medina (the city) because it was the center of Muhammad's activities. The move, *hijra* (known to Westerners as the *hegira*), marks the beginning of the Islamic era, the Muslim calendar, based on the lunar year, begins in 622. Muhammad continued his preaching in Medina, eventually defeated his opponents in battle, and consolidated both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of Arabia before his death in 632.

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly from God as the Quran, the scripture of Islam, others of his sayings and teachings and the precedents of his personal behavior as recalled by those who had known him during his lifetime became the *hadith*. Together they form the *Sunna*, the Muslim's comprehensive guide to spiritual, ethical, and social living.

The *shahadah* (testimony) succinctly states the central belief of Sunni Islam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual occasions, and recital in full and unquestioning sincerity designates one a Muslim. The God Muhammad preached was not one unknown to his countrymen, for Allah is the Arabic word for God rather than a particular name. Rather than introducing a new deity, Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor gods and spirits worshipped before his ministry and declared the omnipotence of the unique creator, God. God is invisible and omnipresent; to represent him in any form is a sin.

Islam means submission to God, and he who submits is a Muslim. Muhammad is the "seal of the Prophets"; his revelation is said to complete for all time the series of biblical revelations received by the Jews and the Christians. God is believed to have remained one and the same throughout time, but men had strayed from his true teachings until set aright by Muhammad. Prophets and sages of the Judeo-Chris-



Badshahi Mosque, Lahore

tian tradition, such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa), are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christianity's deification of the messenger. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, the Day of Judgment, the general resurrection, heaven and hell, and the eternal life of the soul.

The duties of the Muslim form the five pillars of the faith. These are recitation of the *shahadah*, daily prayer (*salat*), almsgiving (*zakat*), fasting (*sawm*), and pilgrimage (*haj*). The believer is to pray after purification through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at a mosque under a prayer leader; on Fridays they are obliged to do so. Women may also attend public worship at mosques, where they are segregated from men, although most commonly they pray at home.

In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed a tax on personal property proportionate to one's wealth; this was distributed to mosques and the needy. Over the years, almsgiving, though still a duty for the believer, became a more private matter. Pious individuals donated properties to support religious activities that were administered as religious foundations (*waqfs*). The injunction to give alms figured in the government's efforts at Islamization in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar, Ramadan (the Pakistani rendering of Ramadan), is a period of obligatory fasting in commem-

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oration of Muhammad's receipt of God's revelation. All but the sick, the weak, pregnant women, soldiers on duty, travelers on essential journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse from sunrise to sunset. The well-to-do usually do little work during this period, and some businesses close for all or part of the day. Because the months of the lunar calendar revolve through the solar year, Ramazan falls at various seasons in different years. A fast in summertime imposes considerable hardship on those who must do physical work.

Finally, all Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if possible, make the *haj* to Mecca to participate in special rites held there during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. The Prophet instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom to emphasize sites associated with Allah and Abraham, father of the Arabs through his son Ishmael (Ismail). The pilgrim, dressed in a white seamless garment, abstains from sexual relations, shaving, haircutting, and nail paring. Highlights of the pilgrimage include kissing the sacred black stone, circumambulation of the Kaaba, the sacred structure that houses it, running seven times between the mountains Safa and Marwa in imitation of Hagar, Ishmael's mother, during her travail in the desert, and standing in prayer on Mount Arafat. The returning pilgrim is entitled to the honorific *haji* before his name.

The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on earth, the *jihad*, represents an additional duty of all Muslims. Although this is used to justify holy wars, modernist Muslims see it in a broader context of civic and personal action. In addition to specific duties, Islam imposes a code of ethical conduct encouraging generosity, fairness, honesty, and respect and forbidding adultery, gambling, usury, and the consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol.

During his lifetime Muhammad was both spiritual and temporal leader of the Muslim community, he established the concept of Islam as a total and all-encompassing way of life for man and society. Muslims believe that Allah revealed to Muhammad the rules governing decent behavior, and it is therefore incumbent on the individual to live in the manner prescribed by revealed law and on the community to perfect human society on earth according to the holy injunctions. Islam traditionally recognizes no distinction between religion and state. Religious and secular life merge, as do religious and secular law. In keeping with this conception of society, all Muslims have traditionally been subject to the *sharia*, or religious law. A comprehensive system of the *sharia* developed during the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the accretion of precedent and interpretation by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, however, legal opinion began to harden into authoritative doctrine, and the figurative gate of interpretation (*bab al ijtihad*) gradually closed. Thenceforth, rather than encouraging flexibility, Islamic law emphasized maintenance of the *status quo*.

After Muhammad's death the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time, some persons favored Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs, Umar and Uthman, enjoyed the recognition of the entire community, although Uthman was murdered. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war Ali moved his capital to Mesopotamia, where a short time later he too was murdered.

Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates and the period in which the entire Islamic community recognized a single caliphate. Muawiyah then proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. Ali's supporters, however, refused to recognize Muawiyah or his line, the Umayyad caliphs, they withdrew in the first great schism and established a dissident sect known as the Shiah or Shiite (the party of Ali) in support of the claims of Ali's line to a presumptive right to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction of Islam, the Sunnis, claims to follow the orthodox teaching and example of the Prophet as embodied in the Sunna.

Originally political in nature, the differences between the Sunni and Shiite interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical overtones. Ali's two sons, killed in the wars following the schism, became martyred heroes to the Shiites and repositories of the claims to Ali's line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis retained the doctrine of leadership by consensus, although Arabs and members of the Quraysh, Muhammad's tribe, predominated in the early years. Reputed descent from the Prophet still carries great social and religious prestige throughout the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the Shiite doctrine of rule by divine right became more and more firmly established, and disagreements over which of several pretenders had the truer claim to the mystical power of Ali precipitated repeated further schisms. Some Shiite groups developed doctrines of divine leadership far removed from the strict monotheism of early Islam, including beliefs in hidden but divinely chosen leaders whose spiritual powers equaled or surpassed those of the Prophet himself. The Shiite *shahadah*, for example, proclaims: "There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Prophet of God and Ali is the Saint of God."

Islamic Institutions and Leadership

The Muslim's relationship to God is personal and direct; the Quran neither recognizes nor justifies the existence of clergy or other intermediaries. There is no communion of saints, no holy orders, no priesthood, no episcopal hierarchy. Further, the holy days of the Christian liturgical calendar have no analogy in orthodox Islam, nor do mosques, though they may be considered sacred, hallowed or consecrated. There is, in sum, no Muslim church.

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Although a formal ecclesiastical organization of ordained priests has no justification in Islam, a variety of quasi-official functionaries perform many of the duties conventionally associated with a clergy and serve, in effect, as priests. One group, known collectively as the ulama (often rendered as ulema in Pakistan), has traditionally provided the orthodox leadership of the community. Another group, *pirs*, is associated with the mystical tradition known as Sufism (see Glossary). Both *pirs* and *ulamas* play a major role in popular belief and practice.

Ulamas interpret and administer religious law, their authority rests on their knowledge of the sharia and the corpus of jurisprudence that grew up in the centuries following the Prophet's death. The members of the ulama include *maulvis*, *maulanas*, *imams*, and *mullahs*. The first two titles are accorded to those who have received special training in Islamic theology and law or, often, to any distinguished Muslim. A *maulvi* has pursued higher studies in a *madrasah*, an institution similar to a religious seminary. Additional study on the graduate level leads to the title *maulana*. *Imam* has a number of meanings. Informally, it refers to the leader of the prayer ritual. So used, anyone can be an *imam*. In a more formal sense it refers to a paid official in charge of a mosque.

An *imam's* income is not assured; he may be paid out of voluntary contributions, funds from property held in a religious trust, or a share of the village produce at harvest. He looks after the mosque, collects its revenues, leads the prayers, and delivers the weekly sermons. He also serves as a consultant on points of Muslim law and is usually called on to participate in religious functions, marriages, and funerals. When the mosque is also used as a school, the *imam* is the teacher, the studies being confined to the Quran. The *imam* holds office by the consensus of the community; in practice, the office is hereditary.

In the larger urban mosques the *imam* is usually a *maulvi* or *maulana* and may be highly respected as a person of learning and distinction, but in most villages he has rarely received any higher education. He has studied long enough to learn by rote the prayers that he recites; he may know Arabic script well enough to read Quranic verses but with limited comprehension. His sermons are usually a jumble of stock phrases in Arabic and the vernacular. His authority stems less from his learning than from the magical powers villagers believe he has because of his familiarity with the Quran. These uneducated *imams* are commonly called *mullahs* to distinguish them from more learned *ulama*.

The term *mullah* is frequently used in a derogatory fashion to connote a semiliterate, backward, bigoted village *imam*. As the recognized spiritual leader of the community, the *mullah* may be influential and exercise considerable authority in village affairs. In other instances, a *mullah* may be regarded with friendliness and indulgence but be accorded little respect.

Villagers call on the *mullah* for prayers, advice on points of religious practice, and marriage and funeral celebrations. More often they come

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to him for a variety of services far from the purview of orthodox Islam. The mullah is a source of holy water, amulets, and charms to cure everything from snakebite to sexual impotence, from protection from evil jians to good fortune in planned undertakings.

Sufism, an Islamic mystical tradition, is common throughout the Muslim world, particularly in South Asia where it combines, in popular worship, with Hindu and other pre-Islamic elements. Orthodox doctrine is clear: Muhammad is the seal of the Prophets, and the individual needs no intermediary in his relationship to God. Sufism's central belief, nonetheless, is that the average believer needs spiritual guides in his pursuit of truth. These guides—friends of God or saints—are called variously *walis*, *murshids*, *ghaws* or, most commonly, *pirs*.

Within Sufism there is a general emphasis on love (as opposed to fear) of God and personal devotion (versus the mechanical performance of ritual). Above all, followers of the Sufi tradition seek truth through the mystical experience of God rather than the ulama's rigorous, dissected study of the sharia. In Islam there has been a perennial tension between the often dry scholasticism of the ulama and Sufism's personal experience of God. There have been periodic efforts to reconcile the two approaches to Islam. Throughout the centuries many gifted orthodox scholars have been inspired by Sufi ideas even if they were not actually adherents of Sufism.

The first object of Muslim reform movements in the nineteenth century was saint worship. Mullahs were particularly active in spreading these reformist movements in the villages. In South Asia, where popular belief had long been suspected of having been diluted with elements of Hinduism, the reformist efforts tended to become movements for the preservation of Islam from Hindu encroachment. As such, they contributed to the growth in communal sentiment and cultural awareness that ultimately led to the creation of Pakistan.

Pirs were particularly active in winning converts to Islam in South Asia. It is estimated that perhaps two-thirds of the Muslims of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are influenced to some degree by Sufism. In its development Sufism acquired a number of distinctly un-Islamic characteristics—celibacy and saint worship among them. In addition, in their conversion efforts some *pirs* were ready to accept a residue of Hindu belief and practice on the part of converts if less than total orthodoxy increased the ranks of the faithful. In popular cosmology Muhammad's unyielding monotheism, with its stern emphasis on the individual's relation to God, gives way to a world view that holds God remote. He is accessible only through the good offices of his saints.

Pirs pass their offices on to their sons. In contemporary Pakistan the turban-tying ceremony emphasizes the hereditary nature of the office of the *pir*. An elderly *pir* designates a son and heir as the individual charged with carrying on his spiritual duties. Just as God is remote to the common believer, the progenitors of these lines of *pirs* became inaccessible following their deaths. It falls to the hereditary *pir* to

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maintain the "lengthy chain of authority" whereby the average believer gains a hearing of his deity.

Upon his death, the tomb of the successful *pir* often becomes the focus of continuing devotion to the master and ultimately a shrine. The anniversary of the death of the *pir* is observed annually. Popular belief holds that this is an especially propitious time for seeking the saint's intercession. Large numbers of the faithful attend these ceremonies, they are festive occasions and enjoyed by the followers of the saint and orthodox Muslims alike.

The devoted have, over the centuries, donated properties to the *pirs* so that contemporary saints often have charge over extensive land-holdings. *Pirs* are a significant segment of the landed aristocracy. The prosperous hereditary *pir* will typically spend his year not only seeing to the maintenance of his ancestor's shrine and its annual celebrations but also visiting his tenants.

Conversion to Islam was often a matter of *cutus regio, eius religio*, meaning that a tribal or caste leader would choose Islam and his followers would follow suit. As a result, many saints and shrines have strong regional and ethnic ties. The cults surrounding individual shrines, too, are highly localized. In India they draw their adherents from Muslims and Hindus alike. In the past there was little to distinguish the Muslim *pir* from the Hindu guru, the spiritual leaders themselves may have been only vaguely aware of the theology behind such differences.

On the village level there is considerable variation in the relationship between *pirs* and mullahs. Although the mullah's office ostensibly requires some measure of formal theological training, this is typically very rudimentary in rural areas. There is, as well, variation in the diverse functions that the two kinds of religious practitioner perform, there may be a high degree of overlap. Where the functions of the two are poorly defined, there may be hostility and rivalry. Jurisdictional disputes heighten the imam's feelings about the lack of doctrinal purity on the part of the *pir*.

Maulvis or mullahs are normally the most orthodox Muslims in the village. Local *pirs*, by contrast, are set apart by their special relationship to God and may not even observe ordinary rules of conduct. The office of the local imam may, like that of the *pir*, be hereditary. The mullah, however, requires the community's consensus. *Pirs* do not attain their office through consensus and do not normally function as community representatives. The guidance proffered is to individuals. The villagers may expect a *pir* to advise them and offer inspiration; they would not expect him to lead communal prayers or deliver the weekly sermon at the local mosque.

Recent regimes have dealt with the country's religious practitioners in various ways. Legislation (1959, 1961, 1976) sought to increase the government's role in the administration of shrines, mosques, and properties held by religious foundations. The general thrust of government

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efforts, until Zia's regime at least, has been to limit the political power of *pir* and ulama alike.

President Mohammad Ayub Khan and Bhutto, because they headed clearly modernizing regimes that were largely secular in orientation, had little appeal for the ulama. Ayub ran afoul of them with his Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961) and by staffing governmental bodies, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology, with scholars of too Western a bent. Bhutto, despite his campaign cry of "Islamic" socialism, was vigorously opposed by the ulama. Prior to the 1970 elections more than 100 of them issued a legal opinion based on sharia (*fatwa*) condemning socialism as heretical (*kufr*, literally, unbelief). Ayub and Bhutto alike tried unsuccessfully to limit the imams' influence. Both began their rules largely ignoring the clergy and ended them by trying, again unsuccessfully, to woo their support.

Policy toward the *pirs* and their shrines has been different. Unlike the policies of some modernizing or Islamizing regimes, there has been no frontal attack on the shrines for their lack of orthodoxy. Bhutto tried to curb the influence of the *pirs* in rural social affairs—particularly since they were prominent landholders. In the end he came to rely on them for support.

Ayub and Bhutto issued a variety of pamphlets pointing out the general piety of the saints. The message was that these men were good and devout Muslims—not miraculous intermediaries—whose virtues were within the grasp of the faithful. The values they stressed were the sociopolitical consciousness of the *pirs* and the universalist message of Islam (an effort to use the otherwise regionally focused shrines to forge a national identity). There was mention of the contrast between contemporary *pirs* and their more pious ancestors.

Zia has not substantively changed these efforts. Perhaps because his regime seeks legitimacy through a policy of overt Islamization, he has had closer ties with the ulama. There have been concomitantly fewer promotional efforts devoted to the shrines or their annual celebrations. He has made no effort to suppress the shrines in the interest of Islamic purity, and the continued focus has been on the exemplary lives of the original *pirs*, leaving it to the faithful to draw their own conclusions about contemporary saints.

Islam in Pakistani Society

Some 98 percent of all Pakistanis are Muslims. The significance of Islam in society, however, is far more than merely a matter of numbers. From its inception in 1947 Pakistan has defined itself as an Islamic republic. The object of partition from India was to have a nation where "Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam"

If Islam is salient, it is equally complex and controversial. Pakistan has been beset by questions surrounding what precisely it means to be an "Islamic Republic." That question is the more important because

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Islam is the central, if not the only, component in Pakistani national identity. Unlike many other predominantly Muslim countries, nothing else seems to unite Pakistani coreligionists. Creed served to set Muslims apart from Hindus, the fear of minority status in Hindu-dominated India was an impetus behind the country's formation. Nonetheless, the Muslim population itself spoke various languages, represented diverse cultures, and spanned the socioeconomic spectrum (see *Ethnic Relations*, this ch.).

Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his lieutenants seem to have had in mind more or less a modern secular state governed by principles congruent with Islamic values. Despite this, the country has been dogged, almost from its inception, by the split between fundamentalists and modernists. Modernists would hold that the modern state founded on the principles of participatory democracy, equality, and justice reflects Islamic ideals and, therefore, a secular state so constituted is congruent with the devout Muslim's duty to live according to the Prophet's dictates. Fundamentalists, by contrast, contend that secularism of any sort has no place in an Islamic state. They hold that modernists are reinterpreting the Quran to reflect notions that are part and parcel of Western liberal thought—not Islam.


The 1971 civil war and the consequent loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) spurred renewed questioning about both national identity and the proper role of Islam in society. With the loss of the East Wing, Pakistan lost most of its major religious minority, the Hindu community. The country looked to Islam and the Muslim states of western Asia to forge a new sense of national identity. In the late 1970s Zia and his fundamentalist supporters looked to a sort of "political religionism" to create a consensus about what Pakistan should be like as a polity.

All of these issues—the role of Islam in society, the nature of an "Islamic Republic," and the relationship between Islam and Pakistani national identity—are made more complicated by the level of diversity among Muslim believers. Not only are there major schisms and differing interpretations of doctrine but also popular Islam is frequently far removed from Muhammad's austere monotheism. Popular belief and practice tend to evolve (degenerate, according to purists) from the Prophet's teachings into little more than a "moralized system of cultural ideals." The mass of popular support for Islamic legislation and the like has come from believers and mullahs unschooled in theology. Not infrequently their beliefs are far from Islamic orthodoxy. Fundamentalism has come to mean not a return to the simplicity of the Sunna but a particular brand of sociopolitical conservatism that is very selective in the aspects of Islam it emphasizes.

Zia called for the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa (the Rule of the Prophet). Legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s sought to "Islamize" social life. The measures were aimed at bringing the legal code, the economy, and the political system into congruence with the dictates of Islamic teaching. Beginning in 1979 the regime, in an effort



Saint's shrine, Multan



Saint's shrine, Multan
Photos courtesy Frederick M. Denny

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to "foster Islamic standards of behavior," rigorously enforced the ban on drinking and gambling and demanded Quranic punishments for adultery and theft—flogging, amputation, or stoning, depending on the offense. Application of these sentences, however, has been spotty. In 1983 flogging remained quite common but was rarely done in public. Some 20-odd sentences of amputation had been handed down in the 1977-82 period, but most either were overturned on appeal or were awaiting a higher court's disposition. As of late 1983 none was known to have been carried out.

In addition, Shariat courts were set up at the provincial and the federal levels. They were charged with reviewing jurisprudence to determine whether or not laws were consistent with Islam's dictates. In fact, matters touching on the Constitution, fiscal law, and legislation on personal status were excluded from the Shariat courts' purview, so their hailiwick was circumscribed. In addition, judges appointed to the benches must be qualified experts in English-Pakistani common law as well as authorities on Islam. By mid-1983 the Federal Shariat Court had found most existing legislation adequately Islamic. The Court expected to finish its review of provincial laws by mid-1984.

Efforts to establish the Nizam-i-Mustafa engendered an ongoing debate about the country's future political configuration. Some argued that an Islamic government composed of a ruler (amir) and an assembly of worthies (*shura*) need not be representative in a strict electoral sense. Retired Supreme Court Justice Badiuzzaman has insisted that the mainstays of Western democracy—the enfranchised electorate and parliamentary government—are "repugnant to the injunctions of Islam." That sort of thinking provided the rationale for Zia's Provisional Constitutional Order (promulgated March 4, 1981) and the wide-ranging powers it gives the president. Others have suggested that only "true Muslims" should be able to vote or that believers and nonbelievers should constitute separate electorates and that political parties have no role in the community of the faithful. Zia appointed a committee of scholars and theologians to look into the question in late 1979. The debate over proper Islamic governance continued into the 1980s (see *Emerging Political System, The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration*, ch. 4).

To re-order the economy in keeping with Islamic principles, the government instituted a tax on wealth and capital (Zakat), proposed a direct tax on agricultural produce (Ushr), and organized profit-and-loss sharing accounts (as opposed to interest-bearing ones) in a variety of financial institutions (see *Public Finance*, ch. 3). The Zakat revenues go into a fund to be used for relief of the needy.

There were a number of educational reforms proposed to bring instruction in line with the regime's Islamic bent. New textbooks were written; "unsuitable" reading matter was banned. There was renewed emphasis on Urdu as the language of instruction (see *Ethnic Relations, Education*, this ch.). Other efforts were aimed at promoting public worship and the cultural trappings associated with traditional Islam.

Government departments were to mark the prayers that occurred during working hours, department heads were encouraged to lead the prayers if at all possible. Private businesses were to allow their employees the opportunity to attend noon prayers on Friday at the mosque. The government encouraged traditional dress and segregated men and women at official banquets.

All of this was accompanied by popular manifestations that demonstrated how far afield Islamization could range. In late 1982 a crowd led by a maulvi stoned to death an abandoned infant (in strict contravention of the Quranic injunction against infanticide) on the assumption that the child must have been illegitimate. Another clergyman inveighed against cricket as un-Islamic and sinful because, he claimed, it inflames the lust of the female spectators. Employment advertisements often specified that an applicant should be "a God fearing and practising Muslim."

Islamization has not been without its critics, whose positions in society suggest some of the problems with using religion—particularly one as varied and complex as Islam—to forge a sense of national identity. As instituted in contemporary Pakistan, Islamization has proved unable to overcome the profound cultural and ethnic differences of the country's diverse populace. In itself it has been divisive.

The educated, urban middle class—a minute fraction of the populace—has been unsympathetic with the attempt to mesh teachings devised for the Middle East roughly a millennium and a half ago with the needs of a twentieth-century developing nation. In their view Islamization simply distracts attention from the country's real problems. Even a group as dedicated to Islamization as the Jamaat-i-Islami—a small but effectively organized fundamentalist party—has criticized the moves as tokenism.

Shiites have taken issue with the Sunni interpretation implicit in the Islamic legislation. Religious minorities have found the moves to set up separate electorates threatening. Baluch, Sindhis, and Pakhtuns have been less than enthusiastic about the efforts. For them, Islamization or no, the regime remains a Punjabi-dominated one. Legislation to weight women's courtroom testimony at half that of men, as well as injunctions prohibiting women from participating in public sporting events, continues to elicit sharp criticism from Pakistani women's groups.

Religious Minorities

The Shiite Muslim population constitutes the country's single largest religious minority, representing anywhere from 15 to 25 percent of the population. The Hindu and Christian communities are each estimated at perhaps 1 million adherents. Ahmadiyas, an Islamic sect, number over 2 million.

In addition, there are small groups of Parsis, adherents of Zoroastrianism. They are principally of Persian descent, centered in Karachi, and notable for their success in that city's commerce. The small Buddhist community comprises a few Chinese emigrants and a number of

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low-caste converts from Hinduism. There are a few Bahais of Iranian origin.

The earliest Christian missionaries were Nestorians who arrived in the eighth century; they left no permanent community of believers. Portuguese missionaries in the sixteenth century were more successful. The largess of the Mughal emperor Akbar permitted them a foothold in Lahore. The Roman Catholic Goan community—mostly prominent merchants—dates from this era. Most Christian proselytizing, however, dates from the British colonial era. The Christian populace is concentrated in urban Punjab.

The Hindus who remained after the secession of East Pakistan are concentrated in the Sind countryside and some of the larger cities. In common with Indian Hinduism, the Pakistan version is a diverse mix of various deities and philosophies. The caste system is an essential element in all the varied manifestations of Hinduism. Caste hierarchy expresses both ritual purity and social prestige.

In general, religious minorities are free in the practice of their faith. They are not permitted to hold the offices of president or prime minister. Proselytizing, especially by foreign missionaries, is subject to restrictions. Minorities face informal discrimination in education and employment.

Ahmadiyas are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. He founded the group in Qadian, India, in 1901, and his adherents are often called Qadianis. He claimed to have received a revelation from God, and with that claim he implicitly denied that Muhammad was the last of the prophets. Orthodox ulama therefore consider the Ahmadiyas apostates.

As a group they are highly organized and have a marked degree of community esprit. There is a pronounced emphasis on caring for the brethren; the community cares for poorer Ahmadiyas and finds employment for its members. They are characteristically ascetic in their personal lives; they bring to their vision of Islam the reforming zeal of some of the fundamentalists. They seek to re-create the glories of the early caliphs. Ahmadiyas strictly adhere to purdah. They are accustomed to running their own schools and welfare institutions.

Their high literacy rate, as well as their general industriousness, has won them a substantial measure of economic success and public prominence, and as a result they are frequently the object of envy. In 1953 there were anti-Ahmadiya riots, which resulted in the first imposition of martial law, albeit local and temporary. Sunnis called for the firing of prominent Ahmadiya officeholders and demanded that the sect be declared non-Muslim. The more extreme wanted the apostates put to death. Anti-Ahmadiya sentiment stirred again in the mid-1970s. Prime Minister Bhutto capitulated to popular demands, and the sect was declared non-Muslim. The oath of office for president and prime minister was reworded to require an explicit declaration of faith in Muhammad as the seal of the Prophets—effectively prohibiting Ahmadiyas from holding either office.

The main split within the Muslim community is between the majority Sunnis and the Shiites. There are substantial numbers of Shiites in the Punjab and the NWFP. As a group they are prone to schism, and there are numerous sects. The Ismailis are particularly prominent in Pakistan. They split over the succession of the seventh imam and supported instead his brother, Ismail, hence, Ismailis. Shiites as a whole are a successful and prosperous community. Jinnah was a Shiite, as were, among numerous other prominent political leaders, Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and Bhutto. There are heavy concentrations of Shiites in Karachi. Many are immigrants from the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh) and Bombay in India. They are highly educated and possessed of significant commercial and financial skills. Their general affluence has not endeared them to the majority Sunnis.

Relations between the two groups degenerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Shiites felt threatened by Zia's Islamization, which they feared was calculated to increase Sunni hegemony. The government, by contrast, fretted about possible Iranian influence among the Shiites. Vigorous Shiite objections to a common religious curriculum won them the promise of separate Shiite textbooks in late 1978. In 1980 their protests over the obligatory Zakat brought violence to Rawalpindi. The government amended the legislation to permit Shiites to seek exemption from the tax. In early 1983 there were clashes between Sunnis and Shiites in Karachi. Fundamentalist leaders tended to inflame sectarian conflicts. The military restored order, and the floggings imposed by military tribunals for the rioting were reputedly the largest set of floggings in the country's history.

Education

Education in Pakistan has enjoyed tremendous expansion since independence. Despite rapid and extensive growth, however, in the mid-1980s the system continued to be plagued by a number of problems that have persisted throughout a seemingly endless stream of committees devoted to their resolution. Attendance rates for the school-age population remained low and drop-out rates high. The 1981 census counted less than one quarter of those over 10 years of age as literate, the rate fell to 14 percent for women, 15 percent of the rural populace, and a scant 5.5 percent of rural women.

Education is organized into five levels: primary school, comprising grades one through five, middle school (grades six through eight), high school (nine and 10), intermediate school (11 and 12), and higher degree programs (13, 14, and above). Academic and technical educational institutions are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, although certain specialized health and agricultural programs fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare, and Population and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Cooperatives, respectively. Universities enjoy a measure of autonomy but are subject to being closed by the government. The language of instruction, according to 1970 and 1983 decrees, is Urdu. Implementation of instruction in Urdu has been

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hampered by a lack of adequately trained teachers. Instruction in the private schools frequented by the elite and the aspiring middle class remains, *de facto*, English.

Enrollment increased more than sevenfold between 1947 and the 1982-83 school year, overall, enrollment grew at approximately 5.8 percent annually from the 1960s through the early 1980s (see table 6, Appendix). The growth in female enrollment was particularly spectacular. From the 1960s through the early 1980s the increase in the number of females attending school grew at some 7.6 percent annually—as opposed to an annual increase in total enrollment of 5.8 percent. The increase in females attending schools was steadiest in the primary grades until the mid-1970s, when it leveled off. Gains by women in the upper levels of the educational system were more erratic. Despite substantial growth, female enrollment remained low; in 1982-83 their portion of estimated enrollment was some 28 percent, 30 percent of the primary-school students. Female enrollments were up from a low of 14 percent in 1947; in the 1960s and 1970s alone they had gained 10 percentage points.

The expansion in enrollments has benefited the few students seeking higher educational degrees in numbers disproportionate to the millions of primary-school-age children. In the early 1960s to mid-1970s the growth rate of students in higher education exceeded primary school expansion by 1.3 percent annually. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1978-83, made universal primary education a major goal; the balance was redressed somewhat and—for the first time—annual growth rates in primary-school enrollments exceeded those for higher education. Nonetheless, the number of students seeking higher education continued to expand at a healthy 3.8 percent annually. Overall, from 1960-61 through 1982-83 annual enrollments in higher education grew nearly a percentage point faster than those in primary schools. Annual rates of increase for secondary and intermediate students were higher than those for primary students, and those for students in higher education exceeded those of secondary and intermediate students.

The number of schools grew dramatically, nearly tripling from 1960 through the early 1980s. Unlike the increase in enrollments, the growth in schools was spread relatively evenly among primary, middle, and advanced schools. In the late 1970s roughly 2 percent of GNP went to public education; spending was on a par with the average for other South Asian countries.

A variety of problems have dogged the expansion of educational opportunities. Roughly half of primary-school-age children were enrolled in 1982-83. Rates of absenteeism, among students and teachers alike, were high. In the early 1980s half of all students dropped out before finishing the fifth year of their schooling. Drop-out rates for girls in primary school were extremely high. Only two-thirds of girls entering first grade continued on to second, only one in 10 continued through the tenth grade. Following middle school, however, differences between drop-out rates for the two sexes were negligible. Rural

and urban poor families were unable to dispense with child labor or afford the requisite school uniforms or supplies. The competence of many primary-school teachers—particularly those sent to rural areas—was questionable. The curriculum itself was widely perceived as irrelevant. Despite the increase in school buildings, many classes continued to be held in the open air, subject to the vagaries of the weather. There was a dearth of the most rudimentary supplies of paper, pencils, and books. Many of the extant buildings were in poor repair.

Until the late 1970s an excessive amount of educational spending went to the middle and upper levels. Education in the colonial era was geared to staffing the civil service and producing an educated elite sharing the values of and loyal to the British colonizers. It was unabashedly elitist, and contemporary education—reforms and commissions on reform notwithstanding—shares the same emphasis. The elitist nature of education was in evidence in the glaring gap between the country's public and private schools. Equal educational opportunity was, again, a goal in the Sixth Five-Year Plan being drafted in 1983. Proponents of Islamization viewed the exclusive private schools as a barrier to Islamic equality of educational opportunity.

Budget allocations in the early 1980s reflected efforts to restructure spending in favor of primary schools. They received nearly one-third of capital and recurrent spending. Despite cut-backs, higher education continued to receive roughly 30 percent of capital outlays.

Critics argued that the per-student cost of higher education was excessive compared to that of lower educational levels. In the early 1980s the cost per primary student ranged from Rs250 to Rs470 (for value of the rupee—see Glossary). At the same time, per capita spending on middle and intermediate students averaged from Rs1,000 to Rs3,000, on university students, over Rs15,000.

Education has had a disappointing relationship to future job prospects for most students. In the mid-1970s surveys of the unemployed found that at least one-third had finished primary school, and nearly 15 percent had finished middle school and obtained certification or continued their education beyond this. The performance of vocational- and technical-school graduates was particularly disappointing. Five to 10 years after finishing their studies, roughly one-quarter of Lahore Polytechnic Institute graduates were unemployed. The Agricultural University found some 16 percent of its graduates without work, of those who were employed, one-third were not in agriculture.

Health

Although the health situation of the populace has improved since independence, the majority continue to face major health hazards. The main dangers to health remain much as they were some 30 years ago, although their incidence has declined. The incidence of communicable disease is extensive; there is widespread malnutrition; adequate sewage disposal and safe drinking water are in short supply; and fertility remains extremely high.

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The leading causes of death are respiratory infections, diarrhea, congenital abnormalities, tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid. Gastrointestinal, parasitic, and respiratory ailments contribute substantially to morbidity. Childhood diseases, such as measles, diphtheria, and whooping cough, that in theory could be eradicated continue to take a substantial toll among children under five. The urban poor suffer from these hazards but, as with so much of poverty in Pakistan, the rural populace is the principal victim. Surveys in the mid-1970s found that nearly 30 percent of the villagers had malaria, and nearly 100 percent were afflicted with parasites or worms. Children under five years of age suffered an average of five bouts of diarrhea a year.

Poor nutrition adds to the health problems of the population both because the malnourished are more susceptible to disease and because some diseases encourage malnutrition. Poor nutrition contributes to infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. In the early 1980s more than 40 percent of children under five years of age were found to suffer from first-degree malnutrition, nearly 10 percent had some evidence of second-degree malnutrition, and roughly 7 percent of third-degree. Surveys found as many as half of all families to have an inadequate caloric intake; more than 10 percent consumed less than 70 percent of the required daily allotment of calories. Two-year-old Pakistani children were equal in height and weight to the average one-year-old European child. Likewise, there was evidence of extensive vitamin and nutritional deficiencies among women of childbearing age.

Less than 40 percent of the population had access to potable water—only 22 percent of those in the countryside. Effective and sanitary sewage disposal was almost unheard of among rural dwellers and rare enough in cities. Some 16 percent of the urban and 4 percent of the rural population had sanitary sewage disposal facilities available to them.

The country's consistently high fertility rates put women of childbearing age and their children at risk. At the same time, high infant mortality rates—80 per 1,000 in the early 1980s—encourage continued childbearing after ideal family size has been reached. High fertility in the context of poor nutrition and negligible prenatal care contributes to maternal mortality as do illegal abortions. Overall, nearly one-third of the deaths of women over 15 years of age are related to childbearing. High fertility also lowers the rate of infant survival.

Formal health care systems include the Westernized public and private sectors, a small social security system, and a large number of indigenous practitioners. Indigenous medical savants are the main source of health care for the rural populace and, hence, the majority of Pakistanis. Their practices are based on Unani and Vedic medical theory. Attempts to evaluate scientifically these alternative systems of treatment date from the 1920s. As early as 1946 an official commission recommended that the government recognize indigenous practitioners and control their certification. In the mid-1980s the government began this process by examining curricula of studies and registering practi-

tioners. By the late 1970s there were nine Unani medical colleges. There were as well an uncounted number of indigenous midwives who oversee the majority of births. There were unsuccessful efforts to enlist their efforts in family planning programs in the 1960s. By and large, however, their activities have remained beyond official purview.

Most urban dwellers encounter the private medical sector in the form of numerous pharmacies. Vitamins and aphrodisiacs are apparently the most popular items. Virtually all drugs are available without prescription, a practice implicated in the growing incident of resistant organisms. According to the Pakistani Medical Society, nearly two-thirds of tuberculosis cases are now resistant to common antibiotics. The prevalence of resistant organisms has significantly raised the cost of treatment.

The social security plan offered to industrial workers through their employers was introduced in the late 1960s. Basically, it is a pension plan, but it does provide medical coverage for workers and their dependents. By the mid-1970s there were perhaps half a million subscribers. The program emphasizes curative medicine; there is little effort in the direction of preventive health care. Although the clientele is concentrated in the high fertility age-group, there is scant attention paid to family planning (see Family Planning, this ch.).

National public health care is a recent innovation in Pakistan. The British provided health care for government employees but rarely attended to the health needs of the population at large. There were a few facilities financed by the British under the aegis of local governing bodies, but public health was generally neglected. Until the early 1970s local governing bodies remained in charge of dealing with the population's health needs.

National health planning began with the Second Five-Year Plan, 1960-65, and continued with projections for the sixth plan in mid-1983. Providing health care for the rural populace was a stated priority, but these efforts continued to be hampered by administrative problems and difficulties in staffing rural clinics. By the early 1970s the system had evolved into one based on basic rural health units designed to provide primary care for a surrounding population of 6,000 to 10,000. On the next level were rural health centers, both of these kinds of health center were to funnel more seriously ill patients to hospitals. In general, the government has been more successful in approaching the five-year plans' targets for health personnel than those for rural health facilities. The third through fifth plans attained roughly 80 percent of the number of doctors projected, 90 percent of the medical colleges, but scarcely more than 20 percent of the rural health centers. The percentage of the target goal attained more than doubled, however, between the fourth and fifth plans, and the number of rural health centers rose some two and one-half times.

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Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, Khalid Bin Sayeed's *Politics in Pakistan*, S. J. Burki's "Economic Decision-making in Pakistan," and Hafeez Malik's "Nationalism and the Quest for Ideology in Pakistan" all deal with the complex issues underlying ethnic relations in contemporary Pakistan. The works of Akbar S. Ahmed, Frederik Barth, and Charles Landholm analyze Pakhtun society. Stephen and Carroll Pastner and Selig Harrison do so for the Baluch.

A collection of readings, *Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan*, looks at changes in rural society during the late 1960s and early 1970s; the articles by Harry M. Raulet and Hamza Alavi are particularly useful. There is a dearth of current fieldwork on Punjabi and Sindhi villages; Zekiye Eglar's work remains valuable, albeit dated. Edmund Leach, Barth, Makhdum T. Ahmad, and Ahmed all describe the workings of the caste system.

Sergey Levin offers a look at the ethnic background of the country's elite. Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky describes the configuration and historical roots of urban Pakistan. Jan van der Linden and J. van der Harst deal with the adaptations that rural-urban migrants have developed to deal with housing, and Khalid Ashfaq outlines the dimensions of the housing crisis. Katherine Ewing, Edward Mortimer, and William Richter all analyze the role of Islam in society. Aziz Ahmad's book, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*, is valuable background reading.

Pakistan: The Effects of Population Factors on Social and Economic Development, by The Futures Group, analyzes the impact of population growth on limited resources through 2020. The Ministry of Finance's *Pakistan Economic Survey* (an annual) offers a wealth of current statistical data. Articles in *Asian Survey*, especially the annual February issue, provide descriptions and analyses of contemporary events. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 3. The Economy



*Mughal miniature of the early nineteenth century showing Babur,
founder of the dynasty, and his grandson Akbar*

CULTIVATION OF THE RICH ALLUVIAL soil of the Indus River Basin has been the primary economic activity since time immemorial, and it remained so in late 1983. Extensions and improvements had been made in the irrigation system that led the waters of the Indus River and its tributaries to the fields, a necessity for cultivation because of scant rainfall. The Indus irrigation system remained the world's largest but not the best. There were problems in water management and its use. Farmers continued to employ traditional cultivation practices, and support services, such as research and extension agents, were inadequate, although high-yield seeds and fertilizers were fairly widely used. Yields of most crops were low by international standards and substantially below the area's potential. Many farms were too small to support a family using existing practices. The landless often sharecropped or worked as agricultural laborers. Rural areas were deficient in schools, health care, potable water, and electricity. Most of the rural population were very poor.

Since partition in 1947 considerable effort has been made to transform Pakistan from an agrarian nation into an industrial one. In little more than three decades a broad industrial base was created, producing a wide range of products for consumers, for further processing, and for use in the production process itself. The country, possessing substantial natural gas, a little crude oil, and considerable hydroelectrical potential, was self-sufficient for about two-thirds of the primary commercial energy consumed, although in the early 1980s there were energy shortages that constrained industrial development and production. Industrialization, however, failed to create sufficient jobs for the rapidly expanding population and migrants from the farms. Expansion of construction and service activities, such as trade, transportation, and government, created more jobs than industry. Nonetheless, considerable underemployment contributed to low incomes and poverty throughout the economy.

Governments since independence have sought a high rate of economic growth in order to raise the bulk of the population's low standard of living. Some have been more successful than others. Nonetheless, gross domestic product (in constant prices) increased an average 4.9 percent a year between 1950 and 1983, roughly 2 percent a year faster than population growth. By 1983 gross national product amounted to the equivalent of US\$28.7 billion, or US\$328 on a per capita basis. Because of a combination of government development strategy and characteristics of the society, however, income has been far from equally distributed. A few received much more and many received much less than any average income measurement. The unequal income distri-

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bution pattern has been an issue since the late 1960s and was expected to become more controversial in the 1980s.

By 1983 the military government that took over in 1977 had successfully restored a high rate of economic growth while pledging help to the disadvantaged. Several external events since 1978—large price increases for imported oil, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulting in an influx of refugees and higher defense costs, reduced foreign assistance in constant prices, a substantial deterioration in Pakistan's terms of trade, and recession and protective measures in the country's export markets—threatened continued high rates of growth and improvements in income distribution. Government-mandated price increases for basic necessities in the late 1970s and early 1980s, for example, provoked controversy and disturbances as the government reduced subsidies to ease pressure on the budget and the balance of payments. By late 1983 the government and the economy faced serious problems that imposed constraints on continued high economic growth and shifts in the distribution of income. Able management of the economy could reduce the constraints. Less successful government policies could undermine the regime itself because of further frustration of aspirations and popular discontent.

Growth and Structure of the Economy

Pakistan became a nation under inauspicious circumstances. At partition in 1947 Pakistan was an agrarian nation in which a few powerful landowners with large holdings dominated the countryside, mostly consisting of tenant farmers cultivating small plots for a meager existence. Scant rainfall in West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) forced reliance on the extensive irrigation system developed by the British for cultivation of fields. The headwaters of the Indus River and its main tributaries, however, were under Indian control. Disputes soon arose between the two riparian nations that took over 10 years to settle (see *Irrigation*, this ch.).

At partition Pakistan had almost no industry. During British rule the area had supplied agricultural products for processing to the territory that became India. Wood and animal dung furnished the bulk of the energy consumed. Ports, transportation, and other services, such as banking and government, were underdeveloped. More than 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory separated East Pakistan (or East Wing) and West Pakistan until the East Wing became independent Bangladesh in 1971 (see *Yahya Khan and Bangladesh*, ch. 1). Disputes soon halted the flow of goods between Pakistan and India, disrupting the complementary nature of their economies that developed under the British.

Partition resulted in communal riots of unprecedented violence that killed over 250,000 people. About 12 to 14 million Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh refugees fled past each other across the new boundary seeking the area of their choice. Settlement of Muslim refugees added considerably to the other costs and tasks facing the new government. The

*Punjabi farmers
enjoying hookah*
Courtesy Kay Muldoon.
WORLD BANK



Muslim refugees from India had played only a small role in commerce, banking, or the professions. Almost none were industrialists. Because the indigenous Muslims in Pakistan were primarily agriculturists, the country began with few trained and experienced people to lead and establish the businesses and institutions for development of the economy.

Despite the formidable problems, the area that is now Pakistan achieved rapid economic expansion. Between fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1950 and FY 1983 gross domestic product (GDP), in constant FY 1980 prices, increased an average of 4.9 percent a year, safely above the rate of population growth. The rate of economic expansion varied considerably during the more than three decades, however. During the 1950s the average rate of growth was 3.1 percent a year as the agricultural sector stagnated. High growth was achieved in the 1960s, real GDP increasing an average of 6.7 percent a year because of rapid expansion of industrial and agricultural output. Between FY 1970 and FY 1977, roughly the period of the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the rate of economic expansion fell back to 3.7 percent a year (see Role of Government, this ch.). Between FY 1978 and FY 1983, under the military government of General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, economic growth returned to a high rate of 6.2 percent a year.

Although the economy returned to a high rate of expansion after 1977, continuation of such rapid growth in the 1980s would require

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adept management. The country faced serious problems. The balance of payments deteriorated between 1979 and 1982 and could remain a long-term constraint. Mobilization of domestic resources had been traditionally weak. Unless domestic savings increased considerably in the mid-1980s, sufficient resources would be unavailable to support a high rate of growth. Officials were aware of the problems, but it remained to be seen whether policy implementation was vigorous enough to accomplish the objectives.

Rapid growth substantially altered the structure of the economy. Agriculture's share (including a little forestry and fishing) declined from 53 percent of GDP in FY 1950 to 31 percent in FY 1983. Industry (including mining, manufacturing, gas, and electricity) was the leading growth component of the economy. It increased over 10 percent a year for three decades, and its share of GDP rose from 8 percent in FY 1950 to 20 percent in FY 1983. A substantial industrial base had been added to the economy, and a large integrated iron and steel plant would soon be completed (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Services increased their contribution to GDP from 37 percent in FY 1950 to 45 percent in FY 1983. Trade was the most important service, followed by transportation and communications and by public administration and defense.

Role of Government

Since independence Pakistani officials have sought a high rate of economic growth in an effort to lift the population out of poverty. Rapid industrialization was viewed as a basic necessity and as the vehicle of growth. For more than two decades economic expansion was substantial, and growth of industrial output was phenomenal. In the 1960s the country was considered a model for other developing countries. Rapid expansion of the economy, however, did not lift the bulk of the population out of poverty. In the 1970s, although a high rate of growth was sought, more attention was given to income distribution, but with little success. In the 1980s more equitable distribution of income remained a major problem.

At partition the new government lacked the personnel, institutions, and resources to play a large role in developing the economy. Exclusive public ownership was reserved only for military armaments, generation of hydroelectric power, and manufacture and operation of railroad, telephone, telegraph, and wireless equipment—fields that were unattractive, at least in the early years, to private investors. The rest of the economy was open to private sector development, and the government used many direct and indirect measures to stimulate, guide, or retard private sector activities.

The country was fortunate in inheriting a competent if small group of administrators from the Indian Civil Service under British rule (see Problems at Independence, ch. 1). They implemented the many controls that were imposed on economic activity. Foreign trade and exchange were tightly controlled, and industrial investments of any

appreciable size required government approval. Until the 1970s civil servants were often in charge of public investment projects, such as irrigation canals, hydroelectric plants, and other infrastructure development.

The disruptions caused by partition, the cessation of trade with India, strict control of imports, and an overvalued exchange rate provided considerable stimulation to private industry. Initially, the investments went into the manufacturing of consumer goods that required relatively simple technology. By the late 1950s private investment began to broaden into more complex manufacturing processes. Government policies afforded liberal incentives to industrialization, while government development of the infrastructure complemented private investment. Some public manufacturing plants were established by a government holding company. Manufacturing proved highly profitable, attracting increasing private investments and reinvestment of profits. Industrial development was rapid, although from a very small base at partition. Except for large government investments in the Indus irrigation system, agriculture was left largely alone, and output stagnated in the 1950s.

Much of the economy and particularly industry came to be dominated by a small group, largely minor traders who immigrated to Pakistan's cities, especially Karachi, at partition. These refugees brought modest capital, which they initially used to start trading firms. Most were tight, vertical organizations of extended families or communities (see *Urban Society*, ch. 2). For several reasons they were in a position to respond to the incentives and disincentives in government policy that favored industrialization and discouraged other activities. Largely using their own resources, they accounted for the bulk of investment and ownership in manufacturing. By the 1960s a few other groups had also become industrialists, but the total number remained small.

The broad outline of government policy was one of squeezing the peasants and workers to finance industrial development. Most observers ascribed the evolution of government economic policies to pragmatic responses rather than an ideological or a thought-out strategy. Compulsory procurement of food grains at prices below imported equivalents kept urban prices stable and low. Cheap prices for basic foods plus curbs on union activity helped keep wage rates down. Low-interest loans to industry from public financial institutions provided cheap capital. Import licenses for machinery and raw materials were usually available to industry, and duties for such imports were generally low. A high level of protection for domestic manufacturing shielded industry from foreign competition. Low prices to farmers and high prices to consumers for manufactured goods financed the country's industrialization, although foreign aid became an important source of financing in the first half of the 1960s. In the 1960s private investment in tube wells and the use of high-yield seeds with other inputs (the Green Revolution) caused a substantial expansion of farm output that contrasted with the agricultural stagnation in the 1950s.

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By the late 1960s there was growing popular dissatisfaction with economic conditions and considerable debate about equitable distribution of income, wealth, and economic power. In 1968 the chief economist of the Planning Commission revealed that 20 industrial families controlled about 86 percent of the country's industrial assets and about 80 percent of insurance and banking assets. Although "20 families" was an oversimplification, it was true that wealth was highly concentrated. Economic expansion and rapid industrialization had handsomely rewarded a few at the expense of many. Between 1968 and 1972 piecemeal measures were enacted to set minimum wages, promote collective bargaining for labor, reform the tax structure toward greater equity, and rationalize salary structures, but implementation was weak or nonexistent.

The advent of the Bhutto government in 1971 stimulated hopes of a new development strategy that would be more equitable, but few economists claimed that the prime minister was successful. Bhutto downplayed economic analysis and planning and relied on ad hoc decisions that created many inconsistencies. In May 1972 he promulgated a major act that devalued the rupee by 57 percent and abolished the multiple-exchange-rate system. This stimulated exports greatly and indicated that removing the price distortions could spur the economy. But devaluation completely altered the cost and price structure for industry, affecting the level and composition of industrial investment and the terms of trade between the industrial and agricultural sectors. Devaluation helped agriculture, particularly larger farms that had marketable surpluses. Mechanization increased but had the adverse side effect of displacing farm laborers and tenants, many of whom migrated to cities seeking industrial jobs.

In 1972 Bhutto's government nationalized 32 large manufacturing plants in 10 major industries. The industries affected included iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, motor vehicle and tractor assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petrochemicals, cement, and public utilities. Subsequently, domestically owned life insurance companies, privately owned banks, domestic shipping companies, and firms engaged in oil distribution, vegetable oil processing, grain milling, and cotton ginning were nationalized. The result was a drop of nearly 50 percent in private investment in large-scale manufacturing between FY 1970 and FY 1973. By FY 1978 such investments were little more than one-third (in constant prices) of that in FY 1970. Private capital fled the country or went into small-scale manufacturing and real estate. Between 1970 and 1977 industrial output slowed considerably.

In a short space of time, the public sector expanded greatly. In addition to nationalizing firms, the government built some plants of its own and created additional public companies for various functions, such as the export of cotton and rice. Able managers and technicians were scarce, a situation that became worse as many left to seek higher salaries in Middle East oil states after 1974. Labor legislation set high

minimum wages and fringe benefits that boosted payroll costs for both public and private firms. Efficiency and profits in public sector enterprises fell. Public industrial investment rose, surpassing private industrial investment in FY 1976. It has since remained double or more the level of private industrial investment.

The Bhutto regime took other major steps affecting the economy. Agricultural measures lowered ceilings on the size of landholdings, stipulated some of the inputs to be supplied by landlords to tenants, and attempted to tax farm income (see Agriculture, this ch.). The Civil Service of Pakistan was abolished and government administration weakened (see The Bureaucracy, ch. 4). Several government organizations were restructured, which made policy formation and implementation more difficult. Before 1977, for example, one ministry was responsible for energy planning and development, but since then, one ministry has handled hydrocarbons and other natural resources while another ministry has been responsible for irrigation and power construction and operation. Bhutto also preferred "grand" solutions, supporting large, long-gestation projects that tied up the country's scarce development resources for long periods and usually with inadequate economic analysis. An integrated iron and steel project was a prime example. By FY 1976 investments in the project had become substantial, and between FY 1978 and FY 1980 such investments were more than 45 percent of total public sector industrial investments. Other large projects started by Bhutto included a major highway on the west bank of the Indus River and a highway tunnel in the mountainous north (see fig. 8).

Economic growth and industrialization slowed greatly under Bhutto. Although many of the measures were ostensibly taken in the interest of greater equality in income distribution, economists have discovered little evidence that such a result was achieved. On the contrary, some economists claimed that the bulk of the population lost ground, although adequate statistical data were unavailable. Bhutto's major economic measures have been interpreted by some economists as primarily steps to strengthen political friends and weaken foes, rather than attempts to improve the general welfare. Because in 1983 he remained a controversial figure, it may be some years before his government receives an objective evaluation.

Since 1977 the Zia government has been trying to reduce the government's role, returning again to primary reliance on the private sector for development. Some nationalized firms were returned to former owners, and some were sold. Private firms have been allowed to operate again in fields that had become public monopolies under Bhutto. The government instituted constitutional measures to assure private investors that nationalization would occur only under limited and exceptional circumstances and with fair compensation. A demarcation of exclusive public ownership was made that excluded the private sector from only a few activities. Yet government played a large economic role in the early 1980s. Public sector enterprises accounted for

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


Figure 8. Transportation System, 1983

a significant portion of large-scale manufacturing and trade in particular commodities and services. Serious and partially successful efforts were made to improve the management, efficiency, and profitability of the public sector companies. The government continued to wield considerable control over prices, investments, and credit. A series of price adjustments for important commodities and services was made to reduce subsidies and price distortions that emerged over the years, but many of the distortions would not be eliminated in the 1980s. Government was cautious about adjusting prices, for some increases of prices of key commodities had sparked riots in the 1970s.

By 1983 the private sector had responded cautiously to the government's overtures and investment incentives. Between FY 1977 and FY 1983 gross private fixed investment (in constant prices) increased 26 percent compared with 17 percent for government fixed investment. By the early 1980s, however, private fixed investment was more widely distributed, particularly to agriculture, transportation, and services, compared with a decade earlier. Private investment in large-scale manufacturing rose about as rapidly as in other sectors, but by FY 1983 it remained below the level of the early 1970s in constant prices. Apart

from lingering distrust of government policies, private industrial investment was constrained by troubled economic conditions at home and abroad, inadequate energy supplies, bottlenecks in domestic transport, and poor labor discipline and growing absenteeism of workers.

A return of confidence and a high level of private investment in large-scale manufacturing were critical for rapid economic growth and appreciable rise in per capita incomes. Investment has primarily come from private savings. Historically, the rate of domestic savings has been low and a major weakness of government development policies. Gross domestic savings were less than 6 percent of GDP during the late 1970s and early 1980s compared with gross fixed investment above 14 percent of GDP. After the mid-1970s, large flows of remittances from Pakistanis working overseas added substantially to national savings and helped finance investments (see Balance of Payments, this ch.). Foreign aid and loans, although diminishing since 1975, financed an important part of investment. For years economists have pointed to the need for government policies to raise the rate of domestic savings.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s national savings were about 12 percent of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). More than one-half of the national savings came from workers abroad, which contributed to a substantial surplus of private savings over investments. Public savings were only about 3 percent of GNP and covered less than 30 percent of public investment. The public sector had to use private savings to finance its investments, particularly public enterprises, which were able to finance only about 15 percent of their investments. Improvements in efficiency and profitability of public enterprises were critical to raising public savings to finance investments because substantial real increases in foreign aid and workers' remittances appeared unlikely during the rest of the 1980s. Although some success was achieved after 1977 in raising government revenues, economists generally agreed that a greater tax effort was needed to expand necessary current expenditures and public investment and that mobilization of domestic resources commensurate with the country's economic conditions was decades overdue.

Islamization of the economy was a novel policy innovation of the Zia government. The policy may have unforeseen effects on the mobilization of domestic resources and the distribution of income and wealth. In 1977 Zia asked the Council of Islamic Ideology to draft an outline of an Islamic economic system. By 1983 such a system had not been devised, but several basic thoughts had been advanced, some reflecting the equality inherent in Islam. If implemented, an Islamic system might entail extensive land reform and restrictions on the inheritance of wealth, for example.

Between 1979 and 1983 only a few financial measures had been instituted as part of the Islamization policy. The Quran prohibits the charging of interest. Thus, interest-free loans for seasonal inputs have been made to small farmers, and several state financial institutions have replaced interest-bearing loans with loans in which the institutions

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share in the profit or loss over a specified period of time with the user of the funds. By 1983 most Pakistani banks had created interest-free deposit accounts in which the depositor shared with the bank the profit or loss from the use of his funds; the banks also continued to pay interest on deposits if depositors chose that option.

In June 1980 the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was promulgated. The Zakat is a traditional religious levy on wealth to help the needy (see *Islam: Tenets and Early Development*, ch. 2). Under the ordinance, a 2.5-percent annual levy is applied to all institutional savings above a specified minimum and on some other financial assets. Shiite Muslims objected to the law, they believed that the Zakat should be voluntary. They were subsequently exempted from the compulsory levy. Zakat on some other forms of wealth depended on voluntary assessment and compliance. Ushr (Zakat of land) is a 5-percent annual tax on agricultural income, after a standard deduction for costs, which replaced the former land tax levied by the provinces. Ushr collections did not begin until March 1983.

Zakat and Ushr collections go into the Zakat Fund, which is separate and distinct from budget accounts of the government. A hierarchy of Zakat councils and committees extended from the local level through district and province, to the central or national level, apparently administering Zakat funds at each level. In early 1983 there were nearly 37,000 Zakat councils and committees with some 250,000 voluntary workers. Zakat collections in FY 1982 (before Ushr collections started) amounted to about Rs904 million (for value of the rupee—see Glossary), 2 percent of consolidated tax revenues that year and nearly double the tax collected on property.

Zakat funds were intended to help the less fortunate. Disbursements from Zakat funds were not clearly identified in available information, but collections in the first couple of years appeared to outstrip disbursements considerably. Use of Zakat funds included direct help to the poor, funds for educating individuals at various school levels, and aid to small businesses. In time, distribution of Zakat funds might have an effect on expenditures at provincial and lower levels of government.

By 1983 it was far from clear what the effects would be of the Islamic measures already instituted. Initially, the Zakat discouraged depositors, and the movement toward abolishing interest appeared to discourage loan repayments. Interest-free loans to farmers expanded rapidly and indicated a growing subsidy from government budget funds. Islamization was a venture into unknown areas that required close monitoring by officials. Moreover, some Islamic authorities indicated that Zakat and Ushr levies did not preclude additional government taxes on wealth or farm income.

Development Planning

Planning the economic development of the country began in 1948, soon after partition. By 1960 a six-year plan had been drafted that primarily guided government investments for development of the in-



Street scene, Karachi



Street scene, Multan

Street scene, Quetta

*Photos courtesy
Frederick M. Denny*



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infrastructure. But the initial effort was unsystematic, partly because of inadequate staff. More formal planning—incorporating overall targets, assessed resource availabilities, and assigned priorities—started in 1953 with the drafting of the First Five-Year Plan, 1955-60. In 1958, during the course of the First Five-Year Plan, planning was elevated in the government administration to the Planning Commission. Subsequently, ministerial, provincial, and lower level planning organizations were established to aid in national and local or functional planning.

Planning an economy dominated by decisions of many private investors and consumers proved difficult at best. Extensive government controls over important activities and higher review and coordinating panels of top government officials aided the planning process. Recruitment and training improved the competency of the staff, which was supplemented by foreign advisers, mostly American. Planning improved up to the early 1970s and provided valuable guidance to policy and investment decisions, even if all the recommendations and goals were not implemented or achieved.

The first plan fell short of major goals, partly because of stagnation in agriculture. The Second Five-Year Plan, 1960-65, surpassed its major goals as all sectors showed substantial development. The first half of the 1960s was the period of highest balanced growth achieved in Pakistan. The Third Five-Year Plan, 1965-70, fell somewhat short of its goals, largely because of a reduced flow of foreign aid. The Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1970-75, was abandoned as East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh. Planning during the Bhutto regime was virtually bypassed. Only annual plans were prepared, and they were largely ignored.

The Zia government accorded more importance to planning and slowly built up the staff. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1978-83, was drafted on short notice. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, which caused increased defense expenditures and a flood of refugees to Pakistan requiring food and shelter, as well as the sharp increase of international oil prices in 1979-80, drew resources away from planned investments. Although a high rate of growth and broad development of economy were achieved, a number of goals fell short of the plan.

In FY 1983 the Planning Commission was revived, chaired by the finance minister, and the staff enlarged. In 1983 the Sixth Five-Year Plan was being prepared, but an outline of targets was not available by late 1983. Economists expected growth to be slower than in the preceding five years because of the problems facing the economy. Energy shortages, transportation bottlenecks, and low productivity in industry and agriculture were largely internal difficulties, and the balance of payments was also likely to constrain economic expansion. Improved management of the economy to raise output from existing plant and equipment had become a necessity, because slow economic recovery abroad and limited availability of foreign assistance was the general prognosis for the world economy.

Public Finance

In the 1970s the public sector came to exert considerable influence on the economy through the budget. The public sector consisted of the federal government, four provincial governments, several levels of local government, and the operations of numerous commercial departments, such as the Post Office, and autonomous agencies, such as the Pakistan Steel Mill Corporation. The commercial departments and autonomous agencies entered budget transactions through transfers of profits or losses and capital expenditures financed by some level of government, public enterprises increasingly financed investments from internal resources and direct borrowing from the banking system, both of which were outside of public sector budgets. The federal government accounted for over 90 percent of tax collections, a portion of which was transferred to provincial government. For practical purposes the consolidated budget included only the federal and provincial levels of government.

Tax collections historically have been a low ratio to GDP compared with many other countries. After 1977 a number of new taxes were added, rates of older taxes increased, and collections substantially improved (individual income-tax payers doubled to 1 million, and collections increased 70 percent between FY 1979 and FY 1982), but by FY 1983 total tax collections were only 14 percent of GDP. Indirect taxes were the main source of revenue, taxes on foreign trade accounted for 47 percent of indirect taxes in FY 1983 (see table 7, Appendix). Excise taxes were the next most important tax. Sales tax receipts came primarily from imported goods. Direct taxes on individuals and businesses supplied only 16 percent of tax revenue in FY 1983.

The low tax structure has traditionally required limitations on current government expenditures. This was particularly true under the Zia government, when partially successful efforts were made to reduce budget deficits. Between FY 1978 and FY 1983, current government expenditures, in constant prices, on community, social, and economic services increased at about the same rate as the population, thus failing to improve appreciably deficient services, such as potable water, sewerage, and health care. Inadequate maintenance of roads, the irrigation system, and other economic services also could not be appreciably upgraded despite the need. Defense was the main current expenditure, accounting for 26 percent of total government spending in FY 1983) (see table 8, Appendix). National security had always had high priority, but spending increased after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Interest on the public debt and subsidies also have required a large part of current expenditures. The most expensive subsidies were for wheat, petroleum products, and fertilizer.

After 1977 government capital expenditures showed substantial growth, but in constant prices public sector investments fell one-third short of those planned in the Fifth Five-Year Plan. The pressure on resources, including less foreign aid than planned, required slowdowns and post-

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ponements where possible on projects under construction. By 1983 the emphasis of government capital expenditures was shifted toward quick-yielding smaller projects in order to have an early impact on production. External financing of capital expenditures fell sharply in terms of constant prices after the mid-1970s; by FY 1983 such aid in real terms was nearly one-half that in FY 1977. Foreign financing of government developmental spending dropped from one-third in FY 1979 to about one-quarter in FY 1983, causing a corresponding increase in capital expenditures financed from internal resources.

In the 1970s budget deficits became increasingly larger, the financing of which contributed to inflation. The Zia government attempted with some success to gain control over government revenues and expenditures. Although the budget deficits trended upward in money terms, they fell as a ratio to GDP from 8 percent in FY 1978 to 5.7 percent in FY 1983. Domestic financing of the deficits was shifted away from bank credit to government savings schemes, which the public found attractive. The domestic public debt amounted to Rs21 billion in March 1982. Servicing of the external debt amounted to Rs16.8 billion in FY 1983 (see Balance of Payments, this ch.). Officials were concerned about an excessive debt burden and realized the need to mobilize domestic resources, but whether they could alter the country's traditionally low savings rate remained to be seen.

Labor Force

The labor force has been growing at a rapid rate, reflecting high population growth and the large proportion under 20 years of age (see Population, ch. 2). In FY 1983 additions to the labor force were estimated at about 820,000 persons. Nonetheless, most data concerning employment were primarily educated guesses by officials because few concrete facts were available. Labor force figures represented orders of magnitude and were not precise. Observers agreed, however, that few women participated in the nonagricultural work force.

In FY 1983 the civilian labor force was officially estimated at 25.2 million, compared with 10.4 million in 1951. In FY 1983 about 55 percent of the civilian labor force was engaged in agriculture, 14 percent in industry, 4 percent in construction, 11 percent in trade, 5 percent in transportation and communications, and over 10 percent in other services (see table 9, Appendix).

Agricultural employment, although increasing, expanded at a slower rate than the total labor force. In the 1960s and 1970s owners of mid-sized farm holdings turned increasingly to self-operation, displacing former tenants. Increased mechanization displaced agricultural laborers. Industry, the major growth sector of the economy, was not able to absorb sufficient workers. Large-scale manufacturing, mostly capital intensive, increased employment opportunities by only a small amount; it employed perhaps 2 percent of the labor force. Small-scale manufacturing and cottage industries employed the bulk, perhaps 85 percent, of the industrial workers. Services and construction had to absorb

a large share of new additions to the labor force, who were nearly all unskilled and usually illiterate. Unemployment remained small—officially estimated at about 3.5 percent in 1983—although many were new college and high-school graduates who could not find jobs. Underemployment was a much larger problem, particularly acute in agriculture, construction, and trade.

Overseas employment partially compensated for insufficient job creation during the economy's development over the last three decades. Since the mid-1970s a growing number of Pakistanis went to labor-short, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East, where in the early 1980s they earned an average of more than six times their income at home. Estimates varied widely on the number of Pakistanis working overseas. In 1983 the government estimated about 1.6 million employed abroad, while others suggested the number was close to 2 million. The bulk of those abroad were production workers, about equally split between skilled and unskilled. Perhaps about 15 percent were professional (largely engineers), along with accountants and teachers, physicians, nurses, and other service-workers.

Pakistanis working abroad had important effects on the Pakistani economy. Remittances home from these workers grew from US\$339 million in FY 1976 to an estimated US\$2.8 billion in FY 1983, probably exceeding total commodity export earnings in the latter year. The remittances raised domestic purchasing power significantly; surveys indicated migrant households used about 60 percent of remittances for consumption and saved or invested the remainder. After the mid-1970s wages of skilled and unskilled workers in Pakistan rose substantially, affected to a considerable degree by the workers abroad. Domestic shortages of various skilled workers developed, and a gap was expected to persist into the mid-1980s. Increased vocational training was indicated, but obtaining and retaining vocational teachers was difficult because they also were attracted overseas. Economists believed that the effects of the overseas workers were favorable to the domestic economy. If the government had the same view, migration would likely continue, but whether the number rose or fell depended largely on conditions in the host countries.

Agriculture

The Indus River Basin with its fertile alluvial soil has been a center for farming since prerecorded time. In 1983 farming in the Indus Basin remained the largest economic activity in Pakistan. In FY 1983 agriculture, including a little forestry and fishing, contributed 31 percent of GDP and employed 55 percent of the labor force. Nearly two-thirds of exports were agricultural products, although some were in finished form, such as cotton cloth and garments. Although agricultural activity existed in all areas of Pakistan, the bulk of production came from the Indus Basin—Punjab and Sind provinces (see fig. 1). Considerable development and expansion of output had occurred since independence; however, the country was still far from realizing the large po-

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tential that the fertile soil, water from the Indus irrigation system, and appropriate cropping practices could produce.

Land Use

Pakistan's total area amounted to about 89 million hectares. About 48 million hectares, or 60 percent, were often classed as unusable for forestry or agriculture, consisting mostly of deserts, mountain slopes, and urban concentrations. Some authorities, however, included part of this area under agricultural land on the basis that it would support livestock activity even though it was poor rangeland. Thus, estimates of grazing land varied widely—between 10 and 70 percent of Pakistan's total area, a broad interpretation, for example, classed nearly all of arid Baluchistan as rangeland for foraging livestock. Government officials listed only 3.1 million hectares, largely in the north, as forested in the early 1980s. About 20 million hectares were cultivated (including fallow) in 1980. The bulk of the cropped area was in the Punjab, followed by perhaps one-fifth in Sind, less than one-tenth in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and only a tiny fraction in Baluchistan.

Since independence the amount of cultivated land has increased by one-third, from 14.7 million hectares in 1948 to 20.2 million hectares in 1980. This expansion was largely the result of improvements of the irrigation system that made water available to additional plots. Substantial amounts of farmland were lost to urbanization and waterlogging, but the losses were more than compensated by the additions of new land. By the 1980s, however, Pakistan had little additional land that could be brought under cultivation, in fact, avoiding contraction of the cultivated area could prove to be a serious problem during the 1980s.

The scant rainfall over most of the country made about four-fifths of cropping dependent on irrigation. Less than 4 million hectares, largely in the northern Punjab and the NWFP, depended on rainfall. An additional 2 million hectares had nonirrigated cropping, such as plantings on floodplains as the water receded. Nonirrigated farming generally had low yields, although technology was available to increase them substantially. Many factors inhibited the government's promotion and farmers' adoption of improved dry-land farming practices.

Irrigation

Pakistan is among the largest nations having insufficient rainfall to support cropping, but for at least 3,000 years it has been a center of agricultural activity, based primarily on irrigation from the Indus River and its tributaries. Over the centuries irrigation from the Indus expanded, and in the 1980s it was the world's largest contiguous irrigation system, capable of watering nearly 14 million hectares even though about one-sixth was not cultivable. The system included three major storage reservoirs and numerous barrages, headworks, canals, and distribution channels. The total length of the canal system exceeded 58,000 kilometers, and farm and field ditches amounted to an additional 1.6 million kilometers.



*One of the spillways, Tarbela Dam
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington*

Partition of the Punjab in 1947, along with the rest of the subcontinent, placed portions of the Indus River and its tributaries under Indian control. The division produced prolonged and acrimonious disputes between the two riparian nations. After nine years of negotiations and technical studies, assisted by the good offices of the World Bank (see Glossary), the Indus waters dispute was resolved in 1960 by a treaty between India and Pakistan. After a transition period, the treaty awarded India use of the waters of the main eastern Indus tributaries in India—the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers. Pakistan received use of the waters of the Indus River and its western tributaries—the Jhelum and Chenab rivers.

After the treaty was signed, Pakistan began an extensive and rapid irrigation construction program, partly financed by the Indus Basin Development Fund of US\$600 million contributed by various nations, including the United States and administered by the World Bank. Several immense link canals were built to transfer water from the western rivers to the eastern Punjab to replace the flows in the eastern tributaries that India began to divert as the treaty terms provided. The Mangla Dam, completed in 1967, provided the first significant water

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storage for the Indus irrigation system. This dam also contributed to flood control, to regulation of flows for some of the link canals, and to the country's energy supply from its 800-megawatt hydroelectric power station. Additional construction was undertaken on barrages and canals.

Studies, often employing international consulting firms, were financed under the Indus Basin Development Fund for the future full development of water, land, and energy resources of the Indus Basin in Pakistan. In 1968 an additional US\$1.2 billion fund was established, also administered by the World Bank, and construction was started on the Tarbela Dam on the Indus, the world's largest earthwork dam. This multipurpose dam was commissioned in the 1970s after being damaged in 1974 during the course of impounding water. The dam reduced the destruction of periodic floods and by 1983 had 1,400 megawatts of installed generating capacity. Most important for agriculture, it increased water availability, particularly during low water, which usually came at critical growing periods.

The Indus irrigation system was designed over the years to fit the availability of water in the rivers, to supply the largest area with minimum water needs, and to achieve these objectives at low operating costs with a limited technical staff. This system design resulted in low yields and low cropping intensity in the Indus River Plain, averaging about one crop a year, whereas the climate, soils, and irrigation could reasonably permit an average of nearly 1.5 crops a year. The urgent need in the 1960s and 1970s to increase crop production for domestic and export markets led to water flows well above designed capacities. Completion of the Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs, as well as improvements in other parts of the system, made larger water flows possible. In addition, the government began installing public tube wells that usually discharged into upper levels of the system to add to the available water. The higher water flows in parts of the system considerably exceeded design capacities, creating stresses and risks of breaches. Nonetheless, many farmers, particularly those with smaller holdings and those toward the end of watercourses, suffered because the supply of water was unreliable, frequently at critical times.

About 95 percent of the area covered by the Indus irrigation system was confined to two provinces. The system was available to 8.4 million hectares in the Punjab, 4.9 million hectares in Sind, but only 700,000 hectares combined in the NWFP and Baluchistan. An additional 2.2 million hectares were irrigated outside of the Indus system. Most of the irrigation was in scattered locations, partly in Baluchistan and the NWFP, and relied on private systems using wells, springs, minor diversion works, and other sources for water.

The irrigation system represented a very significant engineering achievement and watered the fields that accounted for 90 percent of the country's agricultural production. Nonetheless, serious problems kept the system from contributing anything like its full potential for higher output. One weakness was the system's design, which satisfied older agricultural objectives before pressures of population and the

balance of payments required greater cropping intensity and higher yields, the system could not respond adequately to irrigation demands in terms of amounts and timing.

Another severe weakness was the lack of adequate water management and government policies. Officials appeared to assume that investments in physical aspects of the system would automatically translate into higher crop production. Government management of the system ends after the main distribution channels. Individual farmers controlled the water onto their fields based on rigid schedules from long-established social and legal determinants. Groups of farmers in voluntary cooperation managed the watercourses between the government system and farmers' fields. In effect, the system's design and private farmers established the parameters of the efficiency and effectiveness of irrigation.

Water management was based largely on objectives and operational procedures dating back many decades and was inflexible and unresponsive to current needs for greater water use efficiency and high crop yields. Water use charges were less than operational and maintenance costs, even though rates more than doubled in the 1970s. Partly because of its low cost, farmers wasted water. Moreover, irrigated agricultural practices were traditional and primitive with little institutional advice, such as extension services and research. Some experts believed that drastic changes were needed in government policies and the legal and institutional framework affecting water management if water use was to improve and that effective changes could result in very large gains in agricultural output.

Substantial amounts of water were wasted in the irrigation system. The exact amounts had not been determined, but studies suggested that losses were considerably more than previously estimated and perhaps amounted to one-half of the water entering the system. Part of the waste resulted from seepages in the delivery system. Even greater amounts were probably lost as farmers used water whenever their turn came even if the water application might be detrimental to their crops. The attitude among nearly all farmers was that they should use water when available because it might not be available at the next scheduled turn. Moreover, farmers had little understanding of the most productive applications of water during crop-growing cycles because of the lack of research and extension services. As a result, improvements in the irrigation system have not raised yields and output as expected. Experts believed that some relatively minor institutional and inexpensive changes could increase the efficiency of the system but that other changes would require large investments and would only slowly produce results.

Drainage

The continuous expansion of the irrigation system over the past century significantly altered the hydrological balance of the Indus Basin. Seepage from the system and percolation from irrigated fields caused

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a rise in the water table, reaching crisis conditions for a substantial area. Around the turn of the century, the water table was usually more than 16 meters below the surface of the Indus Plain. A 1981 survey found the water table within about 3 meters of the surface in more than one-half of the cropped area in Sind and over one-third in the Punjab. In particular locations, the water table was much closer to the surface. Cropping was seriously affected over a wide area by poor drainage—waterlogging—and by accumulated salts in the soil.

Although some drainage began to be installed before World War II, development of the irrigation system generally paid little attention to the growing waterlogging and salinity problems. In 1959 a salinity control and reclamation project (SCARP) was started in a limited area, based on public tube wells, to draw down the water table and leach out accumulated salts near the surface by irrigating with this groundwater. By the early 1960s some 30 such projects had been started, which, when completed, would benefit nearly 6.3 million hectares. Financial constraints severely limited the installation of public tube wells, and by 1963 the program was substantially behind schedule. Moreover, many of the well pumps in place were not operable. By mid-1960 the government had completed about 11,050 tube wells. Private farmers, however, had installed about 180,000 tube wells (mostly small), mainly for irrigation purposes but also to lower the water table. The private wells probably pumped more than five times as much water as the public wells.

Officials were aware of the need for additional spending to prevent further deterioration of the existing situation. Between FY 1961 and FY 1963, operating and maintenance expenditures were increased 35 percent, and further increases were planned in the 1960s. Emphasis in the 1960s was on rehabilitation and maintenance of existing canals and watercourses, on-farm improvements, including some land leveling to conserve water, and work on drainage and salinity in priority areas. By 1960 emphasis had shifted to short-gestation projects, largely improving operation of the present irrigating system, in order to raise yields. Part of the funding would come from steady increases in water use fees; the intention was to raise water charges to beneficiaries to cover operating and maintenance costs by 1990. Realization of the full potential of the irrigation system would take considerable time and money in order to bring it up to modern standards.

Farm Ownership and Land Reform

At independence Pakistan was a country of many very small farms and a small number of very large estates. Distribution of landownership was badly skewed. Less than 1 percent of the farms held more than 25 percent of the agricultural land. Many owners of large holdings were absentee landlords, contributing little to production but extracting as much as possible from sharecroppers who actually farmed the land. At the other extreme, about 65 percent of the farmers held some 15 percent of the farmland in holdings of about two hectares or less.

Approximately one-half of the farmland was cultivated by tenants, including sharecroppers, most of whom had little security and few rights. An additional large number of landless rural inhabitants worked as agricultural laborers. Farm laborers and many tenants were extremely poor, uneducated, and undernourished, contrasting sharply with the wealth, status, and political power of the landed elite (see *Rural Society*, ch. 2).

Up to the twentieth century, tenant farmers were able to obtain land from landlords on relatively favorable terms. Increasingly in the 1900s, however, population growth led to fierce competition for land to till and to ever higher rental demands on the part of landlords. Payment of one-half the harvest as rent became common practice. In addition, tenants were often required to provide landlords with labor service.

After independence the country's political leaders recognized the need for more equitable ownership of farmland and security of tenancy. In the early 1950s the provincial governments attempted to eliminate some of the absentee landlords or rent collectors, but they had slight success in the face of strong opposition. Security of tenancy was also legislated in the provinces, but because of their ignorance and dependent position, tenant farmers benefited little. In fact, the reforms created an atmosphere of uncertainty in the countryside and intensified the animosity between wealthy landlords and small farmers and sharecroppers.

Accepting the recommendations of a special commission on the subject, General Mohammad Ayub Khan's government in January 1959 issued new land reform regulations, which had the stated aim of boosting agricultural output, promoting social justice, and ensuring security of tenure. A ceiling of about 200 hectares of irrigated land and 400 hectares of nonirrigated land was placed on individual ownership, compensation was paid to owners for land surrendered. Numerous exemptions, including title transfers to family members, limited the impact of the ceilings. A little less than 1 million hectares of land was surrendered, of which a little more than 250,000 hectares was sold to about 50,000 tenants. The land reform made no serious attempt to break up large estates or to lessen the power or privileges of the landed elite. The reform measure attempted to provide some security of tenure to tenants, consolidate existing holdings, and prevent fragmentation of farm plots. An average holding of about five hectares was considered necessary for a family's subsistence, and 20 to about 25 hectares was pronounced as a desirable "economic" holding.

In March 1972 the Bhutto regime announced further land reform measures, which became effective in 1973. The landownership ceiling was lowered to about five hectares of irrigated land and about 12 hectares of nonirrigated land, exceptions were limited to an additional 20 percent of land for owners having tractors and tube wells. The ceiling could also be exceeded for poor-quality land. Owners of excess land received no compensation, and beneficiaries were not charged for land

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distributed. Official statistics showed that by 1977 about 520,000 hectares had been surrendered, and nearly 245,000 hectares had been distributed to about 71,000 farmers.

The 1972 measure required landlords to pay all taxes, water charges, and costs of seeds and one-half of the costs of fertilizer and other inputs. It prohibited eviction of tenants as long as they cultivated the land and gave them first rights of purchase. Other regulations increased tenants' security of tenure and prescribed lower rent rates than existed.

Accompanying measures attempted to help small and medium-sized farmers. A 1972 banking reform act required a channeling of credit to these farmers with easy procedures to facilitate access of the mostly uneducated small farmers. In 1973 the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) began, in which governmental agencies were to cooperate and to coordinate activities in credit, supplies of inputs, extension services, storage, and marketing through numerous centers to be located to serve about 40 to 50 surrounding villages. These integrated service centers achieved very limited success, and many had reportedly ceased functioning by the late 1970s (see Government Policies, this ch.)

In 1977 the Bhutto regime further reduced ceilings on private ownership of farmland to about four hectares of irrigated and about eight hectares of nonirrigated land. In an additional measure, agricultural income became liable to taxation, although small farmers owning 10 hectares or less (the bulk of the farm population) were exempted. The military regime that ousted Bhutto neglected to implement the latest reforms. It remained law, but only as a paper reform.

The various efforts to alter the tenure system had some effect in the countryside, but their significance was difficult to measure with available data. The first agricultural census in 1960 and the most recent for 1980 reported the number of farms, as operational units, and their area. Between these years the number of farms declined by 17 percent, while their area decreased 4 percent, resulting in slightly larger farms (see table 10, Appendix). The decline in the number of farms was mostly confined to marginal farms of two hectares or less, which in 1980 were 34 percent of all farms, constituting 7 percent of the farm acreage. At the other extreme, the number of very large farms of 60 hectares or more remained at 14,000 in 1960 and 1980, although they had a diminished area by 1980. The number of farms between two and 10 hectares increased, as did their area. The Green Revolution, installations of private tube wells, and use of mechanization accounted for much of the shift away from very small farms toward mid-sized farms, as owners of the latter undertook cultivation instead of renting out part of their land.

Data on ownership of farmland were rarely published. The Bhutto regime compiled ownership data for 1971 and 1976. In the latter year, there were nearly 10.3 million owners (excluding Baluchistan), more than double the number in the early 1960s, and 2.5 times the number of farms in 1960. These owners in 1976 held 24.3 million hectares,

substantially more than the nearly 19 million hectares recorded as farmland in the 1980 agricultural census. Apparently about one-quarter of the owned land was not suited to farming. In 1976 nearly 71 percent of the owners had 2.5 hectares or less and possessed 25 percent of the land, an apparent increase in both numbers of owners and area over the early 1950s, although the data were not strictly comparable. In addition, 1.8 million owners (18 percent) having 2.5 to five hectares maintained about 5.2 million hectares (21 percent). Owners of large and very large holdings (over 10 hectares) comprised 4 percent of all owners and held 36 percent of the land, an apparently substantial decline in numbers and area since the early 1950s.

Land reform is an inflammatory and complex issue. Many observers believed that large landowners retained their power over small farmers and tenants in the early 1980s, even though their landholdings had diminished somewhat over the previous three decades. Tenancy continued on a large scale—probably more than one-half the farms rented at least part of land tilled. Fragmented holdings remained a substantial and widespread problem. Studies indicated that larger farms were usually less productive per hectare or unit of water than smaller ones. On the basis of productivity, as well as social justice, changes in ownership and tenure patterns appeared needed. In fact, high population growth and growing tension over access to land in the countryside made change inevitable. Some observers thought access to land could become an explosive issue in the 1980s.

Government Policies

For centuries agriculture was a major source of revenue for rulers. Land ownership and tenancy practices evolved partly to produce taxes almost as much as to produce food, particularly under British rule. After independence, government took an active role and adopted broader objectives for agricultural development, which increased public expenditures, while taxes on farmland relatively declined. By the late 1970s agriculture required transfers from other sectors of the economy, rather than contributing a surplus through the budget to the country's development.

Large government investments in major irrigation projects were required early to adjust to the partition of the subcontinent and creation of two riparian nations with conflicting interests over the waters of the Indus River. Government water charges to farmers, however, were insufficient to finance even inadequate maintenance of the irrigation system, let alone the huge capital expenditures.

The government gradually became deeply involved in management of the agricultural sector. By the 1970s it controlled producer prices of wheat, rice, sugarcane, and cotton through procurement and support programs. State-owned processing, marketing, and distribution companies handled major farm produce and key inputs, such as fertilizer, pesticides, high-yield seeds, tube well components, and tractors. Subsidized credit was channeled to small farmers. By the late 1970s many

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price distortions existed, which required large subsidies through the budget and frequently were disincentives to farm production.

After a period of rapid growth averaging about 6 percent a year in the late 1960s, largely reflecting the Green Revolution, agricultural expansion slowed to below 2 percent a year up to the mid-1970s, less than population growth. Adverse weather played a role, but unbalanced and ineffective policies and programs were also responsible for diminished growth. After taking over in 1977, the military regime focused considerable attention on the agriculture sector. A major study, assisted by a United Nations (UN) agency and the World Bank, of Indus Basin agriculture resulted in a revision of the government's agricultural policy.

In February 1980 the new National Agricultural Policy was announced to guide governmental programs and investments for much of the 1980s. Major elements of the new policy included shifting of investment and maintenance expenditures away from major new irrigation projects and toward optimizing use of the existing system; progressive adjustment of agricultural prices to reflect the real costs of inputs and provide production incentives to farmers, and gradual contraction of public activities, such as distribution of agricultural inputs and installation of tube wells, in favor of these and other operations by the private sector. In the late 1970s the government frequently adjusted prices of agricultural inputs and outputs to reduce the large budget subsidies required, but by 1980 many prices still differed significantly from international prices. In 1981 an Agricultural Prices Commission was established to provide officials with recommendations on prices for inputs and produce that would consider the effects on farm incomes and productivity, consumer prices and consumption, and the competitive position of Pakistan's agricultural products in world markets.

By 1983 the government had taken a number of actions implementing the new policy. Subsidies on pesticides were eliminated in the Punjab and Sind and soon would be in other provinces. Fertilizer prices were raised substantially, and the subsidy was expected to be eliminated in 1985. Private companies became partial suppliers of pesticides and fertilizer. Water charges were increased, but full recovery of operations and maintenance expenditures was not anticipated until about 1990. Agricultural credit was expanded, and extension services were upgraded. Prices paid to farmers for wheat were at about the international level, and those for cotton and rice were close to it.

The government reorganized the approach to rural development. Admitting that the IRDP and other efforts to enhance rural life had had only marginal success, the government attempted to enlist participation of rural inhabitants through elections in 1979 of a three-tiered series of councils to guide rural development. These councils would express local needs, down to groups of about 10 villages, whether they be for roads to reach markets, schools, health care, or aids to increased farm productivity. The IRDP integrated service centers (about

600 for the country's some 45,000 villages) remained the main channel for rural development with banks, post offices, schools, extension services, representatives of highway departments, and other offices and supplying organizations. The Zia government pledged a determined effort to improve the infrastructure, amenities, and productivity of the countryside.

By 1983 the impact of the government's new policy on agricultural production and yields had not been large, partly because of budget constraints and commitments on earlier projects. Experts approved the new policy emphasis but questioned whether implementation was sufficient. Agronomists have long noted Pakistan's low yields even though cropping was predominantly based on irrigation; the country's agricultural potential was rated high if timely and adequate supplies of high-yield seeds, fertilizers, and water were available along with sufficient credit and other supporting services, such as farmers' increased knowledge and use of improved cultivation practices. Supplies of inputs fell short of farmers' needs. Extension services, although upgraded, remained inadequate. By 1983 coordination and implementation of the new policy needed strengthening.

Low direct taxation and a relative decline of revenues from the agriculture sector contributed to the government's difficulties in establishing the necessary infrastructure and institutions in the countryside. A tax on land is one of the earliest sources of revenue used by rulers. By independence an elaborate system of assessments and collection of land taxes existed, although with significant regional variations. Progressive surcharges in some provinces or districts provided some flexibility, but the land tax was rigid, and assessments did not adequately reflect the increasing value of land, rising crop prices, or changes in the land's productivity. Recommendations by committees studying taxation to institute a tax on agricultural incomes were made before the mid-1970s to achieve greater revenues and to make the agricultural sector finance a larger part of the expenditures that benefited farmers, but the recommendations were not adopted. Although indirect taxes on agriculture provided some revenues, direct taxes on farmland, including various cesses and surcharges, fell from 1.5 percent of the nation's agricultural income in FY 1965 to 0.4 percent in FY 1979. The tax base in agriculture shriveled drastically. Provinces collected and retained land revenues.

In late 1975 Bhutto announced the first major change to the land revenue system, which applied to the whole country. Farms of about five hectares or less of irrigated or 10 hectares or less of nonirrigated land would be exempt from payment of the land tax, but farms above these limits would become subject to progressive surcharges, which could reach 200 percent of the land tax in some areas. The changes applied to FY 1976. The measure freed the bulk of farmers from land-tax payments. Net land-tax revenues for FY 1976 in the Punjab declined by about one-quarter, but Sind had a net gain of about one-fifth because of the impact of surcharges.

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In preparation for the 1977 elections, the Bhutto government announced the reduced ceiling on landholdings and the elimination of the land-tax system. The income tax, with allowances for costs of production, replaced the land tax, but landholders owning up to 10 hectares of irrigated or 20 hectares of nonirrigated land were exempted from all direct taxes. These measures were to become effective in FY 1977. Apparently, little study or preparation preceded the announcement, and the exemption of farmers holding up to 10 hectares of irrigated land appeared excessive.

After the coup in July 1977, the military regime canceled imposition of the tax on agricultural income. The land-tax system was reinstated in the provinces, but landholders owning up to 10 hectares of irrigated or 20 hectares of nonirrigated land were not subject to the tax. Basic rates before 1976 were applied, except that progressive surcharges rose more rapidly, amounting to 400 percent of the basic rate in Sind for landholders having over 20 hectares of irrigated land. Although the exemptions applied to the bulk of farmers and were judged too large by critics, the surcharges on large holdings raised net land revenue collections somewhat. Large estate owners protested, and a committee was appointed in 1978 to look into the rate problems.

In 1977 Zia also asked a group of Islamic scholars to recommend measures for an Islamic economic system. In June 1980 an ordinance was promulgated that, among other things, instituted Ushr, effective March 1983. Ushr is a tax of 5 percent on the produce of land, allowing some deductions for costs of production, to be paid in cash by landowner or leaseholder. Ushr replaced the land tax. Self-assessment by farmers is checked by local groups if a farmer fails to file or makes a very low estimate. Proceeds of Ushr go to the local Zakat Council for helping the needy in that locality (see Public Finance, this ch.). Collections of Ushr did not begin until mid-1983.

Ushr is in effect an income tax. It should generate considerable revenue, although information on collections was unavailable in late 1983. The retention of Ushr funds in the area collected meant that rich farm areas would have more to distribute even if there were few needy. It was unclear what effect the lack of direct taxation of the agricultural sector would have on the national and provincial budgets, but it was certain that national government programs to develop agriculture and improve village life could benefit from additional funding. Between FY 1978 and FY 1982 government subsidies to agriculture substantially exceeded direct revenues from the sector; for all but one year of this period, subsidies were roughly double the revenues collected.

Cropping Patterns and Production

Crops accounted for 70 percent of the value added in agriculture in FY 1982. The production index of all crops increased an average of 3.3 percent a year between FY 1949 and FY 1983, barely above population growth. Crop production stagnated between 1950 and 1980, increasing only about 1.1 percent a year. In the late 1980s the crop production

index spurted up, reflecting use of high-yield seeds, only to level off in the early 1970s. Between FY 1978 and FY 1982 the index rose by 5.2 percent a year; the improvement was the result of largely favorable weather and policy changes.

In 1983 farming methods were generally traditional and primitive, and most farms were small and fragmented. Hand labor and draft animals were common on small farms. Use of tractors grew rapidly after the early 1980s but mainly on larger farms. In the early 1980s only about 40 percent of the cultivated area was plowed by tractors; the remainder relied on draft animals. Use of fertilizers, high-yield seeds, and irrigation was widespread, but according to agronomists, yields remained substantially below levels in other countries because of traditional cultivation practices. In spite of extensive irrigation, farm output remained considerably influenced by weather conditions for most crops.

Food Crops

The bulk of cropping was concentrated on the production of food. In FY 1983 about 12 million hectares of food crops were planted, about 3 million hectares more than in 1980. Food grains accounted for the bulk of planting, amounting to nearly 11.1 million hectares in FY 1983.

Wheat is the staple food for the bulk of the population, eaten most frequently in unleavened bread called *chapatis*. As the staple food, wheat was by far the most important crop. In FY 1983 wheat was planted on 7.2 million hectares, which produced about 12.3 million tons (see table 11, table 12, Appendix). Wheat acreage increased 56 percent between FY 1961 and FY 1983, while production increased 222 percent, reflecting the one-time gain from introducing high-yield seeds. By the early 1980s high-yielding wheat seeds were planted on more than 75 percent of the area and above 95 percent in irrigated areas. Nonetheless, yields were substantially below countries with similar growing conditions, averaging only about 1.7 tons per hectare in FY 1982.

Wheat production as a staple food was closely watched by officials. The retail price was subsidized with distribution partly through ration shops. Wheat procurement by government agencies amounted to about 3 million tons in FY 1983. Through much of the 1970s, imports of over 1 million tons of wheat or flour annually were frequently required to meet consumption needs. Imports on such a scale added to the balance of payments pressures and resulted in government efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in grain. By the early 1980s small quantities of wheat were exported to Iran with considerable fanfare, although initially Pakistan remained a net importer. A record harvest of 12.3 million tons in FY 1983 (preliminary estimate) should allow the country to become a net exporter of a small amount. How long self-sufficiency would last was not clear, but critics questioned the emphasis on using irrigated land for wheat when other crops of higher value could be grown.

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Rice was the other major food grain. In FY 1983 the area planted in rice was just under 2 million hectares, and production was estimated (preliminary) at nearly 3.4 million tons. Between FY 1961 and FY 1982 acreage increased 67 percent, while production rose by 233 percent, reflecting the use of high-yield seeds and other inputs. By the late 1970s Pakistan was usually exporting around 1 million tons of rice, making it a major export product and placing the country among the leading rice exporting nations. A state-owned export corporation carried out foreign rice sales.

Other important food grains were millet, sorghum, corn, and barley. Corn, although remaining a minor crop, gradually increased in area and production after independence, partly at the expense of the other minor food grains. Chick-peas, called gram in Pakistan, were the main nongrain food crop in area and production. A number of other foods, including fruits and vegetables, were grown, although area and production figures were unavailable.

Cash Crops

In 1982 cash crops occupied 3.6 million hectares. Cotton was the most important commercial crop. In the late 1970s cotton production constituted about 3 percent of GDP, and cotton textile manufacturing accounted for over 30 percent of industrial employment. In FY 1981 exports of raw cotton and textiles were 36 percent of total exports. Cotton acreage approximately doubled between FY 1960 and FY 1982, increasing from 1.1 million hectares to 2.2 million hectares. Production over the same period increased from 220,000 tons to 748,000 tons. Nearly all of the cotton land was irrigated, and most of the cottonseed consisted of an upland variety (an American-type cotton). The government certified cottonseed and allowed only one variety to be planted in a geographical area to maintain the purity of seeds. Pakistan's yields were among the lowest in the world, and cotton was subject to many pests that were difficult to control because of widely dispersed small fields. Cotton was handpicked.

Other cash crops included sugarcane, tobacco, and rapeseed (not used for vegetable oil). Sugarcane acreage and production showed a sharp climb after independence. By the early 1980s Pakistan produced a large surplus of sugar at costs substantially above world prices. A decline of sugarcane production appeared desirable. Except for some oil from cottonseeds, the country was dependent on imported vegetable oil, the amounts of which rose rapidly in the 1970s and required precious foreign currency. By the 1980s introduction and experimentation with oilseed cultivation was under way. Soybeans and sunflower seeds appeared suitable, but production was still negligible by 1983.

Livestock

Livestock provided the draft power available to most farmers as well as food, fuel, manure, wool, and hides. Livestock contributed 28 percent of the value added by agriculture in FY 1982. In Baluchistan raising sheep and goats on the arid rangeland was an important source



Terraced rice fields, Swat Valley



Camel herd near Dera Ismail Khan

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of cash to a considerable part of the population, although many areas were overgrazed.

In FY 1983 the livestock population was estimated at 16.1 million cattle, 12.4 million water buffalo, 27.7 million donkeys, and a little over 1 million camels, horses, and mules. Except for poultry, the livestock population exhibited gradual growth in the 1970s. Production of some animal products in FY 1983 was estimated at 9.7 million tons of milk, 464,000 tons of beef, 406,000 tons of mutton, 75,000 tons of poultry meat, 4.2 billion eggs, 42,700 tons of wool, and about 34 million hides and skins.

The country faced a continuous shortage of livestock products because of the limited amount of feed and grazing areas. Moreover, little attention had been given to animal husbandry. Improved breeds could increase meat and milk production. The marketing system was inadequate, and producers received little incentive to expand production. In FY 1983 the estimated per capita availability for the year from local sources was 68 kilograms of milk, 10.6 kilograms of meat, and 47 eggs. Little wonder that the diet of many in the population was deficient in protein.

Commercial chicken farming was exceptional in that production using modern methods had expanded rapidly since the 1960s. By the early 1980s there were some 2,250 commercial poultry farms, which were assisted by two research institutes. Although many farmers raised some poultry, the commercial chicken farms accounted for most of the increased availability of eggs and poultry. In FY 1972 about 14,000 tons of poultry meat and 14 million eggs were produced, compared with 75,000 tons of poultry meat and 4.2 billion eggs in FY 1983.

Forestry

Pakistan is extremely deficient in forest resources, and the forested area remained static in recent decades at about 3.1 million hectares. Over the centuries population pressure, extension of cultivation, and overgrazing destroyed much of the native forest, resulting in serious problems of soil erosion, silting of streams, flooding, and a shortage of timber, firewood, and other forest products. Much of the forested area was in the mountainous north, where coniferous trees predominated. Exploitation and even forest management were handicapped by the remoteness of the area. The rest of the forests were spread around the country, including some irrigated tree plantations in the Indus Basin. In FY 1982 government-controlled forests produced 143,000 cubic meters of timber and 451,000 cubic meters of firewood, compared with an estimated demand of about 2 million cubic meters of timber and 16.4 million cubic meters of firewood. Imports filled the gap for timber, while cutting on private land of trees and scrub met part of the need for firewood. Limited afforestation programs were under way.

Fishing

Fishing is a minor activity, contributing only 1 percent to the value added by agriculture in FY 1982. Nonetheless, it had increased by

more than 150 percent in the preceding decade. The fish catch increased from 173,000 tons in 1970 to 301,000 tons in FY 1982. The bulk of the catch, about 260,000 tons, was taken offshore in the Arabian Sea. Much of it was exported, earning US\$55 million, because not many Pakistanis eat fish. Prawns and shrimp were a significant portion of the catch. Sea bass, tuna, bonito, shad, and shark were the important fish caught. Some modernization of the fishing fleet and shore facilities occurred during the 1970s. The country was considered to have a large potential in fishing, reportedly as high as 14 million tons a year if sufficient investments and market expansion occurred.

Industry

At partition only some 5 percent of the industrial facilities of British India that approached large scale were located in what became Pakistan. The country was also desperately short of management personnel, skilled labor, financial resources and institutions, and energy sources. Three small hydroelectric power stations provided limited electricity to a few urban areas. Firewood and dung were the main sources of energy; commercial energy supplied only about 30 percent of the energy consumed. The country started with virtually no industrial base.

Energy

In the nearly four decades since independence, the economy has made considerable progress in the transformation from a wood-burning base to modern energy sources—a process that took centuries in many nations. In 1983, however, the country still had a long way to go. Wood, dung, and bagasse (the woody residue from crushing sugarcane) furnished from 40 to 50 percent of the total energy consumed. Some localities had been denuded of firewood, forcing the local population toward commercial energy, such as kerosine or charcoal. The country's commercial energy sources provided only one-tenth the average per capita consumption in the rest of the world and only one-half the average in developing countries. By the 1980s Pakistan had shortages of primary energy that constrained economic development and failed to meet consumer demand. The constraint was expected to last through much of the 1990s, if not longer.

The country's supply of commercial primary energy slightly more than doubled between FY 1972 and FY 1982. Between FY 1977 and FY 1982 the supply of commercial primary energy increased 9.1 percent a year. In FY 1982 domestic natural gas supplied 41 percent of the commercial energy supply; oil, 37 percent; hydroelectricity, 16 percent; coal, 6 percent; and nuclear power, 0.2 percent. In FY 1982 manufacturing (including the production of fertilizer) was the largest commercial energy consumer (36 percent), followed by transportation (20 percent), power (16 percent), residential (13 percent), government (7 percent), agriculture (5 percent), and commerce (3 percent). Pakistan was self-sufficient for about two-thirds of its primary commercial energy needs, but the increases in petroleum prices made its one-third de-

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pendence on foreign sources costly. Between FY 1973 and FY 1982 petroleum imports increased from 3.1 million to 6 million tons, and the cost of these imports rose from about US\$62 million to nearly US\$1.7 billion.

The country's deficiency in primary energy sources was confined almost entirely to crude oil and some refined products. In FY 1982 some 92 percent of petroleum consumption (about 6.5 million tons) was imported. Domestic production of crude oil began in 1915 near Rawalpindi but never became large. Exploration was not encouraged before the mid-1970s, and the fields discovered were small. In 1983 estimated proved-recoverable reserves were about 70 million barrels (about 10 million tons), a sharp reduction from estimates published in the late 1970s. An additional important field, Dhodak, was believed to have nearly three times existing reserves, but the reservoir had not been fully determined. Crude oil and natural gas had been found in a variety of other locations (some during the 1970s), stimulating hopes for additional major discoveries. The combination of favorable prospects and changes in government policies to encourage foreign oil companies accelerated exploration drilling in the late 1970s. In the early 1980s at least nine foreign companies, plus Pakistan's government-owned oil company, were engaged in exploration, but by 1983 some foreign companies were pulling out after unsuccessful drilling. Important discovery of oil or gas would have a significant impact on the country's energy balance and development policy. Lacking a discovery, economic development would likely be constrained by the late 1980s and later.

Pakistan's crude oil production rose from 99,000 tons in FY 1950 to 469,000 tons in FY 1970. Production then began to decline, falling to 321,000 tons in FY 1975. Development of new fields accelerated production, which reached 522,000 tons (3.96 million barrels) in FY 1982, a 63-percent increase over FY 1975. Production was expected to continue to increase for a few years, the pace depending on oil field development. If recent or new discoveries prove to be large, the country might achieve a period of self-sufficiency by the late 1980s.

In 1983 Pakistan had three refineries—two near Karachi to process imported crude and one near Rawalpindi to process domestic output. Total capacity was 5.1 million tons a year, with plans for expansion to 6.7 million tons a year. Consumer demand was largest for middle distillates—kerosine, for home lighting and heating, and diesel oil, mostly for the transportation system. This consumer demand was encouraged by government pricing, which kept prices low relative to import prices and to other products, such as gasoline, which partly covered the subsidies. Refinery output was unable to meet demand for middle distillates, although additional facilities for such products were scheduled to come on stream in 1984. To meet the deficiency of particular products, growing and expensive imports were required, which reached nearly 1.6 million tons of refined products in FY 1982. In addition, the imbalance of products required costly handling, stor-

age, and transportation of various products in the process of import and export. In the early 1960s Pakistan encountered maldistribution and acute shortages of middle distillates. The bulk of petroleum products were distributed by rail, some were transported by truck, and a little via pipelines. In 1963 a multipurpose pipeline was under construction between Multan and Karachi to bring crude south and send products north.

After independence the large Sui natural gas field was discovered in Baluchistan. Additional gas fields were subsequently found, providing the country with a valuable energy source. Associated natural gas was also recovered from crude oil production. Recoverable natural gas reserves at the beginning of 1963 were 441.8 billion cubic meters. In FY 1962 production amounted to 9.3 billion cubic meters, compared with 1.3 billion cubic meters in FY 1970. About 80 percent of gas production in FY 1962 was from the Sui field, but production from some other fields was growing in the early 1960s. Since production began in the Sui field in 1955, reservoir pressure has been declining. In 1963 a 10-year program to install field compression facilities was started to maintain production. Development of other gas fields had progressed slowly and less than planned. Some fields were too small while others had poor-quality gas, both of which made development uneconomical up to 1963. But observers thought the current shortage of gas and electricity in 1963 could have been avoided by more adequate planning and policy implementation.

Even with substantial gas reserves, demand exceeded supply in the early 1960s and by a substantial margin by 1963. In FY 1962 natural gas consumers consisted of electric power, 29 percent, fertilizer, 27 percent, cement industry, 9 percent, other industry, 24 percent, residential, 9 percent, and commerce, 3 percent. Substantial load shedding became necessary in the early 1960s, which primarily affected the electrical power supply and industrial production. In 1963 critics in the press charged the government with lagging development of gas fields, which had caused considerable shutdown of manufacturing plants. By 1963 large investments were required, which would not result in a greater supply until the mid-1960s at the earliest. By late 1963 the full extent of government investment in gas production facilities was not clear, but consultants predicted that substantial continuing investments and development of new fields would be necessary to avoid gas shortages, particularly affecting industry, for the remainder of the 1960s.

Natural gas pipelines, in which the government owned controlling shares, linked the Sui field and a few others to the main population centers and the major crude oil production areas. The southern pipeline led from Sui to Hyderabad and Karachi, and a spur supplied Quetta. The northern pipeline branches at Faisalabad. One branch went a little farther north of Lahore, the other branch was connected to the crude oil fields and supplied gas to Islamabad, Peshawar, and some nearby

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towns. In 1983 additions and improvements were under way on the gas pipeline system to extend it and raise capacity.

Pakistan had substantial reserves of coal, about 640 million tons in 1963, but most of it had a low calorific value and a high ash and sulfur content. Production in FY 1982 amounted to almost 1.8 million tons. Government officials encouraged greater coal production and switching to coal for purposes such as thermal power generation and cement production, but in the early 1980s coal was largely used in brick kilns. Coal production increased slowly after independence and declined as a share of commercial energy sources. Government-owned mines accounted for only about one-fifth of coal output in the 1980s. The bulk of production was from small, privately owned mines whose owners generally lacked funds, expertise, and interest in expanding output. Coal was distributed largely by rail, which was expensive, and suffered from a shortage of coal cars.

Hydroelectric power was an important domestic primary energy source. The country's economic hydroelectric potential was estimated at around 10,000 megawatts. A large number of additional sites with as large a potential existed in the mountainous north, but the difficulty of access and the high cost of transmission to the populous south made development a distant prospect at best. In March 1983 the country had 4,627 megawatts of installed generating capacity, of which 2,547 megawatts were hydroelectric generators. Nearly all of the hydrogenerators were located at two large multipurpose dams completed since independence. In 1963 Tarbela Dam had 1,400 megawatts of installed capacity, and Mangla Dam had 800 megawatts, both were to be expanded substantially during the 1980s. Minor additions to capacity were also scheduled for small hydroelectric plants. Officials had little choice but to install more generators to existing dams (up to the maximum) in order to avoid the more costly alternative sources of energy. In 1983 a major dam project was being studied, but it would not add to the electrical supply until the 1990s.

Large seasonal fluctuations in river flows posed a serious handicap to hydroelectric power generation. Irrigation received priority at the country's two large dams, contributing to extreme variations in hydro-power generation. Years of low rainfall also seriously curtailed hydroelectricity output. As a result, considerable thermal electric capacity had to be built as backup to the hydroelectric plants for low-water periods and to supply areas not reached by hydroelectricity. This created the anomaly of about two-thirds or more of power generation coming from hydroelectric plants in recent years, although hydro capacity was not much greater than the capacity of thermal units. Thermal generators were about 98 percent gas-fired and about 1 percent oil. Even so, adequate backup was not available from thermal units during the early 1980s to provide power to meet demand during low periods of river flow.

After the late 1970s considerable improvement was made in transmission facilities. By 1983 a grid connected generators and urban cen-


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The Economy

ters of the more populous areas, largely in the Punjab and Sind. Installations of high-voltage transmission lines and other facilities helped reduce power losses from 38 percent in FY 1977 to 30 percent in FY 1982. Power loss was still high, however, which was partly attributed to theft and inadequate metering. About one-fifth of the population had access to the electricity grid. An active rural electrification program nearly doubled the number of villages with electricity between FY 1977 and FY 1983, reaching a total of over 14,000 villages (out of about 45,000) in the latter year.

Pakistan officials moved slowly toward nuclear power. In 1954 the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was formed. Subsequently, a nuclear research institute with a small 5-megawatt research reactor (financed and supplied by the United States) was established, and various schools and facilities were added to train nuclear scientists and engineers, although some were sent abroad for training. By 1983 the country's nuclear facilities, programs, and personnel were generally considered limited for development of nuclear power or weapons, however. By the late 1970s exploration had discovered some ores containing about 400 tons of uranium, but only about one-half of the reserves were considered economically exploitable.

In 1965 officials contracted with Canada for the supply of a 125-megawatt pressurized, heavy-water reactor, which in 1972 became operational near Karachi. This was Pakistan's only nuclear power plant in 1983, and its operating record was poor. In 1983 it was generating at about 30 percent of capacity.

Considerable ambiguity and controversy surrounded Pakistan's nuclear power plans. As early as 1972 officials indicated a second nuclear power reactor would be installed. Not until 1983 were plans firmed and contract negotiations reportedly begun. The plant was to be a 900-megawatt project to be completed in the 1990s at Chashma, about 240 kilometers southwest of Islamabad. France was reportedly the likely supplier.

Meanwhile, the sharp escalation of petroleum prices in the 1970s, India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974, and other developments affected Pakistan's development plans and national security considerations. In the early 1970s and particularly by the mid 1970s, officials began various negotiations for phases of a full nuclear fuel cycle—facilities and technology for reprocessing spent reactor fuel, uranium enrichment, and fabrication of reactor fuel. This caused alarm in a number of countries, because such capabilities would open the possibilities of producing nuclear weapons. In 1976 Canada stopped all nuclear assistance to Pakistan, including fuel for the reactor it had supplied, presumably the reason why Pakistan's nuclear power plant operated below capacity in the early 1980s. The United States suspended military and economic aid to Pakistan in 1979 because the country apparently had acquired the technology and equipment for uranium enrichment. By the early 1980s, there was considerable speculation

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whether Pakistan had acquired facilities and technology that would permit the manufacture of at least a few nuclear weapons.

Some development of renewal energy sources was undertaken, primarily for rural areas and particularly those so isolated they would not have electricity in the foreseeable future. The aim was to upgrade village life while lowering urban migration, reduce reliance on firewood, and provide power to pump water for irrigation where possible. By mid-1983 some 1,200 biogas structures had been installed to produce methane gas for heating and to produce additional fertilizers. A small family biogas plant used human and animal waste (from three or four water buffalo, for example) to produce around 2.8 to 4.2 cubic meters of gas a day for heating and lighting. A larger version served a number of homes or a village. Construction costs were too high for most villagers unless the government underwrote installation. Experimental solar and wind power generators were installed in various provinces and regions, mostly with foreign assistance.

Some of Pakistan's energy shortages in the early 1980s resulted from government pricing policies during the 1970s and earlier. Wellhead prices for gas and crude oil tended to discourage exploration and development, although improvements had been made by 1983. Refinery prices of petroleum products reflected costs up to 1973, but after that, government price fixing discouraged adjustment of refinery output and encouraged consumption of products in short supply. Natural gas prices to consumers were set very low as an incentive to use this domestic energy source, which encouraged consumption while discouraging production. Although natural gas prices were raised after 1973, they remained at about one-fourth the export price of fuel oil in 1983, which was a substitute fuel for some industries. Prices of other petroleum products were raised during the 1970s, on several occasions provoking riots. By 1983 the government was attempting to adjust the various energy prices to eliminate distortions, but it had to move slowly because of the adverse impact on the bulk of the population with low incomes. Officials did not anticipate elimination of all distortions during the 1980s.

Formation of an adequate long-term energy policy was handicapped by the institutional structure as well as by the distortions in the prices of energy. Since March 1977 one ministry has had jurisdiction over hydrocarbons and natural resources, while another has had jurisdiction over electric power and water. Bureaucratic struggles have followed. In 1983 the government began long-term energy planning with the help of foreign consultants. The aim was to develop accurate trends of demand for various forms of energy and to evaluate the most appropriate ways of increasing supply, taking into consideration what energy prices should be. The government wanted a realistic basis for determining energy investment priorities, a task that had been postponed for several years.

Mining and Quarrying

Exploration of the country's mineral resources has barely started. In FY 1983 mining and quarrying contributed only about 1 percent of GDP, although this was about double the share a decade earlier. The increase was largely the result of increased gas and crude oil production. Slow development of other mining was partly the result of inadequate mapping and exploration and the difficulty of access and lack of infrastructure where exploitable minerals were found. Other constraints included the absence of risk capital, the large capital requirements of most mining projects, an inadequate institutional framework, and limited demand for such products from domestic industries. Private investors, including foreign companies, can obtain concessions for mineral extraction.

A number of minerals have been discovered. Officials reported large reserves of chromite, over 430 million tons of iron ore, 74 million tons of bauxite, 412 million tons of copper, 21,000 tons of antimony, large reserves of molybdenum, 800,000 tons of sulfur, and large quantities of limestone, marble, sand, rock salt, and clays for ceramics. This was only a partial list. Much of the mineral wealth was in Baluchistan. Some iron-ore deposits reportedly were of good quality for use in the country's new steel plant, but in 1983 iron ore was not mined, and supplies were imported. Chromite was the major mineral mined and exported, but low international demand kept exports substantially below the early 1970s. A number of public companies were responsible for extraction and sale of minerals.

The Saindak Integrated Mineral Project was a major mining development effort under way in 1983. Located in Baluchistan, the project area contained three separate large deposits of copper ore, iron ore, sulfur, gold, silver, and molybdenum. In 1983 the estimated worth of the minerals in reserves was US\$9.3 billion, and the value of annual production when the project was completed was estimated at US\$130 million (in 1983 dollars). Total cost of the project was US\$400 million. The state-owned Resource Development Corporation, formed in 1974 to develop the Saindak discoveries, had offers under consideration in 1983 from foreign firms for equity participation.

Manufacturing

Nearly all of the country's manufacturing capacity has been installed since partition. The area that became Pakistan was almost completely a supplier of agricultural products that were processed in India or elsewhere under British rule. Local small-scale processing and cottage industries were about all that existed before partition.

The pace of industrialization has been remarkable. During the 1950s manufacturing expanded at about 16 percent a year and during the first half of the 1960s at around 11 percent a year. The pace slowed to under 7 percent a year in the last half of the 1960s. Between FY 1970 and FY 1977 the index of manufacturing output increased an average of only 2.3 percent a year. Between FY 1977 and FY 1982 the index

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rose an average of 9.9 percent a year. Manufacturing output grew about 8.3 percent in FY 1983 on the basis of preliminary data. Although the country achieved rapid industrialization, the variations in rates of growth reflected the impact of numerous factors. There were hints that the resumption of substantial growth of manufacturing after 1977 might be short-lived.

Diminishing trade with India following partition, and its termination in 1949 when Pakistan refused to devalue its currency along with the British pound sterling provided a powerful stimulus to industrialization into the 1960s because of an overvalued Pakistan rupee. Governmental policy measures provided low-interest loans, liberal tax incentives, import licenses for machinery, and restrictions on imports of manufactured consumer goods to spur industrialization. Curbs on labor and low prices for basic necessities helped keep wage costs down, while cheap raw materials, particularly cotton and jute, added to the profitability of manufacturing activity. Government investment in infrastructure facilities encouraged private industrial investment. The government also built some large plants, some of which were sold to private investors after their profitability had been proved, thereby exempting the private sector from risk taking in such cases. In the first half of the 1960s massive infusions of foreign aid to industrial projects offset the declining importance of factors dominant during the 1950s. A favorable atmosphere stimulated industrial investment and production up to the mid-1960s.

After the mid-1960s the atmosphere changed, and the pace of industrialization slowed considerably. Much less foreign industrial aid became available after the 1965 war with India. Domestic manufacturing had substantial excess capacity. Local manufacture of substitutes for imported consumer goods encountered the limits of domestic demand, which was greatly reduced when the East Wing became Bangladesh. Extensive protection from foreign competition produced few industries capable of turning to export sales. The nationalizations under the Bhutto regime caused private industrial investment to fall sharply, and public investment failed to compensate. The major devaluation of the rupee in 1972 greatly altered costs and prices for Pakistani industrialists.

After 1977 Zia's government attempted to encourage resumption of private investment in the manufacturing sector. Several of the nationalized plants were returned to private ownership. In 1979 an order called the Protection of Rights in Industrial Property Order was issued, setting forth limited conditions under which industrial property could be nationalized and the procedures for ensuring adequate compensation to former owners. The area of public industrial monopolies was defined, and little manufacturing was reserved for exclusive public ownership. A new financial institution was formed to facilitate financing of private industrial investments. A stable and expanding series of fiscal and financial incentives, some of which were targeted for specific industries or geographical areas, was provided to spur private investors.



Carpet workers, Karachi
Courtesy Kay Muldoon, WORLD BANK

The efforts were partially successful. By FY 1982 private investment in manufacturing in real terms had increased by nearly three times over the low point in FY 1975, but private investment (in constant prices) was still barely above the level of 1971. Public investment, however, had been falling faster. Total real investment in industry fell about one-third between FY 1978 and FY 1982. Unless private investment became more responsive, there was a threat to the modernization and growth of the manufacturing sector in the immediate future.

Industrialization in Pakistan has meant primarily the installation of large-scale manufacturing plants to fill the void that existed at partition. By the early 1980s large-scale manufacturing contributed over 80 percent of the value added by manufacturing and accounted for more than 90 percent of total investment in the sector. But by their nature, large-scale plants tended to be capital intensive. Employment in large-scale manufacturing was less than 3 percent of the labor force and had failed to grow fast enough to absorb an increasing part of the annual additions to the total labor force. The Census of Manufacturing Industries for FY 1976 (the latest available in late 1983) showed 3,248 large-scale manufacturing establishments (employing 10 or more workers) employing daily an average of 508,600 workers, a gross value of production of Rs30.7 billion and a value added of almost Rs11 billion. Textile manufacturing was by far the most important industry, accounting for about 45 percent of employment and for one-quarter of the number of establishments and of the value added (see Table 13, Appendix). Food processing was another major industry, although chemicals, machinery and metal products were gaining in importance.

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The rest of manufacturing, which might be called small scale, provided about 85 percent of industrial employment but less than 30 percent of the value added by the sector. Definitions of small-scale industry, however, differed over time and differed between government organizations. Moreover, authorities had little hard information about small-scale industry, using instead assumptions and estimates about developments. There was broad agreement, nonetheless, that small-scale manufacturing had a large role to play in the economy in terms of production as well as employment. Such industry was widely dispersed in rural and urban areas, relied primarily on local materials and machinery, and produced a broad range of needed products at affordable prices. Authorities had stressed for years the intent to help small industry with credit, technical assistance, and other aids, the need to boost small-scale industry was repeated in the Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1978-83. In the mid-1980s it remained to be seen whether government policy provided small-scale manufacturing more favorable treatment rather than lavishing nearly all the attention on large-scale industry as in the past.

Before 1972 public sector manufacturing was quite limited. The nationalizations under Bhutto plus the growth of government investment in large-scale manufacturing greatly increased the role of the public sector, particularly for important products such as fertilizers, cement, vegetable oil, petroleum products, and iron and steel. Management and efficiency in many public corporations were far from desirable, however. In 1977 a commission was formed to recommend ways to improve performance. In 1979 public manufacturing plants were regrouped. In 1983 some seven large holding companies and a few ministries managed more than 80 large-scale industrial plants. Public sector corporations employed probably more than 65,000 workers.

After 1977 overall performance of public sector manufacturing plants improved, but considerable variation existed among individual operating units. Managerial autonomy and flexibility increased. Raising of prices for many important commodities reduced some of the financial difficulties that had handicapped numerous public enterprises. Several unprofitable plants were closed or sold. Nonetheless, in 1983 public manufacturing suffered from the loss of qualified managers, technicians, and skilled workers (particularly to overseas employment), low productivity, and weak financial structures.

Until the late 1980s more than one-half of all industry was concentrated in Sind, primarily near Karachi; most of the remainder was in the Punjab. Government policy, as well as real difficulties in the rest of the country—such as lack of infrastructure, distance from markets and financial and administrative centers, and scarcity of skilled workers—accounted for the geographical concentration. In the 1970s more industry located in the Punjab, and by the early 1980s it was about as industrialized as Sind. Government investments and incentives to pri-

vate investors resulted in greater industrial development in the rest of the country, but in the early 1980s Sind and Punjab provinces probably accounted for over 90 percent of industrial output. By 1983 a free-trade zone of some 81 hectares had been established near Karachi to entice export-processing industries to locate free from domestic taxes and levies.

By 1983 Pakistan had established a diversified industrial base, manufacturing a range of goods including consumer items, chemicals, iron and steel products, transportation equipment, and some heavy engineering machinery and machine tools. In 1983, for example, annual cement capacity was about 5 million tons, sugar refining nearly 1 million tons, vegetable oil 561,000 tons, and fertilizers about 2.7 million tons, making the country self-sufficient in sugar refining and fertilizers and nearly so in cement. In FY 1982 production of sugar was 1.3 million tons, cement, 3.7 million tons, soda ash, 107,000 tons, sulfuric acid, 59,000 tons, caustic soda, 40,500 tons, fertilizers, 1.9 million tons, and mild steel products, 587,000 tons.

The country's most important manufacturing industry, textiles, faced considerable difficulties in the 1970s. Reduced foreign demand and greater competition from other exporting countries were difficulties beyond Pakistani control that affected production. Pakistan's cotton textile industry consisted of large-scale plants (in both the public and the private sectors) and considerable cottage industry. A number of large-scale mills had failed to modernize and keep pace with technological innovations in the rest of the world. Aging equipment and poor labor relations contributed to falling productivity. Output of cotton cloth in FY 1982 was less than one-half that in FY 1971. After a study by consultants to revive the industry, the government in 1980 halted approval of new mills, some "sick" mills were closed or sold, and modernization of existing facilities was given priority. In 1983 the country had 4.2 million spindles and over 2,400 looms in large-scale plants, which produced 430,200 tons of cotton yarn and 325 million square meters of cotton cloth. Cottage spinning and weaving expanded rapidly in the 1970s, producing for domestic and export markets. In the early 1980s cottage weaving had more than twice as many looms as the large-scale plants, although production was not nearly as high.

In late 1983 the country's only integrated iron and steel plant, located near Karachi, was more than 90 percent completed. Full production of 1.1 million tons of steel a year was expected by FY 1985. The plant was designed and partly financed by the Soviet Union. This was a major project for Pakistan, taking the bulk of public industrial investment in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It would meet anticipated steel requirements into the mid-1980s, but production depended on imports of 2 million tons of iron ore and nearly 1.4 million tons of coking coal a year. Remaining raw materials were available locally. Planners expected considerable downstream investment by the private sector to produce iron and steel products. But private investment in such projects, as well as in other manufacturing activities, would be partly judged

by the availability of utilities such as gas, electricity, and transportation, all of which lagged behind demand in the early 1980s.

Banking and Monetary Policy

The State Bank of Pakistan, created in 1948, remained in 1983 the country's central bank and financial adviser to the government. It was the sole bank of issue, holder of gold and currency reserves, banker to the government, lender of last resort to other banks, supervisor of other banks, and overseer of national credit policy.

Pakistan's banking system consisted of the State Bank and 26 other banks, nine of which were government owned. Seventeen commercial banks were foreign owned. Four of the government-owned banks had specialized functions. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan were the two most important specialized banks. The Federal Bank for Cooperatives, formed in 1976, was the central bank for the cooperatives' credit system, which grew rapidly in the early 1980s.

Commercial banking consisted of the 17 foreign-owned banks and the five that the government owned as the result of nationalization of banking under Bhutto. Commercial banks largely lent on a short-term basis to agriculture, industry, and commerce. The commercial banks had more than 7,000 branches, including a few abroad. The government-owned commercial banks dominated commercial banking, accounting for 90 per cent or more of deposits, loans, and branches in the early 1980s.

Several nonbanking financial institutions, some of which had a majority of private ownership, were important sources of long-term credit and equity capital. Sources of funds were largely the State Bank and foreign borrowing. Most of these financial institutions concentrated on industrial development, although one financed the construction and purchase of homes. Other financial institutions included stock exchanges in Karachi and Lahore, the nationalized life insurance company, and other insurance companies.

The National Credit Consultative Council formulated annual credit plans. The council included members from government, financial institutions, and the private sector. The State Bank largely implemented the plan. The State Bank relied primarily on direct measures such as credit ceilings and mandatory targets for banks and nonbank institutions for economic activities and for working capital and investment. The State Bank also could use indirect measures, such as liquidity ratios, reserve requirements, and the rediscount rate to influence credit. After 1972, for example, commercial banks had mandatory targets for loans to agriculture; after 1978 interest-free seasonal loans to subsistence farmers were mandated. The system tended to be rigid and not to be the best allocation of financing.

The credit plan rather than interest rates provided the allocative function for credit. Historically, interest rates in Pakistan tended to rise for deposits of long periods and to fall for loans of long periods.

Bank profits were larger for short-term financing. The mandatory system changed this, although adjustment of interest rates was another alternative solution. In much of the 1970s and early 1980s, longer term loans were not a problem for development financing because of the mandatory allocations. In FY 1982 for example, investors used only about 60 percent of the credit available for industry, although it was not clear whether banks discouraged such applications because of the low profits. Some economists saw the Islamization policies applied to banking as a means of more accurately reflecting real costs of loans than the interest rates usually charged. The shortage of longer term credit in earlier years presumably was the reason for the creation in the 1970s of several financial institutions for longer term financing, which by the early 1980s overlapped functions and spread thin experienced bank personnel for evaluating and administering loans for projects.

The banking system evolved largely to supply short-term credit for working capital to industry and seasonal credits to trade and agriculture. Borrowers were primarily large, established firms and farms. Government efforts in the 1970s and early 1980s to make more longer term credit available through mandatory allocations appeared successful in terms of local currency, but foreign exchange financing remained in short supply. Government efforts to extend credit availability to small farms and small-scale businesses met difficulties. Banks generally lacked adequate staff, and borrowers usually lacked knowledge and even literacy to arrange small loans. Loan repayment by farmers having very small holdings was low. In FY 1982 total credit to agriculture was less than 6 percent of output; more institutional agricultural credit was needed, especially with easy application procedures. Expansion of the cooperative credit system in the early 1980s was a positive step. It was not clear how successful the government had been in directing credit to small businesses.

During the Bhutto regime, budget deficits and commodity transactions by public corporations contributed to substantial credit demand and a rapid growth of the money supply. Since 1977 government efforts to restrain public borrowing, restore confidence in order to increase demand and time deposits by the private sector, and develop savings schemes in order to avoid expansion of bank credit successfully dampened the rapid growth of the money supply that the country had endured during much of the 1970s. The money supply increased an average of over 20 percent a year between 1973 and 1980, substantially above the growth of production. Strict limits on credit expansion and other measures sharply reduced growth of the money supply in the early 1980s. In FY 1982 it increased about 10 percent.

During the 1970s the country suffered periods of high inflation, which were caused by rapid expansion of the money supply and international price movements. The wholesale price index rose nearly 33 percent in FY 1974, the worst inflationary year. In FY 1979 the index rose 6.7 percent. In FY 1981 the wholesale price index rose 13

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percent, partially reflecting the increase of world oil prices and upward adjustments of domestic prices as the government sought to reduce subsidy costs in the budget. In FY 1982 the index rose 9.7 percent and probably less than 5 percent in FY 1983 despite continuing upward adjustments of some government-controlled prices. Government officials claimed that inflation was under control.

Foreign Trade

Foreign trade has always been important to Pakistan's economy because of the need for a variety of imports. In FY 1982 imports as a ratio of GNP were 19 percent. Over the years, controls were used on imports to ensure priority use of precious foreign exchange and assist industrialization. In 1983 the government maintained lists of permissible imports besides using quantitative restrictions and the allocation of foreign exchange to control imports. In practice, imports not on the lists were banned. The largest list covered consumer goods as well as raw materials and capital goods that could be imported by commercial and industrial importers. A second list of mostly raw materials could only be imported by industrial users. A third list covered commodities only the public sector could import.

The exchange rate had an important effect on foreign trade. From 1973 to January 1982 the exchange rate to the dollar remained constant. Increasingly, the rupee became overvalued, stimulating imports and restricting exports. In January 1982 the rupee was unlinked from the United States dollar and instead was tied to a market basket of currencies important to Pakistan's trade. The delinking from the dollar resulted in a slow depreciation of the rupee in terms of dollars that by June 1983 amounted to 25 percent, which helped make Pakistan's exports more competitive.

Since the late 1970s the country's foreign trade has been strongly affected by the developments in the world economy. The sharp jump in crude oil prices not only increased Pakistan's oil bill by nearly 200 percent between 1979 and 1981 but also increased prices of other imports. The increase of oil prices also contributed to a recession in many parts of the world that bought Pakistan's exports. The recession depressed the quantities purchased and the prices paid for them. Pakistan's terms of trade showed an adverse change of 30 percent between 1979 and 1981.

In FY 1982 imports amounted to US\$5.5 billion, only a 2 percent increase over FY 1981. The country's largest imports by far were crude oil and refined products, accounting for 30 percent of total imports in FY 1982 (see table 14, Appendix). Oil came from nearby Middle East oil exporters. Imports of machinery and transport equipment were large and important to economic development. A variety of chemicals were imported for industrial purposes. Chemical fertilizer imports dropped sharply in FY 1982 as new Pakistani plants came on stream. Completion of the integrated iron and steel mill in 1984 probably will reduce imports of such products. Imports of vegetable oils were grow-

ing, prompting efforts to develop domestic oilseed production as a substitute. By FY 1982 the country's need for imported grains and flour was largely limited to that required to feed refugees from Afghanistan.

In FY 1982 the Middle East was Pakistan's most important source of imports because of oil, accounting for 32 percent of total imports. Saudi Arabia was the country's largest source of imports. Asia, primarily Japan, supplied 25 percent of imports. China was a growing source of imports, although much less important than Japan. Western Europe supplied 22 percent of imports, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and Britain being the leaders. The United States was the fourth largest supplier of imports and accounted for the bulk of imports from the Americas. Imports from the Soviet Union were quite small. Eastern Europe was more important. Individual countries ranked in terms of the amount of imports supplied were Saudi Arabia, Japan, Kuwait, the United States, Britain, West Germany, and Abu Dhabi of the United Arab Emirates.

Exports were necessary to pay for imports. Although industrialization policies favored domestic manufacturing of substitutes for imports, officials also encouraged manufactured exports over more than two decades. In the early 1960s incentives were again provided to industrialists to increase manufactured exports. The incentives, along with devaluation and economic recovery in major markets, boosted Pakistan's exports in FY 1983, although figures for the year were not available in late 1983. This was welcome news, because exports fell from nearly US\$3 billion in FY 1981 to about US\$2.5 billion in FY 1982, causing alarm about the balance of payments.

The importance officials attached to further processing of domestic raw materials was reflected in the breakdown of the country's exports. In FY 1982 about 52 percent of all exports were manufactured, 13 percent were semifinished, and only 35 percent were raw materials, although the country was usually considered an exporter of primary commodities. Cotton dominated exports, accounting for about one-third of total exports in the early 1980s, although much of it was manufactured into yarn, thread, cloth, and garments before sale abroad. Rice was the other major export (see table 15, Appendix). Exports of refined surplus petroleum products were large but probably uneconomical if policy measures were to change consumption patterns and refinery output (see Energy, this ch.) Small businesses contributed significantly to exports. Production of carpets, as well as some textiles, was partly a cottage industry. Sporting equipment and surgical instruments produced in small establishments became important exports in the early 1980s.

Markets for the country's exports were widely scattered, and they fluctuated from year to year. Much of the manufactured exports went to other developing countries, particularly in the early 1980s, because of the recession in—and protective measures taken by—the industrialized nations. In FY 1982 Asian countries bought 31 percent of exports.

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Japan was usually the country's largest market, although China was in FY 1961 because of large purchases of cotton. Middle Eastern countries bought 29 percent of exports in FY 1962, and Saudi Arabia was the second largest market. Western Europe, of which Britain and West Germany were Pakistan's most important trading partners, received 21 percent of exports. The United States was the third most important export market and accounted for nearly all exports to the Americas (8 percent). The Soviet Union was a small market, overshadowed by Eastern Europe.

Balance of Payments

Pakistan has frequently confronted balance of payments difficulties requiring emergency funding and rescheduling of debt payments. Imports in nearly every year since 1950 have exceeded exports. A substantial level of imports was needed to increase production and to develop the economy. The size of the imbalance between imports and exports was important and largely reflected factors affecting exports. Unfavorable local weather that affected crops, particularly cotton and rice, usually adversely disturbed the trade balance. Unfavorable trends in international prices and conditions that restricted sales in Pakistan's export markets usually enlarged the import surplus. These were the conditions the country faced in the early 1960s.

Since the first oil crisis in 1973 the trend of Pakistan's import surplus has been upward. The negative balance was US\$473 million in FY 1974 and an estimated US\$3.4 billion in FY 1983 (see table 16, Appendix). Partial relief from this adverse trend came from an unexpected source. The greatly increased income of Middle East oil exporters that resulted from the rapid rise of crude oil prices led to huge development efforts. Because of a shortage of domestic labor, many of the Middle East oil exporters hired workers from other countries, including Pakistan (see *Labor Force*, this ch.). Pakistani workers abroad sent remittances home to their families that increased dramatically from US\$578 million in FY 1977 to US\$2.2 billion in FY 1982. The government expected workers' remittances in FY 1983 to increase to US\$2.85 billion, which was higher than anticipated total commodity export earnings. Although interest payments on the country's foreign debt increased, the deficit in the current account of the balance of payments declined until FY 1982. The government expected the current account deficit in FY 1983 to decline from its US\$1.5 billion peak the year before.

Since independence Pakistan has had to depend on foreign assistance in its development efforts and to balance international payments. By FY 1982 such accumulated economic assistance exceeded US\$20 billion. In 1960 the World Bank organized the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium to facilitate the arranging and coordination among the major providers of international assistance. In 1963 the consortium consisted of the World Bank, the United States, Canada, Japan, several West European nations, Saudi Arabia, and the Asian Development Bank. Additional aid came from individual nations outside the consortium, including

communist countries, such as the Soviet Union and China, and from supplier credits and commercial bank loans. Since the mid-1970s Middle East oil exporters have provided substantial bilateral financial assistance in various forms. Foreign aid commitments annually averaged US\$200 million in the First Five-Year Plan, US\$475 million in the Second Five-Year Plan, and US\$540 million in the Third Five-Year Plan. Annual disbursements of aid—including that from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but excluding aid for Afghanistan refugees—were expected to be above US\$1.3 billion in the Fifth Five-Year Plan.

Part of Pakistan's balance of payments difficulties in the early 1980s resulted from receiving less foreign aid than officials had anticipated. Moreover, the international aid received after the mid-1970s declined sharply in constant prices. Additional difficulties emanated from fluctuations in various components of the balance of payments, such as the 1979 crude oil price jump, which increased import costs. By late 1979 Pakistan's international reserves fell below US\$200 million (equivalent to about two weeks of imports), considerably less than a safe minimum. Government restrictions on imports plus emergency help from Middle East oil exporters, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, contributed to avoidance of a crisis. In late 1980 the IMF granted Pakistan a loan—at the time the largest ever to a developing country—for withdrawals over three years. Consortium members also increased the inflow of aid and in January 1981 rescheduled Pakistan's repayments of loans for the next 18 months. These measures allowed a buildup of the country's international reserves in FY 1981, which were largely used in FY 1982 to meet further deterioration in the balance of payments. By June 1982 gross international reserves were US\$809 million, about six weeks of imports.

In FY 1983 the government expected a moderate improvement in the balance of payments. Recovery in the world economy, combined with depreciation of the rupee, was expected to increase exports while imports rose more slowly. Substantial increases in workers' remittances and foreign aid inflows were anticipated. Although in late 1983 balance of payments data were unavailable for FY 1983, gross international reserves had more than doubled by May 1983, compared with June 1982, and amounted to US\$1.8 billion. Even though reserves were less than desirable—about 3.3 months of imports—the growth indicated a temporary improvement in the balance of payments.

The country's public external debt on June 30, 1982, was US\$8.8 billion. An additional US\$2.9 billion had been committed but remained undisbursed. The bulk of the debt (US\$6.8 billion) was owed to consortium members. Debt servicing in FY 1983 was estimated at US\$866 million, 33 percent of expected commodity export earnings and 13 percent of total anticipated foreign exchange earnings. Foreign aid disbursed for refugees from Afghanistan amounted to US\$293 million in FY 1982 compared with the equivalent of US\$75 million spent by Pakistan from its own resources.

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Economists feared that the improvement in the balance of payments in FY 1983 would be short-lived. In FY 1984 Pakistan would have only US\$20 million of net IMF financial assistance compared with nearly US\$600 million the year before. Government projections in 1983 for FY 1984 indicated a shortfall of US\$175 million in foreign capital inflows in spite of what appeared to be optimistic estimates of economic recovery in the world economy, which would permit exports to grow by 15 percent. Should the various projections turn out to be overly optimistic, restrictions of imports would likely follow, which would reduce economic growth.

For the remainder of the 1980s economists expected Pakistan to face continued balance of payments constraints. The slowdown in construction projects in Middle East oil-exporting nations, combined with a preference for foreign workers who lived apart from the general society, was expected to limit growth of Pakistani workers abroad and their remittances home. Foreign aid donors had shown a reluctance to increase assistance, and that was expected to continue. Competition from other developing countries could restrict expansion of Pakistani exports. For economic growth to continue in the neighborhood of 6 percent a year, as Pakistan's officials hoped, further improvement in management of the economy was necessary to raise output from existing facilities. Better mobilization of domestic resources offered the easiest solution, and one subject to internal policies, to ease the balance of payments constraint.

. . .

Two recent books, *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977* by Shahid Burki and *Underdevelopment, Poverty, and Inequality in Pakistan* by S. M. Naseem, provide understanding of the problems and accomplishments in economic development. Gustav Papanek's *Pakistan's Development* reviews in detail the country's development from partition to 1985. The annual *Pakistan Economic Survey* by the Ministry of Finance provides extensive information and statistics on recent developments. The annual *Pakistan Year Book* also presents considerable up-to-date data on the economy. Charles Ebinger's *Pakistan: Energy Planning in a Strategic Vortex* discusses the many aspects of the country's energy situation, including the efforts to develop nuclear power. Mahmood Hasan Khan's *Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan* covers the evolution of land tenure practices and their effects on productivity in farming. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4 Government and Politics



From a steel engraving of 1858 of Grand Durbar at Calcutta in 1858; Lord Canning, first viceroy of India, shown granting a medal to one of Queen Victoria's subjects.

NATIONBUILDING REMAINS a tedious process in Pakistan. Experiments with a variety of political systems have failed to produce national integration, and disparate nationalities have yet to learn the rudiments of living together. The lesson of Bangladesh—formerly East Pakistan or East Wing—was lost even before it could be registered among the governors and people. Centrifugal forces were long at work in West Pakistan, predating the loss of the country's eastern wing, and those forces were not tamed by the dismemberment. To the contrary, they were aroused to greater intensity by the successful secession. Moreover, the nation's political leaders exacerbated the situation. Despite calls for unity and national sacrifice, they practiced self-interest and hence undermined their capacity to lead a divided people.

When General Mohammad Zia ul Haq and his colleagues deposed the civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in July 1977, Zia announced his determination to reverse the course of Pakistani politics. Martial law had been imposed before. Political parties had been banned, the legislatures closed, and constitutions abrogated. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan had offered the nation "Basic Democracy," and General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan had promised to return to parliamentary processes. Neither succeeded in realizing his stated objectives. The nation proceeded from crisis to crisis until civil war engulfed the country in 1971 and nullified the reform programs. Zia was determined to take a different course.

Although Zia did not cancel the 1973 Constitution, his declarations and edicts—particularly the Provisional Constitutional Order of March 4, 1981—emphasized its subordination to martial law and hence its de facto suspension. Zia also publicized his intention to give the nation still another constitution when the basic structure of his new political system was firmly in place. Zia spoke for the military junta that he led but to which he was also indebted. Together the generals pressed the policy that Pakistan's survival, as well as its progress, was dependent on the construction of an Islamic state. Declaring themselves to be true to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the country's founding father, the generals insisted that only by following the tenets of their Islamic faith and by incorporating those tenets in their national life could the country be preserved; only by adhering to the guidelines established by Jinnah and interpreted by the generals could the country realize its true purpose.

Zia's views, and it can be assumed those of his brother officers, were contained in a speech delivered in December 1982 celebrating the birth anniversary of the Prophet. Zia used the occasion to call on the people of Pakistan to shape their lives in accordance with the teachings of the Quran and Sunna and to propagate the faith and performance

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of their spiritual leader. Attending the ceremony were the key ministers and advisers of the government as well as the leaders of the religious community. Their joint appearance suggested the compatibility of temporal and spiritual power and provided a special air of urgency to the address. It also was meant to confer legitimacy on the military rulers. President Zia declared that nothing less than a jihad could promote Islamic values. His government, he argued, sought the guidance of the Quran and Sunna in creating the Nizam-i-Mustafa (Rule of the Prophet) in Pakistan, and toward this goal he sought to enlist the expertise and wisdom of the theologians and spiritual divines. Zia noted that his government had adopted a number of Islamic laws but that Islamization involved more than legal pronouncements. The country's moral fiber had to be strengthened to ensure the genuineness of the Islamic state.

According to Zia, the building of Pakistan's Islamic state must be a "brick-by-brick" exercise, painstaking and deliberate in order to ensure its proper and lasting construction. The president noted the emphasis given to Zakat (alms) and Ushr (the tax on agriculture), which were aimed at providing the state with the resources needed to assist the less fortunate members of society. He also cited the government's intention to impose the Islamic rule of *qisas* (the right of preemption) and *diyat* (the laws of evidence in Islam), to establish Qazi courts (headed by religious judges), and to introduce the Islamic judicial system, as well as the eventual elimination of interest in commercial and financial undertakings. Zia's statements and actions pointed to the necessity of substituting Islamic bodies and practices for those secular institutions and activities long in place in the country. The reforms were not only concerned with reducing alien influence; they seemed aimed also at neutralizing, and in time liquidating, the sophisticated, cosmopolitan elite that had dominated the Pakistan scene from the state's inception.

Zia, however, avoided characterizing his Islamization program as an attempt to destroy real or potential rivals. Rather, the president spoke of decay in the Muslim world permitting foreign powers to divide and weaken the Islamic polity. Pakistan's purpose, explained Zia, was no different from that publicized by other Muslim states. Muslims had drifted from the source of their faith, had lost their way in a myriad of practices imposed on them by outsiders, and as a consequence had suffered humiliation, defeat, and division. Pakistan, he opined, would set an example for the entire Islamic world; piety, selflessness, high ethical conduct, and community endeavor would inspire a new sense of unity at home that would spread to other Muslim countries. The strength of Pakistan's Muslim convictions would not go unnoticed, and the Muslim world was destined to regain the respect and stature that it once enjoyed. Zia's program for Islamic reform, therefore, went well beyond the confines of the Pakistan nation and could be considered a counterpoint to the claims and aspirations of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. For the time being, however, Zia made it clear that his

concern was limited to Pakistan, where national survival had become the pressing imperative.

Political Stability

Pakistan's military junta seized power in a bloodless coup in July 1977, and although it announced an early return to civilian government, the generals have not found it advantageous to pursue such a course. Arguing that the political parties lack national appeal or discipline and convinced that the politicians are incapable of leading a divided nation, the military establishment in late 1983 retained its monopoly of power and judged itself the only guarantee against anarchy and chaos. No mention was made of the fact that the nation had suffered dismemberment during another sequence of military rule. No thought was given to the possibility that the present military government could repeat the experience. The junta appeared convinced that the tragedy of Bangladesh was not caused by the military's ineptitude but rather by General Yahya Khan's persistence in working with the existing political parties and their ambitious leaders (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1).

Junta spokesmen suggested that in 1970 and 1971 the armed forces were duped by the machinations of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of East Pakistan on the one side and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of West Pakistan on the other. Zia and his associates remained publicly determined not to succumb to such political intrigue. The political parties and their leaders have been neutralized and removed from the mainstream of political activity, and their supporters among the intelligentsia and student community have been rigorously isolated. The military alliance with the religious divines (ulama) has also short-circuited the traditional links between the rural masses and the political organizations. The once-vibrant urban communities have been restrained by martial law edicts, and institutional devices have nullified their political activity. Zia reiterated his belief that Pakistani politicians practice "the politics of destruction" and that they should not be trusted with the nation's future.

Political stability in Pakistan has been inextricably intertwined with the country's national security. The threat posed to Pakistan's territorial integrity by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and Moscow's reluctance to withdraw its troops from that area despite international pressure confirmed the need to sustain military rule. Moreover, the existence in Pakistan in 1983 of over 2 million Afghan refugees necessitated concerted action and the utmost control. The politicians were not trusted to manage so complex a demographic problem. Given the regional identities or minimal countrywide appeal of the politicians and noting their sometimes questionable national allegiance, the leaders of the armed forces saw no option other than to sustain their authority.

Pakistan has seldom enjoyed political stability. Civilian government has often failed to live up to expectations. Parliamentary experiments

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and presidential innovations did not bear fruit. Constitutions have not made governing easier. Nor have elections resulted in popular satisfaction or promoted tolerance and understanding. Traditional rivalries and enmities were neither appeased nor reconciled by these sophisticated political refinements. The political system has always appeared distant to the masses. They neither identified with constitutional theory nor related to a Pakistan cast in the modern idiom of consensual pluralism. The people have clung to older arrangements, to local leadership, and to their peculiar life-styles and codes (see *Ethnic Relations*, ch. 2). It was this reality that the Zia government endeavored to address. Thus, the junta concluded that the military establishment had to be a permanent part of any future political system.

On December 18, 1982, Zia spoke about the necessity of a constitutional provision to give the armed forces a legitimate and continuing role in any future political system. He said elections were still two or three years away, but when held they would be under strict rules guided by Islamic principles. He also stressed the importance of the armed forces in shaping the new government and political system. Acknowledging that the armed forces were primarily concerned with defending the country from potential aggressors, he reiterated his belief that the services were also the protectors of the country's Islamic ideology and the primary defense against internal disorder. The military leadership was not interested in power for itself, insisted Zia. Pakistan's political history chronicled divisive movements and parochial expression. In recognition of the feeble nature of the country's political organizations, the only untainted, steadfast, and coherent institution in the country could not neglect its responsibility.

Zia's answer to Pakistan's political disarray—its internal divisions and external threats—was in some measure borrowed from the Turkish experience. Turkey's most recent experience with martial law (imposed in 1980) precipitated the abrogation of the 1961 constitution and the drafting and promulgation of another in 1982. In the 1982 constitution the Turkish armed forces wrote themselves into the political system on a permanent basis. Moreover, General Kenan Evren declared that he was unprepared for politics as usual, and elections fully implementing the new constitution were not held until November 1983. Pakistan's military junta enjoyed intimate relations with Turkey's generals, and the two military establishments freely exchanged views on subjects of mutual interest. Zia also let it be known that the military role in Pakistan's political life transcended his personal involvement. In a speech delivered during his December 1982 visit to the United States, the Pakistani president noted that if "something happens to me, there are other generals in the Army who will take over."

The junta

In the mid-1980s Pakistan was more firmly managed by a military junta than at any time in its history. Moreover, the members of the military elite believed that they possessed the expertise necessary to



*General Mohammad Zia ul Haq
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan,
Washington*

pursue development programs as well as maintain law and order. Neither, in their judgment, was possible under the rule of the politicians. Senior army officers therefore monopolized key positions in the central government as well as in the provincial governments. Assisting the active-duty and retired generals was an assemblage of civilian specialists who were either lifetime public administrators, business and industrial leaders, or landlords. Few of the latter had ever displayed political ambitions, and all appeared to blend well with the military hierarchy.

The junta consisted of an inner core of the highest ranking military officers, surrounded by a circle of serving and retired officers, who in turn were interwoven with a phalanx of civilian specialists. During the Ayub period (1958-69), the idea of employing the army command structure in direct governance was never seriously considered (see *The Ayub Khan Era*, ch. 1). Ayub preferred the development of an administrative state and leaned heavily on the higher bureaucracy, especially the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Yahya Khan seemed more agreeable to using the army, but any plans that may have been on the drawing board were discarded in favor of reassembling a civilian-dominated political structure. Divisions within the junta, however, were exploited by Bhutto. Bhutto's activities complicated matters and led to the tragic civil war in East Pakistan. The discrediting of Yahya's leadership following the Indian invasion of East Pakistan and the dismemberment of the country prevented a full-blown experiment in military rule. But once the generals had rid themselves of Bhutto in 1977, they were prepared to try again, only this time they were determined to build a political system that, Turkish style, they could continue to monitor, shape and, if necessary, run.

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Zia became president of Pakistan on September 16, 1978, when he replaced Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, a longtime politician who had served in that post during the Bhutto regime (see table 17, Appendix). Chaudhry's term had expired, and rather than extend it by decree, Zia decided to fill the office himself. Zia declared that his action was temporary and that he would step aside as soon as a suitable replacement could be found. Zia maintained his status as chief of the army staff and thus guaranteed his command of the Pakistan Army. He also retained the post of chief martial law administrator (CMLA). He emphasized his lack of interest in politics and insisted he was assuming the position because other candidates were not readily available. Moreover, he wanted to avoid internal strife, which he was certain would develop if the office was contested by a variety of candidates. According to Zia, such individuals would only inflame popular passions and thus further divide the nation. Despite his disclaimers, it was widely believed Zia had assumed the presidency under pressure from his brother officers, the same officers who earlier convinced him of the necessity of deposing Bhutto.

Zia was born in 1924, the son of an army clerical officer from the East Punjab (now in India). He joined the British Indian Army and was commissioned in 1945. Zia saw service in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia during and after World War II. He opted for Pakistan in 1947 and joined the Pakistan Army. He received advanced training courses in the United States, and by the time of the 1965 war with India he had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Attached to the army of Jordan, Zia served King Hussein during the monarch's 1970 struggle with the Palestine Liberation Organization and was decorated for his efforts. Zia returned to Pakistan in time for the 1971 war with India. In 1972 he was promoted to major general and given command of an armored division. In 1973 Prime Minister Bhutto promoted him to lieutenant general and made him a corps commander. In 1976 Bhutto selected Zia, despite his junior status among the generals, as chief of the army staff, the first *muhajir* (immigrant from India) to achieve that post. Zia's rapid ascension to the highest position in the army was perceived to be politically inspired in that it gave the prime minister an opportunity to retire other more senior officers who Bhutto believed harbored "Bonapartist tendencies." Bhutto hoped to keep the officers under his influence by threatening to force them into early retirement. Numerous high-ranking officers had already been retired, and the threat could not be taken lightly. But Zia's appointment also gave opportunities to other officers, and they rose rapidly through the ranks. The serving officers convinced Zia of the necessity of moving against Bhutto. And by drawing from the corps of retired generals, they helped assemble the ruling junta that continued to rule in 1983.

In addition to Zia, the inner core of the junta included General Mohammad Iqbal Khan, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC); Lieutenant General K.M. Arif, chief of staff to the president; General Saeed Khan, vice chief of the army staff; Lieutenant

General Mujibur Rahman, the martial law government's information secretary, and Major General (retired) Rao Farman Ali, minister of petroleum and national resources and director of the Faujee Foundation (see *Army and Auxiliaries*, ch. 5). (The Foundation, an arm of the Army Retirement Organization, has more than a million members and represents the largest support group for military government in the country. It is important to note that in 1983 the central government issued a directive to all factories employing 100 or more workers to set aside 25 percent of their positions for ex-servicemen.)

The military council that advised the president, an integral part of the core junta, included Generals Zia, Iqbal Khan, Sawar Khan, and Arif. Also included in this body were Vice Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan, the chief of the naval staff, and Air Chief Marshal Mohammad Anwar Shamim, the chief of the air staff. Some observers believed that Major General Mohammad Afzal Khan, the deputy martial law administrator, also sat on the council. Other members of the inner junta were the seven army corps commanders and the four provincial governors, who were all high-ranking officers. The governors, each of whom also carried the title of provincial martial law administrator, were Lieutenant General Ghulam Jilani Khan in the Punjab, Lieutenant General S.M. Abbasi in Sind, Lieutenant General Rahimuddin Khan in Baluchistan, and Lieutenant General Fazle Haq in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (see fig. 9).

In the circle surrounding these officers were Lieutenant General (retired) Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, who replaced the civilian Agha Shahi as foreign minister in 1982; Major General (retired) Abdul Rahman Khan, who was appointed president of Azad (Free) Kashmir in 1983 upon the death of his military predecessor; Brigadier (retired) Mansoor ul Haq Malik, director of telephone and telegraph; Lieutenant General (retired) Saeed Qadir, minister of production and national logistics; Major General Ghulam Saffar Butt, chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA); Major General M. Rahman Khan, secretary general of the Ministry of Defence and chairman of Pakistan International Airways (PIA); and Lieutenant General Jamal Said Mian, minister of northern areas and Kashmir affairs.

In the extended perimeter of the junta were the civilian specialists in the federal ministries. These included Ghulam Ishaq Khan, minister of finance and economic affairs; Raja Mohammad Zafarul Haq, minister of information and broadcasting; Dr. Mohammad Afzal, minister of education; Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, minister of law and parliamentary affairs; Ghulam Dastgir Khan, minister of labor, manpower, and overseas Pakistanis; Mahmud Ali Haroon, minister of interior; Mohiuddin Baluch, minister of communications; Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur, minister of defense; Mahbubul Haq, minister of planning and economic development; Mohammad Abbas Khan Abbasi, minister of religious and minority affairs; and Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti, minister of railways (see table B). In addition to these civilians, other prominent figures in the outer circle were A.W. Halipota, director, Islamic Re-




Figure 9. Key Figures in the Martial Law Government, October 1983

search Institute, Justice Mohammad Hakeem, chief justice, Supreme Court and chairman, Pakistan Law Commission, Supreme Court Justice Shafiqur Rahman, chairman, Zakat Council, A G N Kazi, governor, State Bank of Pakistan, and Niaz Naik, foreign secretary.

Although periodic changes occurred within the civilian group, the core military leadership remained fairly stable through the first five years of Zia's rule. On December 5, 1982, however, the government announced the "retirement" of Major General Mohammad Iqbal Choudhry, director general of the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare, and Population. Choudhry's departure from both his military and his civil assignments came as something of a surprise. Observers then recalled that Choudhry had presided over the medical board that had reviewed the request of Bhutto's widow, Nusrat Bhutto, to go abroad for medical treatment for what was diagnosed as an advanced case of cancer. The board ultimately recommended her release from house arrest and argued that her request to leave the country should be honored. The junta granted the request on humanitarian grounds and under considerable external pressure. She traveled to Europe where she launched into a series of speeches castigating the military government. Embarrassed by statements suggesting that she and her doctors had deceived them, the junta was hard pressed to offset the verbal abuse. (The junta could not cope effectively with its critics who sought refuge in foreign lands. During December 1982 Zia visited several countries, and at each location he was confronted by disgruntled Pakistanis who sought to discredit him and his government.) Nusrat Bhutto's activities contributed to Zia's negative media profile and rallied her supporters at home and abroad. The Pakistan government took note of her political speeches and questioned how a woman deemed to be very ill could engage in such an arduous performance. Given the junta's chagrin, Choudhry was more than likely forced to retire. The general was not accused of betraying the junta, but his poor judgment was not ignored.

Nevertheless, there were few indications of rifts within the military high command that might bring about the collapse of the junta. Although differences of opinion were believed to exist, and small fractures could widen and possibly swallow Zia, it did not seem a likely possibility in late 1983. Zia remained the front man for the military establishment. He received all the credit and most of the criticism. But Pakistan was governed by a form of collective military-civilian leadership, and it was expected to hold for the foreseeable future. In the 1960-71 period Yahya Khan had been chairman of a weak board of directors, Zia presided over a far stronger board that could remove him at any time. The junta was not without its expendables, but it also needed to maintain its mystique as well as its essential unity. The key to the junta's longevity was its apparent compatibility, harmony of interest, and capacity to address its own inner contradictions. Moreover, sustaining the loyalty of the field officers and ensuring the integrity of the services were the junta's primary concerns.

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Table B. Cabinet, October 1983

<i>Office</i>	<i>Officeholder</i>
Attorney General	Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada
Ministers	
Minister of Cabinet Affairs (C.M.A.) Secretariat and Establishment Division ¹	Mohammad Zia ul Haq Ghulam Ishaq Khan ² Mohiddin Baloch Arbab Niaz Mohammad
Minister of Commerce	
Minister of Communications	
Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism	
Minister of Defence	Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur ²
Minister of Education	Mohammad Alzal ²
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs	Ghulam Ishaq Khan ²
Minister of Food, Agriculture, and Cooperatives	Mohammad Fazil Janjua Sahabzada Mohammad Yaqub Khan
Minister of Foreign Affairs	
Minister of Health, Social Welfare, and Population	Nasiruddin Jegerai
Minister of Housing and Works (Acting)	Elahi Bux Soomro Elahi Bux Soomro
Minister of Industries	
Minister of Information and Broadcasting	Raja Mohammad Zafar ul Haq ² Mahmud Ali Haroon ²
Minister of Interior	
Minister of Labour, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis	Ghulam Dastgir Khan ²
Minister of Law and Parliamentary Affairs	Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada
Minister of Local Government and Rural Development	Fakir Imam
Minister of Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs	Jamal Sadiq Mian
Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources	Rao Farman Ali
Minister of Planning and Economic Development	Mahbubul Haq ²
Minister of Production and National Logistics	Saeed Qadir Nawalzada Abdul Ghafur Khan Hoti ²
Minister of Railways	
Minister of Religious and Minority Affairs	Mohammad Abbas Khan Abbas ² Mohammad Zia ul Haq
Minister of Science and Technology	
Minister of States and Frontier Regions	Mohammad Zia ul Haq Raja Sikandar Zaman
Minister of Water and Power	

¹ C.M.A.—chief martial law administrator

² Civilian who are considered to be closest to the military junta

Table B.—Continued

Office	Officeholder
Ministers of State	
Minister of State	Mahmud Ali
Minister of State for Food, Agriculture, and Cooperatives	Zafarullah Khan Jamali
Minister of State for Social Welfare	Abba Mansoor
Advisers	
Adviser to the President for Business Coordination and Internal Trade	Sheikh Ishrat Ali
Adviser to the President for Foreign Trade	Hamid D. Habib
Adviser to the President for Health	Basharat Jazbi
Adviser to the President for Higher Education	Vacant
Adviser to the President for Overseas Pakistanis	Muazzam Ali
Adviser to the President for Population Welfare	Attiya Inayatullah
Adviser to the President for Science and Technology	M. A. Kazi
Adviser to the President for Shipping	Mustafa K. Gokal
Adviser to the President for Tourism	Vijarun Nua Noun
Adviser to the President for Traditional Medicine	Hakim Mohammad Said

Disaffection and alienation within the officer corps were of greater concern than dissension within the ranks. Hints of rebellion and mutiny were manifested during the Bhutto years. Disagreement with the handling of the insurgency in Baluchistan and Bhutto's attempt to monopolize power disturbed the officer corps. The bypassing of officers scheduled for promotion because they were related to members of the civilian opposition—a not infrequent situation—caused additional strain. The use of clandestine, violent methods to suppress what members of the armed forces perceived as honest opposition further aggravated the situation. Moreover, some officers were influenced by radical ideas and prophecies, others by Islamic principles and values. A leftist organization based in the United States published the *Pakistan Progressive*. An article in the fall 1982 issue, "Islamization and Military Rule," expressed the sentiments of radical, disenchanted officers by using such phrases as "a mercenary army" that had operated as "a colonial power" in East Pakistan and Baluchistan.

In April 1983 another radical organ, the *Delhi Patriot*, published in India, printed the text of a document allegedly drafted by a secret

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group of dissidents within the Pakistan Army. The document was reported to call on the Pakistani nation to rise against the military junta. They also endeavored to rally support abroad in an effort to gain the termination of military assistance to the Zia regime. The group was identified as the Muslim Fauji Biradiri (Muslim Army Brotherhood), and it undiplomatically described the junta as "a despicable gang of corrupt generals, which . . . continues to commit monstrous crimes

thousands of civil servants, our brothers and fathers, are dismissed at the whim of Zia ul Haq . . . Political leaders, senior civil servants, leading intellectuals were arrested on trumped-up charges, such as cattle-stealing, pick-pocketing and robbery, and then thrown into prison without investigation or trial, and treated like animals." The generals, the document continues, are more interested in lining "their own pockets" than in defending the nation. "The corrupt generals . . . had betrayed the ideas of Pakistan's founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and were leading the country to ruin."

Although the authenticity of the Fauji document could not be verified, it nonetheless alleged to represent the hidden sentiments of some officers in the armed forces. Moreover, the comments in the *Pakistan Progressive* and the material published in the *Delhi Patriot* illustrated the possible existence of expanding opposition on both the radical left and the fundamentalist right within the services. The linkage of such groups was something the junta was determined to prevent.

The Bureaucracy

Before Pakistanis became familiar with politicians, their lives had been long influenced by the administrators who virtually ruled the divisions, districts, and subdistricts (*tehsils* and *thanas*) into which Pakistan is divided, as it was as a part of British India. British imperial rule was built on a Mughal foundation, modified and improved to meet European requirements. The success of the British administrative system, the so-called steel frame of colonial power, is evidenced by its record of accomplishment and the oft-repeated view that the foreigners brought law and order to an otherwise turbulent and somewhat anarchic society. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was developed as an all-British enterprise (see *Legacy of the British Raj*, ch. 1). Representing the higher civil service, it drew recruits from the mother country who were carefully screened and relatively well educated. The young men entering the ICS, generally speaking, formed a dedicated body and soon had established a tradition for efficiency and responsibility. Many officers became so enamored with the country that their scholarly interests were stimulated, and a good number engaged in serious research and literary efforts that are citable sources to this day. Whatever stability was maintained by the imperial power in India was due in no small part to these civil servants. Moreover, although alien authority was seldom popular in its broadest context, the intimacy that developed between the ruler-administrators and their subjects caused a network of interrelationships that sustained the system.

In time, the British recognized the need to recruit indigenous members into the ranks of the ICS. These Indian additions were drawn from the elite families, and they proved to be men of high bearing and broad education. Schooled in Britain, they quickly found a place in the ICS and displayed many of the behavioral characteristics associated with their European counterparts. Charged with similar responsibilities, although lower in station than their British mentors, the Indian members of the higher service took readily to their calling and were no less successful in demonstrating their preeminence. In the period leading up to the withdrawal of British rule from South Asia, the Indian members of the ICS assumed greater powers. It was apparent to the political leaders that these trained, sophisticated, and knowledgeable officials would be needed in the postindependence period and that their affiliation with imperial rule must be discounted. The higher bureaucracy, therefore, was never dissolved. In India, it underwent modification soon after independence was achieved. Its all-India structure was provincialized, and the administrators were made subordinate to the political leadership in the various states. In Pakistan, however, the political circumstances were more volatile, and the bureaucracy retained its precolonial role and spirit. The ICS became the CSP, and given the turmoil caused by partition, the select service prided itself on being the backbone of the nation (see *Independent Pakistan*, ch. 1).

Pakistan's politicians never were able to gain control of the CSP or their brethren in the finance, military accounts, and police services. The expertise reflected in the work of these bureaucrats was in marked contrast to the naiveté of the political leaders. Furthermore, the ceaseless bickering of the politicians caused them to neglect their nation-building tasks, and these were carried forward by the civil servants. In time, the unreconciled rivalries of the politicians plunged the country into a period of uncertainty that the bureaucrats believed only they could allay. Ghulam Mohammad, Choudhry Mohammad Ali, and Iskander Mirza—all of whom served as chief of state or head of government during the 1950s—emerged from the ranks of the higher services. Their astute qualities and dedication to service had been acknowledged at the highest level of political leadership. Pakistan's founding father, the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had commented glowingly on the accomplishments of Ghulam Mohammad, whom he characterized as his "financial wizard." Choudhry Mohammad Ali had been made the secretary general of the civil service after independence and bore almost sole responsibility for structuring the new government. Mirza became the country's defense secretary and was deeply committed to the building of the nation's armed forces. As a result of the problems faced by the politicians in framing a constitution and the bitterness aroused between the various nationalities, these confident administrators eventually interposed themselves between the people and their political representatives. Experienced with the techniques of law and order and sensing that the country required stability before all else, the administrators sought to control the Muslim

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League—at that time the dominant political party—and govern the country according to their own lights.

The period between 1947 and 1969 was one of political chaos tempered by administrative know-how and power. In this period the CSP dominated the decision-making processes. It was also a period in which the armed forces, especially the army, expanded its calling and assumed a political posture alongside the civil servants. General Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first indigenous army commander in chief, initially subordinated himself to the higher bureaucrats. But following the death of Ghulam Mohammad, Ayub became more assertive. Thus when Mirza, Ghulam Mohammad's replacement in the governor general's office and Pakistan's first president after the promulgation of the 1956 constitution, called upon Ayub to assist him in abrogating the new constitution and in neutralizing the politicians, Ayub complied, but he then forced Mirza into permanent exile (see *The Ayub Khan Era*, ch. 1). Although Ayub intended to place his imprint on Pakistan and to establish himself as the country's maximum ruler, he gave even greater emphasis to the role of the civil service, not only in ensuring law and order but also in developing the economy. Unlike the 1947-58 years when the bureaucrats played a power game with the politicians, the 1959-69 years provided the CSP and the related services with the opportunity to use power directly, virtually unimpeded by the isolated and fragmented politicians.

Dissatisfaction with Ayub extended to the higher bureaucrats, and after Ayub's fall in 1969 a concerted drive was launched by the politicians to reduce the influence of the services. They were assisted by members of the intelligentsia who complained about the perpetuation of a colonial institution so long after independence. Added to this chorus were those disgruntled members of the civil service outside the elite circle, particularly the leading antagonists of the CSP, the members of the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). It was argued that the CSP was responsible for Pakistan's failure in political development and that the political life of the nation had atrophied as a direct consequence of bureaucratic meddling in politics. The overall demand was that the CSP should be disbanded and its authority distributed among the political leaders. The civil service would be reconstituted as an integrated service, without decision-making powers, and made fully responsive to the political representatives. Ayub's successor, Yahya, proved to be just as dependent on the civil servants as his erstwhile chief, however, and the 1969-71 years proved to be an interregnum as well as a transitional phase in Pakistan's politico-bureaucratic history.

The civil war in East Pakistan resulted in the creation of independent Bangladesh, destroyed the Yahya military regime, forced the armed forces to transfer power to civilian hands, and provided the opportunity to eliminate the CSP. Pakistan's new maximum ruler, Bhutto, set a somewhat revolutionary course for the nation (see *Bhutto and the Restoration of National Confidence*, ch. 1). His Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was supposed to be different from the other political organiza-

tions in that it aimed at embracing all groups, irrespective of religious, ethnic, or social differences. Bhutto had been ushered to power at a dark moment in the nation's history, and his objectives went well beyond the mere restoration of a sense of national purpose and confidence. Bhutto was determined to make the PPP the only acceptable political organization in the country, and he therefore could not tolerate an independent bureaucracy, especially one with the power of the CSP.

In 1973 Bhutto issued a directive disbanding the CSP. The numerous services were amalgamated into one administrative system, and efforts were made to separate the civil servants from their traditional powers. In effect, Bhutto was insistent on politicizing the bureaucracy and thereby making it an integral organ of the PPP. Unable to resist Bhutto's power, the members of the elite services were blended with the other services. But the administrators were not to be denied. Former members of the CSP continued to be needed, their expertise could not be ignored, and they quickly assumed critical positions within the administrative apparatus. The nomenclature had changed, the esprit de corps was broken, the schools and clubs of the privileged were closed, but there was no discounting the continuing importance of the administrative system and its more prominent personalities.

When Bhutto was overthrown in the July 1977 military coup, the bureaucrats were prepared to reassume their old position. The administrative reform decreed by Bhutto remained in place, however, and the CSP was not resurrected. Nevertheless, in the absence of formal political institutions and because of the constraints imposed on the politicians by the martial law authority, the bureaucrats re-created their traditional role. Zia enlisted the support of the civil servants and assigned them to important positions throughout the government. Although many of the key posts were reserved for military figures, some had to be distributed among the more renowned and/or qualified public officials. Zia's inability to come to terms with the politicians guaranteed the reemergence of the bureaucracy.

This was even more pronounced in 1979 when the decision was made to postpone national elections indefinitely. Like Ayub, Zia came to depend on the bureaucrats in the day-to-day management of the country. Because of this dependency, Zia yielded to those administrators who cautioned against giving too much power to the Muslim theologians. The Council of Islamic Ideology, for example, was prevented from playing a more influential role in shaping the country's destiny when the bureaucrats objected to its narrow perception of public policy. As a consequence, the bureaucracy assumed responsibility for the implementation of Zia's Islamic reforms.

The higher bureaucrats, however, found themselves in a difficult situation. They clung to the belief that they represented what was best for the nation and that their responsibilities transcended narrow, personal interests. The country needed guidance, but above all it needed leaders with an aptitude for moderation and balance. Although the

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administrators could not shrink from the much-publicized objective of transforming Pakistan into a "genuine" Islamic state, they also believed it essential to sustain the process of modernization. The latter, it was held, could be seriously entertained only if there were a balance between spiritual needs and secular realities. Therefore, if the pace of Zia's Islamization program was deliberate, it was owing to the bureaucracy's characterization of its role. Some observers would argue that the bureaucracy was the real power behind the junta and that in the absence of the politicians, the administrators made the crucial decisions.

Evidence of bureaucratic power was seen in the selection of candidates for the Majlis-i-Shoora (Federal Council). Zia asked the bureaucrats to identify candidates, and in the final analysis, these selections were made by the deputy commissioners (the officers who administered the districts) and lower level civil servants in the subdistricts who chose from among the more supportive and influential members of the local communities (see *Emerging Political System*, this ch.). The nexus thus established between the administrators and the Majlis members could not be ignored. It also revealed why the Majlis could be filled with persons who were not overly enthusiastic about the construction of a model Islamic state. Zia has consistently repeated his intention to convert Pakistan into an Islamic state as quickly as possible, but he remained dependent on individuals and institutions that did not share his desire for haste.

The bureaucracy held a dim view of the religious-cum-political organizations. The Jamaat-i-Islami—the best organized religious party—initially supported Zia but subsequently cooled somewhat to his posture and was especially outspoken in its criticism of the civil servants. This antagonism was reciprocated by the bureaucrats who neither trusted the Jamaat nor approved of its influence in the universities and colleges (see *The Politicized Intelligentsia*, this ch.). The bureaucrats perceived the Jamaat as a divisive element, dedicated to the destruction of Pakistan. Law enforcement, therefore, was authorized to be firm in its dealings with it. The Jamaat, for its part, argued betrayal of the Islamic revolution and, while attacking the bureaucracy, could not avoid striking at Zia and the junta.

Zia appeared to have little option other than to hope that the bureaucracy could steer a progressive course, that Mahbubul Haq's Planning Commission would help sustain economic growth, and that a rising standard of living would dampen ideological rhetoric and turn the nation toward more positive endeavor. This of course was a large order. It would be difficult in tranquil times, but for Pakistan in the mid-1980s it was an almost impossible task. Threatened by a superpower on its northwestern frontier, eternally challenged by its Indian neighbor, faced with secessionist movements in Baluchistan and, to a lesser degree, in Sind and the NWFP, burdened by sectarian strife between Shites (see *Glossary*) and Sunnis (see *Glossary*), and plagued by demands of the politicians and intelligentsia for a return to constitutional

and parliamentary activity, even the most astute bureaucracy could not promise continuing success. Moreover, if the economy suffered drastic reverses, as was hinted by the rise in natural gas and essential commodity prices as well as by the shortage in electric power, the fall could be sudden and catastrophic for the Zia government (see *Not By Faith Alone*, this ch.).

There were Pakistanis who believed that the only answer to this dilemma lay in reducing the power of the bureaucracy, neutralizing experts like Ghulam Ishaq and Mahbubul Haq, and restoring political parties with grass-roots identification. Such critics of the government spoke, albeit cautiously, of widespread corruption in the administrative services, the police, and the higher echelons of the armed forces. By contrast, these critics insisted that there were honest, sincere "Islamic workers" in the villages and small towns who were prepared to give selflessly of themselves for the cause of Pakistan and the religious order to which they adhered. Real Islamization, such opinion believed, could only be achieved when the so-called modernists were no longer in positions of responsibility and the folk were truly liberated from their grasp.

Not By Faith Alone

In 1983 the military junta's determination to erect a new political system compatible with their vision of a true Islamic state continued to be complicated by numerous problems, not the least of which was the socioeconomic environment. That environment was clouded by a January 1983 directive issued by the government that increased the price of natural gas and petroleum products to new levels and produced a storm of criticism from all sectors of society (see *Energy*, ch. 3). Industrial and commercial centers were as vehement in their criticism as those on the labor side. Both contended that the increase would wipe out gains and make future progress questionable. In defiance of government orders to refrain from disrupting the public order, the drivers of tanker trucks refused to transport petroleum to supply stations unless they were granted a pay increase. In Karachi—heavily dependent on personal travel—there was panic when gasoline, already in limited supply, began to disappear from the service stations. Coming on the heels of the price rise, the strike elevated societal concerns and distress.

Informed Pakistanis noted other price increases in the course of 1982, and many attributed the difficulties to a government decision to delink the rupee (for value of the rupee—see *Glossary*) from the United States dollar. That action had the effect of devaluing the rupee. Added to the strain of having to pay more for necessities, citizens also experienced significant shortages, especially in natural gas and electricity. Houses were darkened, but perhaps more important, industries were required to curtail production, and bazaars and shops were ordered to close during what were generally peak shopping hours. Shopkeepers sought to evade local directives calling for their closure and attempted to

illuminate their establishments with candles and kerosine lamps. The increased demand on the latter items, however, produced still other shortages and more public complaint (see *Role of Government*, ch. 3).

The government quickly recognized the distress in the general population and exempted kerosine (largely used for cooking) and lubricating diesel oil from the new price increases. According to government sources, the heavier costs were to be borne primarily by industry. Commercial consumers faced a 15-percent increase, but fertilizer factories would have to pay more than 33 percent more for their energy. Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq defended the government action, insisting that it was best for the country and that it would enable the government to invest greater sums in the development of new natural gas and petroleum fields. Ishaq cited the shortfall in natural gas supplies, which had already reached alarming proportions. The government contemplated a crash program to open new fields because of the reluctance of private investors to become involved. Because demand was already exceeding supply by almost one-third and continuing to widen, the government was compelled to take drastic action. Nevertheless, the finance minister insisted that the average citizen would be little affected by the price increases and that whatever sacrifices were made would be in the larger interest of the nation.

Ghulam Ishaq's statements were of little comfort to the aroused society, however. Protests continued to portray government policy as inflationary and economically unsound. The public recalled that at the June 1962 session of the Majlis-i-Shoora the government had promised to avoid further surprise price increases. Critics noted that the latest rise would have its greatest impact on the middle and lower classes, less on the upper class, and possibly none at all on those enjoying remittances from abroad (see *Balance of Payments*, ch. 3). The major dilemma, critics noted, would be that faced by persons on fixed wages. Removing the rupee from its association with the dollar also had the effect of devaluing the currency by approximately 30 percent. When all aspects were considered, the conclusion reached was that the masses would be very hard put to meet their basic requirements. Moreover, there was no guarantee that prices would not go even higher.

Societal dissatisfaction threatened to retard the government's reorganization and Islamization programs and also provided grist for political opposition mills. Economic dislocation gave new leverage to the country's Marxists. More ammunition was provided the leftists to fire at the military junta, which was charged with allocating enormous sums to purchase new weapons. Indeed, a large segment of the attentive public noted that Zia's December visit to the United States coincided with the January price increases. Conclusions were therefore easy to come by, and the United States came in for a share of the blame.

The government could not ignore the complaint filed by the general secretary of the Karachi Taxi, Rickshaw, Mini-bus, and Truck Federation, who said that his members would be ruined by the latest price

increase in gasoline. A similar statement was made by the Pakistan National Federation of Trade Unions, which went further by calling for an across-the-board increase in wages for labor in the private sector equal to the 45-percent increase in cost-of-living allowances conferred on government employees. Noting that the government took care of its own, the labor unions said they could do no less for their people. The exchange began to sound like a left-right confrontation. It was interesting to note, however, that labor had considerable support on the capitalist right. The presidents of the Karachi Stock Exchange and the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry also insisted that the price increases would place enormous burdens on consumers and increase bitterness toward government. They called on the military junta to reconsider its options before the situation deteriorated further.

The Politicized Intelligentsia

Pakistan's intelligentsia is represented by its lawyers, journalists, teachers, and students. Perennially a thorn in the side of government, it has often integrated itself with the political parties. Political parties, however, have failed as aggregations of public opinion. Factional turmoil within the organizations and clashes between them reduced their effectiveness and allowed the armed forces to dabble in politics. More important, political party disarray provided the military establishment the opportunity to monopolize the governmental apparatus. The intelligentsia, therefore, has been left heavily dependent on its professional associations. This remained clearly the case in the Zia era.

The military junta has imposed strict controls on journalists, and teachers and university students have been constrained by a variety of decrees and ordinances. At the same time, the government has appealed to these groups to assist it in helping to fashion the Islamic state. This tended to isolate the lawyers, who have been particularly provoked by the administration's Islamic reform program (see *Emerging Political System*, this ch.). The bar associations have organized numerous demonstrations in defiance of martial law, and many lawyers have been arrested for "disturbing the public peace" and for criticizing the government (see *Threats to Internal Security*, ch. 5). The legal fraternity was distressed by the establishment of Shariat (see *Glossary*) courts, and their concerns were greatly heightened by the decision to create Qazi courts, that is, courts headed by clerics who administer justice on the basis of Islamic codes and precepts. The Establishment of Courts of "Qazis" Ordinance, 1981, continued to be debated two years later, despite the training of the qazis who, it was believed, were being prepared to replace the traditional secular judges who possess largely Anglo-Saxon (English common law) legal experience. The lawyers were convinced that the junta's underlying intention was to eliminate its opposition and to create still another constituency favorable to its programs and policies. An independent judiciary, the lawyers argued, would be impossible if the Qazi courts were given authority to interpret the law. The immediate consequences would be

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the subordination of the judiciary to the executive and the disappearance of fundamental rights. The legal profession was fearful that any new constitutional reforms contemplated by the junta would confirm authoritarianism in the country. The lawyers, therefore, believed that they had no recourse other than to oppose the legal reforms proposed by the government.

The All-Pakistan Lawyers Convention met in Lahore in October 1982 with the stated purpose of criticizing the government program. As a result of vituperative remarks aimed at the junta, the police arrested the presidents of the Lahore High Court Bar Association and the Peshawar High Court Bar Association. The president and joint secretary of the Karachi Bar Association were arrested in November and tried, convicted, and sentenced to a year of rigorous imprisonment for violating martial law regulations (see *Law Enforcement*, ch. 5). Although their sentences were commuted in December, the government had demonstrated its resolve.

The lawyers, however, had also dramatized their concern and in the process had established themselves as the most authoritative opposition organization in the country. On December 9, 1982, the Punjabi bar associations met in general convention and approved a statement demanding the withdrawal of the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981, and the repeal of all laws, orders, and regulations "which directly or indirectly tend to bar or curtail the jurisdiction of the superior courts." The 1981 constitutional order had followed a martial law decree of October 1979 that established the supremacy of the military tribunals and a May 1980 amendment order that barred the provincial courts from interfering with a judgment of the military courts. The courts were also prevented from initiating proceedings against the CMLA or a provincial martial law administrator. The Zia government ordered the closing of the Islamabad and Rawalpindi courts, but lawyers assembled in Islamabad from all over the country in December 1982 to observe a two-hour symbolic strike protesting the military junta's denial of civil liberties, the discarding of the rule of law, and the amendments to the Legal Practitioners Act that could eliminate the effectiveness of the legal fraternity.

The politicization of the intelligentsia thus entered a new phase. Malik Qasim, chairman of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), spoke for all the lawyers when he accused the government of fabricating a case against the MRD in order to justify the arrest of still more members of the organization. Qasim declared that thousands of MRD supporters had been arrested in the preceding two years and that many were still wasting away in prison. He called for their release as well as freedom for political leaders such as Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan, Benazir Bhutto (Bhutto's daughter), and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. Adding his voice to the chorus, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, one of the country's more celebrated lawyers and a former federal minister, noted that Islam stood for universal justice and that even the Prophet Muhammad and the four pious caliphs

(*rashidun*) had subjected themselves to a process of accountability. If the people of Pakistan are denied their rights in the name of Islam, Kasuri warned, they could become "allergic" to Islam itself.

Following Kasuri, the president of the Lahore High Court Bar Association, Abid Hasan Minto, declared that his organization no longer wished to emphasize its apolitical character. From now on, he said, his association would provide a forum for all political parties, irrespective of ideology, philosophy, or program. He revealed that this was not simply his decision but rather was a response to an order issued by the National Committee of Lawyers in Rawalpindi. The lawyers believed that only they could prevent the total withering of the political organizations and that they had the responsibility to sustain the parties in difficult times, despite the power arrayed against them. If the country was ever to return to a form of civilian government structured around democratic norms, Minto asserted, people had to remain conversant with political organizations, especially with open, competitive politics. Moreover, by addressing the problems of the political parties, the legal profession also emphasized the need for constitutional guarantees against arbitrary government.

The legal fraternity, indeed the intelligentsia at large, were unimpressed with the Zia government's repeated references to Islam. Nor were they moved by the attention given to the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. Although aware of the country's internal and external problems, they did not believe that the tactics developed by the military establishment would serve the cause of national survival. The fear persisted that the successors to the generals who had presided over the dismemberment of the country in 1971 would commit the same folly, but this time with even worse consequences.

The Politics of Terrorism

In the absence of public debate, political expression has been limited to occasional calls by the "defunct" parties for the restitution of political activity and for general elections that would return governmental authority to civilian hands. Political parties have never fared well in Pakistan. The once powerful parties, i.e., the Muslim League, the Awami League, the National Awami Party (NAP), and the PPP, have either been fractured, banned, or so frustrated that they can no longer, or only with great difficulty, represent their constituents. Generally speaking, political institutions have atrophied, and political differences cannot be reconciled through reliance on the formal state structure, nor is this condition of recent vintage.

The Zia government inherited a legacy of political decay. Indeed, it is that legacy that has influenced the generals to delay a return to partisan politics. In 1980 Ayub Khan cited the failure of the politicians to put national interest before personal ambition when he instructed the bureaucracy to supervise his "Basic Democracy" system (see *Basic Democracies*, ch. 1). Later, Yahya Khan believed that the parties had reformed themselves and could be trusted to sustain the country's

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integrity. The elections of 1970, however, resulted in a nightmare rather than the fulfillment of a fond dream. The dismemberment of Pakistan, from the vantage point of the military establishment, was owing to opportunistic politicians and irresponsible political organizations.

Although the nation's first general election (1970) was judged fair and successful, the politicians proved incapable of living with the results, as a consequence of their personal ambition and arrogance, the country's more populous East Wing seceded and became an independent nation. The civil war that produced the new state of Bangladesh brought to a close one phase of Pakistan's political experiment and opened another. A return to civilian leadership after 13 years of military rule seemed to promise the reinvigoration of political party activity, but under Bhutto's leadership the country's political system became even more constrained.

Bhutto was unreconciled to the free play of the political opposition. His vision of a new Pakistan rising from the ashes of civil war left little place for parties and factions opposed to the dominance of his party, the PPP. Although he indicated a willingness to work with other organizations, he was determined to monopolize power. The opposition therefore was left with the options of accepting the PPP's preeminence or challenging the premise that Bhutto had a mandate to perpetuate his rule in spite of the obvious political divisions within the country. The response from the opposition was to fight. If Bhutto wanted a contest of wills, they were ready to accept the challenge and the consequences.

Bhutto's heavy-handed tactics in beating back his political opposition involved the creation of the Federal Security Force (FSF), whose primary responsibility was to safeguard Bhutto and his rule. The FSF, therefore, was not reluctant to punish the opposition if it meant thwarting or even eliminating threats to the PPP. Thus commenced an extended period of official terror in which dissident politicians were intimidated, physically abused, imprisoned, or in some instances, murdered. This period also produced its counterterror as more and more disenchanted elements employed violence to dramatize their cause. Moreover, groups outside the political mainstream saw their opportunity to act, and they proceeded to add to the mayhem.

The military coup that destroyed Bhutto's administration in 1977 did not bring political terror to an end, nor did Bhutto's execution following a lengthy trial and appeal process usher in a period of tranquillity. On the contrary, political violence became more organized and hence more bold. And in spite of ordinances threatening severe punishment for those engaged in actions against the state, the terror continued. Bombing of public installations, as well as random attacks on populated centers, became more frequent. More persons were believed to possess firearms than at any other time in the nation's history. The influx of some 2.5 million Afghan refugees in the 1980-83 period also opened the floodgates to a variety of weapons heretofore not found in the

country. Moreover, it was generally believed that several thousand foreign agents had infiltrated the country by joining the stream of refugees. Many of these were assumed capable of employing or fomenting violence against the Zia regime.

The most celebrated terrorist organization was known as Al Zulfikar, which was originally based in Afghanistan and was led by Bhutto's sons—Murtaza and Shahnawaz. Its most notorious operation was the seizure and diversion of a PIA airliner to Kabul (see *Threats to Internal Security*, ch. 5). In 1981 and 1982 at least three prominent politicians were assassinated, and their deaths were linked to Al Zulfikar. In early 1983 the Kabul government announced that it had instructed the Bhutto brothers to leave Afghanistan; the "expulsion" was rumored to be linked to the United Nations (UN)-sponsored negotiations that were directed toward the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the concomitant return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland (see *Foreign Policy*, this ch.)

Politicians and Political Parties

Pakistan has had enormous difficulty developing coherent political organizations. The All-India Muslim League (League), which was organized in 1906 to counter the growth of the Indian National Congress and which received the transfer of power from the British Raj in August 1947, never transformed itself from a movement to a genuine national political party (see *Independent Pakistan*, ch. 1). Although a dominant organization, it was not satisfied with being first among equals. After Jinnah's death in September 1948 and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, the party came under the influence of West Pakistani—especially Punjabi—landlords and bureaucrats who were more concerned with protecting their private domains and expanding their personal influence than in building a national organization. Moreover, whereas the creation of Pakistan centered on the theme of Islam, some of the more powerful party officials injected regionalism into their deliberations, and others emphasized the inclusion of sectarian philosophy and practices in subsequent constitution making.

The combination of self-interest and Islamic politics complicated the problem of building an organization having broad responsibilities to the larger society. The achievement of an independent Pakistan was obscured by the League's insistence that it was the only organization with the right to form the government. Efforts by other parties to contest the power of the League were frustrated, and opposition politicians were often physically prevented from appealing to their constituents. Despite the obstacles placed in the path of the challengers, however, they remained relatively free to pursue their objectives. It was only a matter of time, therefore, before the League, having shown itself to be a divided organization, began to lose its grip on the reins of power.

Although the League had its origin in East Bengal, after independence regional parties captured the imagination and gained the support

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of the population of the East Wing. That population contained a sizable proportion of Hindus (approximately 25 percent at independence), and some of the stronger provincial leaders believed that their power rested on the development of broad-based, secular institutions. The League, however, stressed the need to keep the party an exclusive home for Muslims. It also insisted on institutional arrangements that would establish Pakistan as an Islamic state. This argument had considerable appeal to the politicians in West Pakistan, and their perception of political developments in East Pakistan was influenced by the often-repeated Hindu threat. Thus the two wings of the country were at loggerheads even as independence was achieved. Moreover, East Bengali politicians claimed to represent the best interests of the province, and they initiated programs aimed at countering the superiority of a Muslim League government, deemed to be heavily influenced by West Pakistanis.

Faced with a broad-based challenge, League leaders sought to discredit the Bengali politicians by emphasizing their alleged extra-territorial loyalties. H. S. Suhrawardy, the last chief minister of undivided Bengal (Bengal had been divided by the British under Hindu pressure, and half of prepartition Bengal remained in India after independence) and an important member of the Muslim League, was prevented from making political speeches in East Bengal because he maintained a home in Calcutta and had not clearly indicated his loyalty to Pakistan. When he finally was permitted to establish his residence in Pakistan, he quit the League and formed the opposition Awami League. Another important Bengali leader was Fazlul Huq. He had organized his Krishak Sramik (Workers and Peasants) Party even before independence. Also a former Muslim League member, Fazlul Huq had moved the historic Lahore Resolution (later to be called Pakistan Resolution) in 1940, which called for the establishment of one or more independent Muslim national states. After partition, however, Fazlul Huq wanted to rally the broad community of Bengalis against what he perceived to be a Punjabi-dominated Muslim League. Even more than Suhrawardy, his appeal was to Hindu as well as Muslim Bengalis. The view from the League, therefore, was one of treachery and deceit, and the government party became even more committed to sustaining its monopoly of power.

East Bengal's first province-wide elections in 1954, however, dramatized the weakness of the League and its program for constructing an Islamic state. The party was destroyed at the polls by the United Front, an organization that was composed of all the provincial parties. References to Islam, recitation of the Hindu threat, and revival of the prepartition slogan of "Islam in Danger" did not sway the vast majority of Bengali voters, who had come to see the League as an alien and oppressive organization.

When Pakistan received its first constitution, in 1956, the League retained its influence in West Pakistan, but it was forced to organize a coalition government with parties drawn from the United Front in



*Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan*



*General Agha
Mohammad Yahya Khan*

Photos courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington

East Pakistan. Moreover, politicians such as Fazlul Huq and Suhrawardy were brought into the central government, and in 1956 Suhrawardy was made prime minister. By this time, however, the League, undermined by the higher bureaucracy, had also lost its influence in West Pakistan, and the Punjabi landlords sought refuge in a jerry-built organization called the Republican Party. The Republicans coalesced with whatever party in East Pakistan seemed most likely to ensure their personal interests. This crass opportunism opened deep wounds in the body politic that none of the parties could adequately treat. As a consequence, the 1956 constitution could not be fully implemented. Promised general elections were postponed, and the country drifted from crisis to crisis while the administrative services attempted to fill the vacuum. Furthermore, the removal of Suhrawardy from the prime minister's office by President Mirza in 1957 was a clear violation of parliamentary procedure, for Suhrawardy's popularity had not been put to a test in the legislature.

This viceregal action was reminiscent of 1953, when another prime minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin—also a Bengali—was ousted without a

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vote of confidence, and of 1954, when the then "ceremonial" head of state, Ghulam Mohammad, dissolved the Constituent Assembly established by the Independence Act and sought to rule by executive fiat. The Supreme Court forced Ghulam Mohammad to call the Second Constituent Assembly, and it was that body that finished the work on the 1956 constitution. Mirza, Ghulam Mohammad's successor, refused to be constrained by the new constitutional rules and procedures, however. He had conceived the formation of the Republican Party and had enlisted the support of the Punjabi landlords in an attempt to sustain and expand his power. Never a politician, let alone a Muslim League member, he displayed little patience with politicians. Mirza's bureaucratic experience influenced his perceptions and behavior, and he was quick to join forces with those powerful personalities who believed Pakistan required a form of "guided democracy," in other words, management by skilled administrators, not quarrelsome politicians.

In 1958 Mirza decided to terminate the constitutional experiment, and with assistance provided by Ayub Khan and the Pakistan Army, martial law was declared, the 1956 constitution was abrogated, the legislatures were closed, and all political parties were banned. Mirza, however, did not reap the fruits of the coup. Ayub forced Mirza to leave the country, and he quickly assumed the vacated presidency. Ayub argued that Pakistanis were not prepared for parliamentary government or competitive political parties. Instead he offered the country the Basic Democracies, which was a tiered arrangement of councils starting at the grass-roots level and controlled by the bureaucracy. Although the politicians cried "foul," they were powerless to alter a program imposed by the armed forces.

Martial law remained in effect for 44 months and was lifted only when Ayub presented his own constitution to the nation in 1962. Ayub still believed it was possible to conduct government without the formal establishment of political parties. He was soon disabused of that notion, however, and when the political parties re-formed and took their place in the newly established National Assembly, Ayub had no recourse other than to organize his own political party. Curiously, he borrowed the name of the Muslim League, but when the "real" Muslim League members displayed their outrage, Ayub modified the name, and his party became known as the Conventionist Muslim League. The others then dubbed their party the Councillor Muslim League. Once having reinstated the political parties, however, Ayub was hard pressed to control them, yet he found it difficult to retreat from a constitution that he had authorized. By 1968-69 Ayub was strangled by the very document he believed guaranteed his perpetuation in office. The politicians had proved to be a hardy lot, and their persistence ultimately paid off when Ayub was forced to yield his authority.

The politicians no doubt enjoyed a moment of satisfaction when Ayub was forced to resign his office, but they still had to contend with the Pakistani armed forces and with a junta led by Yahya. The army high

command had become highly politicized during the Ayub years, and Yahya appeared ready to implement reforms that were an amalgam of the demands of the opposition political organizations. Yahya abrogated the 1962 constitution, again closed the assemblies, and banned political party activity. But he also demonstrated a desire to placate the military's principal detractors. He abolished the Basic Democracies system, and even more than that, he declared the dissolution of One Unit (the 1955 arrangement unifying the West Pakistan provinces into a single administrative unit) and reconstituted the separate administrative provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the NWFP.

The breakup of West Pakistan had been a principal demand of the National Awami Party (NAP), organized in East Pakistan in 1957 by Maulana Bhashani. The party attracted other regionalists to its banners and soon acquired the support of G.M. Syed in Sind, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the NWFP, A.S. Achakzai in Baluchistan, and Mian Iftikharuddin in the Punjab. Yahya felt the need to win the confidence of these celebrated provincial leaders, but he also wanted the support of a broad cross section of the political leadership. He therefore announced his intention to hold general elections. In 1970 he issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO) specifying the number of seats to be allotted the several provinces in the National Assembly. East Pakistan, because of its larger population, was awarded more seats than the other four provinces combined. The elections, however, were to be conducted under the terms of the LFO, and little if any consideration was given to the consequences.

Pakistan's first national elections were held on schedule and were reported to be open, fair, and with few untoward events. The results, however, shocked Yahya and his army colleagues and sent tremors throughout the country. In East Pakistan the NAP boycotted the polls and thus left the field open to the Awami League, which was led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League won virtually every seat allotted to East Pakistan and as a result of the LFO order enjoyed a majority of seats in the new National Assembly. Mujib's party, however, did not win a single seat in the provinces of West Pakistan. The big winner in West Pakistan was Bhutto's PPP, but its success was largely confined to the Punjab and Sind. In Baluchistan and the NWFP the seats were garnered by the NAP, led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan, a son of Ghaffar Khan, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI).


The Awami League dominated the provincial government in East Pakistan, the PPP controlled the administration of the Punjab and Sind, and a NAP-JUI coalition formed the governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP. A major dilemma developed, however, over the formation of the central government. Bhutto enlisted elements within the military to oppose the transfer of power to Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League. Yahya, faced with a divided junta, decided to bring Mujib and Bhutto together in an effort to work out a compromise. Bhutto, however, sensed that he had the required leverage to prevent an Awami League takeover. Pleading the cause of West Pakistan, Bhutto

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cited the lack of Awami League support in the West Wing. He also emphasized his overwhelming victories in the Punjab and Sind. Playing upon West Pakistani sentiment, Bhutto intimated that the "inferior" Bengalis should not be permitted to take over the central government. Yahya's task was nearly hopeless. Unable to maintain unity within the military high command, he could not manage an acceptable compromise between the leading politicians. He also failed to call on Mujib to form a new government. Instead, the junta authorized a buildup of forces in the East Wing. Troops were transported to East Pakistan and placed on alert status. The Bengali reaction to these developments was violent; anger and bitterness convulsed society. Calls went out to strike, demonstrate, and demand the rewards promised by the election. When the government refused to acknowledge the Bengali claim, cries of secession took over. In March 1971, in the dead of night, the armed forces garrisoned in East Pakistan attacked Awami League strong points, including Dacca University hostels. Mujib was arrested in his residence and flown to a prison in West Pakistan. The martial law government argued it had to act swiftly and with firmness in order to crush an insurrection. Bhutto, who had been in East Pakistan, returned to Karachi asserting that the armed forces had "saved" Pakistan. In fact, the civil war had begun (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1; Military Background, ch. 5).

Some observers saw sinister motives in Bhutto's behavior after the election and in the subsequent negotiations and civil war. It is suggested that he was prepared to see the separation of the East Wing in order to realize his political ambition. Although these allegations persist, irrefutable evidence has never surfaced. Nevertheless, Bhutto's intransigence was directly responsible for the failure to reach a compromise with Mujib, and the defeat of the military gave him command of the country, which he assumed on December 20, 1971. (In July 1983 information that was allegedly leaked from the secret Hamoodur Rahman Commission report and published in the Urdu press promised to shed more light on the story. The commission had interviewed 286 witnesses between 1972 and 1974, including the highest ranking political leaders and army commanders. In 1975 Bhutto had the report classified secret on grounds that its release could jeopardize the country's national security, but the action only increased suspicion concerning his complicity in the dismemberment of the country. Zia's determination to keep the report under wraps, however, suggested it might be even more harmful to the military establishment.)

The PPP administration represented Pakistan's first civilian government in 13 years. Bhutto commented that he had been called on to "pick up the pieces" of a shattered society. The country had lost approximately one-sixth of its land area and more than half its population. Its armed forces had been mauled by a stronger Indian military establishment. More than 90,000 Pakistanis—75,000 of them military personnel—were prisoners of war, and many of this number had been accused of war crimes. The country had suffered physical damage,



Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan,
Washington

especially the port of Karachi and the Punjab Plain. But perhaps worst of all, the humiliation of defeat at the hands of a hated foe and a feeling of helplessness had stretched the national psyche to the breaking point. The people of Pakistan had to have their confidence and self-respect restored, and it became Bhutto's task to treat the disorder (see Bhutto and the Restoration of National Confidence, ch. 1).

Bhutto was experienced, bright, resourceful, and tireless. He plunged into the problem with enormous enthusiasm and quickly restored much of the country's lost pride. After ensuring military support, he moved against the leading entrepreneurial families by nationalizing industries, insurance companies, and banks and stressed that his administration would be a "people's government." The general population responded in the affirmative to Bhutto's actions, and his coalition represented virtually all sectors and groups in the country. Despite difficulties, the economy began to improve, and considerable effort was put into the fashioning of still another constitution. It was at this point that the coalition began to unravel. Bhutto took himself very seriously; he believed he was the heart and mind of the nation. He refused to entertain the thought that others might contest his authority, and he dealt harshly with those who challenged his ideas and actions. Bhutto was the scion of a Sindh wadera (landlord), an absolute and paternalistic figure. He was true to the wadera tradition, and although worldly and erudite, he insisted on running the country much like the wadera manages his lands and its hapless *harts* (peasants). Thus, Bhutto was unaccustomed

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to criticism and impatient with those who questioned his reasoning or policies.

Bhutto first rejected the advice of some of his closest confidants, particularly those with radical views. Some paid for their insubordination by going to jail, others were psychologically or physically abused, and many more lost their influential positions within the party and government. Perhaps the most celebrated clash arose between Bhutto and J.A. Rahim, the chief ideologue of the PPP. Rahim, a fervent leftist, had joined with Bhutto after the latter left the Ayub cabinet. In 1967, when Bhutto was considering joining one of the established opposition parties, Rahim persuaded him to start a new organization. The PPP was a direct result of their collaboration.

Rahim was considerably older than Bhutto and treated him as a son. Moreover, Rahim was accustomed to speaking his mind, and his behavior did not change after Bhutto became Pakistan's maximum ruler. Bhutto, however, did change, and he insisted on absolute obedience from his staff. When Rahim did not perform according to Bhutto's wishes, he was beaten by agents of the FSF and forced to give up his posts in the party and government. Episodes such as the Rahim affair were not uncommon. The FSF inflicted severe punishment on Bhutto's adversaries wherever and whenever they appeared.

Bhutto, however, did not always have his desires satisfied. He wanted a presidential constitution, and he was forced to accept a parliamentary system. In the course of the drafting of the document, his political opposition in the frontier provinces took offense at his authoritarian demands. This clash with the NAP-JUI coalition could not be resolved peaceably, and the situation became critical when Bhutto ordered the provincial governments dissolved. In Baluchistan, Bhutto was faced with armed insurrection. Although he had the leaders of the political opposition arrested, he could not prevent the intensification of the conflict. Ultimately, the army was drawn into the struggle, which was not contained until several army divisions and various support forces were put into the battle. In the meantime, the dissidents had come to depend on Afghanistan for sanctuary and support. And in Afghanistan Prince Mohammad Daud in 1973 deposed his cousin, King Zahir Shah, established a republic of which he was president, and renewed the call for the establishment of an independent Pakhtun state—Pakhtunistan—to be carved out of Pakistan's NWFP and part or all of Baluchistan. Bhutto, therefore, felt justified in crushing the insurgency in Baluchistan as well as denying politicians, such as Wali Khan in the NWFP, an active political voice.

Bhutto's performance destroyed the coalition assembled in the wake of the civil war. It was never resurrected. Although his PPP remained the dominant political party in the country, opposition to his rule grew daily. He agreed to "test" his popularity in a general election only after he had eliminated his principal rival, Wali Khan. The assassination in 1973 of Mohammad Sherpao, a key PPP leader in the NWFP, gave Bhutto the opportunity to arrest Wali Khan on suspicion of murder.

More important, Sheroan's death was used to justify the banning of the principal opposition party, the NAP. The NAP's other officials were also incarcerated, often several times, the party's offices were closed, and its funds were frozen.

In the absence of the NAP, Bhutto appeared to have little to fear from the remaining opposition organizations. Bhutto, however, did not count on the opposition parties forming themselves into the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for the purpose of contesting the election. Nor did he anticipate the attack leveled against his private life. Bhutto was accused of anti-Islamic behavior, of indulging in intoxicants, and of womanizing. Members of the religious community declared him unfit to govern a Muslim country, as did the political opposition. Although Bhutto was reasonably assured of success, this concerted attack demanded a response. Bhutto wanted a bigger victory than that forecast. He wanted nothing less than a popular mandate to deal with his detractors.

The election was held on schedule, but unlike the 1970 experience, this one was immediately challenged by the PNA. The PPP won a sweeping victory, but the opposition at once insisted that the results were fraudulent. The PNA demanded Bhutto's resignation and called for new elections under army and judicial supervision. Bhutto, however, refused to yield and was forced to deal with civil disturbances that broke out in cities and towns across the country. The inability of the FSF to quell the disorder, the mounting death toll, and the destruction of public and private property finally compelled Bhutto to call on the army for assistance. But even the declaration of martial law in the troubled areas had little effect. Facing socioeconomic paralysis as well as persistent civil disobedience, Bhutto lost control of the armed forces. On July 5, 1977, Bhutto was arrested by an army contingent. Other members of his government and party were also apprehended, and Pakistan's latest civilian administration came to an ignominious end.

The leader of the coup, Zia, was rumored to have been pressured to move against his erstwhile leader by his brother officers who feared disaffection in the lower ranks of the army. Zia's initial statements gave some validity to this interpretation. As the CMLA, Zia publicized his intention to hold new elections and to return authority to civilian hands within three months. Bhutto and the other politicians had been rounded up and placed under a modified form of house arrest pending their release and the resumption of political activity. In fact, Bhutto was released for a brief period, and he quickly announced his intent to reestablish his authority. But shortly after that statement, he was arrested again, never to reappear in public. The elections were postponed when the martial law authorities revealed that new evidence had been uncovered implicating Bhutto in a plot to murder a political rival. The plot had failed, but the rival's father died in the encounter, and it was his death that Bhutto was accused of perpetrating.

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Zia suddenly launched into a detailed attack on the man who had elevated him to high office, claiming that Bhutto was responsible for numerous crimes and deceptions. Referring to Bhutto as a "Machiavellian," Zia left little doubt that the former prime minister was to be thoroughly discredited as well as isolated from the public that once referred to him as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the People). In the lengthy trial that followed, Bhutto insisted on his innocence. Nevertheless, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. The appeal process was also long and arduous, but despite strenuous efforts by his lawyers and Bhutto's own detailed presentation in court, the death penalty was upheld. Zia was inundated by appeals for mercy from literally dozens of world capitals, but the general refused to lift the sentence, and Bhutto was hanged on April 4, 1979.

Despite Bhutto's execution, Zia continued to entertain the idea of holding elections, and they were slated for November 1979. This was the second time he made such a promise. Moreover, his advisers had developed an elaborate system of proportional representation as a technique for controlling the political parties. Registration was also imposed on the parties. Organizations refusing to register with the government would not be allowed to run candidates. The PPP declared its intention to ignore the registration order, and one of its leaders, General (retired) Tikka Khan, declared that the party would gain control of the national and provincial legislatures no matter how many obstacles the Zia government placed in its path. Tikka suggested that candidates running under other party names might well be PPP members. Another tactic would be to win over the representatives of the nondescript parties. In an act of bravado, Tikka said the PPP would run candidates even if the government refused to accept the credentials of the PPP. The PPP, he asserted, remained the most popular political organization in the country, and the martial law government could not suppress it without making a mockery of the election process.

The PPP gambled that Zia would not again postpone the elections. Moreover, this open display of defiance was aimed at demonstrating the inherent weakness of the military junta. Indeed, the other political parties also used the opportunity to berate the junta. They accused it of rigging the election process in order to perpetuate its power and intimated that Zia's plan would only guarantee a coalition of weak parties and ensure the continuation of military rule. This volley of criticism convinced Zia and his brother officers that the holding of elections at this time would be very dangerous. At the same time, they wanted to demonstrate to the politicians and the public at large that they could not be intimidated. Thus on October 16, 1979, Zia again canceled the elections. This time, however, he declared that they had been postponed indefinitely.

Up until this time the junta had been concerned with consolidating its power, learning the rudiments of governing, and reducing the capabilities of its adversaries. Zia had emphasized the importance of transforming Pakistan into an Islamic state, decreed the development

of Shariat courts, and insisted on the application of Islamic law in cases involving criminal activity (see *Emerging Political System*, this ch.). But it was fairly obvious that little attention had been given to the rebuilding of the political system. The on-again, off-again promises of elections, the reluctance to liquidate the political parties even though they were prevented from engaging in normal activities, and the decision to retain the 1973 Constitution despite the suspension of its provisions pointed to indecision in the ranks of the military leadership.

But a new phase began in the political life of the nation when the junta decided to put off elections indefinitely. The leadership no longer saw itself as a temporary phenomenon. It was now convinced that it had a mission to perform and that it alone could stabilize society. The military elite was traditionally contemptuous of the politicians, but now they no longer pretended tolerance. At every public opportunity Zia expressed the opinion that the political parties were irresponsible and that the politicians were without moral scruples. Pakistani politics meant character assassination, opportunism, and violence, said Zia. The junta, therefore, would remain in place and would not yield authority to civilian control until virtuous leaders could be found to administer a more perfect political system. That perfect political system would be in tune with the Pakistani genius and would be Muslim to the core.

Most politicians accepted none of this. More important, a substantial portion of the population was likewise unimpressed. Earlier leaders had made similar promises, but the nation neither prospered nor progressed. There was no reason to believe Zia's pronouncements were any more sincere than those of his predecessors. The public had come to mistrust the military establishment, and although the politicians were also perceived as opportunistic and self-aggrandizing, they were without real power. The politicians, however, symbolized opposition to authoritarianism, and the quest for freedom, though elusive, remained a vital goal of the politically conscious public.

Zia let it be known he was not engaged in a popularity contest. His overriding concern was the preservation of the nation, and he firmly believed that the nation's external problems were inextricably linked with its domestic condition. Pakistan required a strong, stable government, managed by men guided by Islamic values. Nothing that he had observed in Pakistan's history told him that political parties were essential to the construction of such a system. Political parties, he implied, divided the nation and exposed its weaknesses to the country's enemies. The formation of Bangladesh was a glaring example. Pakistan, according to Zia, could survive without parties; it might not survive with them. The junta was therefore determined to deal harshly with the politicians if they insisted on disturbing the public order. The authorities did not hesitate to arrest and incarcerate political figures, who were prohibited from making public appearances.

Nusrat Bhutto, along with her daughter, Benazir, led the PPP after Bhutto's execution. The martial law government kept them under almost perpetual house arrest after his death. His widow, however, was

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permitted to leave the country for medical care in November 1962, but her daughter remained under tight security. Similar treatment has been meted out to Asghar Khan, the first Pakistani to serve as the commander in chief of the air force and the founder and leader of the centrist political party, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal. He was seldom permitted to leave the confines of his residence. Arrests of political personalities were commonplace. Khwaja Khairuddin, secretary general of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), was apprehended by police on numerous occasions, but he steadfastly refused to suspend his activities.

In February 1983 leaders of the MRD met in Lahore in violation of martial law regulations and decided to observe a "political prisoner's day." Their meeting was interrupted by the police, who took them into custody. When word of the arrests reached Karachi, female members of the MRD sought to demonstrate at the mausoleum of the Quaid-i-Azam. The authorities locked the gates to the shrine before the demonstration could be formed, but the Zia government could not insulate the public from these displays of discontent. Even the Jamaat-i-Islami, which Zia appeared to favor, took to criticizing his heavy-handed rule. All the parties appeared to share a common concern that the regime sought their elimination and that they had no option but to fight back.

The political parties centered their criticism on Zia's decision to proceed with the construction of a new political system that was "true to Islamic principles." Almost all the parties stressed that the country did not need a new political structure in order to carry forward the process of Islamization. They repeated the argument that the adoption of the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, drafted by Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, a minister in Pakistan's first government, spelled out Pakistan's Muslim purpose and provided sufficient Islamic orientation. The Objectives Resolution and the 1973 Constitution were all the framework required to build a genuine Muslim society. Moreover, the 1973 Constitution had established the Council of Islamic Ideology, and that body was charged with scrutinizing the laws enacted by the legislature. The council could recommend the repeal or amendment of any law deemed to be repugnant to Islam. Finally, the political opposition noted that the Constitution prescribed a time limit for bringing the country's laws into conformity with Islamic precepts.

The MRD—which had a changeable membership that sometimes included the PPP, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Pakistan National Party, JUI, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), National Democratic Party (NDP), Khairuddin Muslim League, Pagaro Muslim League, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) and, on occasion, the Jamaat-i-Islami—joined in condemning Zia's intention to give the country a "new" political system. The opposition envisaged the decree of a set of laws that would make the 1973 Constitution null and void. The future of their political organizations, they believed, also hung in the balance. If the junta reopened the constitution question, the matter of provincial relationships would again be brought into question. Constitution making had been

repeatedly disturbed by the provincial issue. The reopening of old wounds while provincialism was again latent and subject to exploitation by alien powers carried serious consequences. Most important, however, the MRD wanted a return to civilian government and an end to the arbitrary system of martial law.

The MRD's Central Action Committee assembled in May 1983 with Maulana Luqman Alipuri (JUI) in the chair. Attending the meeting was Khwaja Khairuddin, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari and Abid Zuberi (NDP), Farooq Leghari, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Maulana Ehteram ul Haq (PPP), Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Iqbal Hyder, and Alamdar Hyder (Qaumi Mahazi-i-Azadi), Fetehtab Ali Khan (Mazdoor Kisan Party), Mushtaq Mirza (PDP), and Qazi Sher Afzal and Hakim Jamaluddin (JUI). At the conclusion of their meeting, the MRD leaders announced a 31-point program that was aimed at preserving the 1973 Constitution, increasing provincial autonomy, and securing a broader role in decision-making. The MRD called for a strict separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and fundamental guarantees of free expression at all levels. It therefore called for the withdrawal of the Press and Publications Ordinance to ensure an open flow of information.

The program also endorsed trade union activities, including the right of collective bargaining and the withholding of services. The MRD sought the elimination of discrimination against women and religious minorities, as well as the strict accountability of civil and military personnel. Tax burdens were ordered reduced on workers with fixed incomes, and a clear demarcation was demanded between private industry and government corporations. The Leninist phrase "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" was also adopted in redesigning the socioeconomic system. The MRD urged the establishment of compulsory military training and reinforced Pakistan's non-aligned status which, it said, was threatened by the decision to accept substantial military assistance from the United States. The MRD insisted on good relations with all of Pakistan's neighbors and cited the country's special ties to the Third World, especially the Muslim states.

The MRD leaders intended to carry their message throughout the country, announcing they would hold a major protest demonstration on August 14, 1983, the date set by Zia for the proclamation of the junta's new political system. The authorities, however, were unwilling to allow the free movement of the opposition and made interprovincial travel virtually impossible. Sherbaz Mazari, for example, was prevented from deplaning in Peshawar in May 1983. His comments following his return to Karachi revealed the deepening frustration of all the politicians:

The individuals at the helm of affairs have a weakness in that they assume that, if the wheels are turning and their orders are being carried out, all's well. They have no idea of what is fermenting and festering inside, and to avoid facing reality, especially that which concerns the people's feelings and susceptibilities, is not desirable or realistic policy.

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It is also fallacious to deduce that, if the present regime's opponents are not coming into the streets or are afraid of doing so, there is peace and tranquility everywhere.

Despite the criticism of the political opposition, in July 1983 Zia's 17-member Constitution Commission reviewed the different reports of the Council of Islamic Ideology, a committee of the Majlis-i-Shoora, and a cabinet committee. Given approximately two weeks to complete its work and to recommend its findings to the president, the Constitution Commission attempted to draw ideas from all three documents in drafting its response. The work of the commission was especially complicated by the different conclusions drawn by the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Majlis committee. The council called for a unitary form of government, whereas the Majlis committee urged the reconstitution of the parliamentary system, the council recommended elections on a nonparty basis, whereas the Majlis committee argued for the reinstatement of the political parties. The council called for the retention of the Majlis, although reduced in number and with only 70 percent of the body directly elected. It also recommended the creation of the Supreme Majlis for Islamic Affairs, which would have 20 members and be chaired by the president. A separate majlis was also contemplated for non-Muslims.

The Majlis committee, by contrast, argued for the retention of the 1973 Constitution which, it noted, represented the country's Islamic character and ensured the promotion of Islamic order. The committee also urged the protection of fundamental rights, the independence of the judiciary, and a balance between the powers of the president and those of the prime minister. The Majlis committee spoke for the more sophisticated elements, and it left little doubt that it preferred a return to competitive politics, insisted on open elections without proportional representation, and approved an unfettered free press. Its recommendations also reflected concern that the ideas furthered by the Council of Islamic Ideology would only perpetuate arbitrary government in the name of Islam.

The cabinet committee maintained a lower profile, addressing itself to elections on a nonparty basis, but it did not indicate how the elections would be held or what powers should be conferred on the president. It was from these assorted and conflicting recommendations that the Constitution Commission endeavored to assemble its own report for transmittal to Zia.

In the meantime, the government revealed by its actions that it would not tolerate disobedience from the politicians. Sherbaz Mazari was arrested and ordered detained for three months in the Central Jail at Multan. Mazari had been ordered to remain in his village, and his appearance in Karachi prompted his arrest and incarceration. Mazari's plight was a signal to other politicians that the junta would not tolerate disturbances of any kind, especially on the eve of Zia's proclamation of a new political system.

Emerging Political System

The outline of the military junta's political system began to unfold more seriously on December 24, 1981, when Zia announced the formation of the Majlis-i-Shoora. He called the body an interim arrangement to promote "effective contact" between the people and the government. The Majlis was described as an all-nominated assembly, selected by the president from lists assembled by his staff and the bureaucracy. In total, the Majlis would consist of 350 members, but Zia acknowledged that only 287 would be identified for the first session. The Majlis-i-Shoora in theory would perform the tasks of a legislature, but it would not be endowed with the powers normally associated with a lawmaking body. As a temporary substitute for a constitutional parliament, its functions and purpose were sharply defined and circumscribed. Zia explained that there was a need for a broad consultative body in order to bridge popular demand with government policy and claimed that the Majlis would serve such a purpose. The president also cited his reasons for selecting rather than electing the council's members; he said that holding elections would only inflame partisan activity and that the goal of selection would be quickly abandoned. The country could ill afford a violent encounter that could weaken its defenses, he explained. Moreover, there was a need for regional, as well as functional, representation. It was therefore decided that the most expeditious, least controversial, method involved careful selection by the country's chief executive, i.e., Zia.

The "powers" of the Majlis-i-Shoora are defined in the presidential order that created it. The Majlis can recommend the enactment of laws or suggest amendments to existing laws. It may discuss the annual budget, review the five-year development plan, and request information from any ministry or operative agency in the government. Finally, the Majlis can assume additional responsibilities on direct assignment from the president. But the Majlis is not a true legislature. Although its scrutinizing powers are highlighted—a role it shares with the Council of Islamic Ideology—it can neither initiate action involving the country's laws nor insist that its recommendations be adopted by the government.

The government has attempted to give the Majlis a broad character. Members have been selected from the different provinces and regions. No less significant, a whole range of occupational groups has been identified. Members of the ulama, *mashaikh* (students of Islam), farmers, industrial workers, lawyers, teachers, medical doctors, and engineers are associated with the council. Women and minorities are also given special consideration, and seats have been reserved for them. The Majlis has a chairman, or Speaker, who is the chief officer of the assembly. He is appointed by the president from among the council membership, as are the four vice chairmen. All the officers and members of the Majlis are required to take an oath of allegiance to the

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government in accordance with the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1961, which provides the foundation for Zia's rule.

Observers examining the composition of the Majlis-i-Shoora were quick to cite the large number of landlords in the body, many having large rural constituencies. Former government officials and politicians were also quite numerous. It was estimated that approximately one-third of the members were former central government or provincial ministers. The political parties were also indirectly represented by former party faithful. Almost 100 members had been associated with the PPP. The PPP formally denounced the Majlis as a tool of the military junta, as did the Tehrik-i-Istiqal, the NDP, the PDP, and the Khairuddin Muslim League. The Pagaro Muslim League, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the JUP were less critical but nevertheless forbade their followers from joining the council. A number of members, however, defied their parties, and the organizations were left to decide what, if any, disciplinary action would be taken against such individuals. Pakistani politicians seldom placed party above personal ambition, and the Zia government counted on the constancy of that record. The parties complained bitterly about the government's action in forming the council, but their inability to control their own members illustrated their inherent weakness.

Khwaja Mohammad Safdar was appointed Speaker of the Majlis in January 1982. Safdar, an old-line Muslim League politician and a participant in legislatures since 1953, accepted the assignment and immediately went public with his view that the council should function as a fully responsible legislature, with certain limitations. Safdar accepted the directive that the body should not have the power to vote on money bills, but he affirmed the council's right to review the government's budget once it had been officially announced. He strongly believed that the administration should accept constructive criticism focusing on the fair apportioning of funds. Safdar also noted the need to reinstate political parties. He called for a continuing dialogue between the junta and the political leaders and offered the opinion that the Majlis should be dissolved within one year and elections held for a permanent legislature.

But even as Safdar was offering his views, the government was cracking down on the political parties. Martial law orders were imposed, preventing the politicians from indulging in any public activity. Dozens of leading personalities were either arrested, constrained, or prevented from traveling from one province to another. The government was disinclined to take Safdar's advice seriously, but the longtime politician was not about to resign his post. The Majlis was a weak institution, but it permitted expression otherwise denied.

The Majlis-i-Shoora met for two sessions during 1982 and was called together again in February, June, and October 1983. There was no expectation that the body would soon be dissolved, but the Speaker's prediction that general elections would be conducted within a year proved too optimistic. In January 1983 Zia revealed that he would

provide the country with a new political structure and underlined his belief that the country could not tolerate an election campaign in which the several political parties would be free to assault the government. Conditions were far too brittle, he asserted, to permit such unlicensed behavior. The new political system, slated for formal announcement on August 14, 1983—the thirty-sixth anniversary of independence—appeared to leave a place for the Majlis, but perhaps in modified form. Zia declared that the only elections contemplated by the government were for the local councils. First held in 1979, the second round was scheduled for September 1983. In the meantime, the country remained under martial law, and the Provisional Constitutional Order, 1981, continued to supersede the 1973 Constitution.

The local councils that were assembled in 1979 constituted another foundation stone in the junta's political edifice. The councils were perceived to be representative of the nation's gross interests. Councillors were elected from constituencies delimited by the Pakistan Election Commission, and the elections were conducted without formal political party affiliation or involvement. Zia's perception of the councils was positive in that they seemed to meet a need for grass-roots expression and also isolated the conventional political parties. The junta—sounding very much like Ayub in the 1960s—argued that the councillors should be solely concerned with constituent needs and therefore ought to be consumed in development programs, not political hickering.

The local councils were organized into tiers with the union councils at the base, *tehsil* councils above them, and district councils at the apex. Councillors were to serve four-year terms and could stand for reelection. Each union council had approximately 15 members, and the chairmen of the union councils formed the *tehsil* council; members of *tehsil* councils were elected to serve on the district council. Towns were given the same basic structure, but municipal committees and municipal corporations were formed in the larger metropolitan centers. In all, the local councils supposedly provided representation for the common folk while also publicizing a device for the reestablishment of self-government. The Majlis-i-Shoora was meant to raise grass-roots government to the national level. It was also another aspect of the political education envisaged by the country's rulers. Most significant from Zia's vantage point, it provided the nation with the opportunity to manage its political life without political parties.

The local councillors totaled approximately 50,000 and were charged with supervising the raising of agricultural production, promoting education, health and sanitation, and improving the water supply and roads in their particular regions. Cultural affairs were also made a local council responsibility, and services to constituents could range from birth notices to assisting with funeral arrangements. Councillors in the cities had somewhat similar responsibilities, modified by their environment. They were expected to deal with emergency relief in time of flooding or other natural disasters. They were also called on to

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promote economic development, oversee the distribution and use of electric power, and provide a variety of civic services. Councillors were also authorized to determine the needs of their constituents and to draft plans for improving their respective localities. Such planning was supposed to be passed on to government administrators with whom the councillors were associated. Those plans were envisaged as ultimately working their way up to the higher planning boards.

The wide range of responsibilities granted to the councillors made them dependent on the administrators, who possessed the expertise and technical know-how and who controlled the funds that only the government could make available. It was this dependence on the bureaucracy—the traditional steel frame—that led critics of the system to condemn it as little more than a warmed-over version of Ayub's Basic Democracies system (see *Basic Democracies*, ch. 1). The political parties were especially outspoken in their condemnation of the local bodies. They described the junta's actions as a deception and called on the party faithful to boycott their proceedings. The government, however, was even more convinced of their utility.

Zia's much-publicized Shariat courts were also introduced in 1979. The junta declared that the function of the Shariat courts was to supplement the work of the secular courts, but it has been slow in developing the system. Nevertheless, a Federal Shariat Court was established in Islamabad and granted the authority to determine whether existing law is counter to Islamic principle. Although it has been argued that the sharia is separate from secular law and that each is dominant within its separate sphere, informed opinion speaks of the eventual substitution of Islamic law for the older Anglo-Saxon-cum-Islamic law tradition in the subcontinent.

Further evidence of the validity of this opinion was set forth in Zia's presentation on January 26, 1983. Addressing a high-level meeting under his chairmanship, the CMLA declared that the junta gave top priority to efforts aimed at introducing Islamic justice in the country. Reviewing measures taken to enforce his Islamic order, he insisted that the "sole purpose" for creating Pakistan was to provide the Muslims of the region with Islamic justice. With the assistance provided by the ulama and despite unmentioned obstacles, Zia insisted his plan was on schedule. He cited the Haddood Ordinance of 1979, which dramatized Muslim codes of behavior in a variety of social conditions. Crimes against Islam are known as *hadd* and have been treated forcefully by the military government (see *Crime and Punishment*, ch. 5). Imbibing alcohol, attending bawdy clubs, and gambling have been made high offenses. The population has been encouraged to find pleasure in prayer, family life, and productive endeavor.

Penalties for breaking the law were made severe. Public lashing was at first employed, but after receiving an unfavorable foreign press, the junta decided to carry out the punishments in private. The Islamic provision for severing of limbs for crimes involving theft has been reaffirmed, although as of late 1983 such punishments appeared not

to have been inflicted. Those found guilty of murder must forfeit their own lives. Indeed, Zia justified the execution of his predecessor, Bhutto, on the grounds that Islamic justice makes no exceptions for persons of high rank.

Zia has stressed the need to apply Islamic law uniformly to all members of the Muslim community (*umma*), irrespective of sectarian differences. This particular matter has raised problems, however. The Shiite community was provoked by the government's proclamation of a Zakat ordinance and the creation of the Zakat Fund. Zakat is the Islamic requirement that Muslims share their wealth with those less fortunate (see Islam, Tenets and Early Development, ch. 2). The Zia government has sought to institutionalize and enforce the payment of Zakat. Pursuant to the Zakat ordinance, monies derived by the government are divided into three parts—the local account, the provincial account, and the central account (see Public Finance, ch. 3). These funds were earmarked for benefits in the community and were anticipated to spark development in a broad range of projects from the villages to the national scene. A hierarchy of control, whose members include ulama, was created to oversee the distribution of Zakat funds. Zia appointed the administrator general, who was directly responsible to him and who maintained overall control of the program.

Although people of means, who were the ones most affected by the order, were unimpressed with the scheme and quietly expressed the opinion that Zakat was being incorrectly employed, outspoken criticism emerged from the Shiite community, whose leaders argued that the tax was a Sunni responsibility and that the Shiites had their own method of collecting funds from their believers. In effect, the Shiites argued that the tax ran counter to their religious tradition. Moreover, it weakened the Shiite minority—some 20 to 25 percent of the population—and exposed it to arbitrary Sunni actions. When the Zia government displayed indifference to Shiite concerns, direct action was taken to dramatize their position. In July 1979 a Shiite band stormed the secretariat in Islamabad and held it for three days. Only when the government agreed to yield to the Shiite demand and to lift the obligation of Zakat from the community did the protesters leave the premises.

This act of compromise was viewed by certain groups within the Sunni community as appeasement. Resentment, therefore, increased, ready to be exploited by a variety of groups at almost any time. Zia's brother officers were secretly unhappy with the decision to lift the obligation, not for religious reasons but because it projected weakness. Given pressure from his inner circle as well as from members of the Sunni community, Zia was left in a quandry. Although fearful of having to reverse himself again, he had to weigh the consequences of doing nothing. Apparently he decided at least to test the water. His statements in January 1983, therefore, appeared to indicate a possible reversal of his earlier position. Differences between Muslim sects would not be permitted to interfere with the notion of Muslim unity, declared Zia.

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The Shittes, however, interpreted his statement as a betrayal, and riots involving Sunnis and Shittes broke out in Karachi in February. The altercations were said to have been aroused by disputed ownership of a neighborhood mosque. More prescient observers noted the deep-seated animosity between the communities and the intense conflict that had arisen over the application of Zakat. As tension rose to a new peak between the communities, some observers assumed that the riots were instigated—at least in part—by Zia's enemies and those opposed to the notion of an Islamic state. Clearly, the disturbance once again illustrated the fragile nature of the Islamic structure. The Majlis-i-Shoora, then in session, reverberated with demands for a full-blown debate on the Sunni-Shiite controversy. The junta was disinclined to give more publicity to the affair, however, and decided to clamp down on the media's reporting of the communal clashes. Beyond this measure, the government was compelled to take stern action. But despite the imposition of a curfew, indiscriminate killing and arson continued through March. The police arrested hundreds of demonstrators, and Zia declared there would be no leniency for the miscreants.

Another dimension of the conflict was the role played by Iran's consul in Karachi. He was accused by Sunni leaders of actively supporting the Pakistani Shittes. Moreover, the detonation of four explosive devices in Karachi during this period was allegedly traced to Iranian students studying at the University of Karachi. Thus, the controversy not only remained unresolved but also assumed more complex characteristics. The clash revealed the difficulties in erecting a model Islamic state, especially when still another kind of Islamic state was being attempted in a neighboring country. Zia, however, had gone too far to consider retreat. He cautioned his critics who demanded more positive and faster results that Islamization would go forward but that it would have to be a gradual process because of resistance at home and a variety of influences from abroad.

The minister of law and parliamentary affairs and that of finance and economic affairs reinforced the president's presentation. Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq said that the introduction of Zakat, Hadood (see Glossary), and Ushr had not completed the process of Islamization but had set the tone for the flowering of the Islamic state. In a speech to the Majlis-i-Shoora on February 6, 1983, he reiterated the government's belief that Ushr would initiate the Islamic welfare state. Ushr, he noted, had been brought into total conformity with the sharia following exhaustive efforts by government officials, a broadly based, representative body of ulama, and other experts. The funds generated by Ushr would be used to expand industry, construct roads and hospitals, and establish needed social services. In an earlier address the finance minister had called on employers and employees to discuss their mutual relationships and to find ways to express their Islamic heritage in the workplace.

The minister of education, Mohammad Afzal, informed the assembly that books used in the country's schools had been examined and that

materials judged to be anti-Islam had been expunged. This censorship, he noted, would continue in collaboration with the ulama. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting adopted measures ensuring that newspapers did not publish false accounts and absolutely forbade pornography. Repeal of the Press and Publications Ordinance and dissolution of the Press Trust, requested by journalists, was rejected by the government. The provincial governments were also notified by the junta that "obscene" materials must be purged from the marketplace and that anything deemed to be immoral in films or printed matter must be banned. The provincial governments were also given responsibility for policing sermons in the mosques. An ordinance was issued declaring that no religious sect had the right to preach against the faith of another and that violators of this rule would be firmly punished. Sermons critical of the junta were also prohibited.

On January 27, 1983, Zia announced that 150 Shariat courts would open in April. These courts would be staffed by persons from the existing judicial system who were knowledgeable in Islamic jurisprudence and known to be men of the highest integrity. Other judges would be drawn from those formally engaged in studying the sharia and *fiqh* (legal theology) (see *Islam in Pakistani Society*, ch. 2). Given the need for even more personnel to fill the judicial positions, Zia revealed he would draw individuals from the religious schools (*madrasas*). This announcement had been expected, and it suggested that the timetable for transferring of legal cases from the secular to the religious courts had been accelerated. The passage of the Establishment of Courts of "Qazis" Ordinance at the winter 1983 session of the *Majlis-i-Shoora* also confirmed this action. Zia informed the nation that the Qazi courts would be housed in the *tehsils* and would be an extension of the local councils system. The president stated that the Qazi courts increased the number of courts by six times and would add immeasurably to the dispensation of justice.

District Shariat courts were also ordered established. Each court was to have at least two judges who were to be fully conversant with Islamic law. The district courts would operate directly under the Federal Shariat Court. Zia appeared to go out of his way to assure the members of the legal profession who had so vociferously and strenuously opposed the creation of the Qazi courts that they were not intended to replace regular courts or affect them in any significant way. The Qazi courts were meant to treat cases at the grass-roots level that otherwise might not be heard at all, or if they were, not until the passage of months and sometimes years. Islamic justice, according to Zia, must be fair, but it must also be efficient and fast. Justice delayed was justice denied, and such behavior only weakened the relationship between the people and government.

An indication of how the religious courts intended to interpret the law was revealed with a ruling by the Federal Shariat Court in 1983. In an opinion that allegedly defined what a "mosque" is, the court ruled that a mosque built on government land without proper per-

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mission of the government is not a mosque even if prayers are conducted there. If, however, subsequent authority is granted, the structure may be considered a mosque under sharia law. Muslims who pray at a structure illegally constructed are not affected, however. The government was determined to promote religious experience and performance in the country, but it also insisted on maintaining control and use of its property. Open spaces did not ipso facto permit worshippers to erect a mosque. Land had to be legally purchased for this as for other purposes.

The order of the Federal Shariat Court was quickly communicated to all the provinces, and government departments and agencies were authorized to check the practice. The government emphasized that the ruling applied to land owned by individuals as well as by the government. Property owners were to be protected from illegal seizure of their holdings, and an argument that it was done for religious purposes did not make such actions proper. The government was therefore authorized to examine cases where mosques had been built in the past without the permission of the landlord. Such activity was in contravention of sharia law, and the government was duty-bound to ensure that Quranic injunctions and principles of Islamic jurisprudence were not violated. The 1983 Sunni-Shiite clash in Karachi might also be traced to the government directive over ownership of such a disputed mosque.

Despite all the ongoing difficulties and future uncertainties, the junta's evolving political-legal system had nevertheless begun to assume a particular shape. The creation of the office of a national ombudsman (*ucfaqi mohtasib*) in 1983 and the appointment of a former chief justice of the Lahore High Court, Sardar Mohammad Iqbal, to serve in that position for the next four years provided further evidence that the regime wished to ameliorate conditions as it continued to move forward with its overall scheme. The ombudsman was made responsible for identifying, investigating, redressing, and rectifying any injustice committed against a citizen by a government agency. Government agencies defined by the January 24, 1983, order included ministries, divisions, departments, commissions, or offices of the federal government except for courts, judicial tribunals, or commissions established by law. The ombudsman's authority did not extend to foreign affairs or defense questions. His power covered the whole of the country, however, and he was to be provided with an adequate secretariat to enable him to discharge his responsibilities.

Some observers were skeptical that the new institution would be permitted to operate according to its charge. They noted the embarrassment and pressure that could be placed on the authorities and that the highest level administrators could not escape tests of public accountability. In late 1983 it remained to be seen if the government was serious in opening the new office. The question of co-optation was raised, suggesting that the ombudsman could become an instrument of the military junta, even if Justice Iqbal insisted on his independence.

Critics pointed out that Mohammad Safdar, the Speaker of the Majlis, was an "independent" thinker, but the general view persisted that he had been successfully co-opted by the generals. Moreover, the ombudsman could be dismissed by the president if he determined the officer's actions were in violation of unspecified moral codes. The ombudsman also found himself constrained by martial law regulations that he could not question. None of these criticisms, however, deflected the junta from its determined course.

Confirmation on the shape of the junta's "new" political system came in the form of Zia's address to the Majlis-i-Shoora on August 12, 1983. Zia had promised the country a new political order and had reserved August 14, 1983, Pakistan's Independence Day, for his announcement. His decision to move up the timetable of his presentation was apparently provoked by intelligence reports that the political opposition planned nationwide demonstrations and protests for the 14th. Thus, while the police and military establishment were authorized to seize, neutralize, and arrest the political leaders of the "defunct" parties, Zia explained the junta's plan to restart the stalled political process.

Responding to the different presentations of the Council of Islamic Ideology and the special committees of the Majlis and the cabinet, as well as to the presentation of the Constitution Commission, Zia seemed to opt for a blend of the various proposals. The junta's decision permitted the re-creation of a central parliament and provincial legislatures in 1985, but it also insisted on an overarching, all-powerful presidency. In this scheme the prime minister served at the pleasure of the president, not the legislature. Significant too was the indirect presidential election. Although the legislatures would be elected on the basis of universal adult franchise, the president was to be elected on a vote of the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures. The president was slated to enjoy the power of decision in all important matters and would be head of government as well as head of state. The president-prime minister relationship resembled the one written into the Turkish constitution in 1962 and appeared to guarantee the political dominance of the Pakistani armed forces. The presidential system also compared favorably with the one developed by General Ayub Khan in 1962, although in that system Ayub was indirectly elected by an electoral college of Basic Democrats, and there was no place for a prime minister. Irrespective of these differences, in 1983 as in 1962 critics of the presidential system denounced the dictatorial nature of the arrangement and insisted that it only sustained the power monopoly of the armed forces and its general staff.

Zia gave the appearance of acknowledging the demands of those who argued for retention of the 1973 Constitution. Nevertheless, his determination to amend the 1973 Constitution, to transform the presidency from a ceremonial to an active role, and to make the chief executive the country's chief decisionmaker altered the document beyond recognition. Bhutto had wanted the type of presidential system that Zia had proclaimed, but the political opposition forced him to

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accept a modified parliamentary type. The 1973 Constitution had resulted from that confrontation. Zia sought to avoid such pressures. He asserted that elections would be held in March 1985, when martial law would finally be lifted. But he also repeated an often-stated view that the political parties would not be permitted to contest the elections. Zia argued that Islamic principles were at variance with factional political organization and that the politicians practiced the politics of disorder, whereas by contrast Islam emphasized brotherhood and commonwealth. Zia was adamant on the subject of the politicians, and he threatened to deal harshly with anyone threatening to disrupt public order.

According to Zia, the president would be empowered to select the prime minister, a task usually reserved for the leading party in the parliament. He also revealed that the president would have the power to dissolve the parliament, call for new elections, and generally oversee political operations. Because the president would also command the armed forces, it was doubtful that countervailing powers would exist to check the arbitrary actions of a sitting president. Zia explained that the president required far-reaching powers in order to ensure the integrity of the country, provide for its security, and sustain the momentum toward the Islamic state. Observers concluded that the various commissions and special committees that had submitted their recommendations had not altered the course that Zia and his colleagues had set in train in 1979.

The heralded "new" political system may have organized and placed in perspective the variety of programs that the martial law government had already put into force. But Zia's presentation was more a summary of what had already transpired; it was not a new beginning. Moreover, the political opposition wasted no time in demonstrating their dissatisfaction. They too had anticipated what was now a matter of public record. The civil-military bureaucracy was determined to maintain its control over the country, and there was little the politically inspired elements could do but take to the streets and court arrest. The decision to organize mass protests throughout the country on August 14 was aimed at dramatizing the deep-seated discontent in the country. Despite the prior arrest of many opposition leaders and ordinances preventing protest parades, the frustrated politicians and their followers congregated in public places to voice their displeasure. The authorities, however, were ready for them, and in spite of their large number they were contained by the police and army.

The junta was undeterred by the MRD. It also seemed little interested in the cries of the intelligentsia, as represented by an editorial in *Dawn* a few weeks before Zia's speech before the Majlis. The editorial addressed the long and continuing suspension of the political process. It cited the dominant role of the civil-military bureaucracy in managing the country's affairs and lamented the fact that the administrators could not be challenged to answer for their acts. The editorial further stated that political atrophy could only grow worse, the Con-

stitution would not be respected, and confidence in government was certain to deteriorate further. The editorial stressed the inability of the press to play a proper role and criticized an environment that discouraged and prevented the airing of a variety of opinion. *Dawn* called on the government to break its isolation from the politicians, to reinstate the independence of the judiciary, and to open a dialogue with the patriotic citizenry. The politicians, it opined, were prepared to engage the government in constructive discourse, but responsibility for initiating the exchange rested with the government "because as wielders of power through the long political vacuum, it must decide what to do next, whether to bring the continuing political pause to an end or to carry on with the burden of national responsibility for an indefinite period, with all the risks and hazards it entails for the nation's future." The generals apparently decided to ignore these sage comments and pleadings. They had decided to sustain military rule and to pray for their ultimate success and hence acceptance.

The MRD-inspired demonstrations officially commenced on August 19, 1983, with what was to have been a wreath-laying ceremony at the mausoleum of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The ceremony was marred by pitched battles between members of the movement and those opposing it, and the police arrested a number of demonstrators for being in violation of the Quaid-i-Azam Mazar (Protection and Maintenance) Ordinance, 1971. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, president of the PPP in Sind and the chief spokesman for the dissidents, declared that he and his colleagues had taken an oath that they would not give up their struggle against the junta's political system "until democracy was restored in the country and general elections were held under the unanimously adopted 1973 Constitution." But what was described as a peaceful civil disobedience movement on August 14 had degenerated into violence even before it was officially launched. The Zia government had cause for anxiety.

Under cover of the opposition movement, various groups joined in broad-scale attacks on persons and property symbolizing governmental authority, especially in southern Sind. The deaths of several policemen forced the authorities to retaliate, and the use of government counterforce was undoubtedly a desired response from the standpoint of those fomenting the disorder. Grist was provided for the opposition mill; the military government was repressive and had to be replaced regardless of cost.

In effect, the MRD was used as an umbrella organization and front for a wide variety of disenchanted groups. The MRD lacked the necessary framework to ensure that its followers would adhere to the organization's promised peaceful path, and the political groups that sought to take advantage of the MRD were disinclined to forgo violent tactics. Although their actions made a mockery of the organization's democratic objectives, the government was in a poor position to cultivate supporters. Arrests multiplied, but so did the attacks on government property, jails, police stations, and public transport. The

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disorder, however, was generally confined to Sind, the Punjab, the NWFP, and Baluchistan were restless, and protest meetings were held, but by comparison the prevailing situation seemed less threatening. In October, however, Baluchistan's principal metropolitan area, Quetta, was the scene of a large demonstration organized ostensibly by the MRD and the Pakhtun Khwa National Awami Party. The leaders of the demonstration claimed that they were acting in solidarity with their brethren in Sind who had borne the brunt of the struggle against the martial law government. Ultimately, the police and demonstrators both resorted to firing, and at least 10 people were reported killed. The fear that the demonstrations could spread had been realized, and Zia sought ways to address the problem before it became even more critical.

Some observers believed the government was in error in arresting the MRD leaders, because the leaderless rank and file then ran amok, and the violent character of the demonstrations continued to intensify. The junta must have drawn the identical conclusion, because Zia announced that he was prepared to modify the proposed political system in consultation with a variety of prominent leaders, as long as calm and rationality prevailed. Nevertheless, he reiterated both the determination of his government not to tolerate "anarchic elements" and his view that the "lawless under the garb of democracy" were simply out to create chaos and disorder in the country. Zia acknowledged that the MRD had brought thousands of demonstrators into the streets, but he was not convinced that it was a coherent organization. Nor did he believe it had mass appeal outside Sind Province.

Moreover, the JUP withdrew from the MRD nine days after the demonstrations began, and its leader, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, agreed to meet with Zia to discuss the opposition's grievances. The conference was held in October 1983, at the time of the Quetta disturbance, but their meeting ended without bearing fruit. Noorani opined that Zia was seeking to buy time in agreeing to open a dialogue with opposition leaders and that the president was not ready to commit himself to serious modification of his August announcement. Although he was less than satisfied, Noorani believed the course he had taken was preferable to the one launched by more radical elements in the opposition, and he continued to believe that the junta would eventually adopt many of the MRD demands.

In subsequent weeks Zia or his emissaries met with many of the other political leaders. General Arif, for example, visited Asghar Khan, and although their deliberations were not disclosed, there was no doubt they discussed possible ways of modifying the junta's political program. Zia's apparent preference for the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pagaro Muslim League also did not seem to rule out a broader arrangement that would include other political organizations. But the president continued to press for a party-less election, insisting that future campaigns could be held along more conventional lines. The politicians, however, were unreconciled to this idea, and the impasse seemed destined to carry into 1984.

Indeed, the MRD had been severely ridiculed by the far left. The MRD had called for a "Black Day" in July, and it was belittled because of its apparent meekness. The MRD was in fact accused of being too frightened to launch an aggressive campaign. Parties like the Muslim League, the PDP, the Tehrik-i-Istiqal, and the JUI were also identified as business class, capitalist, and bureaucratic. The more extreme left insisted that these parties were afraid of a popular movement and wedded to the United States. Bhutto's widow and her daughter Benazir were considered more genuine popular leaders, and their PPP faction was cited as acceptable to the more revolutionary. Nevertheless, in the absence of the Bhutto women the PPP was judged too divided by sectarian differences to mount a clear challenge to the government. Thus the left saw the necessity of creating an independent movement that would offer them greater leverage.

Toward this goal a number of leftist groups joined Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo's Pakistan National Party. The merger included the pro-Soviet Communist Party Front, or National Progressive Party, which had earlier referred to Bizenjo as an agent of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. All the groups merging with the PNP believed that a Pakistani revolution would result from external forces, not internal developments. Following this merger, Wali Khan's NDP also began negotiations with Bizenjo, indicating its interest in joining the expanding organization. If consummated, the merger would give the left overwhelming influence in Pakistan's frontier regions, enjoying two charismatic leaders in Wali Khan and Bizenjo. Punjabi and Sindhi leftists would also find it difficult to resist such a combination.

Zia's warning to left-wing writers and intellectuals that they should either accept Pakistan's Islamic ideology or leave the country was made in October 1983. Zia was clearly concerned about the new aggressiveness of the left. He was clearly aware of the Bizenjo movement, and Bizenjo was arrested on September 1. But Zia also cast a glance at the Mazdoor Kisan Party and the Pakistan Awami Tehrik, which had refused to accept the idea of outside forces bringing the revolution. They continued to press for revolutionary internal change, but their adherence to the leadership of Moscow-based Afzal Bangash raised again the specter of external influences. Moreover, Zia and the junta were convinced that the continuing disturbances in Sind and the possibility of spreading conflict in Baluchistan were the work of these irreconcilable radicals.

The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration

Pakistan has moved through several phases in its limited but turbulent history. As a result of the significant roles played by its dominant personalities, it is reasonable to describe the period between 1947 and 1966 as the Punjabi phase; the period between 1966 and 1971 as the Pakhtun (Pathan) phase; the period between 1971 and 1977 as the Sindhi phase; and the period since 1977 as the *muhajir* (immigrant) phase. These divisions are admittedly arbitrary, but they can assist in

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attempting to understand Pakistan's political history. Jinnah's vision of a diverse but cooperative, nationally integrated nation died with him in 1948. His successors possessed neither his charisma nor his adroitness. His immediate disciple, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951 while on a speaking tour in the Punjab. Liaquat's mission had been the selling of the Basic Principles Report to those outspoken Punjabis who had refused to accept a constitutional system that appeared to subordinate them to the larger Bengali population. Liaquat had been warned before his departure that an attempt on his life was a possibility, and he was counseled not to make the journey. His death proved to be a turning point in which divisive forces were released that even the armed forces could not control (see *Problems at Independence*, ch. 1).

The 1947-48 phase is also identified as the first parliamentary phase, the constitution-building period (see *Constitutional Beginnings*, ch. 1). Efforts floundered in the search for a formula that would permit representation commensurate with the numerical makeup of the nation. The Bengalis, the most numerous nationality, insisted on a distribution of seats that would have given them a majority in the national legislature. The Punjabis were adamantly opposed to such an arrangement, the drafting of the constitution was delayed, and deep wounds were opened in the body politic. These wounds would never heal. Although the Punjabi elite finally agreed on a draft constitution in 1956, there was so much intrigue prior to its promulgation, so many illegal tactics, so little concern or respect for institutions—such as the original Constituent Assembly, which was dissolved in 1954—that the Baluch, Bengalis, and Pakhtuns never believed the constitution represented their interests. Moreover, prior to the drafting of the constitution, the Punjabi elite was sufficiently strong to force the amalgamation of the provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit.

The Punjabi phase ended with the 1958 coup d'état, which ushered in the Pakhtun phase. Although this phase was associated with General, later Field Marshal, Ayub Khan, the term was actually suggestive of a different style of leadership, because neither Ayub nor Yahya Khan was a true Pakhtun (see *Collapse of the Parliamentary System*, ch. 1).

The Pakhtun phase sought legitimization through the drafting and promulgation of Pakistan's second constitution, in 1962 (see *The 1962 Constitution*, ch. 1). Political parties were resurrected, and the politicians were again active, albeit under restrained circumstances. Ayub had his supporters organize his own political party, the Conventionist Muslim League. The traditional Muslim League members cried foul when they realized Ayub sought to identify his organization with the one responsible for the country's birth. They were bitter in their criticism of the scheme, and they argued long and ardently that the Ayub administration was only playing at politics and that its true intention was the re-creation of a colonial-style administrative state.

In 1968 Ayub suffered a paralyzing bout with viral pneumonia that almost took his life. The higher bureaucracy realized their frailty during

this period, and they sought options that would sustain them in his absence. That year was also the tenth anniversary of Ayub's rule. The government insisted on singing its own praises, citing the accomplishments achieved during the "Decade of Development." A lavish celebration was launched propagandizing the success of Pakistan's economic program. Pakistan was applauded by the World Bank and Harvard University economists—who were responsible for much of the country's economic planning—for the proper use of foreign assistance. The government made much of these accolades and used them as evidence of good management and wise leadership.

The general population, however, was little impressed. In fact, rioting broke out in small towns in West Pakistan and soon spread to the larger cities. The government was heavily criticized for spending precious resources on celebrating its success while ignoring massive poverty and gross deprivation. Mention was made of the 20-odd families who had expanded their fortunes. Notice was also given to Ayub's family, especially his sons, who had capitalized on several industrial schemes.

Ayub was forced to step aside when he no longer had the confidence of the civil-military bureaucracy. In March 1969 Ayub announced he was transferring power to his brother-in-arms, Yahya Khan. Yahya, however, was unprepared for the exercise of political power, and he yielded to demands to reinstate the political parties, to hold elections under a parliamentary format, to dissolve the Basic Democracies system, and above all, to break up One Unit. Ayub's system was quickly and unceremoniously confined to the dustbin of history (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1).

The reconstituting of the original West Pakistani provinces proved to be a Pandora's box of incredible magnitude. Although Yahya orchestrated the country's first experience with general elections in 1970, the decision to follow the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which distributed positions in the National Assembly according to provincial population, produced chaos, not order. The elections vividly demonstrated the deep divisions within the country. East Pakistan had clearly separated itself from the western wing because of its overwhelming support for Mujib's Awami League, while the West Pakistani provinces divided their loyalties among other narrowly conceived political organizations. Bhutto's PPP, although reputed to be the most national in ideology as well as in organization, displayed no support in East Pakistan and won seats only in the Punjab and Sind. Baluchistan and the NWFP marched to the tune of a more parochial drummer and adopted the NAP and the JUI. The 1970s therefore began most inauspiciously for Pakistan. Patterns of relationship were in place, and it only remained to play out the projected scenario.

In 1971 Islam was put to a test in the East Pakistan secession and failed; neither West Pakistanis nor East Pakistanis were prepared to raise religious experience above ethnic identity. Even the cry "Islam in Danger" was not enough to keep Pakistan from splitting in two. The

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Muslim Bengalis, with ample reason, believed their countrymen and coreligionists in West Pakistan were more dangerous than their Hindu Indian neighbors. Indian Army support, therefore, was welcome, and Hindu troops assumed the role of liberators. The intervention of the Indian Army in Pakistan's civil war wrote an end to an experiment in compatible Muslim living. The independence of Bangladesh altered Pakistan irrevocably. It also brought an end to the Pakhtun period and ushered in the Sindhi phase in Pakistan's political history. Pakistan's dismemberment exposed deep fissures in the sociopolitical design, and it remained to be seen if they could be closed or bridged.

The Sindhi phase in Pakistan's political history underplayed neither civil-military relations nor the nationalities problem. The military establishment relinquished its hold on the government following its humiliation in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. The armed forces were proud of their guardian role, but the country had been dismembered during a period of military preeminence. A military junta had provoked the civil war and presided over the breakup of Pakistan. It had the power of decision. The junta therefore had to assume ultimate responsibility for Pakistan's calamitous defeat. The generals were forced to recognize their ineptitude and acknowledge their failure. The armed forces needed time to rebuild their battered forces and to restore their morale and confidence. It was also essential that they give up claims to political authority. The Sindhi phase, therefore, involved the return of government to civilian control. Bhutto and the PPP reestablished the nation's equilibrium, charted a new course, ostracized offenders, and salvaged what remained of the original Pakistan design.

Bhutto was an experienced government official and politician. He served in Ayub's cabinet and inner circle from 1958 until 1966. Educated in the United States and Britain, he was the son of one of Sind Province's leading landlord families. He was endowed with a sharp mind and was able to master detail with relative ease. Bhutto also possessed oratorical gifts that he used to advantage in popular gatherings. Moreover, his youth and defiant public posture attracted a large student following. Bhutto left the Ayub government because he opposed Ayub's acceptance of the Tashkent Agreement after the 1965 war (see Ayub's Foreign Policy and the 1965 War with India, ch. 1). The widespread unpopularity of the agreement gave Bhutto the chance he needed to stand with the political opposition and indeed to organize his own political party. In sum, it gave him the leverage needed to topple Ayub and prepare the ground for his own power grab.

Bhutto's intransigence during the negotiations between Mujib and Yahya hints at his responsibility in the breakdown of the talks and the tragic circumstances that followed. Some critics go further in accusing Bhutto of creating the conditions that led to the loss of East Pakistan. Such a contention holds that Bhutto's only opportunity to satisfy his burning ambition lay in the separation of the eastern wing. Bhutto picked up the pieces of a broken country in December 1971, but they were "pieces" that he had helped to produce. Whether this accusation

is valid or not seems immaterial. Bhutto was a power seeker who was long on rhetoric but short on positive domestic accomplishment. And although the 1977 coup cut short his tenure, his failure is glaring. Bhutto consumed an inordinate amount of time consolidating power, isolating the competition, or neutralizing his closest supporters. For example, General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Abdul Rahim Khan assisted him in gaining the favor of the junta, in ousting Yahya Khan, and in taking power in December 1971. In March 1972, however, he accused them of displaying "Bonapartist tendencies." After denouncing them as "professional politicians," both were retired from service along with six other senior members of the air force.

By late 1976 Bhutto's growing isolation was apparent to internal and external observers, but he seemed oblivious to it. He retained an inner circle of loyal supporters, but he managed to lose the combination that brought him to power. He chose to separate himself from almost all the key personalities who had helped him organize and sustain the PPP, and he had a number of his erstwhile associates imprisoned. The PPP no longer symbolized strong ideological commitment. The loyalty of the armed forces was questionable. Important elements within the bureaucracy were still unreconciled with the 1973 administrative reforms. Student groups repeatedly demonstrated against the excesses of local government and boisterously denounced the police-state tactics used to subdue them. The students also made demands that the authorities refused to or could not honor. The intelligentsia struggled beneath the burden of oppressive provincial regimes. They accused the Bhutto administration of callous tactics and of destroying the country's democratic experience. The entrepreneurial elite condemned the seizure of private property, and many business leaders fled the country to pamphleteer against the government from safe havens abroad. The religious teachers, who were disturbed by the PPP's secularization of society, joined the discontented opposition politicians and sought to stir support among the general population by describing the Bhutto regime as anti-Islamic.

Despite this mounting criticism and the loss of heretofore supportive elements, Bhutto still believed his popularity was unchallengeable. In March 1977 he announced the holding of general elections. But instead of the elections providing Bhutto with the mandate he so much desired, they proved to be a fateful final step in his fall from power (see *Politicians and Political Parties*, this ch.). As rioting and unrest spread throughout the country during April, May, and June, the generals had to decide whether to deal more harshly with the protesters—or with the government. Believing the discipline of the armed forces was at stake, the army high command decided to move against Bhutto and thereby also terminate the demonstrations. Thus Bhutto was deposed in July 1977, just three months after his resounding victory at the polls.

The Sindhi phase had thus ended, and the *muhajir* phase was about to begin, but the legacy of the Bhutto years remained. At the heart of this legacy was the nationalities problem, which had not been resolved

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in the immediate post-Bangladesh period. Pakistan remained a divided country, despite the loss of its East Wing. Bangladesh seemed to whet the appetites of other separatists, and Bhutto's management of national affairs only increased their salivation. In 1973 Bhutto ordered the armed forces to crush an insurgency in Baluchistan, and the military took three years to bring the region under control. Bhutto's quest for total control induced him to ignore frontier opinion, and the NAP-JUI provincial government in Baluchistan was driven from power. The province's principal leaders were arrested for allegedly antistate behavior, and PPP rule was imposed. A similar maneuver replaced the NAP government in the NWFP.

Bhutto found justification for his frontier putsch in the statements of President Daud of Afghanistan, who publicly revived the "Pakhtunistan" issue and thus further inflamed tribal passions along the controversial frontier. The perceived duplicity of Kabul in fomenting disorder on Pakistan's border, as well as within the frontier states, explains the role of the army in turning its arms against still another segment of the citizenry. Although the Baluch insurgency was contained, it raised still fresh memories of East Pakistan, caused thousands of casualties on both sides, and created considerable ill will toward the Islamabad government. The army also had grave misgivings concerning its role against the defiant Baluch. Baluchistan became a breeding ground for insurgents, and alien ideas developed deep roots as a consequence of the repression and bloodletting.

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan added new dimensions to the frontier problem. Soviet forces could provide close-in assistance to secessionist groups. Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, Bizenjo, and Khair Bakhsh Marri, Bhutto's constant adversaries and three of Zia's principal antagonists, were not reluctant to take aid from Moscow for their own "liberation" movement, irrespective of their discomfort over the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion placed an intolerable burden on Pakistani civil and military personnel as well as on the country's modest treasury (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Pakistan became the natural resting ground for destitute Afghans, primarily Pakhtuns, who sought refuge and sanctuary in the frontier region. The government had to house and feed the refugees, provide medical care for them, as well as for the resistance fighters, and also permit the establishment of headquarter positions for a variety of Afghan organizations. Although responsive to the humanitarian needs of the refugees, Zia was reluctant to openly assist the Afghan *mujahiddin* (sing., *Mujahid*; Muslim warriors—those engaged in a military jihad) with weapons. The *mujahiddin* received weapons, ammunition, and supplies from abroad, and the Pakistani government obviously allowed shipment of this equipment. For the most part, however, the *mujahiddin* were forced to manage as best they could by smuggling arms, seizing them from the enemy, or fabricating them themselves. But without sophisticated external support, the guerrillas were seriously outgunned.

There was direct correlation between the desperate plight of the Afghan resistance and conditions along Pakistan's northwestern border. The more it appeared the refugees could not return home, the more ominous the future of Pakistan's "Pakhtunistan" issue. The shift of millions of Afghan Pakhtuns to Pakistan—their prospects of returning to their country diminishing—added another dimension to the "Pakhtunistan" question. If the Soviet Union were inclined toward the eventual redefining of the political geography of the region, a "new" Afghanistan could emerge incorporating Pakistan's frontier region. Moreover, if the Afghan Pakhtuns residing in Pakistan decided that they had no other alternative, the fusing of their plight with Pakistani Pakhtun nationalists could accelerate the demand for a separate, independent Pathan state. The past, as well as contemporary activities of Ghaffar Khan, addressed itself to that possibility.

Ghaffar Khan's long residence in Kabul, his 60-year identification with the Pakhtun "freedom movement," and his reluctance to break with the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal regime gave credence to this view. An aged patriarch, Ghaffar Khan's disciples were numerous, including his son, Wali Khan, who, like his father, has suffered long periods of incarceration or confinement at the hands of the British and Pakistani authorities. Although Wali Khan often spoke of a desire to work within, not outside, the Pakistani political system, the political impediments created by a variety of Pakistani governments frustrated that desire. In 1963 the "Pakhtunistan" issue was far from dead. Linkages between Pakistani and Afghan nationalists, therefore, remained a distinct possibility. Moreover, such a grouping would present Islamabad with monumental problems, and once the alliance's objective crystallized, it would be very difficult to contain. Pakistan may have survived a civil war in East Bengal and an insurgency in Baluchistan, but most observers doubted that it could survive an armed encounter in the NWFP.

The *muhajir* phase in Pakistan's political history centered on the need to sustain what was left of the original Pakistan design following the loss of East Pakistan and the insurgency in Baluchistan. It explained the junta's emphasis on Islam as an integrating force. It also seemed to justify the perpetuation of military rule in the country. Soviet presence in Afghanistan, however, has made contradictions of all these explanations. The military establishment could not sustain the territorial integrity of Pakistan without the willing support of the diverse population. It could not emphasize the building of an Islamic state and at the same time ignore the Muslim cause in the Afghan-Soviet conflict (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). It could not justify its right to rule if it gave even the appearance of collaborating with the Marxists to stifle Pakhtun and Baluch demands for self-government. The intertwining of the civil-military relationship and the nationalities question was clearly evident in the frontier provinces, but it was not confined there.

Although the frontier provinces were most volatile, the nationality question also permeated Sindh Province. The Bhutto years saw the rise

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of a "Sindhu Desh" movement, a homeland for the Sindhis. Events were often violent but never so threatening that they caused the use of full-scale army units to quell the disorder. The demand for a more independent Sind never attained the level of violence of the Baluch insurgency. Nevertheless, it was a serious movement that particularly threatened the *muhajir* community. The *muhajirs* represented groups that settled in Pakistan after partition. The great bulk of this influx established itself in Karachi, where some of the more prosperous refugees became instrumental in transforming the port city into the country's leading commercial center.

Overall, the *muhajirs* were better educated, more industrious, and more politically conscious than their Sindhi neighbors. The contrast in their development therefore was striking. The Sindhis remained a comparatively impoverished element, and their leaders argued that their backwardness resulted from *muhajir* control of government and their vast sources of wealth. During the Bhutto era this Sindhi sentiment was buttressed by the PPP regime, which wanted to neutralize the power of the commercial and financial giants. As a result of Sindhi sentiment and PPP complicity, the *muhajirs* were placed under considerable psychological and physical pressure, and many influential *muhajirs* fled the country. Among those who remained, there was considerable conjecture about the creation of Pakistan and why they, the refugees, had given up so much in order to create Pakistan. Many believed that life might have been better in a Hindu-dominated country and that they had foolishly confused fantasy with reality.

The collapse of PPP authority and the arrest, trial, and execution of Bhutto by the military government somewhat muted the Sindhi extremists. But their cause was not abandoned. A Jiya Sind movement remained affiliated with the PPP. Comprising proclaimed communists (many identified with the small Hindu minority in the province) who called for merger with India and a conservative Muslim branch of landlords who demanded greater autonomy, its primary mission has been the dissemination of literature emphasizing Sindhi differences and grievances with the dominant Punjabis. The Jiya Sind's lack of ideological coherence did not prevent it from sustaining Sindhi nationalism, a cause long represented by G. M. Syed and his disciples. Syed spoke for the province's hapless peasantry who have long suffered abuse at the hands of the landlords. The Syed group identified with the NAP in 1957, but NAP efforts at radicalizing the peasantry did not make significant headway.

Clandestine communist cells have also operated in Sind, but their success has been limited to rallying support among the university students, some labor leaders, and members of the intelligentsia. Student recruits from Karachi and Hyderabad universities, however, persisted in their attempt to convert the peasants to Marxism. Local conditions and historic socioeconomic and spiritual controls seem to militate against their immediate success. As long as the landlords have a significant voice in the Jiya Sind, that organization is not likely to

represent the cause of the peasants. But provincial divines, such as Pir Pagaro (the Hur leader), have spoken for Sind's rural population, and they appear able to carry on in that capacity.

Because of its absence of ideological integrity, the Sindhi movement seemed destined to remain fragmented, guided only by a condition of parochial awareness. Nevertheless, the Sindhis have proved and will continue to prove troublesome for the central authority. The Zia government cannot ignore the linkages between organizations like the Jiva Sind, the banned NAP, and the more factious movements in the frontier provinces. The Sind provincialists were particularly active and violent in 1972 and 1973 when rioting spread through much of the province. Those disturbances focused on the language question, wherein Sindhi nationalists wanted to elevate their language over that of the Urdu-speaking *muhajirs*. Although somewhat subdued by the imposition of martial law since 1977, Sindhu Desh advocates continue to arouse the junta.

Zia's tour of Sind in April 1983 was billed as a "meet-the-people" activity in the interior of the province. The district officers brought out the crowds, and the president used the occasion to announce elections to the local bodies in October or November, whichever was more suitable to local authority. He also reiterated that he did not intend to convert the local bodies into an electoral college, nor would he permit political parties to influence them. Candidates representing political parties would be disqualified, he warned. Zia said his only objective was to "cleanse the body-politic and to bring to the fore people who are God-fearing—true Muslims and true Pakistanis." Despite Zia's professions of empathy with the Sindhis, they adamantly clung to their demand that *muhajir* and Punjabi influence in their province be reduced. The political parties, although politically impotent, promised that this matter would be attended to. Moreover, the PPP was the recognized ally of Sindhi nationalists, and Zia's repression of the PPP was not calculated to win many adherents for the junta.

The lawlessness that consumed southern Sind in the late summer and continued through the fall of 1983 was supposedly prompted by the MRD call for civil disobedience following Zia's announcement of a new political system. The murder, arson, and disruption of provincial routine compelled Zia to make a hasty visit in September to the troubled areas of Jacobabad, Shikarpur, Dadu, Sukkur, Badin, and Hyderabad. Zia played down the emergency nature of his visit, insisting he was simply completing the tour started four months earlier. The president commented that the unrest was minimal, localized, and of no serious consequence to his government. He also used the occasion, however, to suggest that "outside powers" were fomenting trouble in the province. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement in the Indian parliament seemed to suggest that India stood with the protesters. The Pakistani government was incensed over this apparent act of interference in its domestic affairs, which seemed to confirm the junta's belief that the disorder was externally motivated. In an exchange of letters

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between Zia and Gandhi, the latter said that she had no desire to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs but that her government was concerned about the health of Ghaffar Khan, who was detained in a Pakistani jail. The junta used the Indian connection with the Sind disturbances to rally support from a variety of groups, including members of the MRD, and stronger measures were applied to tranquilize Sind. An offshoot of this confrontation with India, however, was New Delhi's claim that the Pakistani government was providing assistance, in addition to moral support, to Sikh separatists in the Indian Punjab, where a state of emergency was declared in October 1983.

Islamization is intended to bridge the difficulties between the provinces, but as of late '943 it had not dampened the ardor of the provincial leaders or their followers. Even Islamic parties are no guarantee of political integration. The Jamaat-i-Islami remained vibrant but less successful since the death of its founder, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. Zia's implicit backing of the Jamaat-i-Islami did not establish the party as a political catalyst for the integration of the nation. The Jamaat has been painstaking in recruiting followers, but its central purpose has been the rebuilding of cadres, not the assembly of a national following. Nevertheless, the Jamaat has been instrumental in challenging Marxist activity in the colleges and universities. Thus, it seems more suited for a role countering leftist subversion within the intellectual community. In the long run, however, the leftists may have more substantial success in attracting the attention of the alienated and materially deprived masses.

It is consistent with the notion of nationbuilding that even an Islamic state must be guided by political parties that are perceived as legitimate, as well as spiritually oriented. These parties do not exist in Pakistan, and in the mid-1980s there was little likelihood that they would suddenly emerge. More secular national parties would appear to be a temporary answer to the problem, but these too, apart possibly from the PPP and the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, remained in a dormant condition. The MRD existed as a loose congeries of organizations that were themselves inchoate. Its single purpose appeared to be the transfer of political power to civilian authority. The MRD stood little chance of developing into a coherent organization even if the military agreed to withdraw from the political arena. By the same token, the MRD did not possess the capability to reconcile rival claims between the provinces, its individual members were even less capable of managing national affairs.

Some observers suggest that perhaps an answer to the dilemma lies in the revitalization of the Muslim League. It was the party credited with the creation of Pakistan, and for years it claimed an exclusive right to represent the nation's millions. But the League suffered internal contradictions that finally consumed it in 1958. As of 1983 all efforts at resurrecting the League had failed, and most observers viewed another attempt with considerable skepticism. Successful political organization requires more than a nostalgic view of the past or a change

in nomenclature. Ayub believed he could adopt and adapt the Muslim League in 1962, a party he had helped bury four years earlier. His plan was a total failure.

Nevertheless, the League did bridge religious-secular differences in creating Pakistan, and the possibility that it could do so again remained alluring. The League demonstrated that it was possible to represent the sentiments of a broad cross section of the subcontinent's Muslims, despite opposition from the ulama. Jinnah, a Shiite who paid scant attention to religious observance, was in fact vilified by many Sunni ulama. The Muslim League nonetheless captured the imagination of vast numbers of Indian Muslims, and it successfully represented Islamic objectives and articulated Muslim sentiment. The resurrection of the League by the military establishment, therefore, remains a distinct possibility. But analysts believed that a simultaneous transformation of the country's federal structure would be essential.

Inasmuch as the civil-military bureaucracy long ago assumed responsibility for directing the affairs of state, that same apparatus was charged with the task of finding the structure and system to sustain the country through the difficult 1980s and into the uncertainties of the 1990s. In 1983 few observers believed that the politicians would have the chance to chart that course. It was not enough to remark that the civilian leaders had never had the chance to display their ruling capacities, the politicians had failed at a critical moment, lost their *raison d'être*, and become programmed to wither. Political atrophy has characterized the scene since the 1960s; it is not a matter that can be easily remedied.

Nonetheless, the "steel frame" of colonial administration remains intact. In its contemporary incarnation as an indigenous institution, it comprises the permanent public services, i.e., the vast civil bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces. This steel frame sustained Pakistan at birth, remained in place through the initial period of socioeconomic development, survived reforms aimed at reducing its power, and moved into the decade of the 1980s confident that it represented the country's best chance for progress as well as survival. The civil-military bureaucrats, therefore, cannot avoid dealing with difficult questions. Zia's promise to provide the nation with a new political system, albeit Islamic, must examine anew the tensions between Islamabad and the provinces. Since the country's founding in 1947, tensions pitting the center against the regions have caused the collapse of numerous governments. More important, they unleashed the forces that destroyed the 1956 and 1962 constitutions and caused the de facto suspension of the 1973 Constitution. Pakistan's inability to sustain a workable constitutional framework led to the conflict of 1971 and the tragic dismemberment of the country. It is doubtful the country could survive another secessionist movement. Regulating interprovincial tensions and tensions between the center and the provinces, therefore, must assume first priority in reordering or restructuring the govern-

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ment and politics. This also remained the key responsibility of the civil-military bureaucracy.

Since the origin of Pakistan, one ethnic-linguistic group has always constituted a majority. The Bengalis were such a group until the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. The Punjabis have filled the dominant role since the creation of Bangladesh. Paradoxically, the Punjabis led the fight against Bengali efforts to oversee the constitutional process, but since then, the Punjabis have sought to defend their preeminence against challenges from the other provinces. And even if it could be shown that the Punjabis were not deliberately seeking a superior position, their numbers, comparative wealth, and governmental experience place them in prominent roles throughout society. Non-Punjabis do not want to be transformed into hybrids of the dominant ethnic group. Nor do they want the Punjabis exploiting and benefiting from their precious and scarce resources. Both foreign and Pakistani observers were convinced that the governing junta must deal more compassionately, as well as more effectively, with the fear of the non-Punjabis, who do not want to be absorbed or colonized by their larger, more powerful countrymen. Official indifference to such fears has always resulted in violent resistance by the one and overreaction by the other. Government coercion failed to establish harmony in the past, and few observers anticipated that coercion would succeed in the future.

Various scholars and observers believe that Pakistan requires modification of its quasi-unitary, federal state. They deem essential more autonomy for the different nationalities; cultural differences need to be enhanced and honored, respected and developed; diversity can be made a source of strength. According to this line of reasoning, "Punjabilization" will not work and can only produce catastrophic results. Nor is it possible to confer autonomy on select sections of the population and deny it to the remainder. Federation also seems doomed to continuing failure as long as one of the federating units possesses more influence than all the others combined. In such an arrangement, the central government will be perceived as the handmaiden of the majority ethnic and linguistic group. The other ethnic groups will have no recourse other than to assault the central government, thereby reducing its capacity to govern effectively.

Because the Punjabis are destined to hold their numerical advantage, it could be argued that a successful federal system might be developed to avoid the ethnic question. Switzerland could provide guidance in establishing such a structure. Although German is spoken by almost three-quarters of the Swiss population, the French, Italian, and Romansh speakers do not fear the majority community. Switzerland long ago opted for the canton system, and the 25 cantons provide ample representation and participation in decisionmaking for the country's multiethnic population. The canton system has also stimulated the development of multilingualism, and the Swiss freely converse in several tongues. This would hardly have been possible had Switzerland



Cityscape, Lahore
Courtesy Tomas Sennett, WORLD BANK

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been divided into four provinces representing individual linguistic groups. Pakistan might well draw some lessons from the Swiss experience.

Political scientist Kemal Faruki has suggested that Pakistan could use the "thirteen or so existing administrative divisions as federating units." The country has lived with this administrative structure since long before partition, and it would not be an unfamiliar design. Moreover, the administrators who manage contemporary Pakistan, both civil and military, are fully knowledgeable in the use of the division as a higher unit of administration. By redefining the divisions as political units, i.e., states or provinces, it could significantly reduce fears concerning ethnic dominance. It might also begin to dilute the intensity of rivalry between the various nationalities.

The dividing of the country into almost a score of provinces, however, would need to be linked to the reconstruction of the political system. The new political system could be presidential or parliamentary, or something that reflects the essence of each. But no matter how this is arranged, it would require the support and favor of the broader population. A compromise will have to be found to satisfy the needs for authoritative allocation at the center and for considerable autonomy within the federating units. Areas exist for power sharing between the central government and the units, but they would have to be identified and honored. Pakistan need not remain cast in a rigid authoritarian posture. The central government could remain strong and continue to manage the nation's external defenses. Advocates of this realignment asserted that the country would be better prepared to meet the challenge of foreign policy and national security if the people were convinced that the existing political system addresses their real needs and represented their multifarious and special interests.

Foreign Policy

Pakistan's foreign policy has been relatively stable and hence predictable. The character of the country's leadership has remained constant despite repeated and often dramatic changes in personalities (see *Early Foreign Policy*; *Ayub's Foreign Policy* and the 1965 War with India, ch. 1). The relationships forged in the 1950s remain virtually intact. The intertwining of domestic conditions with external needs creates the same compelling factors in the 1980s that were there three decades ago. In the 1953-54 period Pakistan embraced the United States, which responded by assisting the country with its multidimensional development programs. The American connection did not prevent Pakistan from improving its relationship with China, which it formally recognized in 1950. By the same token, Beijing did not sever its ties with Pakistan when the latter became an alliance member in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact, later known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), in 1955. The Soviet Union likewise maintained proper relations with Pakistan and tended to underplay that country's intimate association with its principal adversaries. The Kremlin's relationship with Isla-

mahad did not prevent the Soviets from supporting the causes of Pakistan's often hostile neighbors, notably India and Afghanistan.

A major preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policymakers, therefore, has been the separation of national security from overall diplomatic activity. This posture was facilitated by the foreign policy-cum-military policy needs of the superpowers and China. The United States, impressed with Pakistan's official and anticommunist policy at home, provided the aid that reinforced that position. China shared a strategic frontier with Pakistan, and as a result of deterioration in its relations with both India and the Soviet Union, Beijing also welcomed Pakistani friendship. Moscow chose India over Pakistan in the 1950s and exerted influence in Afghanistan, but the Kremlin still exploited every opportunity to cultivate Pakistan's domestic scene. Pakistan has perceived India to be its number-one enemy since the first days after independence. Afghanistan was also a constant irritant, but before the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Kabul did not pose an overwhelming dilemma for the country's defense strategists.

Difficulty with Afghanistan, however, militated against the Pakistani dream of Muslim unity. Pakistan had endeavored and continues to attempt to play the role of catalyst for greater Muslim cooperation. Although Pakistani concern with the extended Muslim community must be assumed genuine, it was also apparent that the country's isolation and its fears of India nourish a desire to enlist Muslim world support against a dreaded Hindu foe. Pakistani leaders realized early on, however, that their defense could not wait upon the development of a collectivity of Muslims. In turning to the United States for assistance, the country's leaders sensed that they had committed the nation to an American policy then aimed at the containment of international communism, but they concluded it was a price that had to be paid because of the prevailing Indian threat. Moreover, no Pakistani leader seriously contemplated a conflict with the Soviet Union. China also had no reason to fear Pakistani arms. Indeed, the Ayub proposal to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India in 1959 for joint defense of the subcontinent was the only serious overture by a Pakistani leader physically to resist communist encroachment in the region. Nehru's outright rejection of the offer removed Pakistan from what might have been judged an exposed position.

Pakistan's principal reason in identifying with the United States was the country's glaring need for military and technical assistance. Only the United States was prepared and willing to provide the matériel and expertise the Pakistanis needed to update their armed forces and promote economic development. The connection cost Pakistan a role in the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, but it contributed to close ties with Iran and Turkey. Ayub Khan urged the formation of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in Tehran and Ankara in 1964, and although the organization never lived up to expectations, it symbolized Pakistani aspirations for an extended Islamic common-

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wealth. But a primary Pakistani goal in the 1950s and 1960s was to blunt India's military capability.

Because of the hard bargaining conducted with Washington by General Ayub and Defense Secretary Mirza, the United States provided more military hardware to Pakistan than was originally contemplated. This substantial military transfer was even more intriguing, given United States professions of friendship for New Delhi. Washington underplayed (or ignored) Indo-Pakistani antagonism and sought to reassure India that American arms never would be used against their forces. Indian leaders, however, were little impressed with these assurances. Even the military assistance that Washington rushed to India in response to the Chinese invasion of its northeastern territories in 1962 failed to gain Indian confidence in United States guarantees. Furthermore, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, precipitated by a Pakistani thrust into Kashmir, confirmed the long-held views of Indian leaders that their country was threatened by Pakistan's arms buildup and that the United States was the chief purveyor of violence in the region. As a consequence of the Chinese threat as well as the Pakistani weapons-procurement program and Indian discontent with the United States role in Pakistan and elsewhere in Asia (the Korean and Indochina wars), New Delhi drew closer to Moscow.

At the same time, Pakistan had reason to question the value of its American ally. Ayub Khan's speech before a joint session of the United States Congress in 1961 proved to be a turning point in American-Pakistani relations. Ayub insisted that the United States could depend upon Pakistan in time of crisis, and hence Pakistan was worthy of United States support. But the Sino-Indian border conflict the following year and the United States decision to send India military aid made that commitment null and void. If Ayub had any intention of honoring a future United States call for assistance, it was made impossible by the arms transfers to New Delhi. The Pakistanis argued that India would never use American weapons against China but would not hesitate to use them against Pakistan.

The war that erupted in Kashmir in the summer of 1965 could not be contained there. It spilled over into Pakistan as a result of Indian actions aimed at expanding the theater of conflict. As a result of the Indian attack on the Pakistani heartland in the Punjab, Pakistan believed that the United States and its other allies should honor their alliance commitments and come to its assistance. The United States, however, remained neutral, explaining that the war did not involve an aggressive communist advance and that Pakistan had provoked the initial hostilities. Moreover, President Lyndon B. Johnson, in an effort to keep the conflict local, placed an embargo on arms shipments to both Pakistan and India with the full knowledge that Pakistan would be more seriously affected by the order. The United States also blocked transfers of American-made weapons from CENTO stores held by Iran and Turkey. The Pakistanis interpreted the Johnson decision as an unfriendly act, and anti-Americanism, provoked by the earlier ship-

ment of weapons to India, intensified. United States installations in Pakistan were assaulted by rioters, the libraries of the United States Information Service, which were burned in September 1965, suffered the greatest loss. Despite this setback in relations, neither country moved to dissolve their association. United States activity in Pakistan, however, was drastically curtailed, the embargo on arms remained in force, and only token diplomatic efforts were made to remedy the ill will.

The fall of Ayub in 1969 brought Yahya and a military junta to power, but the American-Pakistani alliance remained strained. When Pakistan plunged into a civil war in 1971, there was little international sympathy for the Pakistani generals who struggled to prevent the Bengali secessionist movement from succeeding. Nevertheless, in the midst of the civil war, Henry A. Kissinger, then the president's national security adviser, flew to Beijing from Islamabad on a secret mission aimed at normalizing Sino-American relations. At about the same time, India entered into a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. When the Indians intervened in the Pakistani civil war, invaded East Pakistan, and attacked and bombed West Pakistan in December 1971, the United States government pressed the UN Security Council to call on India to cease its military campaign and to withdraw its forces from the country. The Soviet Union, however, supported the Indian invasion and cast a veto, paralyzing UN efforts.

President Richard M. Nixon seemed to raise the ante when he ordered the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, U.S.S. *Enterprise*, to a station in the Bay of Bengal. According to Washington sources, the exercise was meant to assist in the evacuation of American nationals trapped in the war zone. The Indians, however, interpreted Nixon's order as a clumsy act of intimidation, thus further straining relations between Washington and New Delhi. Moreover, the Indians were undeterred by the decision; they accelerated their military campaign and quickly gained the surrender of the Pakistani garrison in East Pakistan. New Delhi played an instrumental role in the formal creation of independent Bangladesh. India also forced a demoralized, humiliated, and defeated Pakistani armed force and government to sue for peace. Although some observers believed Pakistan was saved from total ruin by Washington gestures of support for Islamabad, the alliance revealed gross inconsistencies and shortcomings.

The United States embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan remained in place during the 1971 war in spite of Nixon administration proclivities to assist Pakistan against India. The United States Congress, and public opinion in general, supported the Bengali independence movement. Many Americans, therefore, considered the Indian invasion a humanitarian effort aimed at stopping the atrocities inflicted by the Pakistan Army. Nixon was unable to assist Pakistan against India, even if such an option were contemplated. The United States-imposed arms embargo was not lifted until 1973, during the administration of President Gerald R. Ford. But even then, few American-built arms were made

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available to Pakistan's armed forces. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, Washington displayed renewed interest in an armed Pakistan, and President Jimmy Carter offered a limited supply of new weapons to Pakistan. Washington also contemplated the sale of late-model jet fighter-bombers. Zia rejected this package, claiming it was not enough and suggesting that Washington was insincere. Weapons transfers did not resume in earnest until the administration of President Ronald Reagan, when a US\$3.2 billion deal was agreed to in 1981.

As the first civilian head of government in over a dozen years, Bhutto had been determined to modify Pakistan's foreign policy, and a number of innovative ideas were pursued. Bhutto identified Pakistan with the Middle East and underplayed its South Asian orientation. He insisted that Pakistan formed the eastern edge of the Muslim Middle East and that its destiny lay in working toward Muslim unity and promoting Third World cooperation. Bhutto removed Pakistan from the Commonwealth of Nations, dissolved all ties to SEATO, and hinted that CENTO also would be abandoned were it not for Iran and Turkey's membership in that organization. Although Pakistan's continuation in CENTO prevented the country from joining the Movement of Non-aligned Nations, Bhutto declared his intention to pursue nonaligned objectives and to project himself as a leader of Third World causes. The fall of the shah of Iran, moreover, made it possible for Pakistan to leave the last of its western alliances. Zia withdrew Pakistan from CENTO in 1979, noting continuing membership no longer served a useful purpose. Pakistan followed this action by joining the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, and Zia dramatically announced that the movement formed the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy.

United States commitments to Pakistan's security were never repudiated. Agreements arrived at in 1953-54 and reiterated in 1959 continued to apply. Even the sacking of the United States embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 did not bring a repudiation of that understanding. Indeed, the military assistance provided Pakistan by the Reagan administration was justified under the terms of the 1959 commitment. In those earlier agreements Washington pledged to aid Pakistan should it be threatened by external aggression. The United States always interpreted the arrangement to mean that it would assist Pakistan if the country were being attacked by the Soviet Union or a country or countries acting in behalf of Soviet policy. The 1965 and 1971 wars with India were never judged to fit this interpretation.

Bhutto worked strenuously to reduce differences between his country and the communist states. Relations with China were strengthened, and greater intimacy was developed with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Despite Soviet support for India on all issues concerning Pakistan, difficulties were minimized, and new technical and cultural exchange agreements were signed. The Soviets also played an important role in Pakistan's industrial development. The country's first steel mill was built in Karachi with Soviet financial aid.

and technical know-how and was inaugurated in 1963. The military junta's continuation of Bhutto's foreign policies was observed in a barter-trade protocol between Moscow and Islamabad signed in May 1963. The clear separation of economic and political-military questions helped to maintain open channels of communication. Although deeply disturbed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the human tragedy associated with it, Islamabad wanted to deal directly with the Kremlin to maintain a dialogue and to stress normality in its relationships.

This posture contrasted with Pakistan's attitude toward Israel. In the spring of 1963 Islamabad refused to permit its table-tennis team to play the Israelis at an international tournament, thereby forfeiting its role in the games. The Pakistanis received moral satisfaction from the knowledge that the Indian team had played the Israelis. Whereas diplomatic and commercial arrangements with India and the Soviet Union did not disturb Pakistan's Islamic credentials, Israel was another matter. Any association with the Zionist state threw into question the bona fides of Pakistan's Islamic state. Pakistan remained steadfast in its nonrecognition policy toward Israel, continued to uphold the Palestinian cause, and was especially outspoken on the necessity of wresting Jerusalem from Israeli "occupation." Unlike India, with whom Pakistan had fought three wars, or the Soviet Union, which sought to deny a neighboring Muslim state its independence, Israel involved symbolic issues that touched on the essence of Muslim brotherhood. Continuing opposition to Israel was meant to give credence to Zia's notion of an Islamic state.

In 1972 Bhutto journeyed to India to meet with Prime Minister Gandhi at Simla. In subsequent years, and as a direct result of these deliberations, Pakistan gained the repatriation of its troops captured in the 1971 war, aircraft of both countries were again permitted to overfly each other's territory, trade was resumed, limited travel was approved, and official diplomatic relations were renewed. Bhutto had gone much further than Ayub Khan, who met Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri at Tashkent, following the 1965 war. Ayub had been vilified for his efforts, but Bhutto was treated as a hero on his return from India. Kashmir apparently was no longer such a burning issue, and Pakistanis were more inclined toward peaceful coexistence with their Indian neighbors. The Zia government went a step further in calling on New Delhi to enter into a no-war pact and to make South Asia a nuclear-free zone. President Zia also visited with Prime Minister Gandhi in India, and their foreign ministers explored approaches to improved understanding. Each sought to assure the other that their military programs were defensive in nature. Trust between adversaries was a limited commodity, however, and the future of Indo-Pakistani relations was read in actions, not words.

In the mid-1980s Pakistan retained its position as a leading Third World nation and was tied even more closely to the Islamic states, especially Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms, and Libya. Oil revenues flowed to Pakistan in the form of grants and loans,

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and these states also purchased Pakistani goods and services. The latter deserves special attention. The Arabian Peninsula states were eager to promote their economic development, but indigenous, experienced labor was in short supply. Pakistan encouraged its citizens—specialists as well as skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled individuals—to assume residence there. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis left Pakistan for domicile in the Persian Gulf area (see Labor Force, ch. 3). The gulf states paid higher wages than that earned in Pakistan for comparable work, and the savings of overseas Pakistanis were returned to Pakistan in the form of remittances. Remittances gave the country a greater source of revenue than that earned by any commodity or manufactured export. In 1983 between 1.1 and 1.5 million Pakistanis were working in Saudi Arabia and the shaykhdoms and another 400,000 to 500,000 elsewhere.

According to official statistics, remittances from abroad amounted to US\$2.4 billion in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1982. Others, however, believed the figure was closer to US\$6.2 billion, with US\$3.8 billion coming through bank sources, and another US\$2.4 billion arriving through a variety of foreign exchanges (see Balance of Payments, ch. 3). Markets were expected to develop in agriculture, irrigation, education, telecommunications, railroads, aviation, computer technology and programming, and in medical, health, and military services. Pakistan was expected to cultivate this market. In addition to the financial and economic rewards associated with the mass movement of labor to the Middle East, the gainful employment of large numbers of Pakistanis provided the Zia government with a safety valve against malcontents at home and also an opportunity to spread the message of Islamic brotherhood abroad.

Zia used the leverage created by Pakistan's commitment to the Middle East states to become especially active as an itinerant mediator and confidant to Arabian Peninsula governments. Zia sent military contingents to a variety of Middle East countries, and Pakistan became a Third World leader in the dispensing of military missions. A division of regular army troops was stationed in Saudi Arabia, and another large contingent was reported in Oman. Moreover, the sultan of Oman was permitted to recruit Pakistani Baluch for service in his country. Zia's leading role in the Umma Peace Committee, based in Saudi Arabia, involved him in rigorous efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq War. He also was instrumental in revitalizing the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which periodically brought together the heads of Islamic states. Through Zia's leadership, the OIC took a firm stand in the Afghan crisis. OIC members also were inclined to support his candidate for secretary general of the organization, and he was piqued when the Bangladesh government decided to challenge his nominee with a candidate of its own. Leadership of the OIC was important for Zia because it emphasized Pakistan's role as a leader of Muslim nations and seemed to add legitimacy to his version of an Islamic state.

Zia was probably the most peripatetic of all the Muslim heads of state in the early 1980s. His odyssey in 1982 covered all sectors of the globe and had an impact at home as well as abroad. Although Zia rejected the descriptive term "politician," he was not so opposed when the term "statesman" was employed. Zia's performance resembled that of his predecessor. He displayed enthusiasm for foreign travel and seemed to be at his peak in close encounters with heads of state and other eminent leaders. Sandwiched between India and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, Pakistan's geopolitical position necessitated winning friends and supporters. Zia's external travel minimized the ceremonial and stressed the acquisition of quid pro quos or assurances involving mutual self-defense, trade, economic and financial assistance, and cultural exchange. And despite undergoing gall-bladder surgery on June 1, 1983, Zia was strong enough to continue his foreign tours, visiting Japan in mid-July.

High on Zia's list of priorities was the need to sustain broad support for Pakistan's position on Afghanistan. Zia sought to maintain global pressure on the Soviet Union in the hope that the Kremlin would see fit to withdraw its troops from the country. While stressing the need for a negotiated settlement, he steadfastly refused to recognize the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul and avoided meeting face-to-face with Afghan leaders. Indeed, the last time Zia entertained an Afghan head of state in Islamabad was in 1978. Presidents Duad and Zia discussed the possibility of resolving their differences, but those conversations were terminated by the murder of the Afghan president shortly after his return to Kabul. Since early 1980 Pakistan has been a haven for Afghan resistance groups determined to overthrow the Soviet puppet government in Kabul. Pakistan also provided shelter and nourishment for over 2.2 million Afghan refugees, primarily women and children, the elderly, and the infirm. But with the Soviets pressing against Pakistan's northwestern border, and with India a perennial threat, Zia needed all the diplomatic leverage he could acquire.

In January 1982 Zia visited Romania and Yugoslavia to promote bilateral cooperation and trade. He also joined with his hosts in calling for political solutions to the Afghanistan and Kampuchean problems through UN auspices. In March he went to Saudi Arabia to attend a meeting of the OIC in order to review the Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq conflicts. He returned to Saudi Arabia in June to condole the death of King Khalid and to enter into discussions with King Fahd. In October Zia visited North Korea and signed a protocol establishing a joint commission to pursue cooperation in economic, scientific, and technical fields. Later that month he went to China, where he received reaffirmation of Beijing's commitment to Pakistan's security. The intimacy that developed between Pakistan and China was celebrated in the August 1982 opening of the passage through the Khunjerab Pass, which the Chinese built to facilitate use of the Karakoram Highway linking Xinjiang (formerly Sinkiang) with northern Pakistan (see fig. 8). In November Zia made a brief surprise stop in India on his way to visits

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in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. He endeavored to clarify to Prime Minister Gandhi Pakistan's position on United States arms shipments and appeared satisfied with her reaction. In Southeast Asia he emphasized trade and technical assistance, but political and military questions were not ignored. The death of Leonid Brezhnev took Zia to the Soviet Union directly from his tour of Southeast Asia. In Moscow he met with the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, and afterward hinted that progress on the Afghanistan issue was in the offing.

In December Zia made his first visit to the United States and Canada as head of state. President Reagan repeated the United States commitment to Pakistan's security and well-being. The American president acknowledged Pakistan's position as a front-line state "shouldering great responsibility," including the burden of caring for Afghan refugees, and pledged United States support in both matters. The two governments also established a commission for economic, commercial, scientific, technological, and educational cooperation. As an added feature of United States-Pakistan cooperation, the first consignment of American-made F-16s was delivered to the Pakistan Air Force during Zia's visit (see Air Force, ch. 5). Pakistan, however, indicated by its actions that it would not return to the relationship that brought it into intimacy with the United States in the 1950s. The junta was also determined to maintain an independent foreign policy and to withstand United States congressional pressure concerning its nuclear program and its treatment of domestic dissidents and the political opposition. Moreover, the junta endeavored to seek amicable relations with its bitter enemy and potential foes. It avoided situations that cast it in a role of an American dependent, and it rejected even a hint of bellicosity. Secretary of State George Shultz' visit to Pakistan in July 1983 therefore was cordial, but Pakistan's foreign policy was firmly in place. Nevertheless, the visit provided the two governments with the opportunity to reaffirm their mutual interests and concerns.

The Zia government's emphasis on diplomacy led to the establishment of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission, which was convened for the first time in Islamabad in June 1983. The foreign ministers of the two nations met in cordial circumstances and reportedly made modest but meaningful progress toward bilateral cooperation and understanding. For the first time, India and Pakistan discussed the possibilities of détente and stressed the need to resolve their long-standing differences. Even more dramatic, however, was the Pakistani decision to hold indirect talks at Geneva with representatives of the Afghan government.

The UN adopted a resolution in November 1980 calling for the creation of a personal representative of the UN secretary general who would be encouraged to find a peaceful solution for the Afghanistan affair. In February 1981 Secretary General Kurt Waldheim named Javier Perez de Cuellar as his personal envoy. Perez de Cuellar visited Kabul and Islamabad in April and August 1981 and reported back to

the General Assembly that the parties were interested in continuing the diplomatic exercise. When Perez de Cuellar was elected UN secretary general in December 1981, he asked the Ecuadoran diplomat Diego Cordovez to assume the position of personal representative on the Afghan question. Cordovez went to Islamabad and Kabul in April 1982, and the parties agreed to meet at Geneva in June for more intense but still indirect deliberations.

These talks at Geneva in 1982, made possible by the shuttle diplomacy of Cordovez, became known as Geneva-I. They were followed by Geneva-II and Geneva-III talks in April and in June 1983. At the end of April 1983 discussions, the UN Information Office in Geneva issued a press release revealing that Cordovez had drafted a comprehensive settlement for the Afghanistan problem and that the parties had made "substantial progress" toward reaching an agreement. Cordovez exhibited optimism that a solution might be at hand, and he cited as evidence the decision on the part of the Pakistani foreign minister, Yaqub Khan, and the Afghan foreign minister, Shah Mohammad Dost, to return to their capitals for further study and instructions. The two foreign ministers had not faced one another but had used the good offices of Cordovez to convey their thoughts and reactions to one another.

Following the June deliberations, Foreign Minister Yaqub informed the press that there was no deadlock in the indirect talks but that a major breakthrough also had not been achieved. He added that there was no cause for discouragement. Yaqub had visited Moscow earlier that month and had publicized his satisfaction in conversations with the Kremlin leaders. He reiterated the need to develop a schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, as well as for the return of the refugees to their homes. In the absence of an agreement, however, he was convinced that the Geneva discussions had run their course and that it was left to Cordovez to continue the effort. The UN representative scheduled visits to Islamabad, Kabul, and Tehran for September 1983, in advance of the annual convening of the UN General Assembly.

Although Iran had also been invited to participate in the Geneva deliberations, it refused on grounds that the resistance fighters, the *mujahiddin*, were not represented. The Iranian chargé d'affaires in Geneva spoke for his government when he commented that the negotiations would be considered "null and void" until the Afghan people gave their consent and were active participants. The Afghan refugees and guerrilla leaders also were critical of the talks. A group of Afghan students in Karachi demonstrated on April 27, 1983, condemning the Soviet invaders for the slaughter of 400,000 of their countrymen. They criticized the negotiations and insisted there could be no settlement without *mujahiddin* involvement and approval. The demonstrators noted the heavy fighting around Kabul and Herat while the talks were under way at Geneva. They said hundreds of Afghans were killed by Soviet land and air forces and, in addition, approximately 35 villages had been

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leveled in reprisal raids. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami, and Ustad Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Afghan Jamaat-i-Islami, the more prominent Afghan guerrilla fighters, echoed the sentiments of the students and noted there could be no settlement until their demands had been satisfied. Hekmatyar argued that the resistance could only be bound by an agreement between the *mujahiddin* and the Soviet Union. All other efforts were a "farce." Rabbani took the same approach, adding that the *mujahiddin* were defending their liberty. "If they failed in their struggle, many other countries will also suffer the consequences," he said.

The Pakistan government wished to appear both enthusiastic and restrained over the Geneva talks. It believed that it had remained true to the terms of the UN resolution and therefore had not betrayed the trust of the *mujahiddin*. It continued to insist on the total withdrawal of Soviet troops and refused to recognize the Karmal regime. It demanded the return of all the Afghans to their homes and called for the right of the Afghan nation to choose its own form of government and leadership. The Pakistan foreign minister insisted that the indirect talks were engineered and orchestrated by the UN according to a General Assembly directive and that Pakistan was merely complying with the wishes of the UN. Pakistan wanted a settlement of the Afghan tragedy and believed that the diplomatic approach was the only sensible and viable option. Assuming the success of the UN resolution, there would then be time for the *mujahiddin* to sort out their differences. Pakistan was more concerned with the immediate problem of Soviet forces on their frontier and the fear that an incident could cause them to spill over the border.

Rumors circulated that the Soviet Union had agreed to begin withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan in September 1983. On May 8 Zia insisted he had no information concerning a Soviet pullout and cautioned against overoptimism. Reports from New Delhi, however, persisted, specifying that Soviet units would be withdrawn from along the Pakistan border in the autumn and that this would be a signal for Islamabad and Kabul to enter into direct negotiations aimed at resolving the overall problem. Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan appeared to indicate that a breakthrough was in the offing when he began a series of journeys to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. His first visit in May 1983 was to Beijing, where he met with Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang. At the conclusion of Yaqub's brief stay, the Chinese leader publicly declared his support for the UN effort aimed at gaining a full Soviet withdrawal and return of the Afghan refugees. At the same time, Cordovez informed the Pakistan State News Agency that he believed that the Soviet Union, the United States, and China would be ready to guarantee the UN plan once they had an opportunity to review the text.

In what could be described as further encouragement to the Pakistan government, European news agencies reported that the Karmal regime had ordered Murtaza and Shahaawaz, the sons of Bhutto and the

alleged leaders of Al Zulfikar, to leave the country. Pakistan appeared to anticipate the action of the Kabul government, and members of the resistance sensed reciprocity when Islamabad ordered the Peshawar offices of the *mujahiddin* closed and relocated in tribal areas away from the metropolitan center. This idea was cast aside, however, as events soon revealed that flexibility was absent on the Soviet side. The Soviet line hardened in late 1983, and Moscow now spoke of the "Mongolization" of Afghanistan, ruling out the "Finlandization" proposal that had earlier received considerable world attention. Pakistan was informed that in return for recognition of the Marxist government in Kabul, they would be guaranteed the Durand Line as their legal frontier. Moreover, it appeared that the Soviets were reluctant to withdraw from Afghanistan and were more inclined to encourage "deep social changes" there. Moscow gave renewed support to the Karmal regime and insisted it had no intention of abandoning it or its leader. Therefore, despite the earlier optimism, by late 1983 there was no reason to believe a settlement agreeable to all the parties was possible, let alone in the offing. Pakistan had in fact been put on notice that its destiny lay in its willingness to accommodate its superpower neighbor.

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Political developments in Pakistan can be examined in considerable detail by reading Lawrence Ziring's *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* and *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969*. For studies of Islam in Pakistan, it will be useful to peruse Kemal Faruki's *Islam Today and Tomorrow*, Javid Iqbal's *The Ideology of Pakistan and Its Implementation*, I.H. Qureshi, et al.'s *The Problem of National Character*, and Leonard Binder's *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. For Pakistan's formative period, Richard Symonds' *The Making of Pakistan*, Khalid Bin Sayeed's *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, and Wayne Wilcox' *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation* are all excellent.


Pakistan's first 10 years are expertly covered in Keith Callard's *Pakistan: A Political Survey* and G.W. Choudhury's *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*. The 1958-69 period is treated with care for detail in Herbert Feldman's *Revolution in Pakistan and From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1963-1969*. For special insight into the working of the Pakistani bureaucracy the interested reader might consult Henry Frank Goodnow's *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation* and Ralph Braibanti's *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan*.

The Pakistan Army and its political role are described in Fazal Muqem Khan's *The Story of the Pakistan Army* and Tariq Ali's *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?* The dismemberment of Pakistan is investigated in Rounaq Jahan's *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* and Choudhury's *The Last Days of United Pakistan*. The Bhutto years are examined in Shahid Javed Burki's *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977* and Anwar H. Syed's *Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Sol-*

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identity. For a study of the 1965 war with India, see Russell Brines' *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*. Overviews of Pakistan's foreign policy are presented in S.M. Burke's *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*, William J. Barnds' *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, and Ziring's *The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, Its Neighbors and the Great Powers*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security



Minar-i-Pakistan, which stands on the site where the Muslim League in 1940 adopted the Lahore Resolution, subsequently known as the Pakistan Resolution

PAKISTAN'S ARMED FORCES came into being when the country gained independence from Britain in 1947. The personnel forming the nuclei of the new country's three military services had been members of the British colonial forces who had been given the option of serving either Pakistan or India, if they wanted to remain in military service. Most choices were made according to religious preference—Muslim or Hindu—but some people, including some military personnel, chose to remain in their home areas regardless of the dominant religion. When the Indian subcontinent was divided, there were very few high-ranking Muslim officers available to guide the formation and development of the Pakistani forces. British officers therefore remained in many command positions, including those of commanders in chief of the three services.

The Pakistani armed forces have the missions of defending the country against external attack and assisting the civil authority, as directed, in maintaining internal security. The military establishment, particularly its leadership, continued to be the single most cohesive and powerful institution in the national society. President (General) Mohammad Zia ul Haq has referred to the armed forces as the only sector in the country that was "organized, disciplined, and united." Despite a decline in its prestige after the loss of East Pakistan in the war with India in 1971, the military had generally been rather highly regarded by the people and had fairly well recovered its previous status during the 1970s. Although still considered by some an island of stability in a turbulent political sea, in the early 1980s the military establishment was increasingly seen by others as contributing to the troubles—rather than alleviating them—by perpetuating the martial law regime.

The army, by far the largest and most important of the services both militarily and politically, made up roughly 94 percent of the total strength of almost 480,000. In late 1983 the country had been under martial law for more than six years, and army troops had frequently been called on to act in a police role during several periods of civil chaos. Critics called for the army to return to barracks, and pundits expressed concern that professionalism was dulled by continued use of the military in other than military roles. In August and September of 1983 several towns in Sind Province were under military occupation because police could not handle disturbances brought on by a widespread campaign of civil disobedience.

Pakistan had formerly been a member of two regional collective defense alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In the 1980s, however, the country's commitment to these military pacts became more nominal than real because of bilateral differences with the United States and

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an increasing desire to broaden contacts with other powers for procurement of weapons and equipment. Formal withdrawal from SEATO occurred in November 1972 and, seeking acceptance as a nonaligned nation, the country's leaders also withdrew from CENTO in March 1979. Pakistan was formally accepted into the Movement of Nonaligned Nations at its conference in Havana later that year.

The maintenance of law and order in the country is basically a provincial function; that is, the primary police agencies are provincial rather than national forces. Certain agencies, however, exist at the national level under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Interior. These include the small but highly elite Police Service of Pakistan, whose members hold the top-level police positions in the interior ministry as well as the senior positions in each provincial police force. Other national police agencies include the Special Police Establishment, originally set up as an anticorruption force, and the Frontier Constabulary, primarily an antismuggling and peacekeeping force that is stationed along the border between the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province.

The police system as a whole was carried over nearly intact from that of British India, and although there is no integrated national police, the provincial forces are similar in organization and operation and react uniformly to regulations handed down from the central government. In general, the public has continued to regard the police as a corrupt and often oppressive arm of government—an attitude that has prevailed since independence and has been exacerbated by the relatively low level of education of the citizens who are willing to work for the traditionally low pay of the basic policeman. Through the years several high-level commissions have studied the police and prison systems and have recommended many reforms. Both systems, however, have remained mired in the past, partly because of conservative attitudes of the authorities and partly because of underfunding.

The incidence of nonpolitical crime, although high, has not seemed excessive for a developing country with a high rate of poverty and a volatile, ethnically mixed population. Since the end of the 1970s, however, drug trafficking has increased alarmingly and has become a major cause of concern for the police and for the Narcotics Control Board.

Discontent with martial law, plus the ban on political activities, has caused the incidence of political crime to soar since the inauguration of the Zia regime on July 5, 1977. Stringent regulations and harsh punishments have failed to deter political activists from demonstrating against the government. A loose federation of formally illegal political parties, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, initiated a wide-scale civil disobedience campaign on Independence Day, August 14, 1983, that continued into October, shaking the Zia government.

Armed Forces in Government and Society

Pakistan has endured many years of martial law since gaining independence in 1947. The martial law era of President Zia began in

1977 with the overthrow of the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia continued in the role of chief martial law administrator (CMLA) in late 1983. Although some civilians viewed with contempt various senior military officers who were associated with the heavy-handed aspects of martial law, the military profession as a whole continued to have wide general acceptance as an honorable calling. The residents of some regions, particularly in the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), remain devoted to the military tradition as a heritage from colonial days when their ancestors were especially recruited for the British Indian Army (see fig. 1). The inhabitants of these regions were some of the peoples whom the British labeled "martial races."

In the first year of independence, confidence in the military was upheld by the army's performance in escorting refugees during the massive population shifts. During the next several years, the military forces followed the tradition of the British Indian Army from which they had evolved by remaining, ostensibly, neutral in politics (see *Problems at Independence*, ch. 1). The abstention from overt political activities was considerably eroded in the mid-1950s, however, by the increasing involvement in politics of General Mohammad Ayub Khan (see *The Ayub Khan Era*, ch. 1). The general's assumption of political power by means of a coup d'état in 1958 made the military the dominant force in national affairs. Civilians returned to power in December 1971, but even when Prime Minister Bhutto seemed at the height of his power, some observers described the military hierarchy as waiting in the wings for any sign of wavering by the civilian leadership. Bhutto's regime faltered in 1977, and the military seized the opportunity and the government (see *The Junta*, ch. 4).

The armed forces, in addition to regular military, security, political, and disaster relief roles, also perform certain nonmilitary duties that may be classified as nationbuilding activities. The military establishment, for example, has a prominent role in adult education through its extensive in-service educational and training programs. Large numbers of technicians and administrators, in both public and private segments of the society, received their initial training and education in the service academies and other military training institutions. Through participation in major engineering and communications projects, the military has frequently worked closely with civilians, often breaking down barriers that arise between the armed forces and the people, particularly in developing states that have undergone periods of martial law.

The army functions in peacetime as a central economic agency. For its own consumption, it operates a large number of stock-raising, crop, dairy, and fish farms that use modern methods of cattle breeding, farming, and processing of dairy products. The army also sells produce commercially, including cotton, wheat, rice, and whatever other surpluses become available. Over the years the army has also provided wheat seeds to the civil authorities for distribution to civilian farmers.

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In some instances, army farms have been used for demonstration and experimental purposes.

Military forces had a role in the development of national industries at the time of independence because of the need to build an indigenous logistical base. Because of the scarcity of ordnance factories at that time, a complex of defense-oriented plants was developed in order to provide, at the very least, locally produced small arms and machine guns. In addition, the military has operated in whole or in part a number of businesses and industrial projects in connection with veterans rehabilitation programs. Army engineers have made important contributions through road, bridge, and dam construction for civil as well as military purposes. Army engineer construction has been particularly important in areas of difficult access, of which Pakistan has an abundance (see fig. 5). In the mid-1960s a direct highway linking Karachi and Peshawar was being considered by the government.

Military Background

The early military history of Pakistan is part of the history of the Indian subcontinent and, later, of British India, which included the present-day states of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). The story of human conflict in the subcontinent, as shown by archaeological evidence from prehistoric times, appears to be as old as human presence but is not characterized by major expeditions or waves of conquest projected outward. On the contrary, the area experienced more than 100 major invasions after 1500 B.C., mostly overland from the west and north, until the seaborne incursions by Europeans began almost 500 years ago (see table A).

The period having the greatest influence on military developments began with the arrival of competing European powers in the sixteenth century and, more particularly, with the English royal charter to the East India Company in 1600. The origin of the present-day Pakistan Army may be traced to the guards employed by that company. As trading posts (called factories) were established, indigenous peoples were hired as guards and were trained in the use of small arms for the protection of company trade and property as well as for ceremonial purposes. As the number of trading posts increased, these guards were organized into companies and battalions and received military training under the overall command of European officers.

The distances separating the three main fortified trading posts—Bombay, Madras (Fort Saint George), and Calcutta (Fort William)—presented serious problems of control, and each site therefore was placed under its own president and council and developed its own security force. The three forces, known as presidency armies, were commanded by European officers who were assisted by locally recruited subordinate officers. Individual soldiers were called sepoys, a title still used in the Pakistan Army in the 1960s. Regular troops sent out from Britain were integrated into the presidency armies. In 1748 the three independent forces were grouped under a single commander

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
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
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*President Mohammad Zia ul Haq gives away
Sword of Honor at Pakistan Military Academy
Passing-Out Parade, March 15, 1984.
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington*

in chief and were organized, armed, uniformed, and trained by a cadre of European officers, most but not all of whom were British. For almost 20 years the organization and training of the combined force was directed by its first commander in chief, Stringer Lawrence, who rose from the rank of major to major general while serving in India and became known as the father of the British Indian Army.

During the early part of the nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of British control throughout India was accompanied by mounting turmoil. Social, political, religious, and ethnic tensions resulted in sporadic outbreaks by the people against British rule (see *The Company Rule*, ch. 1). There were several sepoy mutinies from the late 1700s to the mid-nineteenth century and four uprisings in the years between 1844 and 1857, but most British authorities dismissed the events as being of no consequence. The long pent-up discontent of the sepoys, however, broke out into major revolt at Meerut on May 10, 1857, starting the uprising known variously as the Sepoy Revolt, the Sepoy Rebellion, or the Indian Mutiny. The immediate cause was the grease on the cartridges for the new Enfield rifles. The end of the paper cartridge had to be bitten off before loading into the rifle; rumors—probably well-founded—that the grease was from cattle and swine insulted both Hindu and Muslim sepoys, resulting in the widespread uprising.

Regarded by the British as a mutiny but by later Indian commentators as a struggle for freedom, the uprising was largely confined to elements of the Bengal Army in the upper Gangetic provinces and parts of central India. The Punjab, including its Sikh chiefs, remained

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loyal to the British. The Madras Army took no part in the mutiny. Although the trouble began as a military mutiny, it was not confined entirely to the army. It is estimated that some 70,000 civilians participated at one time or another. The revolt marked a turning point in the history of British India; a proclamation by Queen Victoria terminated the government of the East India Company and established India as a British colony. After a reevaluation of the role of Indian forces, the Bengal Army was disbanded, and a complete reorganization of all forces followed. By 1885 the army had been put under the control of a central headquarters at Delhi, and the colony was divided into four territorial commands—Punjab, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay—each commanded by a lieutenant general.

After the Sepoy Rebellion, British recruitment policy was based increasingly on the theory of "martial races," according to which members of certain castes or tribes or inhabitants of certain areas were more amenable to discipline and more courageous as soldiers. The popularization of this concept is usually attributed to Field Marshal Frederick Roberts, who commanded the British Indian Army from 1885 to 1893. Roberts believed that the best, that is, most soldierly, recruits were to be found in northwestern India, particularly the Punjab and the area that in 1904 became the NWFP. The selective recruiting from 1890 until 1914 led to the descriptive phrase "Punjabization of the army." Roberts also favored manning certain units or subunits with members of the same caste, tribe, or religious group from within the martial races, a practice that became fairly common under his command. These methods produced a regular, apolitical, professional force, which was responsive to British command but which accentuated regional and communal distinctions. In effect, it was a policy that enhanced control by the colonial power at the cost of added disharmony among the many varied colonial peoples.

During World War I more than 1 million volunteers of the expanded British Indian Army were sent out of the colony, and more than 100,000 died in combat. About one-half of the volunteers were from areas that later became Pakistan. During the interwar period, Indian nationalism (among both Hindus and Muslims) gained considerable strength, and support for Britain in World War II was not as widespread as in the earlier war (see *The British Raj*, ch. 1). The viceroy of India, without consulting Indian political leaders, declared India to be at war with Germany on the same day that Britain made its declaration, September 3, 1939. The legislature sustained the declaration by passing the Defence of India Bill without opposition, largely because representatives of the Indian National Congress boycotted the session. Despite the political estrangement, the British Indian Army between 1939 and 1945 expanded in size from about 175,000 to over 2 million—entirely through voluntary enlistment. About 700,000 of the total were recruited from areas that later became Pakistan. Naval and air force elements, under British command, saw action in all theaters of operations but were primarily employed in Burma and Southeast Asia.

The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 to form the new states of India and Pakistan also entailed the division of the armed forces and military equipment of the British Indian forces. The division of the forces was made on the basis of religious identification; units having a Muslim majority were transferred to Pakistan with their records and unit designations more or less intact. Individual Muslim servicemen who were from the areas that were to become India were given the option of remaining in the Indian armed forces or moving to Pakistan. Hindus in Muslim-majority units were given the same option.

As initially envisaged, the personnel, ordnance stores and factories, equipment, and other military assets were to be divided on the basis of the ratio of communal strength in the services. Muslims accounted for about 36 or 37 percent of the overall strength, but Pakistani authorities accepted 33 percent as the figure to be applied in deciding Pakistan's share, India retaining the remainder. The bulk of the supplies and equipment were located in Indian areas, and Pakistan has always claimed (apparently with justification) to have received much less, in both quantity and quality, than it should have under the partition formula.

Pakistan inherited armed forces of about 150,000 officers and men, many of whom were combat veterans of World War II campaigns in Burma, Assam, Malaya, North Africa, and Italy. At senior levels Pakistan had only one major general, two brigadiers, and six colonels. The lack of qualified officers was especially acute in technical positions. The elements of the British Indian Navy that came to Pakistan consisted of a small group of officers and several hundred enlisted men, ships had to be purchased, training facilities established, and repair facilities developed. The Pakistan Air Force was allotted two of the 10 former Royal Indian Air Force squadrons, including about 65 pilots, 200 ground officers, and 1,000 airmen. The majority of airmen and seamen who opted for Pakistan were unskilled, forcing the government to institute crash programs of technical training that were seriously handicapped by the lack of training facilities. Pakistani difficulties were further compounded by the extreme shortage of supplies. On the eve of the undeclared Indo-Pakistani war in Kashmir in October 1947, one Pakistani source reported that the army had only a 13 days' supply of ammunition and an eight days' supply of oil and lubricants.

From the outset the Pakistani forces were confronted not only with the critical tasks of organization of units and command systems but simultaneously with urgent operational tasks incident to the massive shifts of population between India and Pakistan. In all, about 5.5 million Hindus living in the areas that became Pakistan fled to India, and about 7.5 million Muslims fled to Pakistan. As British control was withdrawn, Hindu-Muslim intercommunal violence became widespread and severe, and hundreds of thousands of casualties were suffered before the two new states became firmly established. Far-flung, overworked detachments of the new Pakistani forces, of necessity, were heavily committed to the tasks of restraining communal violence on their side of

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the line and of protecting the columns of Muslim refugees moving into Pakistan by foot, vehicle, and train, as well as protecting the Hindu columns moving out.

Soon after independence the new army also became engaged in the conflict with India arising from the dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In October 1947 numbers of armed tribesmen from the frontier areas of Pakistan moved into the disputed region and advanced toward Srinagar, the capital. The Hindu maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who had not yet acted on the question of accession to India or Pakistan, signed the instrument of accession with India on October 26, thus enabling India to defend the area. On October 27 Indian military forces were ordered into action, and an airlift of Indian troops into Srinagar began. The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, which had a majority Muslim population, took on the proportions of a full-scale war, but the fighting was inconclusive. A cease-fire arranged under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) took effect on January 1, 1949, and was so demarcated as to leave Srinagar and almost 139,000 square kilometers under Indian control and 83,807 square kilometers under Pakistan. The agencies of Gilgit and Baltistan plus the quasi-state of Azad (Free) Kashmir were formed from the Pakistani portion of Jammu and Kashmir.

In addition to the tasks of organization, protection of refugees, and war with India, the armed forces of Pakistan were confronted with border troubles in the northwest. The Frontier Corps had replaced regular army units along the northwestern border by December 1947 and became engaged in sporadic clashes with armed intruders from Afghanistan. In December 1971, when transborder Pakhtun (Pathan—see Glossary) tribal forces threatened to occupy the Khajuri Plain and the Kohat Pass, west and south, respectively, of Peshawar, Pakistani regular troops were alerted for possible counteraction, but strafing by air force fighters stopped the advance before the tribesmen came into contact with the army. Similar incidents occurred in the Bajaur area, north of the Khyber Pass, in the early 1980s, but large-scale clashes between the forces of Afghanistan and Pakistan were narrowly averted. Border clashes continued to pose problems for Pakistani security forces until the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 changed the political situation and the balance of power in the entire region. By 1983 some 2.2 million Afghan refugees had taken up residence in hundreds of camps in several areas of the NWFP and, to a much lesser extent, in Baluchistan, and the presence of large Soviet military formations in neighboring Afghanistan presented an entirely new source of apprehension along Pakistan's northwestern borders.

The organization and training of the armed forces continued along the familiar lines of British practice. In the immediate postindependence years the shortage of qualified Pakistani officers was met by the retention of almost 500 contract British officers in senior command and staff positions, but by 1951 most of the positions had been filled by Pakistanis. By the early 1980s there had been significant increases in

sophisticated weaponry leading to overall improvements in defense capabilities. Pakistan's armed forces of roughly 220,000 men, including 25,000 Azad Kashmir troops, were considered well equipped and well trained when a major test of their combat readiness occurred in April 1965. Southeast of Karachi a long-standing border dispute erupted into clashes with Indian forces on the mud flats of the Rann of Kutch, but full-scale war was averted with the aid of British mediation, and both sides accepted the later resolution of the problem by a UN tribunal.

More extensive and serious fighting between the two traditional antagonists broke out in August 1965 along the cease-fire line in Kashmir, in the Chamb area of Kashmir, and along the international border that divides the plains of the Punjab. The hostilities, including incursions into and occupation of the other's territory, resulted in a stalemate, and on September 23 the two contestants agreed to a cease-fire under the combined pressure of the U.N., the Soviet Union, and the United States. The chief executives of the warring states, Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri, were invited to the Soviet city of Tashkent for peace negotiations in which the then Soviet premier, Aleksey Kosygin, participated for several days until the belligerents agreed to withdraw their troops from occupied territories and reestablish the cease-fire line. Later the commanders in chief of the opposing armies met in New Delhi for talks aimed at reducing border tensions. Both sides agreed to keep their forces in peacetime garrisons and to notify the other concerning movements for field exercises or normal rotation.

In addition to the conflicts and border clashes in which the armed forces had participated (the 1965 war involved the navy and airforce as well as the army), the Pakistan Army also was used to assist the civil authorities in maintaining public order and in administering martial law. Periods of martial law prevailed after the assumption of governmental control by General (later Field Marshal) Ayub in October 1958 and after he, in turn, yielded power to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan in March 1969. In combat, Pakistani forces had been assessed as being professional and proficient, but critics expressed concern that combat proficiency could be lost during long periods of military government and martial law. The next full-scale combat test occurred in 1971, when the civil war in East Pakistan culminated in yet another war with India.

In December 1970 elections in East Pakistan returned a strong majority for Bengali nationalist candidates of the Awami League (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1). When negotiations with the central government for transfer of power to these elected officials broke down, the league's action arm, known as Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army), began guerrilla activities—at first for provincial autonomy but eventually for independence. The Yahya military government doubled its regular forces in East Pakistan to about 60,000 and launched a major operation against the Bengali nationalists in March 1971. The operation failed to crush the Mukti Bahini, but over the next several months civilian casualties mounted into the hundreds of thousands as the guer-

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rillas took refuge among the people and the army reached new heights of ruthlessness in trying to eradicate the elusive enemy. Some 10 million refugees (estimated to have been 90 percent Hindu) poured across the border into India to escape the onslaught. India meantime provided matériel and training assistance to the guerrillas and permitted them to use Indian border areas for training bases and sanctuary.

Pakistan raised new divisions and increased troop strength in East Pakistan to 80,000. Border clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces became frequent by August 1971. In November Pakistan counted two armored divisions and 14 infantry divisions, plus support troops and paramilitary units, deployed in both wings of the divided country. India's recently reequipped armed forces had substantial advantages in overall numbers; major units included the equivalent of two armored divisions, 13 infantry divisions, 10 mountain divisions, and at least eight independent brigades.

In response to Indian military incursions into East Pakistan in late November, Pakistan launched a series of preventive air strikes against Indian airfields on December 3, 1971, and declared war on the following day. The Pakistani air strikes failed to knock out the Indian Air Force, which retaliated and gained air superiority within 24 hours, holding it until hostilities ceased 12 days later. The Pakistan Air Force contingent in the east was destroyed, and supply and escape routes were cut off. In the west the Indian Air Force systematically struck aircraft and airfields, base installations, communications centers, petroleum refinery and storage installations, and troop concentrations. At sea an Indian naval task force immobilized the port facilities of East Pakistan and landed an amphibious force to cut off escape routes to Burma. At the same time, a task force in the Arabian Sea contained Pakistan's fleet, damaged shore installations at Karachi, and blockaded the harbor.

On the ground the Indian strategic plan established the conquest of East Pakistan as first priority, while simultaneously containing enemy forces in the west. The Indian force that initially invaded East Pakistan consisted of the equivalent of at least nine infantry divisions with attached armored units and supporting arms and services. This force advanced rapidly, bypassing intermediate cities and obstacles, and pressed relentlessly toward the capital at Dacca (Dhaka). At the same time, guerrilla attacks were intensified by at least 50,000 of the Mukti Bahini. Surprised by the speed and power of the Indian advance, Pakistan's four divisions fought a number of hard actions but were soon bottled up; escape was cut off, and air support was nonexistent. On December 16 Dacca fell to the invaders, and the Pakistani commanding general surrendered his force of about 75,000 men. In the west, Indian forces effectively contained several attacks and made limited advances into West Pakistan. After the fall of Dacca, India declared a unilateral cease-fire that was accepted by Pakistan on December 17.

President Yahya resigned on December 20 and was replaced as president and CMLA by Bhutto, the first civilian president since 1958.

Shorn of the revenues and resources of East Pakistan, which had become independent Bangladesh, the remainder of the country was faced with the severe economic, political, and administrative problems associated with the loss of a disastrous war. In addition, there was the immense problem of rebuilding for the future after the loss of over 31 percent of its territory and almost 56 percent of its population. Not the least of the problems facing the new government was the rehabilitation of the armed forces, the replacement of men and matériel, and the reevaluation of the strategy and tactics that had brought on the debacle in East Pakistan (see Bhutto and the Restoration of National Confidence, ch. 1).

The reputation and morale of Pakistani forces had been generally high at the outbreak of the war. Overconfidence at all levels, however, as well as communications difficulties, contributed to the defeat. Analysts also observed that Pakistan's defeat resulted in part from two misconceptions by the Yahya government: first, that the nationalist uprising in East Pakistan could be quickly put down by massive force and, second, that the Indian forces had not used the years since 1965 to upgrade their strength and capabilities. In retrospect it would appear that the Indian leaders after the 1965 war thought that a return engagement was a real possibility and used the time to prepare for such an event, whereas the Pakistanis conducted business as usual rather than honing their combat capabilities, particularly in the face of odds in favor of the enemy.

In addition to evaluating the lessons of the war, rebuilding and resupplying the units, and participating in civic action and internal security operations, Pakistan's military leadership (as well as the civil authorities) was greatly concerned with the prisoner of war issue. A total of more than 90,000 prisoners had been taken by India. Of these, about 75,000 were military prisoners of war, and the remainder consisted of civilian internees. In November 1972 Pakistan released 617 Indian prisoners of war; the sick and wounded and about 6,000 civilian internees had been released earlier. India, however, continued to hold its prisoners into 1973, and the issue received international attention, including a hearing by the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

An agreement reached in August 1973 finally provided for the release of the prisoners, and repatriation on a graduated basis continued for the remainder of the year. In April 1974 a further agreement, arranged by the foreign ministers of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, provided for the release of the final 195 prisoners after Bangladesh dropped war crimes charges against them. On April 30, more than 28 months after the end of the war, the last prisoner was repatriated. Along the western front, India and Pakistan had earlier exchanged territories seized during the war, and a slightly modified line of control was delineated in Jammu and Kashmir, although no final settlement of that issue had been attained.

A matter of paramount military and political importance to Pakistan was the detonation of a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974. This

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event, described by India as having peaceful rather than military purposes, aroused immediate official alarm in Pakistan and stimulated its own interest in nuclear research and development. On the day after the Indian explosion, Bhutto declared that "we will never let Pakistan be a victim of nuclear blackmail . . . nor will we accept Indian hegemony or domination over the subcontinent."

In 1973 the Pakistan Army was once again engaged in fighting insurgents in one of the country's provinces, this time Baluchistan, with memories of the loss of East Pakistan still fresh, the possibility of further truncation through the loss of Baluchistan was unthinkable. After reports of combat actions, including air force bombing, against dissident Baluch tribesmen, Afghanistan threatened full-scale war in support of nationalist tribesmen across the border. Afghanistan has long been a proponent of an independent state of "Pakhtunistan" to be carved out of Pakistan's NWFP and Baluchistan for the Pakhtuns and others in the area who resent Punjabi dominance. The Afghans also stated that India and the Soviet Union would support Afghanistan, but most observers doubted that such support would be forthcoming in view of the fact that, despite Afghan rhetoric, the discord was essentially an internal Pakistani affair.

Army forces engaged in fighting tribal insurgents in Baluchistan in 1973 suffered continual setbacks. They did not have sufficient strength to mount an effective antiguerrilla campaign, and the warlike Baluch knew the terrain and enjoyed the support of many of the people. In early 1974 the situation began to change as regular troop strength rose to 60,000 (eventually reaching 80,000) and the shah of Iran sent combat support. The shah, worried about the restive Baluch minority in the southeastern part of his own country, sent 25 helicopters with crews to participate in the struggle against the insurrection. By the end of the year the rebels had been driven back into their almost inaccessible mountain strongholds, but they had not been defeated.

In 1975 the Bhutto government announced that the insurgency in Baluchistan had collapsed, but that was apparently more a political tactic than a statement of fact. Although the intensity of the insurgency did drop considerably in 1975 and 1976, low-level action continued until after the overthrow of Bhutto in 1977. During the same period, tribal uprisings requiring army counteractions became more frequent in the NWFP. In September 1976 a major operation against rebellious tribesmen employed two army divisions with air force support. Smaller scale operations were commonplace until the advent of Zia's martial law regime, which has kept a tight lid on the volatile tribes of the two provinces.

Constitutional Basis

The legitimizing authority for the existence, control, and missions of the armed forces is contained in the 1973 Constitution. Although set aside by Zia at the time of the coup in 1977, the Constitution was not abrogated, and many of its provisions remain operative if there is

no conflict with martial law directives. Regarding the armed forces, the president of the republic is empowered to "raise and maintain the Military, Naval, and Air Forces of Pakistan and the Reserves of such Forces, to grant commissions in such Forces, and to appoint the Chief of the Army Staff, the Chief of the Navy Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff, and determine their salaries and allowances." These presidential powers are conditioned by the phrase "subject to law," but since the coup Zia has drawn the reins of power into the office of the presidency, and restrictions on his power were not apparent as he combined the roles of president, chief of the army staff, and CMLA.

Until the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, each service head had been known as the commander in chief of his particular service. From that time on, however, the service heads have been known as chiefs of the staffs of the respective services, and the title commander in chief—if used at all—referred to the president, who was also referred to in some literature as the supreme commander.

The Constitution specifies that "the State shall enable people from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the Armed Forces of Pakistan." This provision does not entirely obviate selective recruiting, but it does open the ranks to all citizens who are otherwise qualified and legally bars discrimination against volunteers on the basis of sect, region, or the old martial races concept. Despite the constitutional provision, imbalances remained in the representativeness of the armed forces. Stephen Philip Cohen, in *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, written in 1980, states that "75 percent of all ex-servicemen came from only three districts in the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Campbellpur) and two adjacent districts in NWFP (Kohat and Mardan), so the army as a whole is still unrepresentative." The authorities are aware of the dangers of an unrepresentative military force, but in Cohen's words, "Since the army is volunteer there is little that can be done to dragoon in reluctant or uninterested ethnic groups."

Each member of the armed forces is required to take an oath that, inter alia, contains a pledge not to engage in any political activity. This prohibition refers to partisan identification and active party work. Members of the forces have the same voting rights, subject to the same conditions, as other citizens of the country.

The primary mission of the armed forces is to defend the country's territorial integrity; the secondary mission is to assist the civil police in maintaining public order and internal security. In addition, army troops have often been used to check smuggling across borders and to provide emergency relief and rescue missions in areas stricken by natural disasters. The navy is responsible for coastal defense, but it also participates in anti-smuggling patrols along the coast and in navigable inland waterways. The air force is charged with the missions of providing operational support to ground, naval, and paramilitary security forces and of defending the country against air attack. Secondary missions include the provision of air transport to ground troops when needed, the coordination of civil and military aviation activities, and

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the conduct of technical training for civil aviation specialists. Military aircraft are frequently used on relief missions, such as transporting food, clothing, and medical supplies to victims of disasters.

Martial Law

In late 1983 Pakistan had been administered under a martial law regime for more than six years. Living under martial law was not a new experience for Pakistanis who remembered, if old enough, the 1969-71 period under Yahya, the 1958-62 period under Ayub, and the de facto martial law regime under Ayub from 1962 to 1969. Both generals were also president during their martial law regimes, as Zia has been during his. Martial law has also been imposed on specified areas, e.g., the Punjab in 1953 by Ghulam Mohammad, or on cities as imposed by Bhutto in 1977 on Karachi, Hyderabad, and Lahore.

After the lifting of the Yahya martial law in the early 1970s, some analysts believed that the Pakistanis would become rebellious if another ruler attempted to reimpose martial law. Nevertheless, when the country in 1977 appeared once more to be on the edge of chaos, a military coup deposed the Bhutto government, and the coup leaders again instituted nationwide martial law. In promulgating the martial law edict, however, Zia also promised that elections would take place within 90 days. Declaring that "the survival of this country lies in democracy and democracy alone," Zia said that his sole aim as chief executive "is to organize free and fair elections, which will be held in October." Seeking to lower the high level of political emotions that existed at the time, Zia banned all political activities, stating that they would be reallowed for a sufficient period before the fall elections. When serious criminal charges were brought against Bhutto and several other former officials, Zia decided that elections had to be postponed until the judiciary had ruled on their guilt or innocence.

The day after the coup Zia dissolved the national and provincial assemblies and declared that the president would henceforth act only on the advice of the CMLA, that is, Zia, and/or the provincial (deputy) martial law administrators (see *The Junta*, ch. 4). A regulation issued on July 10 confirmed the ban on all political and union activities, established new rules on the possession of firearms and explosives, and established a system of military courts to deal with infractions of martial law regulations. The July 10 edict also established the controversial punishments of flogging and amputations (see *Crime and Punishment*, this ch.). Successive martial law regulations that followed rapidly during July established as capital crimes activities such as seeking "the territorial or administrative dismemberment of Pakistan" or inciting disaffection among members of the armed forces. Publishing propaganda that would be "prejudicial to the ideology, integrity and security of Pakistan or the purposes for which martial law has been proclaimed" was punishable by flogging or imprisonment up to a maximum of seven years. These and related draconian measures were similar to those employed by previous martial law governments.

Bhutto was brought to trial on charges of conspiracy to murder, and Zia therefore announced that the elections had to be postponed. In March 1978 Bhutto was found guilty and sentenced to hang, the appeal process lasted until February 1979, when the Supreme Court, by a vote of four to three, upheld the conviction and the sentence. In the meantime, the martial law regime had reinforced its own power by issuing regulations to ban any possible semblance of opposition. In November 1977, for example, Zia gave the power of detention to the four provincial martial law administrators, a prerogative previously reserved to Zia himself but now dispersed in order to act more swiftly against opponents. Military courts became much more active, trying ordinary criminal, as well as political, cases and using flogging as punishment for antigovernment demonstrators and petty criminals. In March 1978 an estimated 200,000 people crowded into a square in Lahore to view the hanging of two convicted criminals in the first public execution to be held in independent Pakistan.

The martial law authorities also cracked down on opposition newspapers and magazines, arresting journalists and publishers (although most were quickly released) and interrupting the printing of publications that had supported Bhutto. Under a regulation promulgated in February 1978, newspapers were forbidden to print any news items dealing with politics. When a Lahore newspaper appeared with several blank columns on the day after the new regulation was issued, its editor was arrested. Zia announced in January 1982 that self-censorship would be the rule for newspaper publishers but later in the year applied a temporary ban on all reporting of political news. In September an editor and two printers of the weekly *Al Fatah* were sentenced to prison and flogging for articles critical of the regime.

Despite demonstrations, strikes, and riots in many areas of the country involving tens of thousands of citizens and despite appeals for clemency from almost all leaders of other Muslim countries, the UN secretary general, the pope, and leaders of countries across the entire political spectrum, Bhutto was executed under conditions of great secrecy at about 2:00 A.M. on April 4, 1979. Burial had already taken place before news of the execution touched off three days of rioting in towns and cities all over Pakistan.

From that time until the fall of 1983 there had been several further promises of a return to a democratic system, but the martial law regime during the same time had become more entrenched, more powerful, and more pervasive in the lives of Pakistanis. In late 1978 President Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, who had agreed to stay in office after the coup, stepped down at the end of his five-year term; Zia assumed the presidency, adding that title to those of CMLA and chief of the army staff. Some analysts estimated that 10 percent of the military hierarchy was engaged in civil administration. Professional military observers, both Pakistani and foreign, voiced warnings about the danger of corruption when so many officers were pursuing civilian-style careers.

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In October 1979 promised elections were indefinitely postponed as Zia blamed political activists for the unsettled conditions and many other aspects of the country's ills. Stating that the rise in crime and corruption resulted from the practice of appealing to higher courts after sentences had been handed down by military tribunals, Zia decreed that such appeals would no longer be allowed. Given carte blanche by the president, mobile military courts toured the country looking for corruption, price fixing, and similar activities wherever they might be found. Trials were swift, and punishment was severe. Flogging, which had been administered behind prison walls, was brought into the open. The list of offenses that could be tried solely by military courts was enlarged to include possession of arms and ammunition, violations of customs laws, gambling, prostitution, and violations of pure food regulations, price controls, and laws on profiteering and hoarding.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 muted the expressions of disclaim for the Pakistani martial law regime that had become common in Western capitals after the execution of Bhutto. Sensing that his country had become important in the worldwide contest of the superpowers, Zia sought military and economic aid from Western governments but maintained the rigorous martial law that those same governments had so frequently criticized and condemned. In March 1981 he institutionalized his military regime with the promulgation of the Provisional Constitutional Order, the preamble of which rationalized the existence of the military government so many years after the coup. The new law was promulgated in order to offset court challenges of the legality of the government, because the 1973 Constitution had not provided for the imposition of martial law. Zia's personal power was enhanced by the statement: "The president as well as chief martial law administrator shall have and shall be deemed always to have had the power to amend the constitution." The Provisional Constitutional Order is to remain in force until martial law is terminated by the martial law authorities.

By late 1983 demonstrations against martial law had become a way of life in Pakistan, but the hold of the military on the reins of government had not slackened. A Karachi newspaper in April 1983 described the unpopularity of military rule as follows: "This government cannot be successful or respectable because it is not an elected government, it does not represent the people, it is not accountable to the people and the people do not consider it their government." Marking the country's independence anniversary in August, Zia promised that elections would be held no later than March 1985.

Personnel

Although Pakistan lost more than one-half of its population when East Pakistan became Bangladesh after the civil war and war with India in 1971, that loss did not present a major problem to military recruiters. East Pakistan's contribution to the military manpower pool before 1971 had been minuscule, primarily because the inhabitants of that area

(particularly Bengalis) were not considered to be of the martial races, a classification hangover from British colonial recruitment practices that continues to be given credence by most Pakistani officers. Even after the breakaway of Bangladesh, Pakistan remained one of the world's more populous countries; nevertheless, most army personnel continued to be recruited from relatively small areas of the Punjab and the NWFP (see Military Background, this ch.). The navy and the air force have discarded the martial races theory and accept volunteers from all parts of the country.

The overall population of more than 88 million in mid-1983 was more than sufficient to maintain the desired personnel strengths of the three services. The number of males in the 15- to 49-year age-group in 1982 was almost 22 million, 68 percent of the total was considered fit for military service. Approximately 1.1 million young men reach age 17—military age—each year. Service in the armed forces is voluntary and, although regulations for a selective service system have existed for several years, the availability of young, physically fit males and their desire to volunteer have made a draft unnecessary.

The educational qualifications of recruits when inducted remained low, particularly insofar as technical knowledge was concerned. The recruits entering service in the early 1980s continued to be drawn from rural areas. Mainly from peasant stock, many, if not most, volunteers were illiterate or barely literate, presenting problems to military planners and trainers who were forced to include literacy programs as part of basic and unit training. The number of men in the armed forces was so small in relation to the overall labor force that their loss to that pool had no impact on the civilian economy. Actually, military personnel contribute to the economies of the areas in which they are stationed, and when they complete their military service, they usually have skills that are in demand in the civilian economy. Enlisted personnel usually serve 15 years and leave the service at age 32 or 33 with skills and experience that are important in a transitional, developing society.

Since the advent of the martial law regime in 1977, many senior officers have served in civilian capacities in the government, as well as in the private sector. Opposition to other than military assignments has reportedly been expressed by many officers, and some enlisted personnel (as well as officers) have expressed distaste for confrontations with Pakistani citizens that result from soldiers acting as police.

Foreign Alliances and Influences

Although it evolved from a foreign-controlled force and has been subjected to a variety of foreign influences in 36 years of independence, the Pakistani military establishment has not been compromised—that is, it has been able to meld foreign features with its indigenous characteristics to produce a uniquely Pakistani force. During the early years of independence, British influence was dominant in organization, orientation, and command and staff procedures; British equipment was standard in all units. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs),

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having served in the British Indian Army, perpetuated British procedures and training methods, retained regimental histories and trophies, and emphasized regimental traditions. The Pakistan Army was formed with British aid and guidance and with many British officers in command positions. Less than four years after independence, however, a Pakistani, General Ayub, was named to replace the incumbent British general as commander in chief of the army.

As British influence in many parts of the world began to decline with the breakup of the empire after World War II, American influence began to rise. In Pakistan that became apparent in May 1954 when the United States and Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which provided a framework for military assistance from the United States. Under the accord the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established to supervise the incoming flow of military equipment and to advise in the training of Pakistani military personnel. By October 1954 American weapons and equipment were arriving in quantity at Pakistani ports, and Pakistani military personnel began attending courses at service schools in the United States. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, as American matériel became increasingly common and American advisers became ubiquitous, American doctrine was interwoven with the indigenous, the British, and the British Indian.

On September 8, 1954, Pakistan joined Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States in signing the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which established SEATO, which was designed to prevent communist expansion throughout the area. One year later Pakistan signed the Pact of Mutual Cooperation (more commonly known as the Baghdad Pact), which was originally concluded between Iraq and Turkey at Baghdad in February 1955. Britain and Iran also became members of the alliance, which was intended to be a link between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and SEATO and to provide a "Northern Tier" against communist aggression in the Middle East. Although not a signatory, the United States participated in the economic and military committees of the alliance and was the moving force of its activities. When Iraq withdrew in 1959, the remaining partners changed the name to Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

A formal bilateral mutual defense pact was concluded in March 1959 between the United States and Pakistan in the form of the Agreement of Cooperation. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the United States agreed to take, in accordance with its constitutional process, "such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon . . . in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request." This agreement, and identical bilateral pacts with Turkey and Iran, had the effect of reinforcing the defense capability of CENTO.

Pakistan's attitude toward SEATO and CENTO underwent marked change after the early 1960s. Sentiment in the country favoring con-

tinued adherence to the treaties diminished after the United States and Britain responded to India's urgent pleas for defense equipment and supplies during its war with China in 1962. Pakistani leaders asserted that Western aid to India was prejudicial to Pakistan's military relationship to India.

As a result of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, the United States suspended arms shipments to both countries in an attempt to limit the scope of hostilities and the probability of an arms race on the subcontinent. The suspension was lifted somewhat in early 1966 to permit the sale of nonlethal military items to both countries, but the United States did cease its grant aid to Pakistan and withdrew the MAAG mission in July 1967. At that time the United States also removed existing restrictions on the kinds of "spare parts which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously supplied equipment" and announced that requests for cash purchases would be considered on a case-by-case basis. Because of the changed relationship with the United States, Pakistan turned to China for military aid and also sought Soviet weapons. The Soviet Union, evidently worried about too much Pakistani dependence on China, agreed to sell some weapons and equipment. At the same time, Pakistan began to acquire French military aircraft and submarines.

During the period of mounting tension between Pakistan and India in 1971, which in December culminated in the second Indo-Pakistani War, the stance taken by the United States led to an improvement of relations and a resumption of limited American arms sales to Pakistan. Despite Pakistan's withdrawal from SEATO in November 1972, the United States formally reauthorized arms sales in March 1973, and a modest program was thus resumed. After India exploded an atomic device in 1974, mounting evidence of Pakistani nuclear development interfered with routine Pakistani military relations with the United States because of the latter's law concerning nuclear proliferation.

United States-Pakistani relations reached a low point in November 1979 when a mob attacked and burned the United States embassy in Islamabad, but after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, Pakistan became very important to United States interests in the entire region. In a 1981 agreement between the governments of the United States and Pakistan, the former agreed to provide low-interest loans during the years 1982 to 1987 for the purchase of approximately US\$1.6 billion in military equipment.

In addition to absorbing influences from several disparate foreign powers, the Pakistani armed forces have also exerted substantial influence on the military establishments of many other nations. The *New York Times* reported on February 6, 1981, for example, that Pakistan had military personnel stationed in 22 different countries, primarily as advisers, but in some cases complete troop units had been deployed. The largest numbers of Pakistani military personnel outside the country at that time were said to have been in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Abu Dhabi—one of the United Arab Emirates. The ultra-security-

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conscious Pakistanis have not confirmed such deployment, but their presence in several Arab and African states has been obvious to visitors.


Mary Anne Weaver, writing in the *Christian Science Monitor* of October 3, 1983, stated that Pakistan had as many as 30,000 military personnel stationed in 24 foreign countries. Of that total, 20,000 were said to be in Saudi Arabia in mid-1983, and Pakistani-Saudi plans called for an additional 7,000. Weaver reported that in exchange for the well-trained, well-disciplined Pakistani troops (who were uninterested in internal Saudi politics), the Saudi government was footing the bill for Pakistan's new F-16 aircraft and other military hardware. Weaver further reported that Pakistani Air Vice Marshal Azim Halepota had been sent to Zimbabwe to command that country's air force, after an agreement between Zia and Zimbabwean prime minister Robert Mugabe. Another avenue of Pakistani military influence on the armed forces of other states is through Pakistan's highly regarded service schools, which are usually well attended by students from the Middle East and North Africa.

Of all the countries in which Pakistan has troops or advisers (whatever that number might be), the longest and strongest tie is between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, actually a military alliance. Although the relationship dates to the early 1980s, events in the late 1970s convinced the Saudis and the Pakistanis that their military fates were linked. The fall of the shah and rise of the mercurial Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran, the seemingly unending Iran-Iraq War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with its regional ramifications all served to strengthen the Saudi-Pakistani tie. In 1983 some outside observers reported that two Pakistani divisions were deployed in Saudi Arabia, which seemed highly unlikely, others suggested that Pakistan had trained two divisions for rapid deployment to its ally, which seemed to be within the realm of possibility. For the Saudis, a few thousand Pakistani troops could be critical in an emergency, for the Pakistanis, a rich and politically powerful ally could be strategically important. According to Shirin Tahir-Kheli and William O. Staudenmaier in an article for *Orbis* in Spring 1982, "The Pakistanis, however, are not merely 'mercenaries'; it is the religious link that is the true underpinning of the relationship and outweighs even the rather substantial economic rewards available."


Administration, Organization, and Training

Ministry of Defence


The army, navy, and air force are subordinate to the minister of defense. In late 1983 that office was held by Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur, who had been appointed by Zia on July 5, 1978, the first anniversary of the coup. Zia had personally held the defense portfolio during his first year in power. Before the coup the defense minister had also been chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), but the responsibilities had been divided, and General Mohammad Iqbal Khan had been appointed to the latter position.



*General K.M. Arif, vice
chief of the army staff*



*Air Chief Marshal
Mohammad Anwar Shamim,
chief of the air staff*



*Admiral Tariq
Kamal Khan, chief
of the naval staff*

*Photos courtesy Embassy
of Pakistan, Washington*

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The JCSC is composed of the chairman and the chiefs of the staffs of the army, navy, and air force, each of whom is granted a large measure of autonomy in supervising the operation and administration of his service. The committee is assisted by the Joint Chiefs Secretariat, which consists of the Directorate of Joint Planning, Directorate of Joint Services Administration, Directorate of Intelligence, Directorate General of Medical Services, and Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate. The secretariat serves as the principal link between the service headquarters and the defense ministry in addition to coordinating interservice matters.

The permanent staff of the ministry is a small group of civil servants headed by the defense secretary general. Of particular importance to the defense ministry is the adviser for military finance, who heads the Military Finance Division, a part of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs but attached to the Ministry of Defence. The adviser functions as the principal finance officer of the ministry and the subordinate services.

Army and Auxiliaries

The chief of the army staff supervises his service through the Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. General Zia, who had been appointed chief of the army staff by Bhutto, retained that office in late 1983, several years after he had become president. General Sawar Khan, the vice chief of the army staff, handled the day-to-day affairs, but the retention of the office by Zia indicated the importance attached to that position in the overall power structure.

The four principal staff officers under the chief in Army General Headquarters were the chief of the general staff, the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, and the master general of ordnance. These positions were usually filled by major generals. The operations and intelligence functions were the responsibility of the chief of the general staff. Other important officers in the headquarters were the chief of engineers, the military secretary, the judge advocate general, and the comptroller of civilian personnel, all of whom reported directly to the vice chief of the army staff.

The army components are categorized as arms or services. The arms are infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and communications. The services include various components, such as the ordnance corps, maintenance and repair corps; electrical and mechanical engineer corps, education corps; military police corps; and the remount, veterinary, and farm corps.

Although the army in 1983 was not deployed in a territorial structure per se, the seven corps that constituted the major formations were associated with the cities in which their headquarters were located. The corps and the locations of their headquarters in late 1983 were: 1st, Mangle; 2d, Multan; 4th, Lahore; 5th, Karachi; 10th, Rawalpindi; 11th, Peshawar; and 12th, Quetta. There was also the Northern Area Command at Gilgit, which was directly controlled by Army General

Headquarters. A corps usually consisted of two or more divisions and was commanded by a lieutenant general whose headquarters was a scaled-down version of the Army General Headquarters. An infantry division, the major ground force combat formation, usually consisted of infantry, artillery, engineers, and communications units in addition to the supply and service support required for sustained independent action. Three infantry brigades usually comprised the primary organic combat units of an infantry division; armored units would be attached depending on the mission of the division and the terrain in which it operated.

Under control of the seven corps headquarters, in 1983 there were 16 infantry divisions, two armored divisions, four infantry brigade groups, five armored brigade groups, seven artillery brigades, two antiaircraft artillery brigades, and a special services, i.e., special forces, group. In addition, there were nondivisional armored regiments, engineer regiments, and six reconnaissance battalions. Major weaponry included about 1,500 tanks and approximately 1,000 artillery pieces. More than 1,100 main battle tanks were Chinese T-59s. The remainder of the tank inventory consisted of a conglomeration of main battle tanks and light tanks of American, Soviet, and Chinese manufacture. The artillery, also a conglomeration of American, British, and Soviet manufacture, included 75mm pack howitzers, 100mm, 130mm, and 140mm guns, and 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Most of the guns and howitzers were in inventory, and more were on order. An agreement signed with the United States in late 1981 called for the delivery of 40 self-propelled 8-inch howitzers, but the status of that order was not known in late 1983.

Auxiliary or paramilitary forces included the Pakistan Rangers, the Frontier Corps, and the Frontier Constabulary. Some earlier auxiliary forces, such as the Azad Kashmir Troops, the Mujahid Force, and the Janbaz Force (primarily locally recruited militia), have been brought under regular army command. The constabulary was essentially a police force rather than an army auxiliary (see Law Enforcement, this ch.). The Pakistan Rangers, formerly the West Pakistan Rangers, comprised only four battalions, but the overall strength of about 15,000 belied the battalion designation. The general headquarters of the rangers was located in Lahore; the battalion designation has been retained for historical purposes—the Pakistani military has been very conscious of unit traditions retaining unit designations from the early British period.

The Frontier Corps—strength estimated at 65,000 in 1983—had headquarters in Peshawar and Quetta and deployed units in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The officers in charge of the two major divisions of the Frontier Corps, known as inspectors general, traditionally have been active-duty brigadiers or major generals on detached service from the regular army. Most—but not all—subordinate officers were in the same category. A complex chain of command has the inspectors general of the corps responsible to the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions as well as to the Army General Headquarters. Since 1977 General Zia

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has been minister of states and frontier regions in addition to his other posts, including chief of the army staff. Enlisted personnel were locally recruited and, most frequently, were Pakhtuns. Many of the units of the corps have long histories as military organizations of British India. Among the older units were the Chitral Scouts, the Khyber Rifles, the Kurram Militia, the Tochi Scouts, the South Waziristan Scouts, and the Zhob Militia.

Navy

The Pakistan Navy, smallest of the three services, in mid-1983 had a total strength of about 11,000 active-duty personnel and about one-half that number in the naval reserve. The chief of the naval staff at that time was Vice Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan. Naval headquarters was located at Islamabad, far removed from the sea, but fleet headquarters and the main center of naval operations were located at Karachi, the country's major port.

In 1982 the navy acquired the ex-British County-class H.M.S. *London* categorized in *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1981-82* as a light cruiser but "officially" a destroyer because its displacement tonnage of 5,440 tons falls below the usually accepted 7,000 tons and above for cruisers. Nevertheless, rechristened P.N.S. *Babur*, the ship replaced a 38-year-old light cruiser of the same name. The "new" *Babur* mounted one quad launcher for Sea Slug surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and one quad launcher for Seacat surface-to-air missiles (SAM), in addition to two twin 4.5-inch gun turrets and a helicopter pad. Like its predecessor, the *Babur* will have an important role as a training ship for midshipmen from the naval academy. The *Babur* made a goodwill cruise to China in the spring of 1983.

Also acquired in 1982 was an additional ex-United States destroyer of the Gearing class, bringing the total number of that class to five and the total number of destroyers to nine. In addition to the Gearings, all of World War II vintage, the inventory included four ex-British World War II destroyers: one Battle class, one CH class, and two CR class, which had been purchased and refitted by the United States and transferred to Pakistan under the Military Assistance Program during the 1950s.

The surface fleet in 1983 also included four ex-Chinese Hainan-class large patrol craft, one British-built Town-class large patrol boat, 12 ex-Chinese Shanghai II-class gunboats, and four ex-Chinese Huchuan-class hydrofoil torpedo boats, in addition to two Italian-built M-55 coastal patrol boats, six ex-United States minesweepers, and various support ships.

The underseas fleet in 1983 included two French-built Agosta-class submarines, the most modern vessels in the navy, having been purchased new in 1978 and commissioned on February 17, 1979. There were also four French-built Daphne-class submarines and six Italian-built SX-404s. The Italian boats, so-called midget subs, were designed

for carrying clandestine raiding parties and for reconnaissance of enemy coasts and similar tasks.

Air Force

The estimated strength of the Pakistan Air Force, about 17,600 plus about 8,000 reservists in 1983, had not changed appreciably in 10 years, but its combat capability was in the process of being enhanced by the acquisition of new aircraft, particularly F-16s from the United States. The chief of the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Mohammad Anwar Shamim, supervised the administration and operation of the air force from the central headquarters in Rawalpindi. Since 1958 air headquarters had been located in Peshawar, but after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Peshawar location, only about 50 kilometers from the Afghan border, was probably considered too exposed. The air force chain of command extended from the chief of the air staff to the commanders of three air defense districts—north, central, and south—and to approximately 18 operational squadrons, 13 of which were combat units in 1983.

A light-bomber squadron, based at Masrur near Karachi, received Mirage-5 aircraft in March 1983 to replace the aging Martin B-57Bs that it had flown for 23 years. Because the squadron will provide close support for naval units in addition to its regular intercept/attack mission, the chief of the naval staff joined the chief of the air staff at ceremonies inaugurating flight operations by the new Mirages.

Other combat units included three ground attack squadrons flying Mirage IIIs and Mirage 5s, eight intercept/attack squadrons equipped with Shenyang F-6s, and one reconnaissance squadron equipped with Mirage IIIs. Support squadrons included two transport, one training, one sea-air rescue (helicopter), and one utility (helicopter) (see table 18, Appendix).

In an article in the *Islamic Defence Review* in 1982, G. Jacobs expressed the opinion that the Pakistan Air Force "is probably the best professional combat force in the country." Jacobs praised the training and motivation of Pakistani air crews and stated that because large numbers of Pakistani pilots have been seconded to air forces in Middle Eastern countries, they have gained experience flying Soviet, British, and United States aircraft in addition to the rather wide variety employed in their own air force.

In January 1983 President Zia visited Sargodha Air Force Base (about 150 kilometers west and north of Lahore) to address the personnel of Squadron II on the occasion of the arrival of the first six of the 40 F-16s that will be delivered by the end of 1984. The F-16s were being purchased by Pakistan on long-range payment terms as part of a six-year US\$3.2 billion economic aid and military assistance package agreed on at the end of 1981. In addition to these American aircraft and the new Mirages, 42 Chinese A-5s had been ordered as part of the modernization program. The first of three planned squadrons of A-5s received its aircraft in February 1983 as Chief of the Air Staff Shamim

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welcomed the Pakistani pilots who ferried the fighters from China. The other two squadrons were expected to receive their aircraft during the remainder of 1963 and early 1964.

Training

After Pakistan gained independence in 1947, its army, quite naturally, carried on a training program patterned on that of the former British Indian Army. During the early years many British officers were seconded to the Pakistan forces to serve as instructors as well as unit commanders. After the mid-1950s, however, increasing emphasis was placed on United States training methods under the guidance and direction of American military advisers. Furthermore, many Pakistani officers received training in the United States before being assigned as instructors in their own service schools. Ten years later, as Pakistan began to receive large quantities of military hardware from China, as well as some from France and the Soviet Union, some training missions accompanied the equipment.

In 1951 the first Pakistani commander in chief of the army, General Ayub, recognized that the training program lacked uniformity and ordered that steps be taken to standardize procedures throughout the army. Ayub prescribed an army-wide training cycle, indicated the objectives it was to attain, and initiated a series of staff studies on methods and procedures. This initiative culminated in the reorganization of training centers and a reorientation of basic training to emphasize efficiency and economy. Over the next several years, each combat arm acquired its own school, and most regimental-size garrisons developed their own training centers.

In the army of the early 1960s, recruits generally received their basic training at the training center of the units to which they were assigned. This training, lasting from about four to 12 months depending on arm or service, included the customary instruction in fundamental military subjects and indoctrination in soldierly discipline. Basic training is usually followed by advanced training for those assigned to the combat arms as well as for those whose assignments require technical skills. Recruit training also prepares trainees to become truck drivers, clerks, and radio operators, among various other specialties. A soldier usually remains with his unit throughout his 15-year military career except for temporary assignments to schools or higher headquarters or other special detached service. The unit training cycle usually runs from October to January, frequently ending in division-level field exercises.

The Command and Staff College at Quetta is the army's highest training institution. Established in 1906 for the British Indian Army, the college offers a 10-month course in tactics, staff duties, administration, and command functions through division level. The curriculum includes command post exercises and one joint exercise with the air force and navy. Students are evaluated on their classroom participation, written examinations, and performance during practical exercises. Classes usually include officers from several foreign countries.



Ali Mangel Fort. Kurram Militia, Kurram Agency, 1904

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The Pakistan Military Academy, established in 1948 at Kakul (about 125 kilometers north of Rawalpindi), presents a two-year course in academic and military subjects, leading to a bachelor of science degree from a cooperating university and a commission in the army. In the early 1980s between 300 and 350 cadets entered the academy annually. Acceptance into the program is highly coveted, and competition for the relatively few spaces is vigorous, as many as 15,000 applications have been inspected in the weeding-out process for a single class. Concerning the education received by cadets, many Pakistani officers have argued about the time given to academic subjects versus the purely military. Some want a "gung ho leader," others want a "better thinker." That argument continued in the early 1980s.

For the education of enlisted personnel, all regimental-size units have programs designed to qualify NCOs and sepoys for the Army Special Certificate of Education, which is roughly equivalent to a secondary-school diploma. The program of study in mathematics, the Urdu language, and general subjects usually requires six to seven years for completion. Interest is sustained because each promotion to a higher rank requires a test on general education, in addition to which better education often leads to better duty assignments. The courses of instruction are highly popular among enlisted personnel, most of whom enter the service having only a minimum of schooling.

Midshipmen, having been selected in the same manner as the military academy cadets, follow a rigorous curriculum at the Pakistan Naval Academy at Rahbar. Part of the regular naval academy course is taught during training cruises aboard the P.N.S. *Babur*. After graduation the newly commissioned acting sublieutenants receive on-the-job training aboard ship or at the naval station to which they have been assigned. Technical training for officers and enlisted personnel is conducted in schools at the Karachi Naval Station near Karachi. Naval cadets from other Muslim countries have also been trained at the Pakistan Naval Academy.

Air force cadets follow a two-year course of general academic instruction in an air force college at Sargodha Air Force Base, earning bachelor of science degrees upon completion. Those going on to become pilots enter the Air Force Academy at Risalpur, east of Peshawar. Flight training begins in Sabh Supporters and proceeds to Lockheed T-33s and Cessna T-37s. Advanced training in Mirage IIIs and MiG-15s is also programmed for pilots.

The Air Force College of Aeronautical Engineering, located at Korangi Creek Air Force Base in Karachi, is affiliated with the University of Karachi and trains aeronautical engineers for the air force and for the civilian airline, Pakistan International Airways (PIA). Graduates receive bachelor of science degrees after studying electrical and mechanical engineering with particular emphasis on aeronautical aspects. Selected senior officers attend the Air Force Staff College, also located in Karachi. Recruit training and specialist courses for enlisted personnel take place at Kohat, some 40 kilometers south of Peshawar.

On the interservice level, the highest and most prestigious institution is the National Defence College at Rawalpindi. The college offers an advanced course in higher military strategy to senior officers of the three services. A second course, presented to integrated groups of top-level civil servants and military officers, covers military, political, economic, and scientific subjects in a manner designed to involve the students in the broadest aspects of national security policy. An innovation in the education of military officers since Zia came to power has been the sending of line officers, i.e., combat-arms officers, to civilian universities for general postgraduate studies. Previously, such opportunities had been limited to Army Education Corps officers and some technicians.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Uniforms worn by officers and enlisted personnel of Pakistan's three services are closely patterned in style and color on those of the corresponding British service. Principal colors are, for the army, greenish brown, navy, traditional navy blue, and air force, light blue. Camouflage fatigues are commonly worn by army troop units. Headgear includes visored caps, soft overseas caps, berets, and steel helmets. Officers' dress uniforms continue to show the British influence passed on from the British Indian Army.

There are 11 grades of commissioned officers in each of the three services. The rank structure follows the British pattern and is similar to the structure used in United States forces. The two warrant officer grades in the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force equate to the highest NCO grades in the United States forces rather than to warrant officer grades. The Pakistan Navy has no warrant officer grades. There are no equivalents to United States warrant officers in the Pakistan forces. Rank insignia are similar to those used by the British (see fig. 10, fig. 11).

A unique feature of the grade structure of the Pakistan Army is the Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO), a rank between warrant officer and acting sublieutenant for which there is no equivalent in the United States forces or in the British forces, although it was created during colonial times for the British Indian Army. The JCO was originally intended to fill the wide gap between British officers and indigenous sepoys, but it was found to be a useful institution even after Indians became commissioned officers, because the gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel remained. The institution was carried over into the Pakistan Army at independence for the same reason that it existed previously. In the 1980s some critics said that the JCO is an anachronism that will no longer be necessary as the educational level of the recruits is gradually raised and as the social base from which officers are drawn is widened. In the past, attainment of the rank of JCO has been a powerful incentive for career enlisted personnel. Some critics who state that the function of the JCO is no longer necessary also admit that a restructuring of ranks would be necessary to provide

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ARMY											
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	General of the Army
AIR FORCE											
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Pilot Officer	Flying Officer	Flight Lieutenant	Squadron Leader	Wing Commander	Group Captain	Commander	Air Vice Marshal	Air Marshal	Air Chief Marshal	Marshal of the Air Force
NAVY											
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Ensign	Lieutenant Junior Grade	Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain	Commodore	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral	Admiral	Fleet Admiral

Figure 10. Officer Rank Insignia, 1983

1. This measure is more	2. There is no agreement	3. No United States agreement
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Figure 11. Enlisted Rank Incidents, 1983

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a supergrade goal for sepoy. There is no comparable rank in either the navy or the air force.

There are three grades of JCOs: *subedar major*, *subedar*, and *jemadar*. They are commissioned from among selected enlisted men after long and meritorious service. Because of their age and experience, JCOs are given wide responsibilities in the day-to-day supervision of the lower ranks.

Military Justice

The administration of military justice and the military court system are based on three separate but substantially similar service laws: the Pakistan Army Act, 1952 (a modification of the Indian Army Act of 1911), the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, and the Pakistan Navy Ordinance, 1961. These statutes, as amended, are administered by the respective services under the central supervision of the Ministry of Defence. The nomenclature and composition of military courts vary slightly according to the service, but court procedures, categories of offenses, scales of punishment, jurisdictional authority, appeal and review procedures, and procedures for commutation and suspension of sentences are almost identical in the three services.

The top two courts of the four-tier army system and of the three-tier navy and air force systems are known as general courts-martial and district courts-martial; at the third level there are field general courts-martial in the army and air force, and summary general courts-martial in the navy. Only the army system has a fourth level: the summary courts-martial. Who may be tried by a specific court and what punishments may be adjudged vary according to the level of the court. In the army, for example, the general court and the field general court may try any officer or enlisted person for any offense and may pass any sentence. The district court, which is between the general and field general courts in the structure, may try only NCOs and other enlisted personnel and may not assess the death penalty, banishment, or imprisonment at hard labor for more than two years. The summary court may handle any case other than those involving mutiny or insubordination, offenses punishable by death, or civil offenses punishable by death, banishment, or imprisonment at hard labor in excess of one year.

Sentences of military courts must be approved by the convening authority, that is, the commanding general of the organization concerned. Every decision of a court-martial above summary court level must be concurred in by an absolute majority of the members of the court, where a vote is split evenly, the law provides that the "decision shall be in favor of the accused." The right of appeal is guaranteed.

The civil court system has no authority to question the legality of a finding or verdict of a military court. When both a civil court and a military court have jurisdiction over a civil offense, defined for the armed forces as one committed by a military person against a civilian, the case must be referred to the central government for a ruling. A

member of the military tried by either a civil or a military court may not be tried again for the same offense.

Punishments available to military courts are death; banishment for periods from seven years to life (only by army courts); imprisonment at hard labor for terms up to 14 years; ordinary detention for terms from six months to two years; dishonorable discharge; forfeiture of seniority for officers, JCOs, warrant officers, and NCOs; reduction to a lower rank or to the lowest rank for NCOs; forfeiture of service and promotion status; penal deductions from pay; severe reprimand or reprimand; and forfeiture of pay and allowances not to exceed three months.

In the army a court-martial may also prescribe field punishment for persons below the rank of warrant officer. The law states that "field punishment shall be of the character of personal restraint or of hard labor but shall not be of a nature to cause injury to life or limb." All sentences of imprisonment, passed by any court, are served in military prisons or detention barracks. Except for the crimes of desertion and enlistment under false pretense, criminal liability lapses after three years from the date of an offense, unless the accused has been brought to trial within the prescribed period. Former servicemen in civilian life who are accused of felonies committed while on active duty are liable for military prosecution under all three service laws under the same time limitation. In addition to the foregoing procedures, courts of inquiry may also be established under the Defence Services (Inquiry) Ordinance, 1969, in order to investigate incidents involving breaches of discipline or irregularities.

The military justice system is separate from the military function in the circumstances of the administration of martial law. When martial law was imposed in July 1977, Chief of the Army Staff Zia took on the duties of CMLA and declared that President Chaudhry would act only on the advice of the CMLA. Zia also declared that the chief justices of the provincial high courts would serve as governors of their respective provinces but would act on the advice of the provincial martial law administrators.


Public Order and Internal Security

Law Enforcement

The primary mission of the police is the preservation of public order. The accomplishment of that mission entails investigation of crime, apprehension of criminals, and prevention of crime. The definition of crime in Pakistan includes antistate activities (terrorism, subversion, and the like) in addition to routine criminal activities. Except in Pakistan's federally administered northern areas and tribal territories, basic responsibilities for public order rest with the police forces of the four provincial governments, supplemented by national-level agencies and aided by the country's regular armed forces when so ordered. Under the martial law regime that has existed since July 5, 1977, the head of




*A Special Service Group (commandos) at
Joint Services Pakistan Day Parade, 1983*



*A Special Service Group (commandos) at
Joint Services Pakistan Day Parade, 1983*



**Column of Pakistan Air Force SAMs at
Joint Services Pakistan Day Parade, 1983**



**Army contingent at
Joint Services Pakistan Day Parade, 1983
Photos courtesy Embassy
of Pakistan, Washington**

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government. Zia, has directly controlled law enforcement agencies through the position of CMLA.

The provincial police services, patterned on those that existed during British rule, are not integrated organizationally as a national police force, and there is no national director or commander; nevertheless, general supervision of the overall service is provided by the federal minister of interior. Police regulations were originally codified in the Police Act of 1861, which was carried forward into independent Pakistan and used, as amended, as a basis for police provisions in the 1973 Constitution. Although the Constitution remained suspended in late 1983, the police regulations essentially continued in force, subject to adaptation by martial law authorities.

Although the police system has been most strongly influenced by British methods, United States influence in equipment and training has also been apparent since shortly after Pakistan independence. A public safety advisory team under the auspices of the United States Agency for International Development worked with Pakistani police forces from 1959 until 1972, and some Pakistani police officers attended courses at the International Police Academy in Washington during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Despite the absence of a police force organized entirely at the national level, there exists a small, highly elite association known as the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), whose members occupy the senior police positions in the provincial police forces. The PSP, which was established at independence, is not an operational unit and was not intended to operate as such. In essence, the PSP is a police career service, similar to the civil service, from which qualified police officers are individually assigned to operational units in the provinces or to a central government agency. After independence, British officers were employed by the PSP for several years until their gradual replacement by qualified Pakistanis.

Officers seeking senior posts in the various police forces are initially identified and selected through the results of a comprehensive annual examination conducted by the Central Public Service Commission of the Establishment Division of the President's Secretariat. The annual examination is given for candidates seeking appointment to the civil service, the foreign service, and the PSP. A ranked list of eligible candidates, based on examination grades, is drawn up by the commission, and from this list the Establishment Division makes new appointments according to vacancies and quotas. This division also controls all matters of training, assignment, promotion, and administrative policy. Typically, only candidates with high passing scores can expect to be selected for PSP appointments because of the relatively few vacancies.

The successful PSP applicant, or probationer as he is called, receives a two-year course of instruction at the Police Training College in Sialkot, near Islamabad. The probationer course consists of instruction in criminal law, police procedures, forensic medicine, languages, and other



*Pakistan Military Academy cadets
at Passing-Out Parade, March 15, 1984
Courtesy Embassy of Pakistan, Washington*

subjects. A period of on-the-job training at a police headquarters is also part of the course. After completion of training, the graduate receives the rank of assistant superintendent and is assigned to a police unit in one of the provinces or to a central governmental agency. The PSP officer, unlike lower ranking officers and constables, is subject to assignment anywhere in the country.

A federal police agency under the direct supervision of the minister of interior is the Special Police Establishment, or Special Branch, which was set up to deal with corruption at both the federal and the provincial levels. The Special Police Establishment grew out of the Anti-Corruption Agency, which had been established by the British in 1941. The agency is an investigative body that may either initiate investigations on its own or respond to requests from other government agencies. Its investigative competence includes cases dealing with embezzlement, bribery, black marketing, and misappropriation of funds. Its director has the rank of inspector general (IG) of police.

At the national level the best-known paramilitary police force is the long-established Frontier Constabulary, commanded and staffed in key positions by officers of the PSP. Headquarters of the force is located in Peshawar; its commander is a deputy inspector general (DIG) who reports directly to the federal minister of interior. Its strength in 1983 was estimated at about 2,000. Units were stationed in the NWFP, where they were primarily concerned with antismuggling duties and maintaining intertribal peace.

Another central government police agency, the Federal Security Force (FSF), was created by Bhutto in the early 1970s, expanded

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rapidly during his brief period of power, and was dissolved by Zia after the coup. Bhutto, complaining about how the Pakistani people take to the streets at the slightest provocation, stated that the country needed some force between the "terribly inadequate and badly equipped" police and the armed forces which, when called on to act in a police role, "play the game according to their own rules." The FSF was to be that force, but it soon acquired a reputation for brutality and terrorist tactics that appalled even Bhutto's supporters. Many of his opponents feared that the FSF was the instrument with which the prime minister would eliminate political opposition. Ridding the country of "Bhutto's private army" was high on Zia's priority list when he took over the government. The FSF was abolished on November 30, 1977, its director and some other high-ranking officers were charged with various crimes. Many other officers were forced out of government service, but most of its personnel were transferred to various police organizations.

At least two other civil organizations at the national level are involved in tasks having to do with security and public order, although neither is part of the police structure, judicial system, or armed forces. The Intelligence Bureau, an executive agency reporting directly to the office of the president, is primarily concerned with subversion and counter-intelligence. The Directorate of Civil Defence, under the Ministry of Interior, is what its title indicates and also is charged with planning and directing civil relief measures in natural disasters or other emergencies in which it operates in conjunction with provincial agencies.

Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order rests with the provincial governments, and a majority of the country's police are members of the police forces of the four provinces. Provincial authorities control the regular police in addition to specialized agencies, such as the special armed police reserve, the railway, highway, and river police, and the village police. Total strength of provincial police in 1983 was estimated to be between 100,000 and 150,000.

Police personnel are categorized as gazetted and subordinate, roughly analogous, respectively, to commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the military services. The top five police grades, in descending order, are inspector general, deputy inspector general, assistant inspector general, superintendent, and assistant superintendent. These grades in all police organizations are customarily filled by PSP personnel. In the provincial police services, the grade of deputy superintendent equates to assistant superintendent but is not necessarily filled by PSP personnel. Below these gazetted grades, the subordinate positions are divided into upper and lower categories. The upper subordinate ranks are inspector, subinspector, and assistant subinspector. The lower subordinate ranks, in which the majority of provincial policemen serve, are head constable and constable.

Each province, for the purposes of local government and administration, is divided and subdivided into divisions and districts, headed,

respectively, by commissioners and deputy commissioners. In police parlance, the division has been known traditionally as the range. Each range contains districts, which are usually subdivided into varying numbers of subdistricts. In each province the chief of the police establishment is the inspector general of police, who reports to the secretary of the home department of the provincial government but who also has communications links to the federal Ministry of Interior through PSP channels. The inspector general's staff of gazetted officers at the provincial headquarters supervises department functions, such as criminal investigation, identification, communications, and administration. The inspector general also supervises the police ranges of his province, each of which is under a deputy inspector general.

The principal operational center for routine police work in the overall structure is the district police headquarters. At district level the chief of police is a superintendent who directs the activities of one or more assistant superintendents and a number of inspectors and constables. The district superintendent also oversees the operations at subdistrict level and at the many police stations subordinate to the subdistricts. Subdistricts are usually commanded by assistant or deputy superintendents, and police stations by one of the upper level subordinate grades. In the larger cities, police are organized on a municipal basis but remain part of the provincial police and report to the inspector general of the particular province.

An official study of the Karachi metropolitan police in early 1963 concluded that the 54 police stations in the far-flung urban jurisdiction were unable to deal adequately with large-scale disturbances, even though reinforced by a special strike force maintained at police headquarters. The study recommended the creation of a special police force armed and equipped to deal with riots and mass demonstrations. As of mid-1963 city authorities and the police inspector general of Sind had not disclosed their intentions concerning the recommendations.

At all levels the senior police officer is in the chain of command of the overall police organization, but he must also be responsive to civil government officials or, since 1977, to martial law authorities. These multiple lines of command responsibility sometimes cause confusion and disagreement, but the principle of ultimate civilian control as established by the British in the Police Act of 1861 continues to be observed. At provincial level the inspector general reports to the home department secretary; at police range level, the deputy inspector general reports to the division commissioner; and at the traditional hub of activity, the district, the police superintendent reports to the deputy commissioner, known since colonial times as the DC. The traditionally powerful DC is the civilian official most involved in matters of law and order and the administration of justice. Although the DC has no authority to interfere directly in the internal organization and discipline of the police, an important part of his duties is to inspect police stations of his district and monitor police activities. In cases of disagreement between the DC and the police superintendent, the DC's judgment

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rules, but serious differences may be appealed to higher authorities by either or both officials.

Personnel are recruited for police work at local levels, and members of police forces are usually residents of the areas in which they serve. Each province has a police training center where recruits receive several months' basic training before being assigned as constables. Women are also recruited for police positions in some jurisdictions, but their numbers have not been publicized, and an estimate of their strength was not available in 1983. Police pay has traditionally been poor, particularly in the lower ranks, making it difficult to improve the educational level of constables in the provincial ranks. Journalist Peter Lewis, discussing low salaries in the army, civil service, and police in the early Zia period, said that the condition led to "undisguised corruption in every official function—and on every police beat—in the country." Lewis cited a then current Pakistani joke in which "a constable who fails to make at least twice his official wages in bribes gets fired for laziness." Corruption engendered by low pay continued to be a problem and continued to exacerbate the hostile attitudes of many citizens toward the police.

Measures taken by the authorities for mob and riot control begin with the local police, who may be reinforced by police reserves. One effective technique for the dispersal of unmanageable demonstrators developed during British rule and carried over after independence is the *lathi* charge. A *lathi* is a five-foot wooden staff that may be steel-tipped or have one end weighted. In the hands of trained riot policemen these weapons are truly formidable, and a charge by shoulder-to-shoulder police holding the *lathis* at the ready is often sufficient to disperse the most unruly mob. Tear gas and firearms are also used and, when necessary, the regular army is called on for assistance.

Crime and Punishment

Courts, Criminal Law, and Procedure

Law enforcement and judicial authorities are governed by a number of statutes carried over from British rule and others enacted after independence. Among the former are the Penal Code of Pakistan, first promulgated in 1860 as the Indian Penal Code, the Police Act of 1861; the Evidence Act of 1872; the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898; the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1908; and the Official Secrets Act of 1911. All have been amended, both before and after independence. Enacted after independence were the Security of Pakistan Act of 1952, the Press and Publications Ordinance of 1960, and the Political Parties Act of 1962, in addition to many other laws believed needed to combat corruption, espionage, smuggling, and other criminal behavior. These, too, have been amended by successive governments or, sometimes, set aside by martial law authorities. The Zia martial law government, in addition to placing the constitution in abeyance, has annulled many long-standing statutes and has promulgated an extensive series of martial law regulations (see *Martial Law*, this ch.).

Zia chose the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad in 1979—February 10—to announce his full-scale Islamization of Pakistani society. Under a new legal code, punishments included death by hanging for rape, death by stoning for adultery or for carnal knowledge of a virgin, and amputation of the right hand for the first offense of theft, amputation of the left foot for a second offense, and life imprisonment for a third. The president asserted that the more extreme punishments for sexual offenses would probably not be carried out because of the requirement that four adult Muslim men must come forward as eyewitnesses in order to prove such charges. A further provision of the new code was a ban on the manufacture, import, or export of alcoholic beverages and illicit drugs. A Muslim found guilty of drinking alcohol is subject to a sentence of 80 lashes. Foreigners and non-Muslim Pakistanis are not subject to the prohibition as long as drinking is confined to private places, but public drunkenness by members of these sectors of the society is punishable by 30 lashes.

Zia continued to press Islamization in the society and particularly in the legal system. He established Shariat (see Glossary) benches in the provincial high courts, but because they did not appear to function well (or at least up to Zia's expectations), he established the Federal Shariat Court to ensure that Pakistani law was completely in concert with the tenets of Islam. One of the court's earliest rulings was against the punishment of stoning to death for adultery, which it found to be alien to the faith. In 1982, however, with three new Zia appointees on the bench, the Federal Shariat Court reversed its earlier ruling and decreed that stoning to death was an acceptable punishment for rape, adultery, and fornication.

Categories of crime are listed in the Penal Code of Pakistan, which is the country's most important and most comprehensive criminal statute. Among the categories of more serious crimes are those called "crimes against the state," for which the code authorizes prosecution against any person or group of persons conspiring to overthrow the government by force or abetting such a conspiracy. Intent of persons or groups involved in a conspiracy against the government distinguished such crimes from riots or other disturbances that would not be considered antistate. The code authorizes the death penalty or lengthy banishment for serious crimes against the state. The incitement of hatred, contempt, or disaffection toward a lawfully constituted authority is also a criminal offense punishable by a maximum sentence of life in prison.

Among other categories of felonies are offenses relating to the armed forces, such as abetment of mutiny or desertion or harboring a deserter; offenses against the public tranquility, meaning unlawful assembly, rioting, and public disturbances; offenses affecting public health, safety, and morals; and offenses relating to religion. Listed felonies also include offenses against the person, such as murder, abortion, assault, kidnapping, abduction, slavery, forced labor, and rape; and offenses against

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property, such as theft, robbery, dacoity (robbery by a group of five or more persons), or misappropriation of property.

Until 1977 punishment had been divided into five categories: death, banishment, imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fines. Banishment, meaning confinement in a maximum security penitentiary, may be for terms ranging from seven years to life. Imprisonment may be "simple" or "rigorous," meaning that it can range from a 24-hour jail sentence for drunkenness or disorderly conduct up to 14 years at hard labor for more serious offenses. Juveniles may be sentenced to reform schools for terms up to seven years. The first surge of martial law regulations in July 1977 contained orders establishing military courts and providing punishments such as flogging and amputation of limbs. Although some Muslim scholars objected, the coup authorities claimed that such punishments were permitted by the Quran. At the time, only Libya and Saudi Arabia allowed those punishments. The martial law regulations also established certain maximum punishments, for example, death for sabotage or assaulting a member of the armed forces, death or amputation for armed robbery, 10 years' imprisonment for issuing propaganda intended to incite class or sectarian violence, 10 years' imprisonment or flogging for insulting or molesting a woman, seven years for organizing or attending a public meeting or demonstration without permission, five years plus flogging for participation in any political activity, three years or flogging for labor union activities, and five years or amputation for looting or theft.

The Penal Code applies to all citizens except the president, duly accredited members of foreign diplomatic missions, provincial governors, and judges of the high courts—once again with the provision that martial law authorities are a law unto themselves. Also exempted from criminal liability is a judicial act of a judge done in good faith, an act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent or done to prevent other harm, an act of a child under seven years of age, an act of a person of unsound mind, an act of an intoxicated person if committed against his will or while the intoxication rendered him "momentarily incapable of distinguishing right from wrong," and an act performed in self-defense.

Unless otherwise directed by the president, the tribal areas are outside the scope of the code. These areas are administered by political agents appointed by the central government who, of necessity, rely on the tribal leaders for the actual administering of the tribal agencies. The Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, as amended, and tribal customary law remain in force, supplemented by special regulations of the central government. The Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary keep open the necessary communications routes, but the routine police activities are handled by tribal guards (*khasadars*). Even the martial law authorities avoid confrontation with some of the tribes of the more remote frontier.

The Security of Pakistan Act, in concert with provincial security acts, empowers the authorities to indict any person "acting in a manner

prejudicial to the defence, external affairs and security of Pakistan, or the maintenance of public order. The act, originally intended to expire after five years but extended many times, authorizes the government to restrict the movements of suspects or place them under preventive detention. If not detained, an individual may be required to report his or her whereabouts or to appear regularly before a designated magistrate, restrictions may also be imposed with respect to a suspect's employment or business activities. Violations are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years or by fine or by both.

In addition to the power provided by the security act, preventive detention may also be ordered under the Code of Criminal Procedure when, in the opinion of the authorities, there is a strong likelihood of public disorder. The same code provides in its Section 144 that magistrates may prohibit assembly of five or more persons, holding of public meetings, and carrying of firearms for renewable periods of two months. The law guarantees basic rights to preventive detainees, but the benefit of the doubt is with the detaining authority, particularly under martial law. A detainee, by law, must be informed of the grounds for detention within one month, but the information can be withheld completely if the authorities deem that the public interest would be harmed by such disclosure. The government is also required to grant the detainee the right to counsel as soon as possible, within 16 days at the latest. Previously, preventive detention could not legally exceed three months unless an advisory board found "sufficient cause" to extend the period. Since 1977, however, martial law administrators have been empowered to detain any person for an indefinite period.

Preventive detention was used extensively by the martial law government in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One example was the roundup of political opposition leaders just before the start of an announced program of civil disobedience in August 1983. Hundreds of leaders of groups opposing martial law were arrested and detained to keep them off the streets during demonstrations in an attempt to render the opposition leaderless.

Amendments to the Security of Pakistan Act in July 1976 limited the powers of the provincial high courts and the Supreme Court by denying justices at those levels the right to grant bail to persons accused under the security act, whether or not an appeal was pending. The amendments further stipulated that no court could revise an order or sentence of a special tribunal or transfer a case from a special tribunal to another court. These amendments were part of the overall schemes of the Bhutto regime to bring all the reins of power into the office of the prime minister.

A bill to amend the Constitution—also aimed at garnering power for the executive and limiting the power of the judiciary—was adopted by the National Assembly in September 1976. The bill provided that no court could grant bail to persons charged with subversion, causing explosions, or under any provision of the security act, that no court could set aside charges on grounds that they were not consistent with

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constitutionally guaranteed rights, that chief justices would hold office for four years on the high courts and five years on the Supreme Court, instead of for life, and that high court judges could be transferred to the Supreme Court or to other high courts. The bill also provided that provincial governors could not be natives of the provinces they governed. Opponents argued that the bill was obviously designed to weaken the judiciary, but Bhutto argued that it was necessary because the courts had encroached on the power of the executive. Bhutto won at the time, but such obvious power grabs and the arbitrariness of his governing were instrumental in bringing down his government less than a year later.

As originally written, the Security of Pakistan Act provided authority to abolish any "association" suspected of acting or being used in a manner prejudicial to the public interest. An amendment later reduced this authority to suspension for a three-month period. Other laws invocable in this connection are the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1906, which proscribes, among other things, the activities of political parties considered antistate, and the Political Parties Act of 1962, designed to prohibit the formation of parties detrimental to "Islamic ideology" or "the integrity of Pakistan." The latter law also enjoins a party from receiving any foreign aid or from affiliating itself with any foreign political organization. Under the martial law regime, all political activities have been banned, and all political parties have been declared illegal.

The scope of the Security of Pakistan Act extends also to the domain of the mass communications media. The statute may be cited to prohibit the printing and dissemination of any publications regarded likely to endanger public order and to dissolve management of publishing houses issuing such publications. It is reinforced by the Press and Publications (Amendment) Ordinance of 1963, which provides for the banning of "objectionable materials" that preach violence against the government, create feelings of enmity between provinces, abet disaffection within the armed forces or police forces, or undermine discipline in those forces.

The Government Servants (Conduct) Act of 1964, designed to enforce the political neutrality of public servants, may also be used against members of their families. The law directs that "no government servant shall permit any person dependent on him for maintenance or under his care or control to take part in, or in any way assist, any movement or activity which is, or tends indirectly to be, subversive of government." It also prohibits government servants from communicating directly or indirectly with "a foreign mission in Pakistan or any foreign aid-giving agency to secure for himself invitations to visit a foreign country or to elicit offers of training facilities abroad."

Persons charged with espionage are punishable under the Official Secrets Act of 1911. A 1966 amendment prescribes the death penalty for a person convicted of espionage instead of imprisonment for a term of 14 years as originally provided. A government regulation prohibits

former government officials from working for foreign diplomatic missions in order to prevent leaks of security information. Pakistanis seeking employment with foreign embassies or any foreign government agencies are required to obtain prior permission from the Pakistani authorities.

The martial law regime has played havoc with the operation of the court system and with court procedure (see *The Politicized Intelligentsia*, ch. 4). The restrictions imposed on the judiciary have seriously undermined this former pillar of government. Previously, the Supreme Court, the provincial high courts, district and sessions courts, and the various magistrate courts that constituted the system maintained a precarious independence, even under earlier military rulers as well as under Bhutto, who purposely sought to weaken the power of the courts. In 1981 Zia fired the chief justice and four other justices of the Supreme Court, along with several high court judges, who had refused to swear allegiance to Zia's new Provisional Constitutional Order, which limits the powers of the civil courts, outlaws political parties, and grants the president unlimited power to amend the Constitution (see *Emerging Political System*, ch. 4).

The superimposing of military courts and Shariat courts on the legal system since 1977 has impeded the operation of the regular courts. The introduction of Shariat punishments has also added an element of confusion in that punishments have been assessed, e.g., amputation of a limb, but as of late 1983 had not been carried out. As far as is known, no sentence of amputation has actually been carried out, although several convicted felons have been known to have received such sentences. Through a martial law regulation of 1981, a basic tenet of the extant legal system was turned 180 degrees as the law regarding subversion was changed to read: "a military court on the basis of police or any other investigation alone may, unless the contrary is proved, presume that this accused has committed the offense charged with." The pending inauguration of Qazi courts, in which religious figures are judges, tends to muddy further the judicial waters. The progressive destruction of the legal system has brought cries of anguish from members of the bar nationwide, many of whom complained, demonstrated, and even engaged in hunger strikes, all to no avail.

The military court system, inaugurated shortly after the coup in 1977, consists of courts on two levels: the special military court and the summary military court. The seriousness of an indictment determines the level of the court that will hear a case. A special military court is constituted just like a field general court martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, having the same powers and following the same procedures (see *Military Justice*, this ch.). A summary military court is the same as a summary court-martial. Any martial law administrator has the power to convene a summary military court simply by appointing any military officer to act in that capacity. According to martial law regulations, a summary military court may not "pass sentences of death or amputation or imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment

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exceeding one year or whipping exceeding 15 stripes or fine exceeding Rs5,000" (for value of the rupee—see Glossary) Martial law administrators may assign any case to a military court.

Incidence of Crime

Official statistics are compiled from reports gathered from the lowest levels of the system and processed through the various headquarters in the structure. Because it is a slow process and because standards and definitions may be reflected, analysts have considered crime statistics as being generally unreliable. Furthermore, most observers are confident that a substantial but unquantifiable amount of crime is not reported to the police. In any assessment of the crime situation, a distinction must be made between ordinary (nonpolitical) criminal activities and violations of the Security of Pakistan Act (see Threats to Internal Security, this ch.)

A random survey of newspaper articles and reports on crime in 1983 indicated that armed robbery, dacoity, and automobile and motorcycle theft were frequently reported crimes. Smuggling of all kinds and narcotics trafficking were also of obvious concern to the authorities. A resolution of the Central Action Committee of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), issued at an April 1983 meeting, condemned the martial law authorities for their unbalanced preoccupation with political dissidents, which, according to the MRD, enabled real criminals to go free. The statement also claimed that the years of martial law had witnessed unprecedented growth in the crimes of robbery, dacoity, murder, rape, and other heinous offenses.

Trafficking in narcotics has become a major problem for law authorities, and the quantity of heroin from the NWFP being smuggled to outside markets by the early 1980s reached alarming proportions. An article by William K. Stevens in the *New York Times* of June 30, 1983, stated that Pakistan has surpassed Southeast Asia as a supplier of heroin to the United States and the rest of the world. Poppies are grown on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border in the NWFP and the tribal areas, and the heroin is produced in a large number of small, primitive laboratories, after which it is smuggled out of the country by "a growing and increasingly skillful network of Pakistani traffickers."

The head of the Narcotics Control Board admitted that his agency had been overwhelmed by the mushrooming drug trade of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and even though huge quantities of heroin had been seized, he feared that much larger quantities had been smuggled to foreign markets. An additional problem for the control board was the quantity of heroin being produced in the tribal areas, where the central government exercises little or no authority. Further adding to the drug problem in 1983 was the increasing use of illicit drugs by young Pakistanis, but heroin was not the major cause of concern; the choice of the relatively small number of young drug abusers was psychotropic synthetic drugs that were being smuggled into Pakistan as the heroin was being smuggled out. The historic tradition of legal

production of opium from poppies, both before and after independence, has also presented problems to the authorities since the custom was outlawed in 1979. The Narcotics Control Board was being aided in its struggle against drug trafficking by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. The reputation as one of the world's leading exporters of opium and heroin seemed incongruous in a country that sentences people to be flogged or imprisoned for consuming alcoholic beverages.

Penal System

Custody and rehabilitation of persons sentenced to imprisonment, a provincial function, is administered under the Penal Code of 1860, the Prisons Act of 1894, and the Prisoners Act of 1900, as amended. Although the system has expanded, there has been little change in method since the days of British control. The highest provincial official in prison management is the inspector general of prisons. At division level the senior official in the prison system is called the director of prisons, at district or municipal level the senior official is the jail superintendent. At village level there are police lockups. All installations, except at village level, are operated by prison police who are usually permanently assigned to such duty. The central government aids provincial prison administrations with federal funding and with operation of the Central Jail Training Institute.

According to observers, the facilities of the prison system have low standards of hygiene and sanitation, poor living conditions, lack of basic necessities, and many other problems affecting the moral and physical well-being of the inmates. Over a period of several years, many observers have attributed the poor conditions primarily to overcrowding. Various reform commissions since the 1960s have recommended additional facilities and greater emphasis on rehabilitation, but a major reform program has not evolved, probably because of inadequate funds and because of continuing strife in the country.

The Council of Islamic Ideology made a series of proposals in early 1983 that were designed to make treatment of prisoners somewhat more humane and to rehabilitate them if at all possible. Measures recommended by the council included improvement of visiting and mail privileges as well as improvement of prison diet: "food should be adequate, hygienic, and energizing." Concerning visiting privileges, the council recommended that prisoners serving sentences longer than six years be allowed regular periods of brief parole to visit wives and children, and if such paroles were not possible, they should be permitted conjugal visits by wives in the privacy of prison "family quarters." Prisoners serving short sentences for minor offenses should not be confined with hardened criminals, and "political prisoners should be kept apart from those who have committed moral crimes." Recommendations for rehabilitation primarily concerned "Islamic and ethical education," and the provision of adequate facilities for "collective prayers" and "lessons from the Holy Quran." The council also stated

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that the "punishment of flogging should be dispensed in strict conformity with the Whipping Ordinance." Like earlier administrations, Zia's was interested in prison reform, but no known programs had been given any priority.

There are three classes of confinement for prisoners, usually referred to as Class A, B, and C. Class C cells, in which ordinary criminals serve their sentences, have been reported as having dirt floors and scant furnishing and being overcrowded. Depending on ability to pay for amenities (however slight they may be), as well as on social and political status, a prisoner may expect the better treatment, less crowded cells, and better food of Class B confinement. Class A confinement was reportedly reserved for very important prisoners.

Threats to Internal Security

Pakistan in late 1983, in its seventh year of martial law under Zia, continued to suffer from political dissidence and from public disturbances generated by political opponents of the regime. Although political parties were outlawed by a martial law edict in 1979, the administrative structures of the parties remained intact, their leaders—when not under arrest or in jail—remained active, and the press continued to report party activities. Outlawing the parties had failed to quell the spirit of political opponents, and demonstrations against the martial law authorities were commonplace despite official harassment. Centrist and leftist parties (mostly under the banner of the MRD) were harassed more than right-wing parties, but this did not curtail their political activities. In essence, despite the status of official nonexistence ("defunct" in governmental parlance), the parties continued as political opposition groups. In addition, the government faced subversive activities from clandestine dissident groups as well as from long-standing regional, linguistic, and religious struggles (see *The Nationalities and Civil-Military Administration*, ch. 4). Since the execution of Bhutto, a group of insurgents known as Al Zulfikar has operated from sanctuaries in neighboring Afghanistan, although the leaders of the group, Bhutto's sons, were reportedly expelled from Afghanistan in mid-1983.

Ever since independence the country has been beset by civil disturbances so numerous that they have become an established feature of political life. Even under the martial law administrations of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia (perhaps because of martial law), the people of cities and large towns have risen time and again to oppose the authorities and demand attention to their grievances. In most instances disorders erupted in sometimes spontaneous, sometimes planned mass demonstrations by students, striking workers, religious groups, or a cross section of all, aroused to the point of protest by conditions that they considered intolerable. Demonstrations have been staged frequently in protest against unfulfilled government promises or as a means of making representations to the authorities that could not be ignored. Causes of disturbances have varied according to local and regional contingencies; most have had distinct political overtones. Vi-

olent clashes between police and demonstrators have become the rule rather than the exception. Communal tensions rooted in centuries of mutual distrust and jealousies among disparate groups have also spawned civil disorder.

Labor strife and student turbulence, both endemic in Pakistan since independence, are often the cause of public disorders, but language and religious disputes have sometimes caused memorable disputes (see *Ethnic Relations*, ch. 2). In the early 1970s, when the provincial assembly in Sind passed a bill making Sindhi the provincial language, the proponents of Urdu, the official national language, reacted violently. Karachi became the arena for mass demonstrations, arson, and looting as mobs blocked highways and railroads and successfully shut down many businesses and services. A curfew and the invoking of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prohibit assembly of five or more persons and the carrying of any kind of weapon temporarily stalled the violence, but not before several people had been killed and many others—including 40 or more policemen—had been wounded. The rioting had by that time spread to Hyderabad, where many more casualties occurred. Rival political factions fought each other as well as the police, who increasingly used tear gas and fired into the massed demonstrators, but before order was restored, regular armed forces had to be used as police reinforcements. Bhutto involved himself personally to arrange a compromise that was acceptable to the disputants, and that particular language crisis ended.

Another frequent cause of disturbances has been sectarian rifts, despite the fact that the country is more than 90 percent Muslim. The first use of the army in a civil disturbance occurred in the early 1950s when two Muslim sects, Ahrars and Ahmadiyas, clashed in the Punjab and the police were unable to restore order (see *Religious Minorities*, ch. 2). Ten years later clashes between Shiah and Sunni Muslims in Lahore overwhelmed the police, and once again the regular army was called on to act in the role of police in restoring order. In the 1970s the Ahmadiya sect was again the center of controversy as a majority in the National Assembly pushed through a constitutional amendment that declared the sect non-Muslim.

Zia and the military junta have had as much (or more) trouble than any of their predecessors in attempting to curb civil disturbances before they could grow into civil war. They ended the guerrilla warfare in Baluchistan that had plagued Bhutto for four years, but the Baluch seemed only to have been quieted rather than pacified. The army maintained a garrison of 80,000 soldiers in and around Quetta, the Baluch capital, ostensibly because of the proximity of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, but the Quetta garrison was the same strength before the Soviet invasion. Although not on the verge of revolution, the NWFP and the tribal areas—where "guns are part of our tribal dress"—seemed always to be on the edge of turmoil, compounding the problems of the central government in Islamabad. In Sind the underlying conviction

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that the Punjabis and refugees dominate Pakistani affairs colors all activities and creates a threat to the central government.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent US\$3.2 billion aid package from the United States were a boon to the Zia government, nevertheless, in late 1983 that government was in trouble with its own citizens. The trouble appeared to be surmountable, but the government did not radiate stability, it relied on heavy police and military force to curb protesters in dozens of cities and towns, and Zia once again promised elections.

At times, 1983 appeared to be a watershed year for the Zia government, a seeming myriad of economic, legal, religious, and social problems were constantly underscored by the nationwide dissatisfaction with the martial law government and with martial law per se. Early in the year sectarian rioting between Shiah and Sunni Muslims resulted in some deaths and considerable destruction of property, including the burning of a mosque. Later, a decision by the central government on rule of evidence in court cases, to the effect that evidence submitted by a man would be equal to that submitted by two women, provoked immediate reaction. Many women banded together in protest, and a group calling itself the Women's Action Forum took to the streets in Lahore to demonstrate against the new ruling. A *lathi* charge by the Lahore police broke up the demonstration but also brought instant condemnation of the police and the Zia government. By midsummer, hundreds of lawyers around the country were participating in symbolic hunger strikes to dramatize their demands for a return to constitutional law and government. Not all politically active Pakistanis backed the attempts of dissident groups to end the martial law government, however, some Zia supporters, claiming that the dissenters wanted to return the Pakistan People's Party (PPP—Bhutto's party) to power, clashed with antigovernment demonstrators.

During the summer the MRD leaders announced that they would issue a call for a nationwide civil disobedience campaign to begin on Independence Day, August 14. Several days before the planned action, police around the country began rounding up political activists in an attempt to render the opposition movement leaderless, but as the date approached, many leaders went underground to escape the police dragnet. In an obvious attempt to blunt the effect of the civil disobedience action before it got started, Zia delivered his nationally televised Independence Day speech two days early. In his speech Zia promised an end to martial law, national elections, and a full return to a democratic system; he further promised that he would not tolerate civil disturbances. Supporters praised Zia's initiative, saying he "has set the nation on the path toward democracy," but opposition leaders rejected his speech as merely another tactic to perpetuate martial law; they then reiterated their call for mass civil disobedience.

The protest campaign began on schedule in several of the country's major cities and towns. In Karachi 20,000 demonstrators surrounded the mausoleum of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the nation's founding father,

in the largest protest action of the day, similar but smaller actions took place around the country. Despite a large turnout of police at all demonstration sites, the opposition leaders who had been in hiding joined the demonstrators. Hundreds of arrests were made, but the MRD activists vowed publicly to continue their protests against martial law. Privately, many opposition leaders voiced the fear that their campaign would fail unless they were joined by much larger crowds in order to make it a truly mass demonstration. Observers credited the arrests of leaders (as well as internal dissension) with having thrown the MRD ranks into disarray in the days leading up to August 14.

During the next week demonstrations occurred daily, leading to confrontations with the police, arrests, and violence. Karachi continued to be the main focus of the protest movement, but other Sindhi towns and cities witnessed large demonstrations, and small demonstrations continued in other locations around the country. Before the end of the week several people, including some policemen, had been killed or wounded. In an effort to curb the violence, army troops and paramilitary forces were deployed in Sind as police reinforcements. Some reports indicated that as many as 12 cities and towns were under army control by the second week of the protest. Another government measure to curb the demonstrations became apparent as a summary military court sentenced four politicians to be flogged for having participated in the action. During the next several days, other demonstrators received one-year prison sentences plus 10 lashes from military courts. Despite the level of protest activity in Sind, the campaign lagged in other parts of the country.

At the end of the second week of the action, more than 20 people had been killed and more than 1,600 (the opposition claimed 3,000) were in jail either awaiting trial or already sentenced for violations of martial law. That law states that raising a banner or placard on which an antigovernment slogan is printed, orally making an antigovernment statement, or assembling in a group of more than five for other than religious purposes is punishable by flogging or imprisonment. The rigorous enforcement of the draconian martial law regulations seemed to have an effect on demonstrators, particularly outside the province of Sind. The quickly convened summary military courts in Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and other cities rapidly disposed of cases and then publicized the harsh sentences in order to deter other potential dissidents.

After two weeks the movement appeared to be confined to Sind, and the central government seemed confident that it could easily control the minor flare-ups in other provinces. Most opposition leaders were under arrest—many in jail, others under house arrest—and the lower level leadership did not seem able to manage the campaign. Merchants around the country, who objected to disruptions of their businesses, announced support of the government despite martial law; lawyers, who had led opposition to Zia since the coup, were divided on the effectiveness of the civil disobedience campaign; and even the

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usually volatile university students did not join the movement in large numbers. By early September, although demonstrations continued, the government was fully in control, and Zia was confident enough to leave the country on a planned visit to Turkey.

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A monograph prepared for the Department of State by Stephen Philip Cohen, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, is invaluable for any reader interested in the Pakistani armed forces. The same author's contribution to *Security Policies of Developing Countries*, edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy, provides a good sketch of the Pakistani security scene. A Rand publication written by Francis Fukuyama, *The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report*, has an excellent analysis of the Pakistani-United States relationship at the beginning of the 1980s, and Fukuyama's *Pakistan since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* is also an important contribution.

The Story of the Pakistan Army by Fazal Mugeem Khan, although published in 1983, remains a standard reference work that should not be ignored. Another interesting and informative work, *Our Defense Cause*, by Lieutenant General Mohammed Attiqur Rahman, is well described by its subtitle, *An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role*. For the internal security aspects of the country under martial law since 1977, many perceptive articles have appeared in newspapers and magazines. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Metric Conversion Coefficients

Temperature and Rainfall, Selected Cities, 1979

Population by Province and Federal Areas, 1972 and 1981

Average Annual Population Growth Rates, 1901-81

Rural and Urban Population Increase, 1951-81

**Enrollment by Educational Level and Sex, Selected School Years,
1980-81 to 1982-83**

**Summary of Consolidated Government Budget Revenues, FY
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**Estimated Labor Force by Sector of Employment, FY 1972, FY
1982, and FY 1983**

Number and Area of Private Farms, 1960 and 1980

Area of Major Crops, Selected Years, FY 1961-83

Production of Major Crops, Selected Years, FY 1961-83

Large-Scale Manufacturing by Industry, FY 1976

Composition of Imports, FY 1979-82

Composition of Exports, FY 1979-82

Summary of Balance of Payments, FY 1979-83

Leadership Changes in the Central Government, 1947-83

Air Force Aircraft Inventory, 1983

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

What you have	Multiply by	To Get
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m ²)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2.204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Temperature and Rainfall, Selected Cities, 1979
(temperatures in Celsius, rainfall in millimeters)

City	Mean Maximum Temperature	Mean Minimum Temperature	Rainfall	Height Above Sea Level (in meters)
Karachi	31.8	20.6	361	22
Quetta	24.1	6.4	349	1,580
Dera Ismael Khan	31.3	16.6	313	174
Faisalabad	30.5	16.3	500	184
Lahore	30.9	17.8	525	214
Rawalpindi	29.7	14.3	959	511
Peshawar	29.8	14.8	404	359
Sargodha	31.7	16.4	606	189

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Statistics Division, *Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1979*, Karachi, 1980, 1-4

Table 3. Population by Province and Federal Areas, 1972 and 1981

Area	Population in thousands		Change in Population 1972-81 in percentage	Males per hundred females		Proportion of Total Population in 1981 in percentage	Proportion of Urban Population in 1981 in percentage
	September 1972	March 1981		1972	1981		
NWFP	8,386	10,195	29.77	108	109	12.99	15.83
FATA ¹	2,491	2,175	-12.66	103	109	2.60	—
Punjab	37,610	47,116	25.26	116	111	56.34	57.53
Sindh	14,136	18,986	33.98	115	110	22.63	43.37
Baluchistan	2,489	4,305	77.23	113	112	5.14	15.61
Islamabad Capital Territory	235	335	42.55	124	119	0.40	60.20
PAKISTAN	65,309	93,792	29.26	114	111	100.00	28.28

— figures not available

¹ North-West Frontier Province

² Federally Administered Tribal Areas; the 1981 census was the first in which a formal land census was conducted in the tribal areas

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Population Census Organization, Housing and Population Censuses, 1960-1981, Islamabad, 1981, 1

Appendix

Table 4. Average Annual Population Growth Rates, 1901-81

Year	Population (in millions)	Annual Growth Rate (in percentage)
1901	16.6	n a
1911	19.4	1.6
1921	21.1	0.9
1931	23.5	1.1
1941	28.3	1.9
1951	33.7	1.8
1961	42.9	2.4
1972	65.3	3.2
1981	83.8	2.8

n a. not available

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning, and Development, Economic Adviser's Wing, *Pakistan Basic Facts, 1961-82*, Islamabad, April 1983, 13.

**Table 5. Rural and Urban Population Increase, 1951-81
(in percentage)**

Year	Rural	Urban
1951-61	+19	+64
1961-72	+47	+71
1972-81	+23	+43

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning, and Development, Economic Adviser's Wing, *Pakistan Basic Facts, 1961-82*, Islamabad, April 1983.

Table 6. Enrollment by Educational Level and Sex, Selected School Years, 1960-61 to 1982-83
(in thousands)

School Year	Primary		Middle		Intermediate		Higher		Total	
	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female	Total	Female
1960-61	2,000	430	440	67	160	27	104	21	2,773	545
1965-66	3,160	730	680	140	244	40	192	30	4,285	987
1970-71	3,900	1,040	933	176	336	67	299	68	5,517	1,353
1975-76	5,940	1,590	1,206	204	480	116	381	78	7,352	2,006
1980-81*	6,300	1,970	1,450	340	560	130	407	116	9,007	2,556
1982-83*	7,124	2,130	1,576	374	680	144	480	122	9,742	2,770

* Estimate

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83, Islamabad, June 1983, Statistical Annex.

Appendix

Table 7. Summary of Consolidated Government Budget Revenues.
FY 1979-83¹
(in millions of rupees)²

	FY 1979 ³	FY 1980 ⁴	FY 1981 ⁵	FY 1982 ⁶	FY 1983 ⁶
Tax revenues					
Income tax	1,143	1,750	4,555	5,237	5,100
Corporation tax	2,211	3,427	2,473		3,300
Property taxes	345	327	495		533
Excise duties	7,992	10,478	12,212	13,555	16,439
Sales tax	1,906	2,410	2,883	3,250	3,747
Import duties	9,844	12,126	13,569	14,690	19,954
Export duties	279	446	707	384	612
Other	1,258	1,543	1,942	1,952	2,171
Total tax revenues	25,006	32,507	39,546	42,578	51,856
Nontax revenues	5,741	5,985	6,156	6,937	10,619
TOTAL	30,749	38,502	47,002	51,515	62,475

¹ Includes federal and provincial governments.

² For value of the rupee, see Chapter.

³ Actual revenues.

⁴ Preliminary accounting of actual revenues.

⁵ Proposed in budgets.

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83, Islamabad, June 1983, 40, Statistical Annex.

Table 8. Summary of Consolidated Government Budget Expenditures and Deficits, FY 1979-83¹
(in millions of rupees)²

Expenditures	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983
Current expenditures					
Defense	10,302	12,635	15,300	19,580	22,879
Interest on debt	3,976	4,785	5,909	6,282	9,204
Subsidies	6,030	7,024	5,178	5,057	6,297
Other	10,192	11,073	12,623	14,979	18,492
Total current expenditures	30,500	35,547	39,210	45,907	56,871
Developmental expenditures	18,494	19,082	23,321	25,133	29,833
Total expenditures	48,994	54,629	62,531	71,040	86,704
Total revenues	30,704	39,502	47,002	51,515	62,475
Income from autonomous agencies	975	1,465	2,019	1,909	2,736
Budget deficit	17,315	14,662	13,510	17,616	21,541
Deficit financed by					
External (net)	6,711	6,950	6,633	5,603	9,370
Domestic nonbank	2,102	1,407	4,522	6,497	6,505
Domestic banks	8,502	6,305	2,355	5,516	5,666

¹ Includes federal and provincial budgets.² For value of the rupee—see Chapter 1.³ Federal expenditures.⁴ Preliminary estimates of actual expenditures.⁵ Proposed in budget.

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83, Islamabad, June 1983, 37, 41, Statistical Annex.

Appendix

Table 9 Estimated Labor Force by Sector of Employment, FY 1972, FY 1982, and FY 1983
(in thousands)

Sector	FY 1972	FY 1982	FY 1983 ¹
Agriculture ²	10,783	13,643	13,987
Mining and manufacturing	2,433	3,349	3,464
Electric power, gas, and water	70	122	126
Construction	642	1,025	1,054
Trade	1,879	2,691	2,778
Transportation and communications	911	1,171	1,217
Other services	2,118	2,510	2,585
TOTAL	19,846	24,501	25,211

¹ Based on projection of trends

² Includes forestry and fishing

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83, Islamabad, June 1983, 174, Statistical Annex

Table 10 Number and Area of Private Farms, 1960 and 1980¹

Size of Farm	1960		1980	
	Number of Farms in thousands	Area in thousands of hectares	Number of Farms in thousands	Area in thousands of hectares
Under 1 hectare	1,508	690	700	370
1-2 hectares	806	1,179	694	972
2-3 hectares	591	1,436	693	1,622
3-5 hectares	759	2,979	915	3,557
5-10 hectares	729	5,040	704	4,690
10-20 hectares	296	3,874	263	3,375
20-60 hectares	68	2,647	96	2,776
60 hectares and over	14	1,982	14	1,598
TOTAL²	4,880	19,825	4,056³	18,949³

¹ Agricultural census years

² Figures may not add to total because of rounding

³ Excludes 189 government farms and 47,000 hectares

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Table 11. Area of Major Crops, Selected Years, FY 1961-63
(in thousands of hectares)

Crop	FY 1961	FY 1962	FY 1963 ¹	FY 1963 ²
Food crops				
Food grains				
Wheat	4,639	6,994	7,110	7,236
Rice	1,181	1,933	1,976	1,954
Millet	746	406	559	492
Sorghum	478	394	383	425
Corn	490	789	739	767
Barley	187	259	221	218
Total food grains	7,709	10,745	10,988	11,092
Chick-peas ³	1,106	943	961	930
Total food crops	8,815	11,598	11,859	12,012
Cash crops				
Sugarcane	398	825	947	960
Rapeseed and mustard	489	417	396	405
Cotton	1,293	2,109	2,214	2,276
Tobacco	39	43	42	n a.
Other	32	44	43	46
Total cash crops	2,251	3,437	3,632	n a.

n a. — not available

¹ Provisional

² Called gram in Pakistan

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, *Pakistan Economic Survey, 1962-63*, Islamabad, June 1963, 31-32, Statistical Annex

Appendix

Table 12 Production of Major Crops, Selected Years, FY 1961-83
(in thousands of tons)

Crop	FY 1961	FY 1961	FY 1962 ¹	FY 1963 ¹
Food crops				
Food grains				
Wheat	3,814	11,475	11,142	12,267
Rice	1,030	3,123	3,430	3,369
Millet	308	214	272	n.a.
Sorghum	221	230	225	n.a.
Corn	439	970	930	1,006
Barley	120	176	157	n.a.
Total food grains	5,930	16,188	16,156	n.a.
Chick-pea ²	610	337	296	452
Total food crops	6,540	16,525	16,442	n.a.
Cash crops				
Sugarcane	11,641	32,356	36,590	33,474
Rapeseed and mustard	214	253	239	n.a.
Cotton	301	715	749	823
Tobacco	60	67	69	n.a.
Other	7	18	17	n.a.
Total cash crops	12,223	33,412	37,652	n.a.

n.a. — not available

¹ Provisional

² Called gram in Pakistan

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83, Islamabad, June 1983, 31-32, Statistical Annex

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Table 13 Large-Scale Manufacturing by Industry, FY 1976¹

Industry	Number of Firms Reporting	Average Daily Employment	Gross Value of Production ²	Value Added ²
Food processing	363	54,230	6,829	2,430
Beverages	25	3,021	327	167
Tobacco	27	7,573	1,312	909
Textiles	850	238,490	7,541	2,670
Wearing apparel	19	995	92	32
Leather (excluding footwear)	59	13,131	538	116
Paper and paper products	29	9,464	495	190
Printing	165	6,300	299	124
Drugs and pharmaceuticals	93	19,149	842	339
Industrial chemicals	60	11,400	1,297	537
Other chemicals	123	22,449	744	211
Petroleum and coal products	4	1,971	499	405
Rubber products	54	9,999	493	137
Nonmetallic mineral products	66	27,119	944	383
Basic iron and steel	153	19,952	1,402	363
Basic nonferrous products	10	490	21	7
Metal fabrication	396	12,120	499	175
Nonelectrical machinery	291	15,196	973	319
Electrical machinery and appliances	134	16,009	909	346
Transport equipment	125	21,539	1,631	704
Other	293	11,346	3,140	409
TOTAL	3,249	506,601	30,674	10,972

¹ Information based on Census of Manufacturing Industries.

² In millions of rupees; for value of the rupee, see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning, and Development, Economic Adviser's Wing, *Pakistan Basic Facts, 1991-92*, Islamabad, April 1993, 61.

Table 14. Composition of Imports, FY 1979-82
(in millions of rupees)¹

Commodity	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982
Chemicals	815	905	2,413	2,690
Drugs and pharmaceuticals	601	751	936	1,222
Dyes and colors	311	302	492	493
Chemical fertilizers	2,808	2,711	3,537	903
Electrical goods	1,608	1,904	1,915	1,697
Machinery (non-electric)	4,251	5,300	5,694	6,945
Transport equipment	2,474	4,903	4,696	5,170
Paper and paperboard	493	608	741	922
Tea	1,000	954	1,194	1,091
Sugar, refined	3	405	473	1
Art silk yarn	1,136	1,547	1,301	1,570
Iron and steel products	2,606	2,992	2,779	3,429
Nonferrous metals	327	494	592	638
Petroleum (crude and refined)	5,247	10,695	15,190	18,046
Vegetable oils	2,953	2,295	2,625	3,450
Flour, grains, and pulses	3,507	1,050	637	806
Other	6,094	7,773	9,300	10,519
TOTAL	36,396	46,929*	53,544	59,481

¹ For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

* Figures as published.

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1982-83, Islamabad, June 1983, 162-63, Statistical Annex.

Table 15. Composition of Exports, FY 1979-82
(in millions of rupees)^a

Commodity	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982
Raw cotton	655	3,321	5,203	2,939
Cotton yarn	1,936	2,038	2,049	2,075
Cotton cloth	2,135	2,417	2,300	2,949
Rice	3,390	4,179	5,602	4,126
Fish products	402	530	559	790
Leather	1,247	1,264	902	1,152
Carpets	1,765	2,198	2,243	1,676
Petroleum products	608	1,764	1,675	2,047
Sporting goods	212	245	312	330
Raw wool	108	108	80	108
Other	4,397	5,346	6,275	6,065
TOTAL	16,985	23,410	29,280	26,270

^a For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1980-83, Islamabad, June 1983, 154-59, Statistical Annex.

Table 16. Summary of Balance of Payments, FY 1979-83
(in millions of United States dollars)

	FY 1979	FY 1980	FY 1981	FY 1982	FY 1983
Current account					
Exports (f.o.b.) ¹	1,644	2,341	2,798	2,319	2,008
Imports (f.o.b.)	-3,816	-4,854	-5,563	-5,691	-6,005
Trade balance	-2,172	-2,513	-2,765	-3,373	-3,997
Workers' remittances	1,305	1,748	2,097	2,225	2,559
Interest payments	-261	-297	-357	-453	-594
Other services (net)	-72	-88	34	71	26
Current account balance	-1,110	-1,140	-991	-1,530	-1,345
Capital account					
Official long-term	686	1,054	956	1,102	1,410
Official long-term repayments	-235	-305	-516	-492	-445
Other long-term (net)	-16	68	141	120	125
IMF credits (net) ²	34	117	315	359	599
Capital account balance	659	954	996	1,089	1,689
Errors and omissions (net)	23	-8	0	-18	-65
Official short-term capital and changes in reserves	456	194	95	460	-579

¹ Quarterly estimate before year end² f.o.b.—single on hand³ IMF—International Monetary Fund⁴ Net of the balance of reserves

Table 17. Leadership Changes in the Central Government, 1947-83

Date	President	Prime Minister	(Chief Minister)
August 1947-September 1948	Mohammad Ali Jinnah	Liaquat Ali Khan	Muslim League
September 1948-October 1951	Khwaja Nazimuddin	-do-	-do-
October 1951-April 1953	Ghulam Mohammad	Khwaja Nazimuddin	-do-
April 1953-October 1954	-do-	Mohammad Ali Bogra	-do-
October 1954-August 1955	-do-	-do-	Nonpartisan
August 1955-September 1956	Ismatullah Mirza	Chaudhry Mohammad Ali	United Front, Muslim League
September 1956-October 1957	-do-	H S Suhrawardy	Azadi League, Republican Party
October 1957-December 1957	-do-	Ismatullah Chaudhry	Muslim League, Republican Party
December 1957-October 1958	-do-	Feroz Khan Noon	Krishak Samiti Party, Nazam-i-Islam
October 1958-June 1959	Mohammad Ayub Khan	-do-	Republican Party, Krishak Samiti Party
June 1959-March 1960	-do-	-do-	Martial law rule, nonpartisan
March 1960-December 1971	Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan	-do-	Constitutional Muslim League
December 1971-August 1973	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	-do-	Martial law rule, nonpartisan
August 1973-July 1977	Chaudhry Fazl Elahi	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	Martial law rule, Pakistan People's Party
July 1977-September 1978	-do-	Mohammad Zia ul Haq	Martial law rule
September 1978	Mohammad Zia ul Haq	Vacant	-do-

¹ Elected as president general from 1967 to 1969.

² Position of prime minister abolished in 1958 and reestablished in 1973.

³ Chief minister for administrative purposes.

⁴ Also held posts of chief minister for administrative and chief of the army staff positions of prime minister before 1960.

Table 18 Air Force Aircraft Inventory, 1983

Type	Designation	Quantity	Manufacturer	Country of Origin
Fighter	B-57B	11	Martin	United States
	F-16	62	General Dynamics	do
	Mirage IIIE	19	Dassault-Breguet	France
	Mirage IIIR	13	do	do
	Mirage SPA	60	do	do
	Nanchang A-5	42	State Factories	China
	Shenyang F-6	144	do	do
	C-130B	14	Lockheed	United States
	C-130E	5	do	do
	L-100	1	do	do
Transport	Super King Air	1	Beech	do
	Boeing	1	do	do
	Falcon 20	1	Dassault-Breguet	France
	F-27, MA 200	1	Fokker	Netherlands
Utility	Acro Commander	1	Rockwell	United States
	PTB-337	24	Reims	France
	L-23	1	Beech	United States
	Ad Astra	3	Dassault-Breguet	France
	MAC-151/71	4	McG	Soviet Union
	Mirage IIIDP	3	Dassault-Breguet	France
	Mirage SDP	2	do	do
	Shenyang FT-5	15	State Factories	China
	Shenyang FT-6	10	do	do
	Supporter	100	Saab	Sweden
Trainer	T-33A	26	Lockheed	United States
	T-37C	40	Cessna	do

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Glossary

DIG—Generally used abbreviation for the rank of deputy inspector general in the police and the Frontier Corps.

fiscal year (FY)—Begins July 1, ends June 30. FY 1983 began July 1, 1982, and ended June 30, 1983.

GDP (gross domestic product)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and investment are included because the values of primary and intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word *gross* indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. *See also* GNP.

GNP (gross national product)—GDP (*q.v.*) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. For Pakistan the GNP in the 1970s was significantly larger than the GDP. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

Hadood—Arabic technical term (*hadud*, sing., *hadd*) for punishments prescribed for certain acts that are viewed as crimes against Islam.

IG—Generally used abbreviation for the rank of inspector general in the police and the Frontier Corps.

imam—A word used in several senses. In general use and lowercased, it means the leader of congregational prayers, as such it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient education to carry out this function. It is also used figuratively by many Sunni (*q.v.*) Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shiites (*q.v.*) the word takes on many complex and controversial meanings; in general, however, it indicates that particular descendant of the House of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity have been the major issues causing divisions among Shiites.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

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jihad—The struggle to establish the law of God on earth, often interpreted to mean holy war.

JUI—Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam. In late 1983 a defunct political party.

JUP—Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan. In late 1983 a defunct political party.

khan—Sometimes the title of a local ruler or prince, as the khan of Kalat. Among the Pakhtuns (*q.c.*), most men of good family claim the title.

miana—The title *mian* is used by men of families that claim descent from a holy ancestor. (The *n* indicates nasalization of the *a*.)

MRD—Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, a loose and shifting coalition of political parties seeking the termination of martial law.

NAP—National Awami Party. In late 1983 a defunct political party.

NDP—National Democratic Party, successor to the banned NAP.

Pakhtuns—Term used here for speakers of Pakhtu or Pashtu, who are frequently called Pathans. The tribes north of Peshawar are mostly Pakhtu speaking, those south of Peshawar mostly Pashtu speaking (see fig. 7).

Pashtuns—Variant of Pakhtuns (*q.c.*).

Pathans—Pakhtuns (*q.c.*).

PDP—Pakistan Democratic Party. In late 1983 a defunct political party.

PPP—Pakistan People's Party. In late 1983 a defunct political party.

rupee (R or Re; pl., Rs)—The national currency, consisting of 100 paisa.

From 1955 to 1972 the official value of the rupee was Rs4.76 per US\$1; it was supported by a rigorous foreign exchange control mechanism. In 1959 the Export Bonus Voucher Scheme was instituted, whereby a government-controlled bonus was added to the rupee face value of certain exports, thus implicitly introducing a multiple-exchange-rate system. In 1970 a fluctuating special tourist rate was established. By May 1972 there were seven different exchange rates in operation ranging from Rs4.76 to Rs14.28 per US\$1, depending on the proportion of bonus vouchers added to the price of the exports involved. In the meantime, the rupee had become grossly overvalued, in large part as a result of the bonus voucher system. From 1947 to 1972 Pakistan was a member of the sterling area, but in 1971, when the United States dollar was devalued, the rupee was unpegged from sterling and pegged to the dollar at the rate of Rs4.76 per US\$1. On May 12, 1972, as part of the reforms introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the rupee was devalued from Rs4.76 to Rs11 per US\$1, and the bonus voucher system was dismantled. In February 1973, when the dollar was again devalued, the rupee maintained its value in terms of gold, and its value in relation to the dollar rose to Rs9.90 per US\$1, where it remained until January 1982. After January 1982 the rupee was pegged to a market basket of currencies important to Pakistan's trade, the value of these currencies diminished in terms of the dollar. The average value of the rupee against the dollar

was Rs11.86 per US\$1 in early 1982, Rs10.55 in FY 1982, and Rs12.72 in FY 1983.

sharia—Islamic law. In Pakistan often spelled shariat or shariah.

Shariat courts—Courts that hear cases and render decisions based on Islamic law.

Shiah—See Shiite.

Shiite (or Shiah, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali)—A member of the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shiites supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue they divided from the Sunni (q.v.) in the major schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among the Shiites over the identity and number of imams (q.v.). Shiites revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be in hiding.

Shiite Islam—See Shiite.

Sufi—Term derived from Arabic *tasawwuf*, denoting the "practice of wearing the woolen robe" and adherence to a mystical and emotional search for union with God.

Sufism—See Sufi.

Sunni (from sunna, orthodox)—A member of the larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the traditional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line. On this issue they divided from the Shiites (q.v.) in the first great schism within Islam.

Sunni Islam—See Sunni. Sometimes given as Sunnite Islam.

syed—Usual spelling in Pakistan of the Arabic *sayyid*, theoretically connoting direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

ulama (English pl., *ulamas*; Arabic sing., *alim*)—Man trained in Islamic theology. In Pakistan, usually spelled *ulema*.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q.v.).

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
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